by
John Aziz
In today’s world, there are
many who want government to regulate and control everything. The most bizarre
instance, though — more bizarre even than banning the sale of large-sized
sugary drinks — is surely central banking.
Why? Well, central banking was
created to replace something that was already working well. Banking panics and
bank runs happen, and they have always happened as long as there has been
banking.
But the old system that the Fed displaced wasn’t really malfunctioning — unlike what the defenders of central banking today would have us believe. Following the Panic of 1907, a group of private bankers led by J.P. Morgan successfully bailed out the system by acting as lender of last resort. The amount of new liquidity disbursed into the system was set not by academics like Ben Bernanke, but by experienced market participants. And because the money was directed from private purses, rather than being created out of thin air, only assets and companies with value were bought up.
The rationale of the supporters of the Federal Reserve Act was that a central banking liquidity mechanism would act as a safeguard against such events, to act as a permanent lender-of-last-resort backed by government fiat. They wanted something bigger and better than a private response.
Yet the Banking Panic of 1907
— a comparable market drop to both 1929 or 2008 — didn’t result in a residual
depression.
The largest economic crisis of the 20th century was the Great Depression, but the second most significant economic upheaval was the panic of 1907. It was from beginning to end a banking and financial crisis. With the failure of the Knickerbocker Trust Company, the stock market collapsed, loan supply vanished and a scramble for liquidity ensued. Banks defaulted on their obligations to redeem deposits in currency or gold.
Milton
Friedman and Anna Schwartz, in their classic “A Monetary History of the United
States,” found “much similarity in its early phases” between the Panic of 1907
and the Great Depression. So traumatic was the crisis that it gave rise to the
National Monetary Commission and the recommendations that led to the creation
of the Federal Reserve. The May panic
triggered a massive recession that saw real gross national product shrink in
the second half of 1907 and plummet by an extraordinary 8.2% in 1908. Yet the
economy came roaring back and, in two short years, was 7% bigger than when the
panic started.
Ben Bernanke, widely seen as
the pre-eminent scholar of the Great Depression thought things would be much,
much better under his watch. After all, he has claimed that he understood the
lessons of Friedman and Schwartz who criticised the 1930s Federal Reserve for
continuing to contract the money supply, worsening the Great Depression; M2 in
1933 was just 72% of its 1929 peak.
So a bigger crash and
liquidation in 1907 allowed the economy to roar back, and continue growing.
Meanwhile, in today’s controlled, planned and dependent world of central
liquidity insurance, quantitative easing and TARP, growth remains anaemic four
years after the crash. Have the last four years proven conclusively that
central banking — even after the lessons of the 1930s — is inferior to the free
market?
Certainly, Bernanke’s response
to 2008 has been superior to the 1930s Fed — M2 has not dropped by anything
like what it did from 1929:
Industrial production has not
fallen by as significant an amount as 1929, nor has homebuilding. And there are
many other wide-scale economic differences between 1907 and 2008 in terms of
the shape of the economy, and the shape of employment, the capital structure,
and the wider geopolitical reality. But
the bounce-back is still vastly inferior to the free-market reality
of 1907. I think there are greater problems to central
banking, ones of which Friedman, Schwartz and Bernanke were unaware (but of
which Rothbard and von Mises were acutely aware).
Does
central banking retard the economy by providing liquidity insurance and a backstop
to bad companies that would not otherwise be saved under a free market
“bailout” (like that of 1907)? And is it this effect — that I call
zombification — that is the force that has prevented Japan from fully
recovering from its housing bubble, and that is keeping the West depressed from
2008? Will we only return to growth once the bad assets and bad companies have
been liquidated? That conclusion, I think, is becoming inescapable.
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