By PHILLIP BLOND
We live in a society of decreasing circles. More and
more of us know fewer and fewer of us. We live alone and eat by ourselves,
often with a TV or computer rather than a human being for company. If we do
marry, the time an average relationship lasts decreases with each passing year.
In the Anglo-Saxon world, we abandon our old and increasingly care badly
for our young. Our grandparents can recall a vivid life in which aunts and
uncles, nephews and nieces wove together the social fabric of a stable, mutual
society. Nearly half of all children are born out of wedlock. Many grow up
without a father, some without any loving parent at all. The young people
emerging from this background, denied any real education in public and private
virtues, are easily seduced by glamorous dreams that promise consumption they
cannot afford. Untouched by ideals of love and fidelity, they operate free of
commitment, discipline, and responsibility. These unreformed teenage idioms
become adult habits and ruin lives by creating people unable to bond or relate.
For men, especially those at the bottom of the social scale who are
increasingly losing out in education and career advancement, an emasculated
life at the margins of society awaits. For successful young women, having a
degree is fast becoming an indicator of a childless future. No one would choose
this outcome nor wish it upon anyone else, not least because it drains the
energy from domestic life and compounds the terrifying fate of getting old
alone. Everywhere we look, the ties that bind are loosening, and the
foundations of a secure and joyful existence are being undermined.
What is the origin of this degradation? Looking back over the past 30 years, we could blame longer working hours that families must put in, a situation itself compounded by the financial necessity that in most households both adults must work, higher levels of personal debt, job insecurity, distrust of institutions, and fear of each other. Our society has become like a ladder whose rungs are growing further and further apart so it is increasingly difficult to ascend. Those at the top have accelerated away from the rest of us by practicing a self-serving and state-sanctioned capitalism that knows no morals and exists only to finance its own excess. Those in the middle are being crushed by bureaucracy and the effort of squaring stagnating wages with higher demands. Those at the bottom are more isolated and despised than ever before.
But decisive as these factors are, they do not add up to the social disaster that we are living through and that many, perversely, increasingly regard as normal. A healthier society could have resisted these trends. A society that still had strong families could have ensured a lifestyle that secured rather than undermined the economic base of the household. A society that still had neighbors who knew one another could have created trusting communities, and they could have produced institutions that served the needs of people rather than the bureaucratic demands of a distant and hostile state.
But through the privileging of alternative lifestyles, the prioritizing
of minority politics, and the capture of markets by monopolies, we have
destroyed the sustained and sustaining society. Little wonder that in a world
in which binding norms, civil behavior, and notions of the common good have
ceased to exist, frightened, isolated individuals call upon an increasingly
authoritarian state to impose the order that we can no longer create for
ourselves.
The loss of our culture is best understood as the disappearance of civil
society. Only two powers remain: the state and the market. We no longer have,
in any effective independent way, local government, churches, trade unions,
cooperative societies, or civic organizations that operate on the basis of more
than single issues. In the past, these institutions were a means for ordinary
people to exercise power. Now mutual communities have been replaced with
passive, fragmented individuals. Civil spaces have either vanished or become
subject-domains of the dictatorial state or the monopolized market.
Neither Left nor Right can offer an answer because both ideologies have
collapsed as both have become the same. Those who construe the libertarian
individual as the center of current rightist thought actually draw upon an
extreme Left conception that finds its original expression in Rousseau, who
held that society was primordial imprisonment. It was Rousseau whose social
theory forced the diversity of the world to conform to the general will—which
was but this same individualism writ large—thereby sponsoring the rationalist
and secular red terror of the French Revolution. In fact, any anarchic
construal of the self requires for its social realization an authoritarian
statism to control the forces that are unleashed. Collectivism and
individualism are but two sides of the same devalued and degraded currency. And
this has been the history of recent modernity—an oscillation between the state
and the individual that gradually erodes civil association, which is in reality
the only check on the extremes of either.
The 1960s New Left, to counter the authoritarian state it created, built
a personal zone free of control in which to repudiate all standards and sell
the poisonous idea of liberation through chemical and sexual experimentation.
But when these New Left individualists preached personal pleasure as a means of
public salvation, they were not resisting state control. They were, through
their demands for freedom without limit and life without responsibility,
undermining all autonomous self-governing structures, leaving a dreadful legacy
of anarchic individualism that required state authoritarianism as the only way
to re-impose order and society. Contemporary libertarian individualism and
statist collectivism created each other and are locked in a fatal embrace that
destroys the civic middle and the life and economy of the associative citizen.
This whole scenario dawned on me when I realized that my left-wing
friends didn’t really believe in community. They only believed in choice. They
supported abortion because they found it validating, a demonstration of real
personal autonomy. But they think that fox hunting is terribly cruel and so
should be ardently opposed. No doubt the same dispensation finds similar
expression in the United States.
The Left harbors a deep and abiding hatred of fixity and tradition, a
loathing of anything settled. In Anthony Giddens’s Third Way—the
book that was behind the Blair revolution in Britain—he talks about how a new
cosmopolitanism will free people from nature, and one gets the sense that Cool
Britannia so envisaged is the permanent destruction of taboo and tie. According
to the Blairite radicals we have to constantly rewrite ourselves by a willful
assertion that wipes the slate clean and lets us begin again through the
permanent act of choice—as long as such volition shows no teleology or
direction. Nobody is told what to choose because the moral act in our
contemporary paradigm isn’t what is chosen, it’s the act of choosing itself.
Indeed, to choose is to repristinate and repeat the idea of oneself as an
isolated, atomistic agent.
The contemporary Right all too often believes exactly the same thing,
but expresses it through economics. The dominant actor for right-wing theory is
the self-interested individual. The invisible hand is meant to mediate goods
and allocate resources according to the price system and the efficient market
cycle. But that “free” market produced a massive centralization in capital, and
it fed an asset bubble whose expansion and disastrous contraction has been
underwritten by the state.
What has been exposed is the shared agenda of cultural libertarianism on
the Left and economic libertarianism on the Right. There really was no
difference between them because both were upholding the same perverted liberal
ideology.
The breaking of that ideology began in the United Kingdom when David
Cameron was elected as Conservative leader and began using the phrase “broken
Britain” to refer to the dislocation that was happening in our society.
Suddenly conservatives were talking about social justice, and it wasn’t the
failed form of “compassionate conservatism.” It was a revival of an original
One Nation Toryism that was acutely concerned with the interests of the bottom
half of the population.
This was violently attacked by the Left. Liberal journalists were caught
in a bind: “This is nonsense. The lives of the poor are fine. Oh no, we can’t
say that: we’re left-wing. Well, it’s not broken, it’s just different. If
people want to have seven partners in one week and to take drugs in front of
their children, that’s their choice. But wait, that can’t be right. We just
won’t talk about it then.” The Left was completely wrong-footed, and
conservatism, which had been out of power for three elections and could easily
have been out for another, rose to the top of the polls by adopting the mantle
of social justice.
This was not wholly unique. During the 19th century, the Tories were far
more radical and more inclined toward the cause of the poor than were the
liberal Whigs. It was the conservatives who largely led the campaign against
slavery, who argued that the conditions of the white working class in the mills
were analogous to those of black slaves, and who pushed for reduced working
hours. It was the Tories who through the factory acts opposed the Whigs forcing
women and children to work 16 hours a day.
Conservatives need to look back to William Cobbett, Thomas Carlyle, and
John Ruskin, who were critics of authoritarian statism as well as denouncers of
self-serving capitalism. As conservatives, they hated the cultural consequences
of industrialization—the creation of a landless, dispossessed mass forced to
work at subsistence levels, cut off from any cultural enrichment. Then came
Hilaire Belloc’s 1912 tour de force, The Servile State, in which he denounced both
capitalism and socialism for instituting master-slave relations. The capitalist
monopolizes land, ownership, and capital, forcing the formerly self-sufficient
to work for subsistence wages. The socialist dispossesses in the name of
general ownership and communal monopoly. For the worker, both have the same
result.
Because this new conservatism echoes a nobler and more radical past, it
has great resonance. But it is still allied with the idea of the old neoliberal
model of markets. Conservatives can care for social justice, but they still
have to support the political economy that had done great damage to the bottom
half of society. In 1976, the bottom 50 percent of the British population had 12
percent of the wealth (excluding property). By 2003, that percentage had fallen
to 1 percent. So much for the idea that assets and equity will through market
mechanisms evenly distribute themselves. A recent UK government survey showed
that asset inequality between the 90th percentile and the bottom tenth was 100
to 1—a massive capture of assets by those at the top of the tree.
Now I view myself a pro-market thinker who advocates a popular
capitalism and is persuaded by what the utopic thought on the Right wanted: a
market economy of widely disbursed property, of multiple centers of innovation,
of the decentralization of capital, wealth, and power. But neoliberalism has
delivered none of these things. It has instead produced centralization;
reduction in plurality; the driving upward, not the driving downward, of
opportunity, leverage, and innovation. It has re-inscribed the very things it
purported to end.
A vast body of citizens has been stripped of its culture by the Left and
its capital by the Right, and in such nakedness they enter the trading floor of
life with only their labor to sell. These individuals created by the
market-state settlement cannot form a genuine society, for they lack the social
capital to create such an association or the economic basis to sustain it. All
neoliberalism has done is change class to caste and cut people off from the
means whereby self-improvement can result in a genuine change in circumstance.
But most people don’t know what has unhinged their lives, what has
driven them and us apart from each other. We don’t know why the ideology we
spout and the language that we claim as our own has delivered a situation
radically different from what they purport. Liberalism has linked Left and
Right into the most illiberal political formation we have yet crafted. I attack
it in my book from the point of view of liberty itself:
I am in part appalled by the legacy of modern
liberalism precisely because I take myself to be a true liberal. I believe in a
free society, where human beings, under the protection of law and guidance of
virtue, pursue their own account of the good in debate with those who differ
from them and in concord with those who agree. Since in this life we cannot
know all that can be known and all human knowledge is conditioned by our own
lives and the culture in which we are immersed, we can never transcend this
condition and know directly and completely the ultimate principle of everything
that exists…
But it does not follow that there is nothing to be
known. Unfortunately, all too many British students, who have suffered the
misfortune of ten weeks of bad French philosophy, or empiricistic analytic
philosophy of a more homegrown kind, emerge from university with the deep and
abiding conviction that there is no such thing as objective truth and that
everything cultural is arbitrary. They carry into their twenties and beyond the
view that any claim about truth is hierarchical and therefore synonymous with fascism
and all manner of evil and conservative consequences. Happily convinced by the
radical import of this message, too many of our talented young people give up
on the possibility of transformative politics and assiduously work their way
into the managerial and governing class of our country. Once there, with
self-interest duly satisfied, they repeat and institutionalize the same
compliant liberal nostrums, which ironically translate into increasingly
centralized and bureaucratic procedures that exclude the poor and those who
have not been so well-positioned or so well-advantaged to work the system.
While the idea of a universal relativism doesn’t survive the first brush with
serious rational reflection, such juvenile dictums have permeated our governing
elite and undermined the foundations of all our great institutions…
If we are just empty, atomized individuals whose only mode of progress
is whim and personal inclination, then no common bond can exist between us,
because bonds limit will and subject us to something other than ourselves. For
the liberal, there is no more profound violation than that. Moreover, a
self-interested individual needs the state to police relationships with other
individuals. Ergo, extreme individualism leads to extreme collectivization—and
back again.
This defines our political life. The Left loves collectivization: the
state is a moral proxy for anything I do; the state protects my rights so my
little individualisms can subsist and my cultural liberalism can then be
defended by the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the Right enforces an economic system
that supports exactly that vision.
Those dominant oscillations in the West—between the extreme liberalism
of the Right and the extreme collectivization of the Left—are one in the same
and subtend from the same origin: from a violent, secular liberalism that broke
with the antique model of liberty and has essentially destroyed both the Left
and the Right.
I want to suggest three ways to move forward: economic, political, and
social.
First, we must acknowledge that the whole of our free-market economy has
been captured by the Chicago School. Because we’re only focused within
competition law on price utility as the interpreter of what would be a good
outcome, the bigger your company, the cheaper you can deliver goods. So we
pursue monopoly in the name of freedom and asset capture in the name of wealth
extension. What we have produced as a result, from the Right, is a whole
ideology of competition but no competitors. We’ve created a condition in which
large businesses dominate—via a rigged market of rent-seeking capital—in an
economy that cuts off for the majority the path to mobility and prosperity.
What do you do for people who aren’t that clever, or that well
positioned, or that rich, but who are hard-working? Well, it’s permanently low
wages for you—and for your children, and your children’s children. You say you
would like to open a store or a business, to have some financial autonomy?
Well, we can’t have that. The truth is, we can’t create a situation in which
you could prosper because you can’t compete—you can’t bully suppliers, you
can’t cross subsidize, you can’t access the supply chains that are already
controlled by the new monopolies, so you can’t capture the price utility that
those big concerns can. (No matter that the corporate model is subsidized by
various tax breaks.) Consequently, there is no route out for many of those in
the bottom half of the population.
Until we can change that economic structure, we cannot break the law. So
staying within the private sector, we need to adopt an older liberal model and
broaden it with a Catholic, distributist, or even Austrian account of the
notion of various plural senses to give human beings a chance at a stake in the
world. An economy not wedded to a single market model susceptible to the winds
of global finance could spread wealth throughout the sectors, creating a
resilient and plural economy capable of self-sustaining in the face of the
collapse of one segment.
I believe in the free market, but we haven’t had a free market. In a
brilliant paper, the head of monetary stability at the Bank of England, Andrew
Haldane, recently asked why the speculative economy has done so well. Because
the state has taken all the risks. Capital will always seek the highest return,
and if you look at the rise of the state and the way it has legislated the
banking sector, it has essentially (through deposit, capital, and liquidity
insurance) taken on the risk of investment banking activity. Investment bankers
can take any risk and not pay any price. Because of this, all capital is
centralized. Why would you go to Wisconsin to open a smelting plant when you
can get a much safer and higher return in Wall Street or the City of London
because you are engaging in the highest return activity at a risk premium
covered by the taxpayer? The most you can lose in high finance is your original
stake, and sometimes not even that, as there seems no limit to what the state
will do for finance capital. If you add up all the debt in the UK—personal,
state, and corporate—it comes to 468 percent of GDP. This could mean 10 to 20
years of de-leveraging—a generational economic contraction. There’s nothing
free about that.
Along with the private sector being captured by big capital, the public
sector has been captured by the big state. The public sector should be broken
up—not privatized out, so that big-money interests could essentially gain the
difference between the wages of those in the public sector and the wages they
were prepared to pay, but turned into employee-owned co-ops. Let’s have worker
buy-outs instead of multi-leveraged management buyouts that game both
stakeholders and workers. Let them de-layer and de-managerialize their own
professions, and let them have a stake and deliver the service they’ve always
wanted.
In terms of public assistance, I argue for a power of budgetary capture.
Millions of welfare dollars are spent, yet all that ever does is make
recipients passive. Ordinary people, recipients of public largesse, can’t in
any way create the associations and culture that can be part of their own
renewal. So why not allow citizens’ groups to take over government budgets and
run them for themselves? Imagine women bonding together because they don’t want
to see their children fall into crime and degradation. In giving these people
power over their own communities with the public money that has been
subsidizing rather than transforming their lives, we will be giving the poor
capital. And if they can gain access to the market, they might really create
the free economy that everyone has been claiming but no one has been
delivering. Then we’ll have a situation in which the state won’t regulate the
small and the intermediate out of existence, a situation in which people can
genuinely compete.
In the political realm, we have to admit that democracy doesn’t work
particularly well, mainly because it’s hugely centralized and substantially
captured by vested interests. We need to turn it upside-down—a doctrine of
radical democratic subsidiarity that would allow local associations both to
select and vote for their own candidates. We can’t do that in the current
political settlement. It’s too locked; there are too many vested interests. But
if, like budgetary capture, we had a democratic capture, we could send
democracy back to the streets. If we could ally that political economy with
actual democracy, we could really have bottom-up associations and render the
central state increasingly superfluous.
This sort of subsidiarity isn’t a fetishization of the small. It’s a
belief in the most appropriate, and that can even be large transnational
corporations. I don’t, for example, believe in a localized nuclear industry. In
addition, there will always be a role for the state as a kind of ultimate guild
or virtue culture that can step in when things go wrong. In that view, it’s not
Robert Nozick’s night-watchman state nor is it the centralized state of the
Fabian socialists. The state becomes a facilitator of the sort of outcome it
wants, but it has to be agnostic as to how people realize that outcome. And
only if the outcome isn’t being realized—for instance, if poor people aren’t
being educated—should it step in.
Finally, the real recovery has to come in civil society itself. Society
should be what rules, what regulates, what is sovereign. Both the state and the
market must be subservient to renewed civil association. This requires a
restoration of social conservatism that recognizes the claim of the common good
over the free agency of the individual. Rather than being a reactionary force
that makes war on minorities or vilifies one-parent families, it should, for
example, promote the understanding of the family as a feminist institution that
because of its reciprocity and mutuality liberates both men and women to pursue
the ends that most of them want, which is human flourishing, probably involving
children. It should also reach beyond the family to restore the social square.
Placing people in relational matrices recreates for those who don’t have a nuclear
family the possibility of a civic and extended one.
In Britain, there’s a part of Birmingham called Castle Vale that has had
no government money. But they drove from their streets the drug dealers, the
prostitutes, the criminals. They took complete control of their area purely
through social capital and self-organization, and all the indices of crime and
violence dropped to rates unseen by any sort of state action. By having that
social capital, they were able to capture political and economic power.
This is the essence of the Western liberal tradition: the rise of
association—a state that isn’t dictated by the oligopolies of the market and
the central government. The task of a radical conservative politics is to
recover this: the middle life of civil society. Villages should run villages,
cities cities, and neighborhoods their own streets and parks. Additionally and
most importantly, a transformative conservatism must take on the rampant
individualism of the self-serving libertarian, not least because an
individualism that undermines all social goods by denying a virtue-binding code
and moral belief is not a conservative philosophy. On the contrary, extreme
individualism is a leftist construct and should be recognized and abandoned as
such.
The future is there to be gained. It is the politics of the middle, the
life of the civic, and the empowerment of the ordinary. It is to be hoped that
a radical conservatism embraces this opportunity and creates and facilitates
this future for us all: free association and a self-organizing citizenry
producing the norms and the universals that alone license a civic state, a
plural society, and a participative economy.
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