"A common mistake that people make when trying to design something completely foolproof is to underestimate the ingenuity of complete fools."
- Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy
By John Mauldin
For quite some time I have been making
the case that for the eurozone to survive, the European Central Bank would have to print more
money than any of us can now imagine. That the sentiment among European leaders
was that they were prepared for such a move was clear – except for Germany,
which is haunted by fears of a return to the days of the Weimar Republic and
hyperinflation.
When Germany agreed to a fixed monetary union and a
European Central Bank, it was with the clear understanding that it would be run
along the lines of the German central bank, the Bundesbank. The members of the
Bundesbank and the German members of the ECB were most outspoken about the need
for a conservative monetary policy that would keep a clamp on inflation.
However, as I have previously noted, the Bundesbank was a toothless tiger. Germany has two votes out of 23 on the ECB, and the loud drumbeat from most of Europe, which is experiencing the difficulty of austerity accompanied by too much debt, is for a far more accommodating ECB.
The simple fact is that Mario Draghi, the Italian
president of the ECB, created €1 trillion euros to help fund European banks,
which promptly turned around and bought their respective countrys' sovereign
debt. Germany's Angela Merkel forced the Bundesbank to
"play nice" and go along with what was seen as the only way to solve
a growing banking crisis in Europe. Everyone breathed a sigh of relief,
thinking that this at least bought a year during which things could be sorted
out. But it turns out that a trillion euros just doesn't go as far as it used
to. The "relief" lasted about a month. The last few weeks have
presented yet another budding crisis, as least as large as the last one. Where to get the next
trillion?
This week the German Bundesbank waved the white flag.
The die is cast. For good or ill, Europe has embarked on a program that will
require multiple trillions of euros of freshly minted money in order to
maintain the eurozone. But the alternative, European leaders agree, is even
worse. Today we will look at the recent German shift in policy, why it was so
predictable, and what it means. This is a Ponzi scheme that makes Madoff look
like a small-time street hustler.
Waving the White
Flag
It is the world's worst-kept secret: Germany does not
want inflation but wants to abandon the European Union even less. And as we
will see, the eurozone simply does not have enough money to keep itself
together without massive ECB intervention.
"Cry havoc," wrote Shakespeare in Julius Caesar, "and let
slip the dogs of war." The military order "Havoc!" was a signal
given to the English military forces in the Middle Ages to direct the soldiery
(in Shakespeare's parlance "the dogs of war") to pillage and incite
chaos.
The cry is much the same in Europe today, though it is
not the dogs of war that will ravage the land but the hounds of inflation. The
English edition of Spiegel Online today
carries a story with the headline "High Inflation Causes Societies to
Disintegrate."
Spiegel Online explains:
"'Inflation Alarm!' reads the front-page headline in Bild, Germany's biggest selling newspaper. "How quickly will our money be eaten up?" the paper continues on page 2. "Millions of Germany [sic] are worried: Inflation is returning!" Just in case the message wasn't clear enough, the article is illustrated with a picture of a 1-trillion-mark note from 1923, the high point of German hyperinflation.
"The fact that Bild, arguably Germany's most influential newspaper, chose to run with the story in its Friday edition shows just how deep-rooted Germans' fears of inflation are. Nine decades later, the hyperinflation of the early 1920s still haunts the country.
"The panic-mongering was prompted by a statement by a senior official from the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank, to the finance committee of the German parliament earlier this week. Jens Ulbrich, head of the Bundesbank's economics department, said that Germany is likely to have inflation rates 'somewhat above the average within the European monetary union' in the future and that the country might have to tolerate higher inflation for the sake of rebalancing national economies within the euro zone.
"Ulbrich did not give concrete figures in his statement, saying only that it was important that inflation in the euro zone as a whole continues to remain stable, even if it rises in some countries and falls in others. Observers believe the Bundesbank may be reckoning with an inflation rate of around 2.5 or 2.6 percent."
If only they could be assured that inflation would be
so mild. It is already at 2.1% in Germany. On Thursday, Finance Minister
Wolfgang Schäuble, heretofore an inflation hawk of the old Bundesbank school,
told reporters that inflation could go as high as 3 percent. "As long as
we are ... in a corridor between 2 and 3 percent …we are in an area that is
still acceptable," Schäuble said.
Bild wrote in the actual editorial:
"For 10 years, the euro was very stable and had lower inflation than the deutsche mark. But now the worst part of the financial and euro crisis is coming: creeping currency devaluation and inflation which could possibly continue for years. That's how counties want to wash away their debts. But it mainly affects (blue-collar) workers, employees and retirees. They are precisely the people who have borne the burden of solving the crisis and who have kept a cool head. That's unfair….
"Inflation gnaws at our trust in money, in our most important institutions, in politicians and in the central banks, which in German are dubbed 'guardians of the currency' for a good reason. Because they experienced it so bitterly, Germans know that in the end high inflation causes societies to disintegrate. It robs the individual of trust in the future, without which no country can thrive."
What brought on such a remarkable display of German
forbearance? The threat of a complete eurozone collapse, brought on not just by
Spanish banks (the present culprit) but what appears to be the dawining
realization that this is about more than just Spain or Greece or Portugal or
Ireland.
I have been writing for almost two years about the
fact that the cajas, or Spanish regional banks, are worse than bankrupt. US
banks are shut down when their nonperforming loans are at 5% of their capital.
Spanish banks are at 20% and rising rapidly. This week the Spanish government basically
nationalized Bankia, the nation's 4th largest bank, which had
been cobbled together from seven failed cajas and given a large government
guarantee and a €3 billion public-offering equity infusion. Only roughly half
of its real estate loans are generating returns, and that is the number for public
consumption.
"Aside from creating a financially unsound bank, the government also demanded an additional 30 billion euros worth of write-downs on loans – valuing 84 billion euros in total, when combined with the original requirement of 54 billion euros in write-downs. The combined write-down program is, however, unlikely to be sufficient to address the close to 180 billion euros in toxic assets held by Spanish banks. Furthermore, many of Spain's struggling banks will be unable to maintain the core tier-one capital ratio required by EU regulations without the government's assistance. Spanish banks will require an estimated 100 billion-250 billion euros in recapitalization later this year to reach this capital ratio target – a significant percentage of which will have to be shouldered by Madrid.
"The government takeover of Bankia is a clear policy reversal for the conservative administration of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, who for months insisted that no additional public funds were needed for the banks. Intervening on Bankia's behalf demonstrates the failure of Spain's banking consolidation strategy." (Stratfor)
We are talking the need for new Spanish-government
debt amounting to roughly 25% of GDP that will be needed just this year, and that's if
things don't deteriorate beyond present assumptions in their real estate
sector. Care to make a wager on how sound those assumptions are? About as sound
as Rajoy's assessment, only a few months ago, that no public money would be
needed, perhaps?
Let's do some basic math. Spanish banks took down some
€352 billion in the LTRO (created by the ECB), or over 1/3 of the total amount.
They have about €80 billion left after deposit outflows and buying sovereign
debt. Which will be needed to buy yet more Spanish government debt, so they can
be bailed out.
As near as I can tell, Spain is guaranteeing about $20
billion of the new IMF funds that will be used for a European bailout. Spain
already has $332 billion of liabilities to the ECB, $125 billion to the
stabilization fund, another $99 billion for something called the Macro
Financial Asset Fund, and various guarantees for other bank and European funds,
all of which totals over $600 billion, give or take. Their public debt-to-GDP
ratio is only 69%, but add in these other guarantees and commitments and you
get over 130% debt-to-GDP. And that is before they start bailing out their banks, and before any
additional debt from their fiscal deficit, which is running at 8%.
(Yes, I know they say it will be around 5%; but they
are in a deepening recession; unemployment is rising at an alarmingly high
rate, which lowers revenues and increases government spending; and their bond
costs are rising. Care to take the over/under bet on, say, a 7% fiscal deficit?
You get to be the under. Hmmm, I don't see many hands out there.)
Look at this chart of ten-year Spanish bonds:
Notice that rates came down when the LTRO was issued and Spanish banks had the
money to buy Spanish government debt. Why would they buy it? Because they got
to borrow money from the ECB at 1% for three years and could make a very fat
spread. Making a "free" 4% is a tried and true way to garner profits
that can be used to offset losses.
Once the LTRO was done, Spanish interest rates began
to climb. Note that they only briefly dipped below 5%.
I think I have this straight. Spain wants to guarantee
more bank debt that the banks will use to get more money from the ECB, which
will in turn be invested in Spanish bonds that will provide the money to run
higher deficits, which will…
This is somewhat like a destitute bar patron
guaranteeing his friend's tab so his friend will buy him more drinks. The ECB
is the bartender. European taxpayers are the bar owners. We know who pays the
tab in the end.
It seems quaint that only a few years ago the concern
in Europe was that there would be "contagion" risk resulting from a
Greek default. So worried were they that we had almost-daily pronouncements
that Greece would not be allowed to default, that there was no need for a Greek
default, the developed countries no longer defaulted, etc. Now that Greece has
defaulted, the line in the sand is "That was just Greece; no other country
will need to default."
But just in case, European leaders created all sorts
of funds, guaranteed joint and severally, to help bail out nations in trouble.
First Greece, then Ireland and Portugal. Even with all the money that was
raised, it was not enough to prevent a Greek default. And the "new"
debt is trading at around 10% of what the original was … as I was predicting
two years ago.
The austerity that was forced on Greece has resulted
in a backlash from Greek voters. The two ruling parties, basically run by two
families, had traded control of the government back and forth for 50 years.
Last week they could not even get 33% between them. In fact, no coalition can
be cobbled together from any of the splinter parties. There will now be new
elections, probably in June. Looking at the early polls, it is probable that a
coalition will form that will reject the enforced austerity. Which will of
course mean that Greece will not get the European funds it needs to be able to
pay for even the austerity programs. Which will make things worse and hasten
the departure of Greece from the euro.
Europe and the euro can survive without Greece. They
could even make it without Portugal. Ireland will merely default on the debt it
incurred from the ECB to bail out its banks, but will want to stay in the
eurozone.
But the euro needs Spain, to maintain a credible
standing, or so Germany evidently believes.
The next usual suspect is Italy. And indeed Italy will
soon be paying 5-6% of GDP just to cover the interest on its debt. If it were
not for interest, they would have an actual government surplus. While they are
making progress, a European recession is not going to make it any easier.
Let's move on from Italy. Let's consider France. They
just had an election, and to no one's surprise they voted a Socialist into the
office of president. And it appears likely he will get a majority in the
legislative branch as well, giving Hollande control of the government. What he
says he will do is get things under control by raising taxes to cover about 40%
of the deficit and cutting spending to cover the other needed 60% – although he
has not said what he will actually cut. He has pledged higher taxes on business
and top earners (75% taxes on earnings over €1 million), subsidies for
companies taking on younger and older workers, a partial reversal of the rise
in the retirement age to 62, a promise to hire 60,000 new teachers, and he will
take longer to get the budget under control than the current agreement with the
EU allows.
Brussels issued a rather stern warning today,
asserting that France must comply with the agreed-upon budgetary terms, which
will require a lot more taxes and/or cuts than Hollande is willing to do. And
whatever he decides, he has no easy task. France's acknowledged, official
debt-to-GDP is 86%; but when you include their various commitments to the ECB,
the ESFS, ESM, EIB, etc., the number rises to about 146%. Not all of that
requires France to make the interest payments, but just to cover any losses in
case of a default. But that 86% number is rising rather rapidly.
And their problems are not a short-term cyclical
issue. They have committed to relatively larger entitlements and pensions than
even here in the US! And those bills are coming due in the same time frame as
in the US. It does not get any easier, and the French are notoriously unwilling
to accept cuts in pensions or labor conditions. Want to touch agricultural
subsidies? Want to see more tractors and burning tires on the Champs-Élysées?
Just saying.
France has not balanced its budget since 1974. Note
that the budget deficits are over 8% for the last few years (but not as bad as
US deficits!), and now they have a negative trade balance.
Hollande campaigned explicitly on an anti-austerity platform. Angela Merkel campaigned for his opponent, Sarkozy. Not exactly the basis for a lasting friendship. And the rest of Europe is watching closely to see how this all works out. What will Germany do? Louis Gave (living in Hong Kong but still very French) writes:
Hollande campaigned explicitly on an anti-austerity platform. Angela Merkel campaigned for his opponent, Sarkozy. Not exactly the basis for a lasting friendship. And the rest of Europe is watching closely to see how this all works out. What will Germany do? Louis Gave (living in Hong Kong but still very French) writes:
"Assuming this program [Hollande's pledges to increase spending, raise taxes, etc.] ends badly, then France will need friends. Fortunately, the head of the IMF happens to be French, though this may be a double-edged sword, as Christine Lagarde cannot be seen giving France a privileged deal. In light of this rhetoric, and his promise of more spending, it is hard to think that Hollande and Angela Merkel will become fast friends. Meanwhile, Hollande's promise that his first act will be to pull France's troops out of Afghanistan is unlikely to endear him to the US administration. In short, France will soon need friends, but those may be as rare as an interesting French presidential candidate. Meanwhile, we have to hope that, like Groucho Marx, Hollande is a man who will declare 'These are my principles and if you don't like them, I can change them.'"
The Economist recently wrote:
"Although one ratings agency has stripped France of its AAA status, its borrowing costs remain far below Italy's and Spain's (though the spread above Germany's has risen). France has enviable economic strengths: an educated and productive workforce, more big firms in the global Fortune 500 than any other European country, and strength in services and high-end manufacturing.
"However, the fundamentals are much grimmer. France has not balanced its books since 1974. Public debt stands at 90% of GDP and rising. Public spending, at 56% of GDP, gobbles up a bigger chunk of output than in any other euro-zone country – more even than in Sweden. The banks are under-capitalized. Unemployment is higher than at any time since the late 1990s and has not fallen below 7% in nearly 30 years, creating chronic joblessness in the crime-riddenbanlieues that ring France's big cities. Exports are stagnating while they roar ahead in Germany. France now has the euro zone's largest current-account deficit in nominal terms. Perhaps France could live on credit before the financial crisis, when borrowing was easy. Not anymore. Indeed, a sluggish and unreformed France might even find itself at the center of the next euro crisis."
The banks of France are over 4 times the size of
French GDP. The markets have been punishing the larger banks, with some of them
down almost 90%. Look at this graph for Societe Generale:
While French banks are not the problem that Spanish banks are, they are far larger relative to the size of their home country. Even a small problem can be large for the country. And French banks have very large exposure to European peripheral debt. A default by Spain would push them (and a lot of other European banks) over the edge. Which is one reason that Sarkozy was so loudly insistent that any bank problems should be treated as a European problem and not the problem of the host country. (Interesting idea if you are Irish!) France simply cannot afford to deal with any problems in its banks while it is running such large deficits. And not while it is guaranteeing all sorts of European debt, which is at the heart of the problem. Germany needs France to help shoulder the financial burdens of Europe. And as long as France can keep its AAA rating, Germany has a partner. But if France loses that rating, then any European debt it guarantees clearly loses that rating as well.
While French banks are not the problem that Spanish banks are, they are far larger relative to the size of their home country. Even a small problem can be large for the country. And French banks have very large exposure to European peripheral debt. A default by Spain would push them (and a lot of other European banks) over the edge. Which is one reason that Sarkozy was so loudly insistent that any bank problems should be treated as a European problem and not the problem of the host country. (Interesting idea if you are Irish!) France simply cannot afford to deal with any problems in its banks while it is running such large deficits. And not while it is guaranteeing all sorts of European debt, which is at the heart of the problem. Germany needs France to help shoulder the financial burdens of Europe. And as long as France can keep its AAA rating, Germany has a partner. But if France loses that rating, then any European debt it guarantees clearly loses that rating as well.
S&P has already taken France down one notch to AA+
and still has a negative outlook. Moody’s has warned of a possible downgrade to
France. Italy now has a BBB+ rating, just below that of Spain. When you look at
the actual balance sheet and total debt, France is not all that far from
further downgrades, unless it embraces a new budget ethic, which is precisely
what Hollande has said he will not do.
That would be a real crisis for the eurozone. German
voters might not be willing to shoulder the European burden without a full
partner in France. And if France had to guarantee a great deal more
pan-European debt, while it continued to run deficits and, God forbid, had a
crisis in one or more of its banks, it would be putting its credit rating at
risk.
Is there any wonder about the timing of the Bundesbank
retreat? They looked at Greek and French elections and then at the ongoing
Spanish crisis, which is trending from very bad to awful with a risk of
horrific. They glanced at the balance sheets of their own banks and those of
French banks vis-à-vis sovereign debt from peripheral Europe, then took a peek
at German-voter polls and flipped through their own balance sheet, and decided
that the only entity with enough money to stem the crisis was the ECB. And that
means a “little” inflation.
I think the vast majority of Germans (and to be fair,
the entire world) have no idea how many trillions of euros are going to be
needed to keep patching the leaky ship that is the eurozone. It is even
possible that most German politicians actually think it might only be 3%
inflation.
Spain is too big to save and too big to fail. The only
way for Spanish debt to remain at 6% is for the ECB to basically buy it (or
lend to Spanish banks so they can buy it, or whatever creative new program
Draghi and team can think up). When Spain goes, it is just a matter of time
before we lose Italy and then, yes, even France. The line must be drawn with
Spain. And the only outfit with a balance sheet big enough that can also do it
in a politically acceptable manner is the ECB, and the only way they can do it
is with a printing press.
Will it buy time? Yes, but time for what? To fix
government deficits? To deal with bank debts? Sovereign debt? To somehow solve
the massive trade imbalances between Germany and the European periphery? To
force voters to accept a fiscal union? In the midst of a crisis? If there is
some conspiratorial cabal that has a secret plan, they have kept it well
hidden. Because from here it looks like they are making up the “plan” as they
go along.
Their actual intentions are no secret. They will do
whatever it takes to keep the European Union and eurozone together. And
whatever it takes is a very open-ended plan. But it is going to cost them
trillions of euros.
Someone is going to have to pay that bar bill. And
there’s going to be one helluva hangover.
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