Occupy Europe
By Nicole Gelinas
As with everything related to the
ongoing global financial crisis, the situation is incredibly complicated. Last
week, Europe pretended once again to have fixed its debt problem. Under the
latest plan, lenders to Greece, including big French banks, are supposed to
take a “voluntary” loss of half the face value of their Greek bonds. French
president Nicolas Sarkozy and German chancellor Angela Merkel have insisted on
this “voluntary” canard because an “involuntary” loss would be, well, a
default. Official Europe wants to avoid a default, which would mean big payouts
for speculators who bought “credit-default swaps”—yes, those things again—in
anticipation of such a disaster. Europe wants to punish the speculators, whom
the politicians blame for precipitating the sovereign debt crisis in the first
place.
But this political and financial
alchemy is itself a gamble. It’s not only speculators who bought the financial
instruments that were supposed to pay off in the event of default. Investors
who hold Greek bonds purchased them, too, to protect their bond investments (as
bond prices go down, swap prices should go up). These investors have also
bought credit-default swaps as a hedge against Italian, Portuguese, and Irish
debt—and now they’re wondering if such “insurance” is worthless. “If you owned
a sovereign bond and you got scared because you bought [credit-default swaps]
thinking [they] would pay out, you’ll realize you would have been better off
just selling your bond—and you’ll just get rid of everything,” AllianceBernstein’s
co-head of credit, Ashish Shah, told the Wall Street Journal.
Since nobody sells a financial
instrument that hedges against the risk of political default, investors don’t
know quite what to do. It’s unlikely that they’ll start putting money into the
bonds of the other struggling countries. These countries need new money,
though, to refinance their existing debt. Indeed, last Friday, after the latest
deal for Greece was announced, Italy had to pay even higher interest rates on
its own new borrowing; it can’t keep that up for long. Unless Europe inflates
its way out of this crisis, prevailing upon its central bank to print money to
buy up all the stranded bonds, more Greek-style restructurings on other
European sovereign debt are inevitable. And we haven’t heard the last from
Greece: Monday, prime minister George Papandreou said that he wants to give
Greek voters a direct say—via referendum—in the budget cutbacks they must bear
as a condition of European aid.
The prospect of bigger losses for
investors in sovereign debt terrifies France. Sarkozy knows that French banks
can muddle through the Greek mess. But to bear losses on other countries’ debt,
France would need to raise capital. If the private sector won’t provide this
new money, the French state would have to do so—or risk losses for the
bondholders of these banks. It gets worse: France doesn’t have unlimited funds
to bail out “private” financial institutions, at least not without cutting back
severely elsewhere and experiencing low growth for years. France may have to
decide whether it wants to be Ireland—protecting lenders to its banks at the
expense of its economy—or Iceland, letting bank creditors suffer losses to
protect the nation’s long-term future. To avoid having to make this choice, France
is looking east. Sarkozy hopes that China will invest some of its trillions in
a new fund, which Europe would manage, to prop up the bonds of indebted
eurozone countries.
But China’s participation is another
self-set trap for Europe. China has no willingness to throw good money after
bad. “Beijing must be given strong guarantees on the safety of its investment,”
the Financial Times noted, citing two Chinese sources. Europe can’t offer
explicit guarantees against loss without getting each country’s permission
again—permission that the Germans, Finnish, Slovenians, and other Europeans are
tired of granting.
If the past two years are any guide,
Europe will try to get around this problem with wink-and-nod provisions. But
either something is guaranteed, or it’s not. Otherwise, Europe would have to
call the new fund the “Schrödinger’s Cat” fund (after the quantum mechanics
example that calls on an observer to assume that a cat is both alive and dead
at the same time). If Merkel were that brilliant a physicist, she wouldn’t have
gone into politics.
The bigger problem is existential.
As Sarkozy’s Socialist opponent in next year’s election, Francois Hollande,
asks: “Are we supposed to imagine that if China comes to the aid of the euro
zone, it will do so without expecting anything in return?” China likely would
want Europe to stop criticizing it for undervaluing its currency—a government
intervention that makes Chinese investments more attractive globally—or for
“competing” through unfair trade practices. Giving China more room to compete
unfairly costs European jobs. Sarkozy disavows concern. “Our independence would
not be put into question” by a Chinese rescue, he told a French interviewer.
European leaders have said many
things over the last few years of crisis. Here’s what they don’t say: bad
lending and borrowing carries a hefty price, for borrowers and lenders alike.
Someone, somewhere, has to pay that price. It is better for the financial
system—“involuntarily”—to take the hit than to force these losses onto the
West’s supposedly priceless political and market freedoms.
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