The Federal Reserve System can monetize anything. It can create digital
money and buy any asset it chooses to buy. There are no legal restrictions on
what it is allowed to monetize.
If it were to do this, and it continued to do this, the dollar would
fall to zero value. This would produce hyperinflation. The result would be the
destruction of all dollar-based creditors. Debtors could pay off their loans
with the sale of an egg or a pack of cigarettes. This is what farmers did in
1923 in Germany and Austria.
The economists who advise the Federal Reserve System know this. The
bankers who run the banks that own the shares of the 12 regional FED banks know
this. Bernanke knows this.
The day will come when the decision-makers on the Federal Open Market
Committee will have to fish or cut bait. They will have to decide: mass
inflation (20%) or hyperinflation (QEx). They will have to decide: recession or
hyperinflation.
Will they see that it’s really Great Depression 2 (not just mass
inflation) vs. hyperinflation? I don’t think so. They have been able to
manipulate the economy for over 90 years between recessions and booms. Only
once did it become a depression: 1930-40. That depression became deflationary,
1931-34, because the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1934) did not
exist. Depositors took their money out and did not redeposit it. That created
monetary deflation through the bankruptcy of banks. The fractional reserve process
imploded.
The FED inflated the monetary base in order to prevent this, contrary to the account by Friedman and Schwartz in their famous book, “A Monetary History of the United States” (1963). Depositors thwarted the FED, 1931-33. A chart produced by a senior official at the St. Louis FED should forever silence those economists who think that Friedman and Schwartz proved the case of FED “complacency.” It won’t, of course. The Friedman/Schwartz story is just too convenient for pressuring the FED to inflate. Friedman and Schwartz wrote the single most important book favoring FED inflation ever written, because it is universally believed in academia. The only section of the book ever cited by mainstream economists is the section on the FED in the early 1930s. That story is analytical and historical bunk. Here are the facts.
Today, depositors could do it again. If the FDIC were not backed up by a
$600 billion line of credit from Congress, we might see it happen again. But
there is a line of credit. That calms depositors.
The creditor – Congress – is the world’s biggest debtor. Congress is
running a $1.2 trillion deficit each year. But it has central banks to cover
the debt: Japan’s, China’s, America’s. So, the depositors believe that Congress
can save the FDIC, which will save the banks. They leave their money in banks.
If they pull money out of bank A, they deposit it in bank B. The system does
not lose deposits. There is no deflation. The fractional reserve system
survives.
The system has worked for a long time. The day of ultimate reckoning has
been delayed. I think this has given central bankers a sense of confidence.
They will think that one more refusal to go to hyperinflation will succeed. They
will not believe that the refusal to pump new digital money into the system
will bring on Great Depression 2. They will believe in their ability to
manipulate the system one more time.
The system overcame the collapse of Lehman Brothers. They will assume
that credit liquidation will be orderly. If it isn’t, they can intervene one
more time.
The European banking system is being propped up by monetary inflation.
There are signs that this cannot go on much longer, but the central bankers
have enormous self-confidence. They believe that fiat money can delay any major
crisis. They believe that fiat money is the ultimate ace in the hole. So do
Keynesians. So do politicians. They really do believe that the exclusive
government monopoly authority to supervise the creation of digits is the basis
of prosperity.
Investors invest digits called money. They are convinced that the
ability of central banks to create digits has created a failsafe for investors’
digits. They believe that a prudent mixture of digit-generating investments
will gain them a positive rate of return, as measured in digits, just so long
as the total number of digits is always increasing. This is the key to every
investment strategy that is tied to “digits invested now, more digits to invest
later”: an ever-increasing supply of digits.
You might think that investors would judge their success in investing by
increased real income: stuff, not digits. But the vast majority of investors
assume that stuff will inevitably take care of itself, if only the supply of
digits is increasing. Here is the mantra of this generation: “The system of
stuff production depends on a steady increase in the supply of digits.”
This is why there is no resistance to central bank monetization. On the
contrary, there is cheering. The journalists follow the economists. The
economists have adopted the mantra of digits with the zealous commitment of any
priesthood. Milton Friedman is their high priest.
FRIEDMAN, NOT KEYNES
Keynes argued for government spending to save the system. This is
universally believed by academic economists. But there is a problem with this
scenario: interest rates. Governments must borrow. From whom? At what rates?
Keynes had little to say analytically about central banks, yet central
banking is at the heart of government debt. Economists can intone the mantra,
“government spending,” but this does not answer the economist’s universal
question: “At what price?”
That is where Friedman enters the picture. Keynes was the prophet of
government spending. Friedman was the guy with the green eyeshade in the back
room. He ran the books. Without Friedman, Keynes & Company would have
folded during World War II.
Keynes was the academic prophet of big government. Friedman was the high
priest of big central banking. The high priest raises the money. Every prophet
needs a high priest, or else the religion disappears.
Friedman argued for decades that the banking system need only create
money at a rate of 3% to 5% per annum for the economy to prosper.
I never saw anyone make this observation: 5% is 66% more than 3%, so
Friedman was not recommending anything like stable money. Nevertheless, the
monetarists adopted his mantra. So, the free markets’ best-known academic
defenders universally accepted the legitimacy of a government monopoly, central
banking, as well as a government-licensed cartel, fractional reserve commercial
banking. Only the Austrian School economists rejected this legal arrangement,
and there were few of them. None had any influence.
Keynes gets the credit as the supreme economist of the era, but Friedman
was more important operationally. Keynes promoted government spending, but said
little about central banking. In contrast, Friedman provided the theoretical
justification for the funding of government deficits by central bank purchases
of government debt.
The trouble was this: the deficits during major recessions were so large
that a steady 3% to 5% increase in the money supply did not suffice. More was
needed. The central bankers then took their monopoly and put it to immediate
use: unlimited expansion of money. That was what the FED did in 2008.
The predictability of steady monetary inflation never was honored.
Friedman’s defense of central banking was well-received by the Keynesian economists.
His limit of 3% to 5% was of course ignored. The central banks did not adhere
to the limit, any more than the Internal Revenue Service adhered to the 1943
withholding tax law as a temporary wartime measure. Friedman provided the
intellectual support for that law, too.
Once you consecrate the priesthood, you will find that the limitations
which you specified are no longer taken seriously by the priesthood. Call this
the Nadab and Abihu factor. Call it the sons of Eli factor. It always appears.
Friedman gave repeated theoretical justifications for the actions of the
federal government, based on an official position of limited government. In the
two most important areas of economic policy, income taxation and central bank
legitimacy, he stood squarely behind the federal government.
Once consecrated, the government agencies paid no attention to his
practical restrictions on the exercise of power. This is the curse of everyone
who recommends a government policy to make government more efficient. This merely
furthers the expansion the power of government into new areas of the economy.
Then the politicians and central bankers ignore the recommended practical
limits that were supposed to guarantee liberty and its blessings. The camel’s
supposedly efficient nose becomes its entry point into the tent.
LIMITS TO HYPERINFLATION
The main limit is a currency unit of zero value. The idea behind
hyperinflation is for the government to be able to buy goods and services
without raising visible taxes. This policy ceases to function when the monetary
unit falls to zero value. At that point, the currency unit has only one
practical economic function: to pay off debt.
Once the state overcomes its debts through hyperinflation, the benefits
to the state of further inflation cease to exist. It can no longer buy anything
of value.
The economy goes to barter before hyperinflation reaches its theoretical
limit of zero purchasing power. The tax authorities cannot easily assess taxes
in barter transactions. Most barter transactions are not recorded. If a
business must report these transactions, it pays its taxes at the end of the
tax period. By then, the purchasing power of the monetary unit has fallen. A
tax bill is a debt. Hyperinflated money is excellent for paying debts.
So, the government starts over. It kills the old currency. It knocks off
lots of zeroes. Then the process begins anew. But, in the meantime, the middle
class was wiped out. Pension funds are gone. Bonds are worthless. The political
system has had a major defeat. The government promised security and justice,
and it delivered insecurity and injustice.
Western Europe experienced hyperinflation in only two nations in
peacetime: Germany and Austria, 1921 through 1923. Hungary had the worst
inflation ever recorded immediately after World War II. But it was not an
industrial economy. Israel had hyperinflation in the mid-1980s, but pulled back
short of the destruction of the shekel. Argentina had hyperinflation in the
late 1980s.
My point is this: central bankers are aware of the short-term effects of
hyperinflation. These effects cause losses in production. They disrupt the
banks, especially the large banks. Banks lend money; then they are repaid in
money of vastly depreciated value.
The capital base of the nation is undermined. The lenders of long-term
money are wiped out. They have no money to lend after the period of
hyperinflation is over. If they saw it coming and bought hard assets such as
real estate, as few do, then in the recessionary period after hyperinflation they
have illiquid assets. If they bought foreign currencies, they are sitting
pretty, but few investors buy foreign currencies.
Central bankers are trained in the basics of banking. They recognize the
threat that hyperinflation poses to the banking system. The social order is
threatened. Their pensions are threatened. They resist hyperinflation.
IS HYPERINFLATION POSSIBLE?
In the early 1970s, a debate broke out in the hard-money camp between
deflationists, who argued that hyperinflation is no longer possible, and the
inflationists, who said it was inevitable. Both positions have yet to be
proven. Both positions still have their defenders.
In the 1970s, the positions were best represented by John Exter
(deflationist) and Franz Pick (inflationist). Pick was the first person I ever
heard refer to government bonds as certificates of guaranteed confiscation.
Exter argued that the financial structure is leveraged to such a degree
that central bank inflation could not save it from massive de-leveraging in a
panic. So, despite the attempts of central banks to re-liquify the economy, the
collapsing financial structure would produce price deflation.
I do not recall that he brought up the issue of excess reserves. This
may be a problem with my memory rather than Exter’s analysis. But what we have
seen since 2008 seems to confirm one part of his thesis, namely, the lack of
effect on consumer prices of Federal Reserve monetary base inflation. But there
has not been a collapse of financial asset prices. So far, his case is not
proven.
He said there would be a massive run on gold in this deflation. Why?
Because gold is the ultimate liquid asset. He came up with a pyramid of
increasing liquidity. Gold was at the bottom. We still see this pyramid in
economic analysis. You can see it here.
Yet gold fell by 25% in 2008, contrary to his prediction. This calls
into question his theory of over-leveraged financial markets as the cause of
deflation.
What he never showed was this: how the total money supply could contract
in a world in which banks are protected from collapse by central banks. If the
money supply does not fall, then there is no reason for consumer prices to
fall. Asset prices could fall, but that has nothing directly to do with
consumer prices.
Those of us who were anti-deflationists kept coming back to this
argument. The price movements within the capital markets are not the same as
price movements in the consumer goods markets.
Then there is this. The Federal Reserve is legally allowed to monetize
anything. It can monetize stocks, bonds, commodities – anything.
The FED can buy the S&P 500. It can buy S&P futures. It can buy
individual shares. If there were ever a collapse of share prices as a result of
fears over Federal Reserve deflation, the FED could monetize the entire stock
market.
The FED can enter markets in a panic sell-off and buy any asset class
that it chooses. It can head off the panic by serving as the buyer of last resort,
not simply the lender of last resort.
There is no seller of an asset who would not take the FED’s money. There
is no lack of trust in the FED so great that a frightened seller of an asset
will say, “Sorry, but your money’s no good here.” The sellers will sell for
dollars.
CONCLUSION
I do not believe that hyperinflation is inevitable. I think it is
unlikely. I do think that a Great Default is inevitable. Governments will
default when the workers who are paying into Social Security and Medicare
finally figure out that (1) this is not in their self-interest and (2) they
outnumber the geezers.
Central bankers are arrogant. They really do think they have the upper
hand. They really do think fiat money creation by central planners (themselves)
is more powerful than free market forces (investors). They really do believe
that they can find a suitable middle/muddle road between deflationary collapse
and hyperinflation. So, they will not pull out all the stops. They will not
hyperinflate unless Congress compels this.
Paul Volcker is the model. He reversed the policies of the ill-equipped
G. William Miller, who was persuaded to resign by Carter after only 18 months
in office. Volcker stuck to his guns from the fall of 1979 until August 13,
1982. By then, the public had lost its fear of inflation. It had gone through
back-to-back recessions.
Volcker saved the dollar and the bond market. He let the politicians pay
the price: first Carter, then Reagan. Reagan weathered the storm because the
economy had turned back up by 1984. He smashed Walter Mondale.
The leverage is much greater today. The leverage of the big banks is
much greater. The public still trusts Bernanke and Draghi. The investors think
the central banks can save the system from a catastrophe. I don’t. But I think
the central banks have their choice of catastrophes: deflation/depression vs.
hyperinflation/depression. I think they will try to navigate a middle ground,
but when push comes to shove, they will risk a controlled deflation, with
selective bailouts for the largest banks.
The central banks are not there to save the governments, which come and
go. They are there to save their clients: the largest banks. They know where
their bread is buttered.
But if Congress ever nationalizes the FED, then hyperinflation is a real
possibility.
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