By MARK SKOUSEN
“Austerity” has become the watchword of the year. Governors, prime
ministers, and presidents around the world are talking about cutting welfare
benefits, curtailing public union power, and reducing deficits. We’ve
over-promised at the public trough, and now we must pay the price. Whoever is
elected president in November is going to face the need to retrench.
Yet only one school of economic thought, that of Friedrich Hayek and
Ludwig von Mises, predicted and prescribed austerity before the Great
Recession. More prominent branches of free-market economics, no less than the
spendthrift left, have been slow to realize that neither fiscal nor monetary
stimulus can cure what ails the West. As the psalmist says, “The rejected stone
has become the chief cornerstone.”
Nobody in power was talking austerity in 2008, when the financial crisis
hit. Big government and its patron saint, John Maynard Keynes, were in the saddle,
with Republicans and Democrats falling over each other to run up deficits and
pass the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Keynes’s biographer, Robert Skidelsky,
came out with a bestseller, The Return of the Master.
The monetarists, meanwhile, students of Milton Friedman and the Chicago school of economics, were extravagant in their own way. The Federal Reserve’s Ben Bernanke had told Friedman on his 90th birthday, in 2002, “You’re right, we did it”—causing the Great Depression by allowing the money supply to collapse—“We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.” Yet what was the monetarist response to the crisis?
Central bankers and professors of money and banking answered as one:
Inject liquidity! Cut interest rates! Over the next two years, Bernanke
instituted two rounds of “quantitative easing” (QE1 and QE2), a duplicitous
name for printing money, and adopted a zero interest rate policy (ZIRP). He was
convinced that Friedman would be smiling down from the Pearly Gates.
Maybe he’s right about that—or half-right. Last month on the London
Underground I ran into Paul Krugman, last of the old “crude” Keynesian breed.
He was in the city to promote his book, End This Depression Now! For the next half hour, we debated the
causes and cures of the Great Recession. Krugman insisted that we need to
double or triple the deficit—but only in the short run. “We must eventually
adopt austerity.” He paraphrased St. Augustine: “Give me austerity, but not
yet.”
I asked him if there was anyone equal to him in debate. He couldn’t
think of anyone, so I suggested Milton Friedman—a safe bet because Friedman
died in late 2006. Krugman nodded reverently, but insisted, “If Milton Friedman
were alive today, he would be anathema to the Tea Party Republicans because he
would have favored easy money to end this crisis.”
“But not TARP and the deficits,” I replied. Krugman sheepishly nodded.
Friedman was convinced by the empirical data that fiscal activism—deficit
spending—was unnecessary and even counterproductive. Monetary policy could do
all the heavy lifting. British monetarist Tim Congdon confirms this. In his
excellent and underappreciated work Money
in the Free Economy, Congdon cites Friedman’s denigration of fiscal
policy: “A deficit is not stimulating because it has to be financed, and the
negative effects of financing it counterbalance the positive effects, if there
are any, of spending.”
Massive government expenditures and deficits during World War II
appeared to get us out of the Great Depression. But wait—Friedman was quick to
point out that monetary policy was also activist: M2 grew at a 20 percent
annualized clip from 1940-45. In another famous example, the Kennedy-Johnson
tax cut of 1964 engineered by the Keynesians appeared to be stimulative. But
wait—monetary policy was also expansionary during this time.
Congdon, following Friedman’s lead, looks at natural experiments where
fiscal and monetary policy moved in opposite directions to see which one
dominated. Monetary policy won out in almost every case. He observes that in
1981 the Thatcher government in Great Britain raised taxes by £4 billion in a
recession, while adopting expansionary monetary policy. Three-hundred and
sixty-four Keynesian economists signed a statement in The
Times decrying
the move and predicting economic collapse. Yet the economy roared. Why? Because
monetary policy was liberal at the time, offsetting fiscal austerity. Congdon
concludes: “Contrary to a large number of textbooks, the size of the
government’s budget deficit is by itself not necessarily of any importance to
aggregate demand.”
If he were alive, Friedman would not be surprised that trillion-dollar
deficits have had little impact in stimulating the U.S. economy. What
government gives, private business takes away. Despite record profits and
historically low interest rates, corporations are holding back on spending and
hiring because of the uncertainty caused by wasteful government spending.
The deficits have run their course without success, leaving us with
mounds of debt and interest payments. Monetary easing, Friedman would agree, is
the only game in town. But even easy money is not having the effect it once
did. Mises said it best: “We have outlived the short run, and are now suffering
from the long-run consequences of [Keynesian-monetarist] economics.”
The Great Recession is in its fourth year, and the legacy of
big-government macroeconomics is long indeed—unsustainable and chronic deficit
spending; permanent easy money; excessive dependence on the welfare state (with
46 million on food stamps); overregulation (including Sarbanes-Oxley and
Dodd-Frank); an anti-saving, debt-ridden consumer society; deteriorating public
infrastructure; economic stagnation; and a stop-start market on Wall Street.
Political leaders around the world are looking for a new model with which to
restore prosperity and economic stability.
What about the supply-siders? Tax cuts play a role in encouraging
economic growth, but in an age of rising deficits legislators are reluctant to
slash rates aggressively. Supply-siders blundered in the past decade by
repeatedly contending that “deficits don’t matter” and assuming that we could
grow our way out. Unfortunately, without constitutional restrictions on
government spending, increased revenues from more efficient tax policies simply
lead to more spending without solving the deficit problem.
There is only one school that consistently defends the classical model
of fiscal and monetary responsibility as established by Adam Smith in The
Wealth of Nations. And that is the school of austerity, led by the
Austrian economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek—whom Krugman
laughingly calls the “Austerians.” But nobody is laughing anymore.
Who is the anointed economist of austerity? The leading theoretician appears
to be Friedrich Hayek. Who would have thought that the austere Hayek would make
a comeback after the financial crisis of 2008? He is the only Austrian to have
won the Nobel Prize in economics, but until now his reputation has languished
in the shade of Milton Friedman’s sun.
Perhaps the best example of Hayek’s resurrection is a bestselling book
by British economist Nicholas Wapshott, Keynes-Hayek: The Clash That Defined
Modern Economics. Even a popular rap song, “Fear the Boom and
Bust,” has come out of the debate between Keynes and Hayek. (Google “Keynes
Hayek” and it’s the first result to pop up.) The rap song is the brainchild of
musician John Papola and George Mason University economics professor Russ
Roberts. It’s a favorite way on campuses to explain the ideological divide in
macroeconomics.
Why isn’t Milton Friedman the nemesis of Keynesian economics? Because
during a crisis, he is not a classical economist. While he opposed fiscal
stimulus, he advocated easy money to keep the economy from collapsing. Hayek
and his mentor Mises are the real enemies of big government. Hard-core
Austrians are true believers in the classical model of fiscal and monetary
restraint, even during a Great Recession.
The first debate between Keynes and Hayek took place in the 1930s and is
recounted in Wapshott’s book and in chapter 12 of my own Making
of Modern Economics. Hayek, then teaching at the London School of
Economics, opposed Keynes’s prescription of deficit spending and easy money to
get out of the Great Depression. Hayek defended the classical “Treasury” view
that governments, like the private sector, should cut costs and prudently live
within their means even during downturns. He excoriated easy money as well,
which he said would only make matters worse. If the central bank had any
legitimate role, it was as a lender of last resort—but along the lines
described by Walter Bagehot, who advocated in Lombard Street (1873) that the central bank lend
money to troubled banks at higher, not lower, interest rates.
The Great Depression was so deep and long that eventually Keynes won the
debate, at least in the minds of policy-makers. Hayek fell into obscurity and
turned to political writing, producing his bestselling Road
to Serfdom (1944) and The
Constitution of Liberty (1960).
After Hayek shared the 1974 Nobel Prize in economics with socialist Gunnar
Myrdal amid the inflationary stagnation of that decade, interest in his
economic thinking rose, but he still played a smaller role on stage than Milton
Friedman—who won the Nobel in 1976—and the supply-siders.
Hayek, building on the original work of Ludwig von Mises, developed a
macro model of the economy and the Austrian theory of the business cycle.
Austrian macroeconomics is a sophisticated improvement in the classical model,
while Keynesian macroeconomics seeks to demolish the House that Adam Smith
built.
Hayek and the Austrians contend that easy-money policies—expanding the
fiat money supply and artificially lowering interest rates below the natural
rate—lead to structural imbalances in the economy that are not sustainable.
Austrians predict that the Fed’s policies of QE and ZIRP will inevitably lead
to further asset bubbles in the stock market, manufacturing, exports, and real
estate, depending on who gets the money first. As Mises taught, “Money is never
neutral.”
The Austrians conclude that the boom-bust cycle is not a natural
phenomenon under free-enterprise capitalism but is caused by government
intervention in the monetary sphere. A legitimate international gold standard
and “freely competitive banking” would minimize the risks of a boom-bust cycle.
(Incidentally, the Austrians are the only school of economics today that
defends the classical model of the gold standard.)
Until the 2008 crisis, the Keynesians and monetarists were unconcerned
about asset bubbles. A bear market in housing prices or high-tech stocks would,
they thought, only have a marginal impact on the global economy and could
easily be countered by deft monetary stimulus. The market recovered from the
1988-90 real estate bust and from the 2001-2002 dot-com stock-market collapse
without a global meltdown, for example.
The real-estate/mortgage bust of 2008 changed all that, and suddenly the
focus shifted to the only school that argued all along that “asset bubbles” had
macroeconomic effects: the Austrians. Since then, the Austrians and their
primary advocate, Friedrich Hayek, have been in the limelight, popularized by
financial gurus like Peter Schiff and political figures like Ron Paul.
Management theorist Peter Drucker once predicted that the “next economics”
would have to come from the “supply side, productive sector,” by which he meant
the Austrians. He had in mind Joseph Schumpeter of “creative destruction” fame,
but Hayek will do.
In May, I visited Poland for the first time to give a series of lectures
on Austrian economics. Most of my books have been translated into Polish,
thanks to energetic publisher Jan Fijor. My lectures were packed with business
leaders, academics, and students who had an insatiable interest in Austrian
economics and finance.
Eastern Europe, in particular, is taking a Viennese waltz down the
economy. Leaders there are focused on adopting sound monetary and fiscal
policies along the classical/Austrian lines. The supply-side flat tax movement
is also popular.
Right now Estonia is in the limelight because it’s the fastest-growing
economy in the region, expanding at a 7.6 percent rate. It is the only eurozone
country with a budget surplus. National debt is just 6 percent of GDP. How did
they bounce back from the devastating 2008-09 crisis?
“I can answer in [three] words,” states Peeter Koppel, investment
strategist at the SEB Bank: “Austerity, austerity, austerity.” Estonia went
through three years of belt-tightening. Public sector wages were cut, the
pension age was raised, benefits were reduced. “It was very difficult, but we
managed it,” explains Juhan Parts, Estonia’s minister of economy and
communication. This “little country that could” is now leading the way to
recovery and prosperity. The Austrian way.
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