By WALTER RUSSELL
MEAD
The European
monetary crisis is like a botched root canal: painful, expensive, interminable.
Weeks, months and even years go by and the world helplessly sits in the chair
as the incompetent dentists poke, scrape, bicker and endlessly, endlessly
drill. From time to time there are shots of Novocaine—usually in the form
of liquidity injections from the ECB—that reduce the pain to a dull throb, but
there are no signs of improvement, no signs that the long and futile European
process is coming to any kind of successful conclusion.
We are frightened and bored at the same time: we can’t
look away but we can’t bear to master the intricate details of this most
tedious of world crises.
Yesterday yet another worthless European summit saw yet another series of posturing speeches as yet again Europe’s so-called ‘leaders’ failed to agree on any way out of the deepening mess. Yet again the world’s financial markets heaved and thrashed as traders and investors tried to figure out if the Europeans were really as inept as they appear — and, if they are, when and how will the catastrophe come.
The details change, but the underlying situation is the same. There are two games of chicken being played in Europe at the moment. One is the game between Greece and the rest of the eurozone. The Greeks believe, or at least they are doing their best to pretend to believe, that a Greek exit for the eurozone will be so catastrophic that in the end the EU will have no choice but to offer the Greeks substantially better terms than are now on offer. The eurozone authorities, on the other hand, believe, or at least they are doing their best to pretend to believe, that the consequences of a Greek exit can be managed for Europe as a whole, but that the devastation in Greece will be so great that the Greeks will have no choice in the end but to comply with the agreements they have already signed.
The other game of chicken is the contest between Germany
and France. The Germans swear up and down that whatever happens they will
never, never, never accept the ‘mutualization of eurozone
debt’ or the ‘politicization of European monetary policy.’ They won’t bail out
the debts of the Club Med countries and they won’t accept the classically Latin
form of currency management in which the currency’s value is manipulated
(generally downward) by the political elite. The French (politely and
deferentially in the Sarkozy era and more confrontationally under Hollande)
point out that this German policy will lead Europe into an interminable series
of financial crises, and at each crisis point the Germans will have to accept
new bail outs and new debt guarantees in order to stave off a general European
financial collapse.
So far, the French strategy has largely worked.
The Germans say no, no, no until some new banking crisis peaks, at which point
they grudgingly give way.
The trouble with this approach is that it condemns
Europe and the world to one moment of crisis after another. Doomsday threats
are now a routine part of eurozone economic governance. There is a
certain necessary European political logic to this. Given the politics of
Germany, Angela Merkel can’t take certain steps until it is obvious
that the alternative is a complete financial meltdown. Given the politics
in Greece, no Greek politician can accept anything like the current
arrangements unless the financial equivalent of Armageddon is staring the country
in the face.
But if this situation makes a certain perverse sense
in the context of European politics, from the global standpoint it is
outrageously irresponsible. The kind of doom that European negotiators
regularly invoke in their routine financial conversations these days has
horrifying implications for the world. Neither Asia nor the Americas can
survive a full fledged European financial crisis unscathed. Meanwhile, the
uncertainty in Europe hangs like a pall over the whole world, reducing growth
everywhere and threatening the still fragile recovery from the Great Recession.
This is eerily like the irresponsible egotism and
political incompetence that plunged Europe and the world into the great
conflicts of 1914 and 1939. The recklessly incompetent design of the eurozone—a
monetary union among quite different countries with no serious agreement on its
rules—was widely noted at the time. The Europeans simply did not care. They
wanted the euro and so they announced it. The irresponsible egotism is reflected
in the casually brutal way in which the different European countries are ready
to invoke a global financial Ragnarok to make relatively minor points in their
internal squabbles.
European shortsightedness and European selfishness
were the prime movers in the great catastrophes of the twentieth century. (The
US, too, had its part to play in these disasters.) Now in the first grave
crisis of the twenty first century they sometimes seem bent on demonstrating
how little they have learned.
Part of the problem is the mismatch between the
excruciatingly slow pace of the European political process and the rapid moves
that financial markets make. Europe’s failure to achieve a viable federal
structure to date means that “Europe” is as weak and inconsequential as the
United States was under the Articles of Confederation. Endless debates are
needed while deals are cut and compromises are painfully hammered out before
even the simplest steps can be taken.
The ECB is the only body in Europe that can act
quickly and decisively in the name of the eurozone. Beyond the central bank,
there is no person or no committee in whom serious executive authority is
vested; there is no one in the European system who can order its governments to
act — and no European government has the authority to compel the others to do
much of anything.
The weak and diffuse nature of authority in Europe
condemns the EU to the kind of dilatory process that has marked the European
response to the financial crisis. The hope among euro-federalists was that
adopting the euro would ultimately force a political union on Europe. European
optimists hope that that is what is happening now: that the crisis of the euro
will force the emergence of a true United States of Europe.
There is not much sign of that yet, and no sign that
it will happen quickly enough to shorten the agony of the current economic root
canal procedure. The world is stuck in the chair for the foreseeable future
while the world’s most incompetent dentist wields the world’s dullest and noisiest
drill.
The most we can hope for at the moment is that he will
keep the Novocaine coming. It doesn’t solve anything, but life would be very
much worse without it.
The worst thing to fear? The next great game of
chicken where irresponsible and selfish politicians will gamble with the
world’s economic future is now scheduled to be held in the United States after
November. As the Bush tax cuts move toward expiration and automatic budget cuts
are set to go into effect, the lame duck US Congress will see Republicans and
Democrats engage in their own form of brinkmanship. If European brinkmanship
and American brinkmanship come together, Katy bar the door. The mother of all
meltdowns, a financial event that would make the Mayan apocalypse (also
scheduled for next fall) look like a high school pep rally, could be upon us
much sooner than we think.
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