By Murray N. Rothbard
The Austrian theory of money
virtually begins and ends with Ludwig von Mises's monumental Theory of Money and
Credit, published in
1912 (1). Mises's fundamental accomplishment was to take the theory of
marginal utility, built up by Austrian economists and other marginalists as the
explanation for consumer demand and market price, and apply it to the demand
for and the value, or the price, of money. No longer did the theory of money
need to be separated from the general economic theory of individual action and
utility, of supply, demand, and price; no longer did monetary theory have to
suffer isolation in a context of "velocities of circulation,"
"price levels," and "equations of exchange."
In applying the analysis of
supply and demand to money, Mises used the Wicksteedian concept: supply is the
total stock of a commodity at any given time; and demand is the total market
demand to gain and hold cash balances, built up out of the marginal-utility
rankings of units of money on the value scales of individuals on the market.
The Wicksteedian concept is particularly appropriate to money for several
reasons: first, because the supply of money is either extremely durable in
relation to current production, as under the gold standard, or is determined
exogenously to the market by government authority; and, second and most
important, because money, uniquely among commodities desired and demanded on
the market, is acquired not to be consumed, but to be held for later exchange.
Demand-to-hold thereby becomes the appropriate concept for analyzing the
uniquely broad monetary function of being held as stock for later sale. Mises
was also able to explain the demand for cash balances as the resultant of
marginal utilities on value scales that are strictly ordinal for each
individual. In the course of his analysis Mises built on the insight of his
fellow Austrian Franz Cuhel to develop a marginal utility that was strictly
ordinal, lexicographic, and purged of all traces of the error of assuming the
measurability of utilities.
The relative utilities of
money units as against other goods determine each person's demand for cash
balances, that is, how much of his income or wealth he will keep in cash
balances as against how much he will spend. Applying the law of diminishing
(ordinal) marginal utility of money and bearing in mind that money's
"use" is to be held for future exchange, Mises arrived implicitly at
a falling demand curve for money in relation to the purchasing power of the
currency unit. The purchasing power of the money unit, which Mises also termed
the "objective exchange-value" of money, was then determined, as in
the usual supply-and-demand analysis, by the intersection of the money stock
and the demand for cash balance schedule. We can see this visually by putting
the purchasing power of the money unit on the y-axis and the quantity of money
on the x-axis of the conventional two-dimensional diagram corresponding to the
price of any good and its quantity. Mises wrapped up the analysis by pointing
out that the total supply of money at any given time is no more or less than
the sum of the individual cash balances at that time. No money in a society
remains unowned by someone and is therefore outside some individual's cash
balances.
While, for purposes of
convenience, Mises's analysis may be expressed in the usual supply-and-demand
diagram with the purchasing power of the money unit serving as the price of
money, relying solely on such a simplified diagram falsifies the theory. For, as
Mises pointed out in a brilliant analysis whose lessons have still not been
absorbed in the mainstream of economic theory, the purchasing power of the
money unit is not simply the inverse of the so-called price level of goods and
services. In describing the advantages of money as a general medium of exchange
and how such a general medium arose on the market, Mises pointed out that the
currency unit serves as unit of account and as a common denominator of all
other prices, but that the money commodity itself is still in a state of barter
with all other goods and services. Thus, in the premoney state of barter, there
is no unitary "price of eggs"; a unit of eggs (say, one dozen) will
have many different "prices": the "butter" price in terms
of pounds of butter, the "hat" price in terms of hats, the
"horse" price in terms of horses, and so on. Every good and service
will have an almost infinite array of prices in terms of every other good and
service. After one commodity, say gold, is chosen to be the medium for all
exchanges, every other good except gold will enjoy a unitary price, so that we
know that the price of eggs is one dollar a dozen; the price of a hat is ten
dollars, and so on. But while every good and service except gold now has a
single price in terms of money, money itself has a virtually infinite array of
individual prices in terms of every other good and service. To put it another
way, the price of any good is the same thing as its purchasing power in terms
of other goods and services. Under barter, if the price of a dozen eggs is two
pounds of butter, the purchasing power of a dozen eggs is, inter alia,
two pounds of butter. The purchasing power of a dozen eggs will also be
one-tenth of a hat, and so on. Conversely, the purchasing power of butter is
its price in terms of eggs; in this case the purchasing power of a pound of
butter is a half-dozen eggs. After the arrival of money, the purchasing power
of a dozen eggs is the same as its money price, in our example, one dollar. The
purchasing power of a pound of butter will be 50 cents, of a hat ten dollars,
and so forth.
What, then, is the purchasing
power, or the price, of a dollar? It will be a vast array of all the goods and
services that can be purchased for a dollar, that is, of all the goods and
services in the economy. In our example, we would say that the purchasing power
of a dollar equals one dozen eggs, or two pounds of butter, or one-tenth of a
hat, and so on, for the entire economy. In short, the price, or purchasing
power, of the money unit will be an array of the quantities of alternative
goods and services that can be purchased for a dollar. Since the array is
heterogeneous and specific, it cannot be summed up in some unitary price-level
figure.
The fallacy of the price-level
concept is further shown by Mises's analysis of precisely how prices rise (that
is, the purchasing power of money falls) in response to an increase in the
quantity of money (assuming, of course, that the individual demand schedules
for cash balances or, more generally, individual value scales remain constant).
In contrast to the hermetic neoclassical separation of money and price levels
from the relative prices of individual goods and services, Mises showed that an
increased supply of money impinges differently upon different spheres of the
market and thereby ineluctably changes relative prices.
Suppose, for example, that the supply of money increases by 20 percent. The result will not be, as neoclassical economics assumes, simply an across-the-board increase of 20 percent in all prices. Let us assume the most favorable case — what we might call the Angel Gabriel model — that the Angel Gabriel descends and overnight increases everyone's cash balance by precisely 20 percent. Now all prices will not simply rise by 20 percent; for each individual has a different value scale, a different ordinal ranking of utilities, including the relative marginal utilities of dollars and of all the other goods on his value scale. As each person's stock of dollars increases, his purchases of goods and services will change in accordance with their new position on his value scale in relation to dollars. The structure of demand will therefore change, as will relative prices and relative incomes in production. The composition of the array constituting the purchasing power of the dollar will change.
If relative demands and prices
change in the Angel Gabriel model, they will change much more in the course of
real-world increases in the supply of money. For, as Mises showed, in the real
world an inflation of money is alluring to the inflators precisely because the
injection of new money does not follow the Angel Gabriel model. Instead, the
government or the banks create new money to be spent on specific goods and
services. The demand for these goods thereby rises, raising these specific
prices. Gradually, the new money ripples through the economy, raising demand
and prices as it goes. Income and wealth are redistributed to those who receive
the new money early in the process, at the expense of those who receive the new
money late in the day and of those on fixed incomes who receive no new money at
all. Two types of shifts in relative prices occur as the result of this
increase in money: (1) the redistribution from late receivers to early
receivers that occurs during the inflation process and; (2) the permanent
shifts in wealth and income that continue even after the effects of the
increase in the money supply have worked themselves out. For the new
equilibrium will reflect a changed pattern of wealth, income, and demand
resulting from the changes during the intervening inflationary process. For
example, the fixed income groups permanently lose in relative wealth and income(2).
If the concept of a unitary
price level is a fallacious one, still more fallacious is any attempt to
measure changes in that level. To use our previous example, suppose that at one
point in time the dollar can buy one dozen eggs, or one-tenth of a hat, or two pounds
of butter. If, for the sake of simplicity, we restrict the available goods and
services to just these three, we are describing the purchasing power of the
dollar at that time. But suppose that at the next point in time, perhaps
because of an increase in the supply of dollars, prices rise, so that butter
costs one dollar a pound, a hat twelve dollars, and eggs three dollars a dozen.
Prices rise but not uniformly, and all that we can now say quantitatively about
the purchasing power of the dollar is that it is four eggs, or one-twelfth of a
hat, or one pound of butter. It is impermissible to try to group the changes in
the purchasing power of the dollar into a single average index number. Any such
index conjures up some sort of totality of goods whose relative prices remain
unchanged, so that a general averaging can arrive at a measure of changes in
the purchasing power of money itself. But we have seen that relative prices
cannot remain unchanged, much less the valuations that individuals place upon
these goods and services(3).
Just as the price of any good
tends to be uniform, so the price, or purchasing power of money, as Mises
demonstrated, will tend to be uniform throughout its trading area. The
purchasing power of the dollar will tend to be uniform throughout the United
States. Similarly, in the era of the gold standard, the purchasing power of a
unit of gold tended to be uniform throughout those areas where gold was in use.
Critics who point to persistent tendencies for differences in the price of
money between one location and another fail to understand the Austrian concept
of what a good or a service actually is. A good is not defined by its
technological properties but by its homogeneity in relation to the demands and
wishes of the consumers. It is easy to explain, for example, why the price of
wheat in Kansas will not be the same as the price of wheat in New York. From
the point of view of the consumer in New York, the wheat, while technologically
identical in the two places, is in reality two different commodities: one being
"wheat in Kansas" and the other "wheat in New York." Wheat
in New York, being closer to his use, is a more valuable commodity than wheat
in Kansas and will have a higher price on the market. Similarly, the fact that
a technologically similar apartment will not have the same rental price in New
York City as in rural Ohio does not mean that the price of the same apartment
commodity differs persistently; for the apartment in New York enjoys a more
valuable and more desirable location and hence will be more highly priced on
the market. The "apartment in New York" is a different and more
valuable good than the "apartment in rural Ohio," since the
respective locations are part and parcel of the good itself. At all times, a
homogeneous good must be defined in terms of its usefulness to the consumer
rather than by its technological properties.
To extend the analysis, the
fact that the cost of living may be persistently higher in New York than in
rural Ohio does not negate the tendency for a uniform purchasing power of the
dollar throughout the country. For the two locations constitute a different set
of goods and services, New York providing a vastly wider range of goods and
services to the consumer. The higher costs of living in New York are the
reflection of the greater locational advantages, of the more abundant range of
goods and services available(4).
In his valuable history of the
theory of international prices, C.Y. Wu emphasized the Mises contribution and
pointed out that Mises's explanation was in the tradition of Ricardo and Nassau
Senior, who was the first economist to
give a clear explanation of the meaning of the classical doctrine that the
value of money was everywhere the same and to demonstrate that differences in
the prices of goods of similar composition in different places were perfectly
reconcilable with the assumption of an equality of the value of money(5).
Pointing out that Mises
arrived at this concept independently of Senior, Wu then developed Mises's
application to the alleged locational differences in the cost of living. As Wu
stated,
To him [Mises] those who
believe in national differences in the value of money have left out of account
the positional factor in the nature of economic goods; otherwise they should
have understood that the alleged differences are explicable by differences in
the quality of the commodities offered and demanded.
Wu concluded with a quote from
Mises's Theory of Money and Credit:
The exchange-ratio between commodities and money is everywhere the same. But men and their wants are not everywhere the same, and neither are commodities(6).
If the tendency of the
purchasing power of money is to be everywhere the same, what happens if one or
more moneys coexist in the world? By way of explanation, Mises developed the
Ricardian analysis into what was to be called the purchasing-power-parity
theory of exchange rates, namely, that the market exchange rate between two
independent moneys will tend to equal the ratio of their purchasing powers.
Mises showed that this analysis applies both to the exchange rate between gold
and silver — whether or not the two circulate side by side within the same
country — and to independent fiat currencies issued by two nations. Wu
explained the difference between Mises's theory and the unfortunately
better-known version of the purchasing-power-parity theory set forth a bit
later by Gustav Cassel. The Cassel version ignores the Austrian emphasis on
locational differences in accounting for differences in value of technologically
similar goods, and this in turn complements the broader Austrian and classical
position that the purchasing power of money is an array of specific goods. This
contrasts with Cassel and the neoclassicists, who think of the purchasing power
of money as the inverse of a unitary price level. Thus Wu stated:
The purchasing power parity
theory is that the rate of exchange would be in equilibrium when the
"purchasing power of the moneys" is equal in all trading countries.
If the term purchasing power refers to the power of purchasing
commodities, which are not only similar in technological composition, but also
in the same geographical situation, the theory becomes the classical doctrine
of comparative value of moneys in different countries and is a sound doctrine.
But unfortunately the term purchasing power in connection with the theory
sometimes implies the reciprocal of the general price level in a country. While
so interpreted the theory becomes that the equilibrium point of the foreign
exchanges is to be found at the quotient between the price levels of the
different countries. That is … an erroneous version of the purchasing power
parity theory(7).
Unfortunately, Cassel, instead
of correcting the error in his concept of purchasing power, soon abandoned the
full-parity doctrine in favor of a different and highly attenuated contention
that only changes in exchange rates reflect changes in respective purchasing
power — perhaps because of his desire to use measurement and index numbers in
applying the theory(8).
When he set out to apply the
theory of marginal utility to the price of money, Mises confronted the problem
that was later to be called "the Austrian circle." In short, when
someone ranks eggs or beef or shoes on his value scale, he values these goods
for their direct use in consumption. Such valuations are, of course,
independent of and prior to pricing on the market. But people demand money to
hold in their cash balances, not for eventual direct use in consumption, but
precisely in order to exchange those balances for other goods that will be used
directly. Thus, money is not useful in itself but because it has a prior
exchange value, because it has been and therefore presumably will be
exchangeable in terms of other goods. In short, money is demanded because it
has a preexisting purchasing power; its demand not only is not independent of
its existing price on the market but is precisely due to its already having a
price in terms of other goods and services. But if the demand for, and hence
the utility of, money depends on its preexisting price or purchasing power, how
then can that price be explained by the demand? It seems that any Austrian
attempt to apply marginal-utility theory to money is inextricably caught in a
circular trap. For that reason mainstream economics has not been able to apply
marginal-utility theory to the value of money and has therefore gone off in
multicausal (or non causal) Walrasian directions.
Mises, however, succeeded in
solving this problem in 1912 in developing his so-called regression theorem.
Briefly, Mises held that the demand for money, or cash balances, at the present
time — say day X — rests on the fact that money on the previous day, day X –1,
had a purchasing power. The purchasing power of money on day X is determined by
the interaction on day X of the supply of money on that day and that day's
demand for cash balances, which in turn is determined by the marginal utility
of money for individuals on day X. But this marginal utility, and hence this
demand, has an inevitable historical component: the fact that money has prior
purchasing power on day X –1, and that therefore individuals know that this
commodity has a monetary function and will be exchangeable on future days for
other goods and services. But what then determined the purchasing power of
money on day X –1? Again, that purchasing power was determined by the supply
of, and demand for, money on day X –1, and that in turn depended on the fact
that the money had purchasing power on day X –2. But are we not caught in an infinite
regression, with no escape from the circular trap and no ultimate explanation?
No. What we must do is to push the temporal regression to that point when the
money commodity was not used as a medium of indirect exchange but was demanded
purely for its own direct consumption use. Let us go back logically to the
second day that a commodity, say gold, was used as a medium of exchange. On
that day, gold was demanded partly because it has a preexisting purchasing
power as a money, or rather as a medium of exchange, on the first day. But what
of that first day? On that day, the demand for gold again depended on the fact
that gold had a previous purchasing power, and so we push the analysis back to
the last day of barter. The demand for gold on the last day of barter was
purely a consumption use and had no historical component referring to any
previous day; for under barter, every commodity was demanded purely for its
current consumption use, and gold was no different. On the first day of its use
as a medium of exchange, gold began to have two components in its demand, or
utility: first, a consumption use as had existed in barter and, second, a
monetary use, or use as a medium of exchange, which had a historical component
in its utility. In short, the demand for money can be pushed back to the last
day of barter, at which point the temporal element in the demand for the money
commodity disappears, and the causal forces in the current demand and
purchasing power of money are fully and completely explained.
Not only does the Mises
regression theorem fully explain the current demand for money and integrate the
theory of money with the theory of marginal utility, but it also shows that
money must have originated in this fashion — on the market — with individuals
on the market gradually beginning to use some previously valuable commodity as
a medium of exchange. No money could have originated either by a social compact
to consider some previously valueless thing as a "money" or by sudden
governmental fiat. For in those cases, the money commodity could not have a
previous purchasing power, which could be taken into account in the
individual's demands for money. In this way, Mises demonstrated that Carl
Menger's historical insight into the way in which money arose on the market was
not simply a historical summary but a theoretical necessity. On the other hand,
while money had to originate as a directly useful commodity, for example, gold,
there is no reason, in the light of the regression theorem, why such direct
uses must continue afterward for the commodity to be used as money. Once
established as a money, gold or gold substitutes can lose or be deprived of
their direct use function and still continue as money; for the historical
reference to a previous day's purchasing power will already have been
established(9).
In his comprehensive 1949
treatise, Human Action, Mises successfully refuted earlier
criticisms of the regression theorem by Anderson and Ellis(10). Subsequently
criticisms were leveled at the theory by J.C. Gilbert and Don Patinkin. Gilbert
asserted that the theory fails to explain how a new paper money can be
introduced when the previous monetary system breaks down. Presumably he was
referring to such examples as the German Rentenmark after the
runaway inflation of 1923. But the point is that the new paper was not
introduced de novo; gold and foreign currencies had existed
previously, and the Rentenmark could and did undergo exchange
in terms of these previously existing moneys; furthermore, it was introduced at
a fixed relation to the previous, extremely depreciated mark(11).
Patinkin criticized Mises for
allegedly claiming that the marginal utility of money refers to the marginal
utility of the goods for which money is exchanged rather than the marginal
utility of holding money itself; he also charged Mises with inconsistently
holding the latter view in the other parts of The Theory of Money and
Credit. But Patinkin was mistaken; Mises's concept of the marginal utility
of money always refers to the utility of holding money. Mises's point in the
regression theorem is a different one, namely, that the marginal
utility-to-hold is itself based on the prior fact that money can be exchanged
for goods, that is, on the prior purchasing power of money in terms of goods.
In short, money prices of goods, the purchasing power of money, has first to
exist in order for money to have a marginal utility to hold, hence the need for
the regression theorem to break out of the circularity(12).
Modern orthodox economics has
abandoned the quest for causal explanation in behalf of a Walrasian world of
"mutual determination" suitable for the current fashion of
mathematical economics. Patinkin himself feebly accepted the circular trap by
stating that in analyzing the market ("market experiment") he began
with utility while in analyzing utility he began with prices ("individual
experiment"). With characteristic arrogance, Samuelson and Stigler each
attacked the Austrian concern with escaping circularity in order to analyze
causal relations. Samuelson fell back on Walras, who developed the idea of
"general equilibrium in which all magnitudes are simultaneously determined
by efficacious interdependent relations," which he contrasted to the
"fears of literary writers" (that is, economists who write in
English) about circular reasoning (13).
Stigler dismissed Böhm-Bawerk
for his failure to understand some of the most essential elements of modern economic
theory, the concepts of mutual determination and equilibrium (developed by the
use of the theory of simultaneous equations). Mutual determination … is spurned
for the older concept of cause and effect.
Stigler added the snide note
that "Böhm-Bawerk was not trained in mathematics."(14)
Thus, orthodox economists
reflect the unfortunate influence of the mathematical method in economics. The
idea of mutual functional determination — so adaptable in mathematical
presentation — is appropriate in physics, which tries to explain the
unmotivated motions of physical matter. But in praxeology, the study of human
action, of which economics is the best elaborated part, the cause is known: individual
purpose. In economics, therefore, the proper method is to proceed from the
causing action to its consequent effects.
In Human Action,
Mises advanced the Austrian theory of money by delivering a shattering blow to
the very concept of Walrasian general equilibrium. To arrive at that
equilibrium, the basic data of the economy — values, technology, and resources
— must all be frozen and understood by every participant in the market to be
frozen indefinitely. Given such a magical freeze, the economy would sooner or
later settle into an endless round of constant prices and productions, with
each firm earning a uniform rate of interest (or, in some construction, a zero
rate of interest). The idea of certainty and fixity in what Mises called
"the evenly rotating economy" is absurd, but what Mises went on to
show is that in such a world of fixity and certainty no one would hold cash
balances. For since everyone would have perfect foresight and knowledge of his
future sales and purchases, there would be no point in holding any cash balance
at all. Thus, the man who knew he would be spending $5,000 on 1 January 1977
would lend out all his money to be returned at precisely that date. As Mises
stated:
Every individual knows precisely what amount of money he will need at any future date. He is therefore in a position to lend all the funds he receives in such a way that the loans fall due on the date he will need them.… When the equilibrium of the evenly rotating economy is finally reached, there are no more cash holdings (15).
But if no one holds cash and
the demand for cash balances falls to zero, all prices rise to infinity, and
the entire general equilibrium system of the market, which implies the
continuing existence of monetary exchange, falls apart. As Mises concluded:
In the imaginary construction
of an evenly rotating economy, indirect exchange and the use of money are
tacitly implied.… Where there is no uncertainty concerning the future, there is
no need for any cash holding. As money must necessarily be kept by people in
their cash holdings, there cannot be any money.… But the very notion of a
market economy without money is self-contradictory (16).
The very notion of a Walrasian
general equilibrium is not simply totally unrealistic; it is conceptually
impossible, since money and monetary exchange cannot be sustained in that kind
of system. Another corollary contribution of Mises in this analysis was to
demonstrate that, far from being only one of many "motives" for
holding cash balances, uncertainty is crucial to the holding of any cash at
all.
That such problems are now
troubling mainstream economics is revealed by F.H. Hahn's demonstration that
Patinkin's well-known model of general equilibrium can only establish the
existence of a demand for money by appealing to such notions as an alleged
uncertainty of the exact moments of future sales and purchases, and to
"imperfections" in the credit market — neither of which, as Hahn
pointed out, is consistent with the concept of general equilibrium (17).
With respect to the supply of
money, Mises returned to the basic Ricardian insight that an increase in the
supply of money never confers any general benefit upon society. For money is
fundamentally different from consumers' and producers' goods in at least one
vital respect. Other things being equal, an increase in the supply of
consumers' goods benefits society since one or more consumers will be better
off. The same is true of an increase in the supply of producers' goods, which
will be eventually transformed into an increased supply of consumers' goods;
for production itself is the process of transforming natural resources into new
forms and locations desired by consumers for direct use. But money is very
different: money is not used directly in consumption or production but is
exchanged for such directly usable goods. Yet, once any commodity or object is
established as a money, it performs the maximum exchange work of which it is
capable. An increase in the supply of money causes no increase whatever in the
exchange service of money; all that happens is that the purchasing power of
each unit of money is diluted by the increased supply of units. Hence there is
never a social need for increasing the supply of money, either because of an
increased supply of goods or because of an increase in population. People can
acquire an increased proportion of cash balances with a fixed supply of money
by spending less and thereby increasing the purchasing power of their cash
balances, thus raising their real cash balances overall. As Mises wrote:
The services money renders are
conditioned by the height of its purchasing power. Nobody wants to have in his
cash holding a definite number of pieces of money or a definite weight of
money; he wants to keep a cash holding of a definite amount of purchasing
power. As the operation of the market tends to determine the final state of
money's purchasing power at a height at which the supply of and the demand for
money coincide, there can never be an excess or a deficiency of money. Each
individual and all individuals together always enjoy fully the advantages which
they can derive from indirect exchange and the use of money, no matter whether
the total quantity of money is great or small. Changes in money's purchasing
power generate changes in the disposition of wealth among the various members
of society. From the point of view of people eager to be enriched by such
changes, the supply of money may be called insufficient or excessive, and the
appetite for such gains may result in policies designed to bring about
cash-induced alterations in purchasing power. However, the services which money
renders can be neither improved nor impaired by changing the supply of money.…
The quantity of money available in the whole economy is always sufficient to
secure for everybody all that money does and can do (18).
A world of constant money
supply would be one similar to that of much of the 18th and 19th centuries,
marked by the successful flowering of the Industrial Revolution with increased
capital investment increasing the supply of goods and with falling prices for
those goods as well as falling costs of production(19). As demonstrated by
the notable Austrian theory of the business cycle, even an inflationary
expansion of money and credit merely offsetting the secular fall in prices will
create the distortions of production that bring about the business cycle.
In the face of overwhelming
arguments against inflationary expansion of the money supply (including those
not detailed here), what accounts for the persistence of the inflationary trend
in the modern world? The answer lies in the way new money is injected into the
economy, in the fact that it is most definitely not done according to the Angel
Gabriel model. For example, a government does not multiply the money supply
tenfold across the board by issuing a decree adding another zero to every
monetary number in the economy. In any economy not on a 100 percent commodity
standard, the money supply is under the control of government, the central
bank, and the controlled banking system. These institutions issue new money and
inject it into the economy by spending it or lending it out to favored debtors.
As we have seen, an increase in the supply of money benefits the early
receivers, that is, the government, the banks, and their favored debtors or
contractors, at the expense of the relatively fixed income groups that receive
the new money late or not at all and suffer a loss in real income and wealth.
In short, monetary inflation is a method by which the government, its
controlled banking system, and favored political groups are able to partially
expropriate the wealth of other groups in society. Those empowered to control
the money supply issue new money to their own economic advantage and at the
expense of the remainder of the population. Yield to government the monopoly
over the issue and supply of money, and government will inflate that supply to
its own advantage and to the detriment of the politically powerless. Once we
adopt the distinctively Austrian approach of "methodological
individualism," once we realize that government is not a superhuman
institution dedicated to the common good and the general welfare, but a group
of individuals devoted to furthering their economic interests, then the reason
for the inherent inflationism of government as money monopolist becomes crystal
clear.
As the Austrian analysis of
money shows, however, the process of generated inflation cannot last
indefinitely, for the government cannot in the final analysis control the pace
of monetary deterioration and the loss of purchasing power. The ultimate result
of a policy of persistent inflation is runaway inflation and the total collapse
of the currency. As Mises analyzed the course of runaway inflation (both before
and after the first example of such a collapse in an industrialized country, in
post-World War I Germany), such inflation generally proceeds as follows: At
first the government's increase of the money supply and the subsequent rise in
prices are regarded by the public as temporary. Since, as was true in Germany
during World War I, the onset of inflation is often occasioned by the
extraordinary expenses of a war, the public assumes that after the war
conditions including prices will return to the preinflation norm. Hence the
public's demand for cash balances rises as it awaits the anticipated lowering
of prices. As a result, prices rise less than proportionately and often
substantially less than the money supply, and the monetary authorities become
bolder. As in the case of the Assignats during the French Revolution, here is a
magical panacea for the difficulties of government: pump more money into the
economy, and prices will rise only a little! Encouraged by the seeming success,
the authorities apply more of what has worked so well, and the monetary
inflation proceeds apace. In time, however, the public's expectations and views
of the economic present and future undergo a vitally important change. They
begin to see that there will be no return to the prewar norm, that the new norm
is a continuing price inflation — that prices will continue to go up rather
than down. Phase two of the inflationary process ensues, with a continuing fall
in the demand for cash balances based on this analysis: "I'd better spend
my money on X, Y, and Z now, because I know full well that next year prices
will be higher." Prices begin to rise more than the increase in the supply
of money. The critical turning point has arrived.
At this point, the economy is
regarded as suffering from a money shortage as evidenced by the outstripping of
monetary expansion by the rise in prices. What is now called a liquidity crunch
occurs on a broad scale, and a clamor arises for greater increases in the
supply of money. As the Austrian School economist Bresciani-Turroni wrote in
his definitive study of the German hyperinflation:
The rise of prices caused an
intense demand for the circulating medium to arise, because the existing
quantity was not sufficient for the volume of transactions. At the same time
the State's need of money increased rapidly … the eyes of all were turned to
the Reichsbank. The pressure exercised on it became more and more insistent and
the increase of issues, from the central bank, appeared as a remedy.…
The authorities therefore had
not the courage to resist the pressure of those who demanded ever greater
quantities of paper money, and to face boldly the crisis which … would be,
undeniably, the result of a stoppage of the issue of notes. They preferred to
continue the convenient method of continually increasing the issues of notes,
thus making the continuation of business possible, but at the same time
prolonging the pathological state of the German economy. The Government increased
salaries in proportion to the depreciation of the mark, and employers in their
turn granted continual increases in wages, to avoid disputes, on the condition
that they could raise the prices of their products.…
Thus was the vicious circle
established; the exchange depreciated; internal prices rose; note-issues were
increased; the increase of the quantity of paper money lowered once more the
value of the mark in terms of gold; prices rose once more; and so on.…
For a long time the Reichsbank
— having adopted the fatalistic idea that the increase in the note-issues was
the inevitable consequence of the depreciation of the mark — considered as its
principal task, not the regulation of the circulation, but the preparation for
the German economy of the continually increasing quantities of paper money,
which the rise in prices required. It devoted itself especially to the
organization, on a large scale, of the production of paper marks(20).
The sort of thinking that
gripped the German monetary authorities at the height of the hyperinflation may
be gauged from this statement by the president of the Reichsbank, Rudolf
Havenstein:
The wholly extraordinary
depreciation of the Mark has naturally created a rapidly increasing demand for
additional currency, which the Reichsbank has not always been able fully to
satisfy. A simplified production of notes of large denominations enabled us to
bring ever greater amounts into circulation. But these enormous sums are barely
adequate to cover the vastly increased demand for the means of payment, which
has just recently attained an absolutely fantastic level.…
The running of the
Reichsbank's note-printing organization, which has become absolutely enormous,
is making the most extreme demands on our personnel(21).
The United States seems to be
entering phase two of inflation (1975), and it is noteworthy that economists
such as Walter Heller have already raised the cry that the supply of money must
be expanded in order to restore the real cash balances of the public, in effect
to alleviate the shortage of real balances. As in Germany in the early 1920s,
the argument is being employed that the quantity of money cannot be the culprit
for inflation since prices are rising at a greater rate than the supply of
money(22).
Phase three of the inflation
is the ultimate runaway stage: the collapse of the currency. The public takes
panicky flight from the money into real values, into any commodity whatever.
The public's psychology is not simply to buy now rather than later but to buy
anything immediately. The public's demand for cash balances hurtles toward
zero.
The reason for the enthusiasm
of Mises and other Austrian economists for the gold standard, the purer and
less diluted the better, should now be crystal clear. It is not that this
"barbaric relic" has any fetishistic attraction. The reason is that a
money under the control of the government and its banking system is subject to
inexorable pressures toward continuing monetary inflation. In contrast, the
supply of gold cannot be manufactured ad libitum by the
monetary authorities; it must be extracted from the ground, by the same costly
process as governs the supply of any other commodities on the market.
Essentially the choice is: gold or government. The choice of gold rather than
other market commodities is the historical experience of centuries that gold
(as well as silver) is uniquely suitable as a monetary commodity — for reasons
once set forth in the first chapter of every money-and-banking textbook.
The criticism might be made
that gold, too, can increase in quantity, and that this rise in supply, however
limited, would also confer no benefit upon society. Apart from the gold versus
government choice, however, there is another important consideration: an
increase in the supply of gold improves its availability for nonmonetary uses,
an advantage scarcely conferred by the fiat currencies of government or the
deposits of the banking system.
In contrast to the Misesian
"monetary overinvestment" theory of business cycles, on which
considerable work has been done by F.A. Hayek and other Austrian economists,
almost nothing has been done on the theory of money proper except by Mises
himself. There are three cloudy and interrelated areas that need further
elaboration. One is the route by which money can be released from government control.
Of primary importance would be the return to a pure gold standard. To do so
would involve, first, raising the "price of gold" (actually, lowering
the definition of the weight of the dollar) drastically above the current
pseudo-price of $42.22 an ounce and, second, a deflationary transformation of
current bank deposits into nonmonetary savings certificates or certificates of
deposit. What the precise price or the precise mix should be is a matter for
research. Initially, the Mises proposal for a return to gold at a market price
and the proposal of such Austrian monetary theorists as Jacques Rueff and
Michael Heilperin for a return at a deliberately doubled price of $70 an ounce
seemed far apart. But the current (1975) market price of approximately $160 an
ounce brings the routes of a deliberately higher price and the market price
much closer together(23).
A second area for research is
the matter of free banking as against 100 percent reserve requirements for bank
deposits in relation to gold. Mises's Theory of Money and Credit was
one of the first works to develop systematically the way in which the banks
create money through an expansion of credit. It was followed by Austrian
economist C.A. Phillips's famous distinction between the expansionary powers of
individual banks and those of the banking system as a whole. However, one of
Mises's arguments has remained neglected: that under a regime of free banking,
that is, where banks are unregulated but held strictly to account for honoring
their obligations to redeem notes or deposits in standard money, the operations
of the market check monetary expansion by the banks. The threat of bank runs,
combined with the impossibility of one bank's expanding more than a competitor,
keeps credit expansion at a minimum. Perhaps Mises underestimated the
possibility of a successful bank cartel for the promotion of credit expansion;
it seems clear, however, that there is less chance for bank-credit expansion in
the absence of a central bank to supply reserves and to be a lender of last
resort (24).
Finally, there is the related
question, which Mises did not develop fully, of the proper definition of the
crucial concept of the money supply. In current mainstream economics, there are
at least four competing definitions, ranging from M1 to M4. Of one point an
Austrian is certain: the definition must rest on the inner essence of the
concept itself and not on the currently fashionable but question-begging
methodology of statistical correlation with national income. Leland Yeager was
trenchantly critical of such an approach:
One familiar approach to the
definition of money scorns any supposedly a priori line
between money and near-moneys. Instead, it seeks the definition that works best
with statistics. One strand of that approach … seeks the narrowly or broadly
defined quantity that correlates most closely with income in equations fitted
to historical data.… But it would be awkward if the definition of money
accordingly had to change from time to time and country to country.
Furthermore, even if money defined to include certain near-moneys does
correlate somewhat more closely with income than money narrowly defined, that
fact does not necessarily impose the broad definition. Perhaps the amount of
these near-moneys depends on the level of money-income and in turn on the
amount of medium of exchange.… More generally, it is not obvious why the magnitude
with which some other magnitude correlates most closely deserves overriding
attention.… The number of bathers at a beach may correlate more closely with
the number of cars parked there than with either the temperature or the price
of admission, yet the former correlation may be less interesting or useful than
either of the latter. The correlation with national income might be closer for
either consumption or investment than for the quantity of money925).
Money is the medium of
exchange, the asset for which all other goods and services are traded on the
market. If a thing functions as such a medium, as final payment for other
things on the market, then it serves as part of the money supply. In his Theory
of Money and Credit, Mises distinguished between standard money (money in
the narrow sense) and money substitutes, such as bank notes and demand
deposits, which function as an additional money supply. It should be noted, for
example, that in Irving Fisher's non-Austrian classic, The Purchasing
Power of Money, written at about the same time (1913), M consisted of
standard money only, while M1 consisted of money substitutes in the form of
bank demand deposits redeemable in standard at par. Today no economist would
think of excluding demand deposits from the definition of money. But if we
ponder the problem, we see that if a bank begins to fail, its deposits are no
longer equivalent to money; they no longer serve as money on the market. They
are only money until a bank's imminent collapse.
Furthermore, in the same way
that M1 (currency plus demand deposits) is broader than the narrowest
definition, we can establish even broader definitions by including savings
deposits of commercial banks, and cash surrender values of life insurance
companies, which are all redeemable on demand at par in standard money, and
therefore all serve as money substitutes and as part of the money supply until
the public begins to doubt that they are redeemable. Partisans of M1 argue that
commercial banks are uniquely powerful in creating deposits and, further, that
their deposits circulate more actively than the deposits of other banks. Let us
suppose, however, that in a gold-standard country, a man has some gold coins in
his bureau and others locked in a bank vault. His stock of gold coins at home
will circulate actively and the ones in his vault sluggishly, but surely both
are part of his stock of cash. And, if it also be objected that the deposits of
savings banks and similar institutions pyramid on top of commercial bank
deposits, it should also be noted that the latter in turn pyramid on top of
reserves and standard money.
Another example will serve to
answer the common objection that a savings bank deposit is not money because it
cannot be used directly as a medium of exchange but must be redeemed in that
medium. (This is apart from the fact that savings banks are increasingly being
empowered to issue checks and open up checking accounts.) Suppose that, through
some cultural quirk, everyone in the country decided not to use five-dollar bills
in actual exchange. They would only use ten-dollar and one-dollar bills, and
keep their longer-term cash balances in five-dollar bills. As a result,
five-dollar bills would tend to circulate far more slowly than the other bills.
If a man wanted to spend some of his cash balance, he could not spend a
five-dollar bill directly; instead, he would go to a bank and exchange it for
five one-dollar bills for use in trade. In this hypothetical situation, the
status of the five-dollar bill would be the same as that of the savings deposit
today. But while the holder of the five-dollar bill would have to go to a bank
and exchange it for dollar bills before spending it, surely no one would say
that his five-dollar bills were not part of his cash balance or of the money
supply.
A broad definition of the
money supply, however, excludes assets not redeemable on demand at par in
standard money, that is, any form of genuine time liability, such as savings
certificates, certificates of deposit whether negotiable or nonnegotiable, and
government bonds. Savings bonds, redeemable at par, are money substitutes and
hence are part of the total supply of money. Finally, just as commercial bank
reserves are properly excluded from the outstanding supply of money, so those
demand deposits that in turn function as reserves for the deposits of these
other financial institutions would have to be excluded as well. It would be
double counting to include both the base and the multiple of any of the
inverted money pyramids in the economy.
Murray N. Rothbard (1926–1995)
was dean of the Austrian School. He was an economist, economic historian, and
libertarian political philosopher. See Murray N. Rothbard's article archives.
Notes
Originally appeared as a
chapter in The Foundations of Modern Austrian Economics, Edwin
Dolan, ed. (Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1976), pp. 160–84.
[1] Ludwig
von Mises, Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufsmittel (1912); see the
third English edition, The Theory of Money and Credit (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953).
[2] On
the changes in relative prices attendant on an increase in the money supply,
see Mises, Theory of Money and Credit, pp. 139–45.
[3] For
more on the fallacies of measurement and index numbers, see Mises, Theory
of Money and Credit, pp. 187–94; idem, Human Action: A Treatise on
Economics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949), pp. 221–24;
Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van
Nostrand, 1962), vol. 2, pp. 737–40; Bassett Jones, Horses and Apples: A
Study of Index Numbers (New York: John Day, 1934); and Oskar Morgenstern, On
the Accuracy of Economic Observations, 2nd rev. ed. (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1963).
[4] See
Mises, Theory of Money and Credit, pp. 170–78.
[5] Chi-Yuen
Wu, An Outline of International Price Theories (London: George
Routledge and Sons, 1939), p. 126.
[6] Ibid.,
p. 234; Mises, Theory of Money and Credit, p. 178. Mises's
development of the theory was independent of Senior's because the latter was
only published in 1928 in Industrial Efficiency and Social Economy (New
York, 1928), pp. 55–56; see Wu, Outline of International Price Theories,
p. 127n.
[7] Ibid.,
p. 250; Mises's formulation is in Theory of Money and Credit, pp. 179–88.
[8] See
Wu, Outline of International Price Theories, pp. 251–60.
[9] Mises's
regression theorem may be found in Theory of Money and Credit, pp. 97–123.
For an explanation and a diagrammatic representation of the regression
theorem, see Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, pp. 231–37. Menger's
insight into the origin of money on the market may be found in Carl Menger, Principles
of Economics (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1950), pp. 257–62. On the
relationship between Menger's approach and the regression theorem, see Mises, Human
Action, pp. 402–04.
[10] Mises, Human Action, pp.
405–07. The regression analysis was either adopted by or arrived at
independently by William A. Scott in Money and Banking, 6th ed. (New York:
Henry Holt, 1926), pp. 54–55.
[11] J.C.
Gilbert, "The Demand for Money: The Development of an Economic
Concept," Journal of Political Economy 61 (April 1953): 149.
[12] Don
Patinkin, Money, Interest, and Prices (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson,
1956), pp. 71–72, 414.
[13] Paul
A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1947), pp. 117–18.
[14] George
Stigler, Production and Distribution Theories: The Formative Period (New
York: Macmillan, 1946), p. 181; also see the similar, if more polite, attack on
Menger by Frank H. Knight, "Introduction," in Menger,Principles, p.
23. For a contrasting discussion by the mathematical economist son of
Menger, Karl Menger, see "Austrian Marginalism and Mathematical
Economics," in Carl Menger and the Austrian School of Economics, John
R. Hicks and Wilhelm Weber, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 54–60.
[15] Mises, Human
Action, p. 250.
[16] Ibid.,
pp. 249–50, 414.
[17] F.H.
Hahn, "On Some Problems of Proving the Existence of an Equilibrium in a
Monetary Economy," inThe Theory of Interest Rates, F.H. Hahn and F.P.R.
Breckling, eds. (London: Macmillan, 1956), pp. 128–32.
[18] Mises, Human
Action, p. 418.
[19] On
the advantages of a secularly falling price "level," see C.A.
Phillips, T.F. McManus, and R.W. Nelson, eds., Banking and the Business
Cycle (New York: Macmillan, 1937), pp. 186–88, 203–07.
[20] Costantino
Bresciani-Turroni, The Economics of Inflation (London: George Allen
and Unwin, 1937), pp. 80–82; also see Frank D. Graham, Exchange, Prices,
and Production in Hyper-inflation: Germany 1920–23(New York: Russell and
Russell, 1930), pp. 104–07. For an analysis of hyperinflation see Mises, Theory
of Money and Credit, pp. 227–30; and idem, Human Action, pp. 423–25.
[21] Rudolf
Havenstein, Address to the Executive Committee of the Reichsbank, 25 August
1923, translated inThe German Inflation of 1923, Fritz K. Ringer, ed. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 96.
[22] See
Denis S. Karnofsky, "Real Money Balances: A Misleading Indicator of
Monetary Actions," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 56
(February 1974): 2–10.
[23] Mises's
proposal is in Theory of Money and Credit, pp. 448–57; also see Michael A.
Heilperin, Aspects of the Pathology of Money (Geneva: Michael Joseph,
1968); and Jacques Rueff, The Monetary Sin of the West(New York:
Macmillan, 1972).
[24] See
Mises, Human Action, pp. 431–45.
[25] Leland
B. Yeager, "Essential Properties of the Medium of Exchange," Kyklos (1968),
reprinted inMonetary Theory, R.W. Clower, ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1969), p.
38.
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