Undoubtedly, Syria is at the epicenter of one of the
bloodiest and most unfortunate conflicts in recent times. It increasingly
resembles a protracted humanitarian crisis that is endangering the very
integrity of the Syrian nation-state.
There is no way to understate the tragic dimensions of the crisis: more than 20,000 civilians in casualties, 1 million internally displaced people, two million in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, and almost 140,000 fleeing to neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and most especially Turkey. Unfortunately, as the armed uprising gains momentum, and the regime desperately clings on to power, the humanitarian costs are bound to increase - with no clear end in sight.
There is no way to understate the tragic dimensions of the crisis: more than 20,000 civilians in casualties, 1 million internally displaced people, two million in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, and almost 140,000 fleeing to neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and most especially Turkey. Unfortunately, as the armed uprising gains momentum, and the regime desperately clings on to power, the humanitarian costs are bound to increase - with no clear end in sight.
There is also an international dimension to the
crisis. A coalition of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Arab
monarchies are supporting the armed-opposition, while Eastern powers such as
Iran, Russia, and China have stood by the "regime".
However, the most worrying aspect of the Syrian crisis - especially in the long-run - hovers around two intertwined issues: (1) the fate of Syria's considerable stockpile of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and a whole host of advanced weaponry that could be used by sinister elements in the most pernicious manner; and (2) the continuous infiltration of extremist elements into the Syrian theatre, which is not only undermining the democratic-secular nature of the uprising, and increasing the prospects of even bloodier sectarian mass atrocities, but also represents a serious challenge to regional and broader international security.
The highly fluid situation
Syria is practically a warzone. Much of the countryside is a "no man's land", filled with the heavy presence of Free Syrian Army (FSA) units that have routinely sabotaged the regime's heavily-armed forces through a combination of asymmetrical and (even in certain instances) conventional warfare.
Unable to exert decisive control on key cities such as Homs and Idlib, the regime has resorted to bombing and artillery shelling to neutralize opposition strongholds - placing heavy casualties on residents and the cities' infrastructure. It justifies such actions by accusing the opposition (or what it calls "extremist elements and terrorists") of using residents as human shields.
Enjoying significant support in the country's two most important cities, Aleppo and Damascus, the regime has sanctimoniously continued its "all out" assaults as a form of retaliation for the opposition's increasingly deadly attacks against public offices and crowded centers in the two cities.
Yet, in recent days, things have got even more precarious with the FSA infiltrating the country's commercial center, Aleppo. In fact, at some point, the opposition claimed to have established its presence in the key district of Salaheddin, controlling up to a third of the city. The armed opposition has also moved on to secure strategic transportation networks such as the Latakia- Aleppo highway to deny much-needed mobility to an increasingly besieged regime.
The regime has already withdrawn from the Kurdish-dominated northeastern regions, bordering Turkey and Iraq. Much of the northern areas bordering Turkey are beyond the state's control, while the south and center have been in throes of revolution for more than a year. So practically it's only in Damascus that the regime exerts decisive and full control.
Even that has been put into doubt by the fact that the FSA (and other elements) has been able to operate in Midan, Shaghur, and Tabbalah districts, while the town of al-Tal has been transformed into a "disaster area" after heavy clashes between opposing forces, according to the umbrella opposition group, the Syrian National Council (SNC).
Only few months ago, prior the collapse of Kofi Annan's Six-Point Plan, the regime seemed pretty much in control of the situation, with the opposition struggling to coalesce around a unified armed-and-political strategy. So what explains the sudden upsurge in the opposition's momentum?
Extremists to the rescue?
The regime has been suffering from critical tactical and symbolic reversals in recent months - thanks to the growing lethality of extremist forces that have come to the aid of the FSA.
Last month, the German foreign intelligence service, the BND, announced that the Al-Qaeda and like-minded elements have been responsible for "95" attacks, including the deadly flurry of bombings that have rocked Aleppo and Damascus since late-2011. The US State Department has also admitted to the presence of such elements.
In an interview with the Associated Pres (AP), the State Department's counter-terrorism coordinator, Daniel Benjamin, stated, "There is a larger group of foreign fighters ... who are either in or headed to Syria," and their numbers are set to "grow" as the violent clashes continue.
These elements may have been responsible for an event, which has arguably changed the balance of forces in favor of the armed opposition: the successful assassination of Syria"s top security officials, including defense minister Dawoud Rajha, his deputy, Assef Shawkat (Assad's brother-in-law), and the country's Assistant Vice-President and Presidential Security Adviser Hasan Turkmani.
Flushed with cash and weapons from sympathetic, hardliner donors from across the Persian Gulf monarchies, they have brought with themselves tremendous combat experience and logistical know-how to the Syrian theatre.
Veterans of the Afghan wars have teamed up with their counterparts from other conflict-ridden nations such as Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, and Libya, transforming Syria into a new front for global Islamic Jihad - ironically, against the only Arab country that has stood up to the West.
Not only have these elements developed increasingly sophisticated command-and-control structures to coordinate their joint operations, but they have also attracted the loyalty of many members of the (more moderate and SNC-affiliated) FSA, who have been impressed by the former's combat efficacy and ruthless efficiency.
As adroitly put by Murhaf Jouejati, a member of the SNC, the extremists "come with weapons and money." They have not only been responsible for most IED attacks, but also the source of anti-tank weapons, 12.5 mm and 14.5 mm anti-aircraft guns, rocket propelled grenades (RPG), mortars, and stockpiles of heavy armaments as souvenirs of the Libyan revolution and the 2003 the Iraq war. Just like the anti-Soviet Afghan war of the 1980s, these groups are beginning to outmaneuver their heavily armed opponent, which they see as "infidel" and "tyrannical".
A combination of deepening humanitarian tragedy and growing military reversals on the ground, amidst intensifying international support, has also struck into the hearts of some of the regime's important figures. The regime is experiencing a flurry of "high-profile" defections, ranging from top diplomats in Baghdad and London to Brigadar Manaf Tlas as well as the Aleppo parliamentarian Ikhlas Badawi.
However, the most worrying aspect of the Syrian crisis - especially in the long-run - hovers around two intertwined issues: (1) the fate of Syria's considerable stockpile of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and a whole host of advanced weaponry that could be used by sinister elements in the most pernicious manner; and (2) the continuous infiltration of extremist elements into the Syrian theatre, which is not only undermining the democratic-secular nature of the uprising, and increasing the prospects of even bloodier sectarian mass atrocities, but also represents a serious challenge to regional and broader international security.
The highly fluid situation
Syria is practically a warzone. Much of the countryside is a "no man's land", filled with the heavy presence of Free Syrian Army (FSA) units that have routinely sabotaged the regime's heavily-armed forces through a combination of asymmetrical and (even in certain instances) conventional warfare.
Unable to exert decisive control on key cities such as Homs and Idlib, the regime has resorted to bombing and artillery shelling to neutralize opposition strongholds - placing heavy casualties on residents and the cities' infrastructure. It justifies such actions by accusing the opposition (or what it calls "extremist elements and terrorists") of using residents as human shields.
Enjoying significant support in the country's two most important cities, Aleppo and Damascus, the regime has sanctimoniously continued its "all out" assaults as a form of retaliation for the opposition's increasingly deadly attacks against public offices and crowded centers in the two cities.
Yet, in recent days, things have got even more precarious with the FSA infiltrating the country's commercial center, Aleppo. In fact, at some point, the opposition claimed to have established its presence in the key district of Salaheddin, controlling up to a third of the city. The armed opposition has also moved on to secure strategic transportation networks such as the Latakia- Aleppo highway to deny much-needed mobility to an increasingly besieged regime.
The regime has already withdrawn from the Kurdish-dominated northeastern regions, bordering Turkey and Iraq. Much of the northern areas bordering Turkey are beyond the state's control, while the south and center have been in throes of revolution for more than a year. So practically it's only in Damascus that the regime exerts decisive and full control.
Even that has been put into doubt by the fact that the FSA (and other elements) has been able to operate in Midan, Shaghur, and Tabbalah districts, while the town of al-Tal has been transformed into a "disaster area" after heavy clashes between opposing forces, according to the umbrella opposition group, the Syrian National Council (SNC).
Only few months ago, prior the collapse of Kofi Annan's Six-Point Plan, the regime seemed pretty much in control of the situation, with the opposition struggling to coalesce around a unified armed-and-political strategy. So what explains the sudden upsurge in the opposition's momentum?
Extremists to the rescue?
The regime has been suffering from critical tactical and symbolic reversals in recent months - thanks to the growing lethality of extremist forces that have come to the aid of the FSA.
Last month, the German foreign intelligence service, the BND, announced that the Al-Qaeda and like-minded elements have been responsible for "95" attacks, including the deadly flurry of bombings that have rocked Aleppo and Damascus since late-2011. The US State Department has also admitted to the presence of such elements.
In an interview with the Associated Pres (AP), the State Department's counter-terrorism coordinator, Daniel Benjamin, stated, "There is a larger group of foreign fighters ... who are either in or headed to Syria," and their numbers are set to "grow" as the violent clashes continue.
These elements may have been responsible for an event, which has arguably changed the balance of forces in favor of the armed opposition: the successful assassination of Syria"s top security officials, including defense minister Dawoud Rajha, his deputy, Assef Shawkat (Assad's brother-in-law), and the country's Assistant Vice-President and Presidential Security Adviser Hasan Turkmani.
Flushed with cash and weapons from sympathetic, hardliner donors from across the Persian Gulf monarchies, they have brought with themselves tremendous combat experience and logistical know-how to the Syrian theatre.
Veterans of the Afghan wars have teamed up with their counterparts from other conflict-ridden nations such as Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, and Libya, transforming Syria into a new front for global Islamic Jihad - ironically, against the only Arab country that has stood up to the West.
Not only have these elements developed increasingly sophisticated command-and-control structures to coordinate their joint operations, but they have also attracted the loyalty of many members of the (more moderate and SNC-affiliated) FSA, who have been impressed by the former's combat efficacy and ruthless efficiency.
As adroitly put by Murhaf Jouejati, a member of the SNC, the extremists "come with weapons and money." They have not only been responsible for most IED attacks, but also the source of anti-tank weapons, 12.5 mm and 14.5 mm anti-aircraft guns, rocket propelled grenades (RPG), mortars, and stockpiles of heavy armaments as souvenirs of the Libyan revolution and the 2003 the Iraq war. Just like the anti-Soviet Afghan war of the 1980s, these groups are beginning to outmaneuver their heavily armed opponent, which they see as "infidel" and "tyrannical".
A combination of deepening humanitarian tragedy and growing military reversals on the ground, amidst intensifying international support, has also struck into the hearts of some of the regime's important figures. The regime is experiencing a flurry of "high-profile" defections, ranging from top diplomats in Baghdad and London to Brigadar Manaf Tlas as well as the Aleppo parliamentarian Ikhlas Badawi.
Of course, the defection of Prime Minister Riad Hijab
is the latest blow to the regime, signifying growing ossification and
vulnerability within the highest echelons. During his first press conference,
which took place in the Jordan's capital, Amman, the regime's highest profile
defector emphatically stated, "The regime is on the verge of collapse
morally and economically," and called upon, "the army to follow the
example of Egypt's and Tunisia's armies [and] take the side of people,"
while adding, "Syria is full of honorable officials and military leaders
who are waiting for the chance to join the revolution."
By some estimates, around 60% of country's economy has ground to halt, especially with Aleppo - the commercial center of Syria - in the midst of a civil war, plus the regime's inability to sell crude oil, responsible for much of the country's exports, to traditional trading partners in the West.
By some estimates, around 60% of country's economy has ground to halt, especially with Aleppo - the commercial center of Syria - in the midst of a civil war, plus the regime's inability to sell crude oil, responsible for much of the country's exports, to traditional trading partners in the West.
The million-dollar question is: for how much longer
can Assad hold on?
The fight rages on
The fight is perhaps far from over. The regime still wields considerable firepower to hang-on for some time and continue its deadly confrontation with the armed opposition forces: it still commands the support of hundreds of thousands of army, navy, and airforce soldiers. Despite the high-profile defections (gaining momentum in recent months), the upper echelon (especially the praetorian guard and security-intelligence sectors) of the regime is still relatively intact. This explains the regime's ability to push back the FSA forces from parts of Aleppo, most especially in the highly strategic Salaheddin district.
Of course, the Kurds have kept out of the conflict, while Alewite and Christian minorities - wary of the intentions of the Sunni-dominated armed-opposition - are holding on to the regime.
Owing to its complete aerial advantage, and the opposition's lack of effective anti-aircraft guns, the regime has been able to bombard opposition strongholds with impunity (despite some questionable accounts of some FSA units recently gunning down a Syrian aircraft). The FSA has also been struggling to gain much-needed support by a significant proportion of Aleppo's citizenry, who have harbored their own reservations against former's intentions, capacity, and principles - especially in light of growing reports of summary executions, forced recruitment, tortures, and massacres by the armed opposition.
The regime also holds the ultimate card: weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Developed as a counter-measure to Israel's military superiority, the Syrians - who are not signatory to the international convention on chemical weapons - are believed to possess five manufacturing plants and 20 storage sites, containing significant stockpiles of mustard gas, VX and Sarin gas - plus the artillery and missile systems to deliver it.
According to a recent report, neighbors and Western powers are taking pre-cautionary measures: they are talks of assembling a 60-thousand-strong ground force to secure the WMDs, while US special forces and reconnaissance teams have been deployed around and within Syria.
There are special treatment medical facilities for chemical weapons injury in Jordan and Turkey. Meanwhile, in Israel, "IDF Home Front Command units embarked on a series of chemical attack drills in the towns of the northern district down to Afula, which is 52 kilometers east of Haifa and 110 kilometers north of Tel Aviv. ... The soldiers taking part those drills wore new anti-contamination suits. ... In Tel Aviv, city hall announced underground parking spaces would be available in an emergency as bomb shelters for up to 850,000 people," according to the report.
Will the Syrian government use its WMD against the opposition? Or against Western forces as a form of deterrence? Or against Israel - mo matter how suicidal the move - to shift the frontiers of the war and unify the country amidst a nationalist struggle to retake the Golan Heights? Or hand it to allies such as Hezbollah?
Well, the Assad regime's primary fear is not losing power as much as facing the prospect of large-scale massacre and revenge attacks by the armed opposition, especially extremist Sunni groups, which have lamented the dominance of the minority-led Alewite-Baathist regime for almost six decades. This means that the regime - with or without Assad - will do anything to defend itself, unless the international community crafts an effective platform for "managed political transition".
For some observers, somehow given the regime's depleting control over the country, it might begin to act like 'just-another-militia-group' embroiled in a civil war - portending a dangerous phase of lawless war.
Avoiding the nightmare scenario
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's latest visit to Turkey - amidst intensified military clashes between opposing forces in Aleppo, Syria's commercial center - has purportedly touched on the possibility of a 'limited intervention' in the form of: (1) establishing humanitarian "safe zones" along Turkish-Syrian borders; (2) imposition of a "no-fly zone" to neutralize the regime's usage of helicopter gunships and fighter jets to bombard opposition strongholds; and (3) increased logistical, military and financial assistance to FSA.
With Iran and Russia (and to a certain degree China) heavily criticizing any form of military intervention (direct or indirect) in Syria, on one hand, and fears of NATO hardware falling into wrong hands, on the other, it seems that, at least in the meantime, option 3 is the most appealing - or least risky - course of action for NATO and its Arab allies, mainly Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Thus, Syria is locked into a state of a precarious "internal arms race".
With an international community splintered along conflictual geopolitical interests, and the West's insistence that Iran - the foreign actor with greatest leverage over Assad - should be excluded from any multilateral solution, the Syrian crisis could most likely lead to two possible scenarios: (a) either the regime itself will sacrifice Assad to save its own skin (akin to how the Egyptian Army dispensed with Mubarak to retain its own power), or (b) the armed opposition will continue to benefit from the inflow of increasingly advanced armaments and defections within the regime's ranks to eventually override the regime.
However, in an event of the disintegration of the regime, after a protracted and tremendously violent conflict, the extremist elements could gain the upper-hand by not only by taking credit for the regime's fall, but also transforming a failed Syrian state into a new training ground, which could be used as a launching pad for terrorist attacks across the region and beyond (especially proximate European landmass).
Worse, they could gain control over the regime's considerable stockpile of advanced armaments and WMDs, which they could, in turn, use against minority groups that have stood by the regime, as well as against enemy states, most especially Israel. Under such scenario, Syria will be host to continuous perpetration of mass atrocities, against a backdrop of intervention by regional powers, from Israel to Iran, who have a direct political and existential stake in Syria.
The fight rages on
The fight is perhaps far from over. The regime still wields considerable firepower to hang-on for some time and continue its deadly confrontation with the armed opposition forces: it still commands the support of hundreds of thousands of army, navy, and airforce soldiers. Despite the high-profile defections (gaining momentum in recent months), the upper echelon (especially the praetorian guard and security-intelligence sectors) of the regime is still relatively intact. This explains the regime's ability to push back the FSA forces from parts of Aleppo, most especially in the highly strategic Salaheddin district.
Of course, the Kurds have kept out of the conflict, while Alewite and Christian minorities - wary of the intentions of the Sunni-dominated armed-opposition - are holding on to the regime.
Owing to its complete aerial advantage, and the opposition's lack of effective anti-aircraft guns, the regime has been able to bombard opposition strongholds with impunity (despite some questionable accounts of some FSA units recently gunning down a Syrian aircraft). The FSA has also been struggling to gain much-needed support by a significant proportion of Aleppo's citizenry, who have harbored their own reservations against former's intentions, capacity, and principles - especially in light of growing reports of summary executions, forced recruitment, tortures, and massacres by the armed opposition.
The regime also holds the ultimate card: weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Developed as a counter-measure to Israel's military superiority, the Syrians - who are not signatory to the international convention on chemical weapons - are believed to possess five manufacturing plants and 20 storage sites, containing significant stockpiles of mustard gas, VX and Sarin gas - plus the artillery and missile systems to deliver it.
According to a recent report, neighbors and Western powers are taking pre-cautionary measures: they are talks of assembling a 60-thousand-strong ground force to secure the WMDs, while US special forces and reconnaissance teams have been deployed around and within Syria.
There are special treatment medical facilities for chemical weapons injury in Jordan and Turkey. Meanwhile, in Israel, "IDF Home Front Command units embarked on a series of chemical attack drills in the towns of the northern district down to Afula, which is 52 kilometers east of Haifa and 110 kilometers north of Tel Aviv. ... The soldiers taking part those drills wore new anti-contamination suits. ... In Tel Aviv, city hall announced underground parking spaces would be available in an emergency as bomb shelters for up to 850,000 people," according to the report.
Will the Syrian government use its WMD against the opposition? Or against Western forces as a form of deterrence? Or against Israel - mo matter how suicidal the move - to shift the frontiers of the war and unify the country amidst a nationalist struggle to retake the Golan Heights? Or hand it to allies such as Hezbollah?
Well, the Assad regime's primary fear is not losing power as much as facing the prospect of large-scale massacre and revenge attacks by the armed opposition, especially extremist Sunni groups, which have lamented the dominance of the minority-led Alewite-Baathist regime for almost six decades. This means that the regime - with or without Assad - will do anything to defend itself, unless the international community crafts an effective platform for "managed political transition".
For some observers, somehow given the regime's depleting control over the country, it might begin to act like 'just-another-militia-group' embroiled in a civil war - portending a dangerous phase of lawless war.
Avoiding the nightmare scenario
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's latest visit to Turkey - amidst intensified military clashes between opposing forces in Aleppo, Syria's commercial center - has purportedly touched on the possibility of a 'limited intervention' in the form of: (1) establishing humanitarian "safe zones" along Turkish-Syrian borders; (2) imposition of a "no-fly zone" to neutralize the regime's usage of helicopter gunships and fighter jets to bombard opposition strongholds; and (3) increased logistical, military and financial assistance to FSA.
With Iran and Russia (and to a certain degree China) heavily criticizing any form of military intervention (direct or indirect) in Syria, on one hand, and fears of NATO hardware falling into wrong hands, on the other, it seems that, at least in the meantime, option 3 is the most appealing - or least risky - course of action for NATO and its Arab allies, mainly Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Thus, Syria is locked into a state of a precarious "internal arms race".
With an international community splintered along conflictual geopolitical interests, and the West's insistence that Iran - the foreign actor with greatest leverage over Assad - should be excluded from any multilateral solution, the Syrian crisis could most likely lead to two possible scenarios: (a) either the regime itself will sacrifice Assad to save its own skin (akin to how the Egyptian Army dispensed with Mubarak to retain its own power), or (b) the armed opposition will continue to benefit from the inflow of increasingly advanced armaments and defections within the regime's ranks to eventually override the regime.
However, in an event of the disintegration of the regime, after a protracted and tremendously violent conflict, the extremist elements could gain the upper-hand by not only by taking credit for the regime's fall, but also transforming a failed Syrian state into a new training ground, which could be used as a launching pad for terrorist attacks across the region and beyond (especially proximate European landmass).
Worse, they could gain control over the regime's considerable stockpile of advanced armaments and WMDs, which they could, in turn, use against minority groups that have stood by the regime, as well as against enemy states, most especially Israel. Under such scenario, Syria will be host to continuous perpetration of mass atrocities, against a backdrop of intervention by regional powers, from Israel to Iran, who have a direct political and existential stake in Syria.
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