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| Cute, sure, but not an actual person according to Oxford academics |
Cute, sure, but not an actual person according to Oxford academics.
Parents should be able to kill their newborn children. So have concluded a
group of academics with ties to Oxford University. In a recent article published in the Journal
of Medical Ethics, the authors concluded that there is no difference
between abortion and killing a newborn. They called the latter “after birth
abortion.” The Telegraphs’ Stephen Adams reports :
They argued: “The moral status of an infant is equivalent to that of a fetus in the sense that both lack those properties that justify the attribution of a right to life to an individual.”
Rather than being “actual persons”, newborns were “potential persons”. They explained: “Both a fetus and a newborn certainly are human beings and potential persons, but neither is a ‘person’ in the sense of ‘subject of a moral right to life’.
“We take ‘person’ to mean an individual who is capable of attributing to her own existence some (at least) basic value such that being deprived of this existence represents a loss to her.”
While no doubt repugnant to many readers, the premise which these authors
have rested their case upon is actually a welcome concession which advances the
pro-life argument. Indeed, there is no moral difference between the born and
the unborn. Of course, that means we should protect the unborn, not kill our
children. Even the journal’s editor acknowledges that their premise works both
ways.
[Prof Julian Savulescu, director of the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical
Ethics] said the journal would consider publishing an article positing that, if
there was no moral difference between abortion and killing newborns, then
abortion too should be illegal.
By accepting the premise which pro-life activists have long asserted, that
there is no difference in moral value between the born and the unborn, the
authors lead us to the more fundamental premise upon which not just abortion
but every political issue must ultimately be decided. What are rights, and
where do they come from?
According to the authors, in order to have a right to life, a human being
must be “capable of attributing to her own existence some (at least) basic
value such that being deprived of this existence represents a loss to her.” In
other words, fetuses and newborns have nothing to lose. So killing them
deprives them of nothing.
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| Like these ancient worshipers of the pagan deity Molech, we have come full circle to sacrificing children on the alter of "the good life." |
Understanding this point is difficult, primarily because it is wholly
arbitrary nonsense. Even the authors admit the uselessness of their definition
of personhood:
Our point here is that, although it is hard to exactly determine
when a subject starts or ceases to be a “person,” a necessary condition
for a person to have a right to X is that she is harmed by a decision to
deprive her of X.
It can only be hard to determine when a person is a person when you lack an
objective definition. Of course, ambiguity is essential to anti-life
moralizing, as it cannot hold up under objective scrutiny.
In truth, the right to life does not arise from these authors’ convoluted
notions, but from the facts of reality and the observable
requirements of life. Human life is distinct from that of plants and animals in
that it requires the application of reason in order to be sustained. Liberty to
act upon one’s own judgment is necessary in order for reason to be applied.
Taking action to deprive another of the capacity to act upon their judgment —
either by barring them physically, stealing from them, defrauding them, or
harming their person — is an assault upon their life. Acknowledging these facts
presents us with a moral obligation to refrain from assaulting others.
Of course, the right to life as thus described is not a right to
sustenance. Abortionists consistently argue that a child’s life presents a
“burden” to its parents. Indeed, there is no doubt that a child requires a
tremendous amount of attention and resources in order to survive and thrive
until reaching adulthood. Therefore, even objectivists who agree wholeheartedly
with the right to life as described above argue that abortion is
morally permissible ,
in part because the unborn have no right to derail the otherwise carefree lives
of their parents.
However, this completely ignores the consequences of sexual behavior and
the obligation of rational actors to accept responsibility for their choices. A
child is not a randomly encountered other to whom we owe nothing. Children are
a wholly predictable product of sexual union. We accept implicit responsibility
for any potential children when engaging in the reproductive act. Intention is
irrelevant. That I meant to light a candle does not absolve me from setting the
house on fire. We know what sex can lead to, and are responsible for any
consequence, most especially a new life.
Related to the notion that children are an undue “burden” to their parents
is the abortionist argument that the unborn are not really individual human
beings or persons. There are many versions of this argument which arbitrarily
place personhood at birth or other points of “viability.” By arguing for
infanticide, the Journal of Medical Ethics is only shifting
the arbitrary threshold for personhood to some undefined point after birth.
Regardless, the underlying premises informing the personhood argument
consistently rely upon perceptions of development and/or dependency. Diana
Hsieh and Ari Armstrong write in The Objective Standard :
Birth is a radical biological and existential change for the fetus, more significant than any other change over the whole course of life, except death. The newborn infant lives his own life, outside his mother. Although still very needy, he maintains his own biological functions. He breathes his own air, digests his own food, and moves on his own. He can leave his mother, either temporarily or permanently, to be cared for by someone else, and still live and prosper. His mind, although in its nascent stages of development, now enables him to grasp the world and guide his actions. The newborn infant is no longer a dependent being encased in and supported by the body of another; he is a person in his own right, living in a social context.
The notion that birth is “more significant than any other change over the
whole course of life, except death” ignores the “radical biological and
existential change” known as conception. Birth is a threshold of development,
not identity. While birth is certainly a better candidate for the point at
which personhood begins than any other arbitrarily offered option, it is still
arbitrary. As Hsieh and Armstrong concede, newborn infants are very needy. As a
father of a three-year-old boy, I can testify to the fact that a born child rolling,
crawling, walking, and running is a far more profound dependent than a fetus
which requires only the sustenance of its mother to survive. Furthermore, the
fresh mind which experiences the world as a newborn is demonstrably active in
the womb.
Arbitrary definitions of humanity, personhood, and rights are the
foundation of eugenics, the pseudo-science which proceeded our culture of
abortion -- not to mention the Nazis.
In the final analysis, the debate over abortion is really a debate over
personhood and individual rights. That is why it is so contentious and
provocative, because it strikes at the heart of our most fundamental beliefs
about ourselves, our world, and each other. It also has earth-shattering
consequences which extend far beyond family planning and reproductive rights.
If we accept arbitrary definitions of human life, and only recognize the
rights of those who meet our hand-picked developmental and dependency criteria,
we provide philosophical cover for those who would regard some individuals as
more human than others. The pseudo-science of eugenics is replete with such
arbitrary distinctions, and the precursor to the culture of abortion we live in
today. The philosophical defense of individual rights requires an
uncompromising affirmation of human identity from conception until death.
Otherwise, you can bet the academics won’t stop at killing newborns. Indeed, The
Telegraph tells us :
When you have no objective definition of life, no objective definition of
personhood, and no objective definition of rights, you tend not to see much of
a problem with anything.
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