Could Israel and Turkey go to war?
by Soner Cagaptay
The Arab Spring and recent dramatic deterioration of Turkish-Israeli ties
present Israel with a uniquely threatening security environment. Since 1949,
Israel has always had the comfort of having Turkey, one of the two major
Levantine powers, as its friend. This is no longer the case. In fact, conflict
seems to be looming between Turkey and Israel.
In the aftermath
of the 2010 Flotilla Incident, Ankara attempted to intimidate Israel by saying
its warships would escort missions to Gaza. Now Turkey and Israel are at
dangerously opposing ends of Levantine politics. Not only is Ankara no longer a
trusted friend of Israel, but it has also begun to emerge as the key regional
actor opposing Israel.
When Turkey became
the first Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel in 1949, Israel took
comfort in the fact that it had the backing of one of the Middle East's most
influential players. The strength of the Turkish military allowed it to become
and remain a friend of Israel despite Islamist opposition to it.
Following the Camp
David Treaty in 1978, Israel established a cold peace with Egypt, bringing the
second major Levantine power closer to its side. Whereas in the 1960s Nasser's
Egypt represented the center of opposition to Israel in the region, Cairo
ceased to pose a threat to Israel in the wake of Camp David. This security
environment is all but gone.
For starters,
Turkey has become like the old Egypt under Nasser - positioning itself as the
regional center of opposition to Israel. Meanwhile, Egypt is becoming like the
old Turkey. The outcome of the forthcoming Egyptian elections is far from
certain. Yet it is very likely that the Muslim Brotherhood will emerge as a
power to be reckoned with in the Egyptian polls this fall. Even if the Egyptian
military stands for maintaining ties with Israel, the Muslim Brotherhood will
push for limiting those ties. Accordingly, Egyptian-Israeli ties will continue
to become more cold and tenuous with each passing day.
For the first
time, the two major states of the Eastern Mediterranean are aligning against
Israel. This is the most important shift in Levantine politics since Camp David
or even since 1949 when Turkey recognized Israel. This new balance is a serious
threat for Israel, which must now consider an increasingly hostile Turkey and
an ever colder and unfriendly Egypt when it evaluates its security environment.
Yet, the new
balance carries risks for Turkey, too. Ankara's September 8th announcement that
its warships will escort new flotillas to Gaza bears the potential of armed
conflict between Turkey and Israel. What if the Israelis decide to stop the
next Turkish navy-escorted flotilla as they stopped the Turkish-backed flotilla
in 2010? Will the Turkish navy ships choose to react? As chilling as this
scenario sounds, it is not unlikely. If the two countries fail to slow the escalating
situation, they could well find themselves in conflict.
The specter of
conflict also hangs over gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey
objects to Israel's desire to drill in its exclusive economic zone in the
Mediterranean Sea largely because it hopes to block the Greek Cypriots from
having the precedent of an exclusive economic zone in which they could drill
for gas to the detriment of the Turkish Cypriots. The latest escalation between
Turkey and Israel might just pour oil on the political flames of gas
exploration in the Mediterranean Sea.
Perhaps Ankara is
only bluffing to bring Israel to its knees, and perhaps the Israelis would
rather let Turkish navy-escorted flotillas sail to Gaza than risk regional war.
But one thing is clear: The Arab Spring and the Turkish-Israeli Winter are
churning up the Mediterranean.
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