If we understand risk cannot be eliminated, it can only be transferred, then we will understand why the current financial trickery in Europe and elsewhere is doomed to fail.
by Charles Hugh Smith
The entire global economy's fundamental financial
instability can be traced back to one simple rule of Nature: risk cannot be
eliminated, it can only be transferred to others or masked. And when it is
transferred to others or masked, then the causal feedback between risk and
consequence is severed.
Once risk has been disconnected from consequence, then
it is impossible to discover the price of capital and risk. Once capital and risk
have been mispriced, then the inevitable result is misallocation of capital and
a positive feedback loop of self-referential, self-reinforcing risk.
Once the causal negative feedback of the real
world--consequence--is no longer available to those taking on risk, then only
positive feedback remains. Positive feedback inevitably leads to runaway
reactions that self-destruct.
This can be illustrated by imagining yourself in a casino where a consortium will guarantee your losses up to $1 million. We call the disconnect of risk from the resulting gain/loss "moral hazard," and to understand the ramifications of moral hazard, we need only compare the actions of two gamblers in the casino: one is using his own money, the other has none of his own capital at risk, and his losses will be covered up to $1 million.
How much risk will you take on in gaming if you can
lose $1 million without any loss to yourself? Obviously, we will accept enormous risks because
if we win the high-risk bet, the gain will be ours to keep. Low-risk bets yield
low returns but high-risk bets yield high returns.
If our losses will be transferred to others, then why
waste time betting on low-risk, low-return "red" at the roulette
wheel? Let's bet on single numbers because the payoff will be astronomical.
If we actually score a few high-risk "wins,"
this success feeds our risk appetite. This is a positive feedback loop: our wins
reinforce our risk appetite, while negative feedback (the losses from losing
bets) no longer register--they have been eliminated from our calculations of
risk and gain.
This positive feedback eventually leads us to make
stupendously large bets. Eventually, we bet $1 million on a high-risk play and lose. We are
wiped out, but oh well, it was fun while it lasted. If we were especially
disciplined and clever, we squirreled away some of our winnings in our own
account: we kept the gain and the consortium took all the losses.
The risk didn't vanish, it was simply transferred to
others who now bear the cost of the unfettered risk being played with abandon. The consortium who
financed the no-risk gambling spree now has to absorb the $1 million in loss.
If the consortium masked its own risk by presenting a phantom financial
security to the casino, then the casino will have to absorb the loss.
In effect, the risk was transferred to the entire
system.Since the
consortium is made up of many investors, and the casino has many investors,
then the risk and loss was effectively spread over many participants. The $1
million loss, catastrophic to any one player, is effectively distributed to
everyone in the system.
When losses are trivial compared to the size of the
system, then this distribution of transferred risk results in a modest loss to
all participants.
But let's suppose the player with the $1 million
backstop was extraordinarily successful with insanely high-risk bets, and he
built the $1 million stake into $100 million, which he then rolled into several
stupendous bets.
He loses, because the risk of gambling hasn't been
elminated, it has only been masked and transferred to others. Now the
consortium faces a loss 100 times its guaranteed backstop, and since its
capital is only $10 million, it is also wiped out and leaves the casino with
$90 million in uncollectible debt.
If the casino needs that $90 million to pay its own
speculative debts, then it too will be wiped out.
This is how one player who manages to mask or transfer
risk to others can bring down entire systems.The risk only appears trivial and manageable at the
start, but since the negative feedback of consequence (reality) has been
eliminated from the players' perspective, then risk piles up in a
self-reinforcing positive feedback.
Since the system itself has disconnected risk from
consequence with backstops, guarantees and illusory claims of financial
security, then it is has lost the essential feedback required to adapt to
changing circumstances. As the risk being transferred to the system rises
geometrically, the system is incapable of recognizing, measuring or assessing
the risk being transferred until it is so large it overwhelms the system in a massive
collapse/default.
The consortium has only two ways to create the
illusion of solvency when the punter's $100 million bet goes bad: borrow $100
million from credulous possessors of capital or counterfeit it on a printing
press.
These are precisely the strategies being pursued by central banks and states around the globe. But since risk remains disconnected from gain/loss, then capital and risk both remain completely mispriced.
These are precisely the strategies being pursued by central banks and states around the globe. But since risk remains disconnected from gain/loss, then capital and risk both remain completely mispriced.
Risk is being transferred to the entire global
financial system at a fantastic rate, because counterfeiting money or borrowing
it on this scale to cover losses creates new self-reinforcing feedbacks of
risk.
As long as risk is being masked or transferred to
others who don't reap the gain, they only reap the losses, then the system is
doomed to self-reinforcing instability and eventual collapse.
The only solution is to enforce the causal connection
between risk and consequence: those who took the risk have to absorb all the
loss. Since risk cannot be eliminated, it can only be masked or transferred,
then all the tricks that are being played out in Europe, China, Japan and the
U.S. are only enabling risk to pile ever higher in the system itself.
At some unpredictable stick/slip point, the
accumulated risk will cause the system to implode like a supernova star.
No comments:
Post a Comment