A parody 'Neo-Laffer curve'. Critics argue that the assumption that the curve should be a simple, smooth and empirically identifiable one is not borne out by real world evidence. |
by Keith Weiner
Jude Wanniski, a writer for the Wall
Street Journal, coined the term “Laffer Curve” after a concept promoted by
economist Art Laffer. Laffer himself says the idea goes back to the 14th century
The idea is that if one wants to maximize the government’s tax revenue, there is an optimal tax rate. (Ignore for the moment whether or not you think this makes good economics in the long run, or whether or not you think this is even moral.)
Laffer noted that if the tax rate is
zero, then the government gets no revenue. But likewise, if the rate is set at 100%,
the government also gets no tax revenue. Mainstreamers say that there is no
incentive to produce income at 100% tax rate, and this is true. But even more
importantly, there is no means: a 100% tax rate is pure capital destruction.
The “Laffer Maxima”, i.e. the tax
rate which maximizes the tax take, is somewhere between 0% and 100%. The
Wikipedia article shows a picture of a Laffer Maxima at 70%, and implies that
although it’s somewhat controversial this may be the right number.
There are two points about the
Laffer Curve that are important to consider.
First, what in the world makes any
economist think that he can gin up some differential equations and compute the
right value for this Maxima? In the first place, every market is composed of an
integer number of people transacting an integer number of trades, and each of
those trades consists of an integer number of goods. People do not behave like
particles in an ideal gas—they have reason and volition. The very idea of
modeling a large number of people with equations is preposterous. Never mind
that degrees are awarded every year to economists who purportedly do just that.
Second, what makes anyone think that
the Laffer Maxima is a constant?
Let’s do a thought experiment that is in the vein of the Austrian School of economics. Let’s consider the boom-bust cycle, or what Austrians note is really the credit cycle. The central bank first expands credit, which flows into wealth-creating as well as wealth-destroying activities (malinvestment). As the expansion ages, an even greater proportion of credit funds wealth-destroying activities. Sooner or later the boom turns to bust. Malinvestments are liquidated, people are laid off from their jobs, portfolios take big losses, tax revenues decline, etc.
One clue can be found right there, in my
description of the bust: tax revenues decline.
OK, maybe the Laffer Curve remains static and
the only thing that changes is the absolute tax dollars?
Let’s continue comparing the boom
and the bust phases. In the boom phase what’s happening is that economic
activity is being stimulated, i.e. beyond what it would naturally have been.
This fuels demand for everything: commodities, labor, construction, fuel,
professional services, etc. And all of the people hired in the boom are
demanding everything too. It feeds on itself synergistically, for a while.
At this stage, the frictional cost
of taxes may be masked by the lubricant and fuel of credit expansion. This is
especially so when everyone feels richer and richer on paper. People spend
freely and we saw this in spades in the most recent boom that ended in 2007.
Now let’s look at the bust phase.
The net worth of most people is falling sharply. Many are laid off, their
careers, and sometimes lives, shattered. A huge component of the marginal bid
for everything is withdrawn. People struggle to make ends meet. Budgets are
stretched to the max.
I submit for the consideration of
the reader that in the bust phase, any change in the tax rate drives a big
change at the margin of economic activity. The tax rate is more significant in
the bust phase than it was in the boom phase. The Laffer Maxima is not a
hard-wired, intrinsic value of 70 (or 42 for fans of Douglas Adams). Like
everything else in the market, it moves around. It is subject to the forces of
the markets.
I will close with an example. Consider the
marginal restaurant. Let’s say it is generating $25,000 per month in gross
revenues. Net of $24,700 in expenses, it is generating positive cash flow of
$300 per month. Why would the owner even keep it open? Well, times may get
better…
Now, let’s say the tax rate goes up
a little, say 100 basis points. The restaurant, making little money, pays
essentially no taxes anyway. So this does not cause a direct impact. But what
about the patrons of the restaurant? If their blended tax rate was 25%, then an
increase of 100 basis points (i.e., to 26%) is a tax increase of 4%. These
people will have to reduce their budget by 4%.
One logical place to cut is eating
out. Suppose that they reduce their spending in the restaurant by $1,000, in
aggregate. Now our restaurant has
$24,000 per month in gross revenues. But its fixed costs cannot be reduced. And
even the labor can’t be reduced in this case. The only reduction will be food
supplies. So let’s say food supplies are reduced 1/3 of $1,000, or $333. So now
the restaurant has expenses of $24,367. Whereas it formerly made $300 profit
per month, now it makes a loss of $367 per month.
The owner can’t continue this very
long. And so he closes shop. He defaults on the loans on the fixtures and
tenant improvements, lays off 8 people, leaves the electric and gas companies
with fixed infrastructure which no longer produces revenue for them, etc.
The impact to the economy (and hence
to the total taxes collected) is negative and disproportionate to the tax
increase.
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