The crisis in Syria has prompted the Israeli leadership to make a strong pitch for repairing the ties with Turkey. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu personally took the initiative.
The Israeli leader's move most certainly enjoys American backing, while Netanyahu also felt emboldened by his consolidation within Israel's ruling coalition to press ahead with the initiative. But the clincher would have been that Turkey is a manifestly divided house with regard to the policies to be pursued over the Syrian crisis. The ball is now on the Turkish side of the court.
On Monday, Netanyahu met in his office an eight-member team of senior Turkish journalists in a high-profile attempt to break the ice between Israel and Turkey. This is the first such meeting since the incident in May 2010 involving the killing of nine Turks by Israeli commandos who tried to stop the Turkish ship Mavi Marmarafrom breaking the Gaza blockade, which pushed the ties between the two countries into a free-fall.
Turkey expelled Israel's ambassador when Tel Aviv refused to meet its demands, which included an official apology for the incident, compensation for the families of the victims and an end to the Gaza blockade. Ankara also froze all military and security cooperation with Israel and filed criminal charges against the chiefs of the Israeli armed forces.
Washington tried in vain to cool down tempers while Turkish and Israeli diplomats negotiated behind the scenes to reach a mutually acceptable formula. But Israeli hardliners including Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman refused to countenance an apology or to allow Ankara a say in the blockade of Gaza.
Israel today is in a mood to compromise. The recent inclusion of Kadima Party in the ruling coalition marginalizes "hardliners" like Lieberman. Netanyahu himself was never in two minds that rapprochement with Turkey was in Israel's interests.
The second factor is of course the upheaval in Syria. The alienation from Turkey hurts Israel and accentuates its regional isolation and limits its options on the ground to be proactive despite Israel's unquestionable military superiority over Syria.
The tumultuous flow of events in Syria vitally affects Israel's security - be it the civil war and fragmentation or the role of radical Islamists in the event of "regime change" in Damascus. The short point is that closest possible cooperation with Turkey at the level of the military and intelligence is needed to optimally handle the fallouts.
The Israeli statement following Netanyahu's meeting with the Turkish media personalities quoted him as saying:
"Turkey and Israel are two important, strong and stable countries in this region, which is very turbulent and unstable. The Turkish people and the Jewish people have had a long relationship. Turkey and Israel have had a long relationship. We have to keep looking for ways to restart the relationship we had because I think it is important for which of our countries, and it is particularly important now for the stability of this region at this time."
Netanyahu
told the Turkish journalists:
"Since I believe in a common interest, both Israel and Turkey should do as much as they can to restore their relationship. We would like to restore our relations again and both countries are looking for opportunities to do so."In background briefings to the visiting Turkish journalists, Israeli officials were more explicit:
"What is happening in Syria is a tragedy, and a greater tragedy is imminent … Both Turkey and Israel have close ties with the United States, and each of is shares important information about Syria with the Americans. We share the same concern…"
Natural
allies
The big question is whether or not the Syrian crisis could inspire a Turkish-Israeli deal. A recent article in the New York Times co-authored by Michael Herzog (former chief of staff to Israel's defense minister) and Soner Cagaptay at the influential Washington Institute for Near East Policy, toyed with this big question. The two prominent pundits argued that there could be a "new degree of openness" in Tel Aviv and Ankara to the idea of reconciliation, but a rapprochement will still probably require American mediation. They wrote:
The big question is whether or not the Syrian crisis could inspire a Turkish-Israeli deal. A recent article in the New York Times co-authored by Michael Herzog (former chief of staff to Israel's defense minister) and Soner Cagaptay at the influential Washington Institute for Near East Policy, toyed with this big question. The two prominent pundits argued that there could be a "new degree of openness" in Tel Aviv and Ankara to the idea of reconciliation, but a rapprochement will still probably require American mediation. They wrote:
"President Obama has a unique opportunity to help rebuild a strategically vital relationship between these two American allies. While their relationship is unlikely to return to past levels of strategic cooperation, normalizing it could advance important American interests in Syria, Iran and the eastern Mediterranean."
They
estimated that Israel's national security establishment is "firmly in
favor of a reconciliation initiative" and a partnership at the operational
level between Turkey and Israel could be very productive to bring about over
the regime change in Syria:
"A normalized Turkish-Israeli relationship would also open opportunities for cooperation against the Assad government, with the Turks taking the political and regional lead and the Israelis providing intelligence and additional practical assets … Any Israeli contribution would, of course, have to be invisible in order not to create a sense that Israel was behind the Syrian uprising. This makes Turkish-Israeli cooperation against Mr Assad even more valuable, for it would allow Israel to provide untraceable assets to support Turkey's efforts to undermine the Assad government."
Traditionally,
Israel enjoyed deep pockets of influence in Ankara. The "Kemalists"
were drawn to Israel and the Turkish-Israeli partnership flourished in the
recent decades. The Turkish security and military establishment (which used to
be the "deep state" up until recently when the civilian elected
leadership gained control) valued Israel's expertise and professional acumen.
Among the Turkish elites, there was high regard for Israel as an outpost of
democracy in a region dotted with despots. Suffice to say, in the a
priori history of Turkey's politics, the mainstream secular parties
saw Israel as Turkey's natural ally in the Muslim Middle East.
However, things began to change after the Islamist AKP stormed into power. In retrospect, a trend toward "downgrading" the ties with Israel began much before the Mavi Marmara incident. The leadership of Prime Minister Recep Erdogan moved according to a pre-determined plan to fundamentally reset Turkey's Middle Eastern relationships in which ties with Israel were downsized in a calibrated way. Arguably, Mavi Marmara episode provided a leitmotif to hasten the reset.
Many sub-plots
It cannot be that Israel is unaware of the reality that the deep chill in Turkey's relations with Israel is symptomatic of the massive transformations in Turkish society and politics during the past eight years, rather than being the inevitable consequence of an unfortunate incident, however tragic it might have been.
The fact that Netanyahu nonetheless made his overture on such a sensitive issue to a group of journalists rather than discreetly at a political level or through diplomatic channels shows that Israel hopes to appeal to Turkish public opinion. A spokesperson of the Israeli foreign ministry Yigal Palmor, while briefing the visiting journalists, alleged that there are personal dislikes and feelings of mistrust between senior Turkish and Israeli officials. All the same, he added, "We want to have strong ties with Turkey, and we have not given up on relations with Turkey. We need to work on it. We do want to extend our hand to Turkey. We need to understand what is hurting each other. The doors are open."
To be sure, Netanyahu's overture has many sub-plots. It weighs in on Turkey's acute predicament over the Syrian crisis and it most certainly enjoys US support. It estimates that Turkey is going to make some crucial moves over the Syrian situation in the coming days and weeks. And it tries to rally the enduring sections of Turkish opinion (which are by no means insubstantial) that always favored strategic ties with Israel.
Prominent commentator Mehmet Ali Briand probably drew attention to just one such intriguing sub-plot when he sized up Netanyahu's olive branch in this way:
However, things began to change after the Islamist AKP stormed into power. In retrospect, a trend toward "downgrading" the ties with Israel began much before the Mavi Marmara incident. The leadership of Prime Minister Recep Erdogan moved according to a pre-determined plan to fundamentally reset Turkey's Middle Eastern relationships in which ties with Israel were downsized in a calibrated way. Arguably, Mavi Marmara episode provided a leitmotif to hasten the reset.
Many sub-plots
It cannot be that Israel is unaware of the reality that the deep chill in Turkey's relations with Israel is symptomatic of the massive transformations in Turkish society and politics during the past eight years, rather than being the inevitable consequence of an unfortunate incident, however tragic it might have been.
The fact that Netanyahu nonetheless made his overture on such a sensitive issue to a group of journalists rather than discreetly at a political level or through diplomatic channels shows that Israel hopes to appeal to Turkish public opinion. A spokesperson of the Israeli foreign ministry Yigal Palmor, while briefing the visiting journalists, alleged that there are personal dislikes and feelings of mistrust between senior Turkish and Israeli officials. All the same, he added, "We want to have strong ties with Turkey, and we have not given up on relations with Turkey. We need to work on it. We do want to extend our hand to Turkey. We need to understand what is hurting each other. The doors are open."
To be sure, Netanyahu's overture has many sub-plots. It weighs in on Turkey's acute predicament over the Syrian crisis and it most certainly enjoys US support. It estimates that Turkey is going to make some crucial moves over the Syrian situation in the coming days and weeks. And it tries to rally the enduring sections of Turkish opinion (which are by no means insubstantial) that always favored strategic ties with Israel.
Prominent commentator Mehmet Ali Briand probably drew attention to just one such intriguing sub-plot when he sized up Netanyahu's olive branch in this way:
"One important factor we should not ignore is that a Turkey which has no dialogue with Israel is not as interesting as it used to be in the eyes of the countries of the region … The change in the Arab world is also reflected in Turkey. And Turkey, involuntarily, has lost its former influence. Everyone knows that no Middle East policy can be conducted without Israel. It is also obvious that in the chess game of the Middle East, one cannot go anywhere with only Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf countries, or be influential just by forming a Sunni front. Turkey also should make a decision now. Paths in diplomacy never come to an end; there is always an exit."
Meanwhile,
ironically, one of the main Turkish conditions for reconciliation with Israel -
ending the blockade of Gaza - has also been partly fulfilled. On Monday, Cairo
announced the easing of restrictions for Palestinians from Gaza into Egypt. The
unprecedented move followed last week's meeting in Cairo between President
Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal.
Thus, it becomes highly significant that on Tuesday - within a day after Netanyahu made his overture - at an Iftar dinner at Erdogan's residence, there were surprise guests - a team of Hamas officials led by Mashaal.
Mashaal used to be based in Damascus but his equations with the Syrian regime have lately become ambivalent. An estimated 500,000-strong Palestinian community lives in Syria. Hamas is also a "branch" of the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey is currently hosting the exiled leadership of Syria's Brotherhood.
Erdogan's talks with Mashaal lasted well over three hours and it seems they will have substantial bearing on the Syrian situation. Erdogan was assisted at the meeting by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and the head of the Turkish intelligence Hakan Fidan. There will be a sigh of disappointment in Tel Aviv - and in Washington.
Thus, it becomes highly significant that on Tuesday - within a day after Netanyahu made his overture - at an Iftar dinner at Erdogan's residence, there were surprise guests - a team of Hamas officials led by Mashaal.
Mashaal used to be based in Damascus but his equations with the Syrian regime have lately become ambivalent. An estimated 500,000-strong Palestinian community lives in Syria. Hamas is also a "branch" of the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey is currently hosting the exiled leadership of Syria's Brotherhood.
Erdogan's talks with Mashaal lasted well over three hours and it seems they will have substantial bearing on the Syrian situation. Erdogan was assisted at the meeting by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and the head of the Turkish intelligence Hakan Fidan. There will be a sigh of disappointment in Tel Aviv - and in Washington.
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