By John Mauldin
We are often
told that the current election is the most important in recent history. I think
I have heard that in about ten presidential cycles, ever since I first voted,
for McGovern, as a young man. And looking back, only about one of those
elections actually qualified on that score. I think this election does have the
potential to be one of those rare times, at least in terms of economic
outcomes. Today, we cross that gray line, but at a somewhat different angle,
as we look at the economic consequences of the political decision that will
come with the choices we make in November in the US.
But it is not as
simple as suggesting that choosing one party over the other will solve the
nation's economic ills. If that were the case, we would not be facing the
momentous challenge we now do, because both parties have had firm control of
the levers of power in recent years, and both have failed to deal with what has
become, at least for this economic analyst, the burning issue of the day.
Indeed, both have made it worse. Today we look at what the choices are and the
impacts of those choices.
The preview of
economic consequences depends on your view of what the most important issues
are that need to be decided (in terms of economics). Let me list my top ten.
1. The Deficit2. The Deficit3. The Deficit4. The Deficit5. The Deficit6-10. Everything Else
I am only being
mildly flippant. How we deal with the deficit affects everything else. And not
dealing with the deficit leads to a disaster of biblical proportions, the
equivalent of all eight of the first eight plagues. Ask Greece or Spain.
It is easy to
dismiss the deficit as something that has always been there. Haven't Chicken
Littles been telling us the deficit sky is falling for decades? Japan seems to
be capable of running large deficits, and we are nowhere near their level of
debt. Isn't "Japanese Disease" the worst outcome we are looking at –
a slow-growth world that, while frustrating, is not cataclysmic? And some have
been calling for even larger deficits in the name of spurring economic growth
and jobs, harking back to periods when the government did indeed run deficits
and the economy seemed to respond and once again grew.
It is easy to
dismiss deficits as something we can deal with later. Like Hemingway's
character, who when asked "How did you go bankrupt?" replied,
"Two Ways. Gradually, then suddenly."
For most times,
deficits are indeed not a problem. Many families and companies and governments
run losses and borrow money to keep from having to curb their lifestyles and
programs. It is not actually the immediate deficit that is the issue, but the
total debt. If debt is low and cash flow is good, then deficits can be a good
thing. Debt that is invested in income-producing assets or infrastructure that
makes a family or business or nation work more efficiently can be beneficial.
It is when the
total debt becomes too large that servicing that debt becomes an issue. And
that is when the lenders first ask for more collateral or higher interest and
then, if the debt is not brought under control, they stop lending. For a
nation, its bond market simply collapses.
In a book that
we have looked to many times, This Time Is Different, Ken
Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart detail over 200 instances where nations had a credit
crisis. One of their main points is that nations seem to be able to borrow money
right up until what they call the "Bang Moment" happens, and the bond
market no longer functions. Right up until that moment, proponents of ever more
debt argue that "this time is different," but it never is.
In the opening
line of Anna Karenina Leo Tolstoy says, "Happy
families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way."
And governments and nations that get into debt problems get into them in their
own way, as well. Spain, we are told, is not Greece. And it certainly is not.
Spain created a completely different route to its own debt crisis than did
Greece . And France, which will argue that it is neither Greece nor Spain (nor
Italy nor Portugal, etc.), will find that if it does not quickly adjust its
finances (and it certainly appears to be in massive denial), it will devise yet
another way to have a full-blown debt crisis, with the bond vigilantes at her
door.
It is a process
I describe in Endgame. Much of Europe faces a debt crisis. It
will not end happily. Spain and Greece have fallen into what can only be
described as a depression. Much of the rest of Europe is either in recession or
at the tipping point, and a slip into a full-blown, continent-wide depression
is quite possible, for reasons we have explored in previous letters. Simply,
Southern Europe (along with Ireland) borrowed too much money (for different
reasons), all European banks leveraged themselves too much (with the blessings
of the regulators), and the Europeans created massive internal trade
imbalances.
It is impossible
to balance out a fiscal deficit while running a massive trade deficit,
especially if there is capital flight. And a fall in currency prices, which is
the normal balancing mechanism for a trade deficit, is not available to Greece,
Spain et al. as long as they remain in the eurozone. This leaves a very large
shift in labor costs as the only way to rebalance, and that solution cannot
come quickly in the peripheral countries, without politically impossible
structural reforms. The eurozone has no good choices. No matter what they (as a
collective Europe and as individual countries) choose, it will mean years of
extreme economic hardship.
Japan, as I am
wont to say, is a bug in search of a windshield. They have transmuted the
savings of two generations into the largest debt ever for a country that I am
aware of (in terms of GDP). It is now approaching 220% and rising at a
prodigious pace, about 10% in 2011. They have gone from a savings rate of 16%
to around 1%, largely due to an aging population that is now living off its
savings.
When that
savings rates goes negative, and it is a demographic certainty that it will,
Japan will either be forced to pay higher interest rates or print massive
amounts of yen or cut government spending by equally massive amounts. All of those
options are ugly in the short term. If interest rates rose by a mere 2% for
Japan, they would be spending more than 70% of their budget on just interest
expense within a few years. That is not a workable business
model. Today, we can't get into the election later this month in Japan, but it
will be an important one.
The US deficit
(held by the public) is now over 72% of GDP and rising.
"Egan-Jones Ratings Co.
said Friday [September 14] it downgraded its U.S. sovereign rating to AA- from
AA on concerns that the Fed's new round of quantitative easing, or QE3, will
hurt the U.S. economy. The ratings agency said the Fed's plan of buying $40
billion in mortgage-backed securities a month and keeping interest rates near
zero does little to raise GDP, reduces the value of the dollar, and raises the
price of commodities. 'From 2006 to present, the US's debt to GDP rose from 66%
to 104% and will probably rise to 110% a year from today under current
circumstances; the annual budget deficit is 8%,' Egan-Jones said in a note. 'In
comparison, Spain has a debt to GDP of 68.5% and an annual budget deficit of
8.5%.'" (MarketWatch)
(For what it's
worth, I don't count the "Social Security Trust Fund" as debt, as it
is an accounting fiction. It does not exist except on a fictional balance
sheet, thus I see the debt as less than Egan-Jones does, but they are correct
about the deficit.)
There is no set
debt-to-GDP ratio at which point a nation loses its ability to borrow money at
reasonable rates. For Russia it was 12% in 1998. Japan, as noted above, is at
220% (the exact figure is somewhat up for debate, but this is close enough).
Spain lost access without major ECB intervention at less than 68%. Italy is at
120% and has seen its rates rise to levels that cannot be sustained.
At some point,
if a nation does not get its debt and deficit under control, it will lose
access to the bond market at reasonable rates. There have been no exceptions.
There is a point at which the bond market begins to worry about the ability of
a nation to repay its debt with a currency that is now worth less than when the
money was lent, and then interest rates begin to climb.
There is no
reason to think the US will be an exception to that rule. That is not what is
meant by American exceptionalism.
Why do I think
the deficit is such an issue? What makes me concerned that we can't wait
another four years until the US loses access to a low-interest bond market?
Would that really be a disaster?
First, in a
world without Europe or Japan, the US could probably go out to the latter part
of this decade running large deficits. We have the world's reserve currency, we
are the major superpower, the engine of free markets, etc.
But I think
Europe is likely to hit a real wall by the end of 2013 or the middle of 2014,
if not sooner. Ditto for Japan. I am afraid that the bond marketeers will look
at their losses in Europe and Japan and tell the US government something like
this:
"We have already watched the movies about European and Japanese debt. Those did not have happy endings. The US debt movie seems to be based on the same script; so if you don't mind, since we know how this ends, we are going to slip out during intermission."
In my opinion,
the deficit needs to be dealt with in 2013. If we wait until 2014, we will be
in the middle of another election. As we will discuss below, solving the
deficit is going to involve politically unpopular compromises for either or
both parties. While I am optimistic that something can be done in 2013, I am
cynical enough to think that 2014 is much more politically problematic.
By 2015 the debt
will be well above 90% of GDP. As outlined in previous letters, there is
increasing evidence that when the debt of a country grows to 90%, GDP slows by
about 1%, which of course makes it harder to grow your way out of debt.
Interest rates
start to rise as a result, and that makes it harder to balance the budget. Yes,
I know, the Fed can hold rates down and print money; but printing money in
quantity is not a strategy designed to bolster bond market confidence in the
value of the dollar.
Not only the
research of Rogoff and Reinhart, but numerous other studies also point out that
when confidence goes, it is a fairly quick process. It is indeed the Bang! moment.
If rates start
to creep up, perhaps Congress will be forced to do something. But at that
point, it will be time for higher taxes and deeper cuts than any of us can now
imagine. The longer things go on as they are, the worse the final result and
restructuring will be.
We have often
been told that borrowing money creates a problem for our children. And that is
true. But it is also creating a problem for this generation in the here and
now.
Much of Europe
and Japan are going to fall into a depression as a result of their
unwillingness to deal with the deficits and the structural issues they face.
25% unemployment is an ugly, ugly reality that is spreading across Southern
Europe. Japan will face its own version of a debt crisis, and I think the
result will be significant inflation in its import prices and a drop in the
living standards of its elderly.
Perhaps I am
wrong and the US can go on for another four years before we reach our own Bang! moment.
Things can sometimes go on for longer than we think, for reasons we (or at
least I) do not understand. But waiting longer certainly will not make it any
easier. Entitlement programs are steadily getting into worse shape, and
interest costs will be another $80 billion a year for the additional debt we
will take on (my back-of-the-napkin estimate – you can make your own). Trying
to solve the problem four years from now will require decisions even more
difficult than those we have to make now.
Let's be clear.
For reasons I have written about at length, there is a significant cost to
cutting the deficit. It will impact current-year GDP. I certainly would not
advocate balancing the budget all at once or even in a few years. I would
suggest cutting by no more than 1% of GDP per year, or about $150 billion a
year. Even that little will produce growth headwinds.
Tax cuts or
increases have an impact on the economy. Quoting from Forbes:
"A powerful analysis by President Barack Obama's first Chair of his Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) indicates the President's proposed tax increases would kill the economic recovery and throw nearly 1 million Americans out of work. Those are the extraordinary implications of academic research by Christina D. Romer, who chaired the CEA from January 28, 2009 – September 3, 2010. In a paper entitled "The Macrcoeconomic Effects of Tax Changes," published by the prestigious American Economic Review in June 2010 (during her tenure at the White House), she stated: 'In short, tax increases appear to have a very large, sustained, and highly significant negative impact on output.'
"The AER paper, co-authored with her husband and fellow UC Berkeley Professor, David H. Romer, examines the impact of tax increases and reductions on U.S. economic growth for the period 1945 to 2007. One of the innovations in the paper is its focus on 'exogenous' changes in taxes, that is changes in taxes that were meant to either increase the rate of economic growth (not simply offset a recession), such as the Kennedy, Reagan and Bush tax cuts, or to reduce the budget deficit, such as the Clinton tax increase. Excluded were 'endogenous' tax changes that were purely countercyclical, such as the 1975 tax rebates, or were used to 'offset another factor that would tend to move output growth away from normal', such as the tax increases to finance the Korean war and the introduction of the payroll tax to finance Medicare.
"The Romers' baseline estimate suggests that a tax increase of 1% of GDP (about $160 billion in today's economy) reduces real GDP by 3% over the next 10 quarters. In addition, the Romers used a variety of statistical tests to take into account other factors that could influence economic growth at the time of the tax changes, including government spending, monetary policy, the relative price of oil, and even whether the President was a Democrat or Republican (it doesn't matter much). A summary of the statistical work estimates that a tax increase of 1% of GDP would lead to a fall in output of 2.2% to 3.6% over the next 10 quarters.
"'In all cases, the effect of tax changes on output remains large and highly statistically significant,' they write.
"'Thus the finding that tax changes have substantial impacts on output appears to be very durable. That including controls for known output shocks has little effect on the estimated impact of tax changes is important indirect evidence that our new measure of fiscal shocks is not correlated with other factors affecting output.'
"'The behavior of output following these more exogenous changes indicates that tax increases are highly contractionary. The effects are strongly significant, highly robust, and much larger than those obtained using broader measures of tax changes.'"
Forbes goes on to say that
"In his 2013 budget, President Obama proposes $103 billion in 2013 tax
increases, including $83 billion of higher income taxes on those who make more
than $250,000 a year, or about 0.65% of GDP. Using the Romer baseline estimate,
that would reduce real GDP by 2 percentage points over the next 10
quarters. Based on the general relationship between economic growth and
unemployment, such a fall in output implies a loss of more than 800,000
jobs."
(Note: There are
those who disagree, often vigorously, with the conclusions of the paper, but
offer no counter-data that I am aware of. Romer resigned less than two months
after publishing the paper.)
Basic economic
accounting and academic research suggest that cutting spending will also have a
contractionary effect on GDP for about 4-5 quarters. But if you cut 1% a year
for 5 years, then you have reduced potential GDP by 1% year for those 5 years,
which does not help job growth.
Of course, if
the US loses access to low-cost bonds, that will be a disaster that even worse
for jobs. We face either a difficult situation or a disastrous one. That is the
nature of the Endgame, when the Debt Supercycle is in its final throes. There
are no easy choices. Right now the US merely has some very difficult choices.
If we put those off much longer, we will be faced with the disastrous choices
of Europe.
I am not going
to go into detail about how to balance the budget over time in this letter.
There are numerous ways to get there. Simpson-Bowles (the presidential debt
commission) is one path. It gets rid of many of the so-called tax expenditures
and actually reduces the top rate by 24% and raises more taxes.
I would prefer
to get rid of almost all tax deductions, except the earned-income tax credit,
and end up with a lower top rate. The large majority of tax deductions favor
those with higher income, anyway. If I really got my wish, there would be some
type of consumption tax (like a VAT) and much lower income taxes across the
board, and perhaps we'd even get rid of the Social Security tax as part of the
deal, which would clearly help lower-income citizens. For what it's worth, consumption
taxes have less of a negative impact on the economy than income taxes.
Neither the
Romney proposed budget nor the budget Obama submitted to Congress (and that did
not get even one positive vote from his own party) is politically doable, and
both have serious problems in dealing with the deficit.
To get to a real
budget solution is going to take a compromise, which means some combination of
spending cuts and tax increases. It must deal with entitlements and health
care. In one sense, the election is about how much health care we want and how
we want to pay for it. Everything else is "easy" after that.
I have talked
with lots of Congressmen, Senators, and their staffers in the past few years,
from both parties. They all get that something must be done, and my sense is
that they will do something after this election. The consequences of doing
nothing would be disastrous, especially given the "fiscal cliff."
Facing such a scenario, I think Congress will act.
The question
then becomes, what is the nature of this compromise? And that, gentle reader,
will be the real economic effect of this election.
We are voting
about the direction of the compromise. Pure and simple.
One path will
mean a larger government and budget, and the other a (relatively) smaller government,
although I can see no path to a truly smaller government in terms of tax
burden, unless we decide we want a lot less health care, which I do not see
anyone predicting or advocating.
A
"sweep" by either party would be a game changer, but that does not
seem likely, according to any poll I am looking at today.
As we saw last
week, in research I cited from Europe, there is a correlation between
government size and GDP growth. Which makes sense, in that jobs really come
from the private sector. Government jobs depend on taxes, which come from the
private sector. Please note that this is not the same as saying that we should
get rid of all government costs to increase economic efficiency – that is
clearly not true. But we should recognize the costs of government spending and
taxing of the private sector.
It will come as
no surprise that I favor the smaller-government version. But I hope that while
we are on the way to compromise we will completely overhaul the tax code,
simplifying the process and lowering overall rates while eliminating most tax
deductions. And perhaps getting rid of all special corporate
tax deductions, while lowering the rate to 15% on US income and 10% on foreign
income. That would mean the very large corporations that shelter income by
various means and domiciles would pay taxes just like local businesses. We
could drop the rates that low and still collect more taxes and really boost our
economic competitiveness.
If we balance
the budget over time (say 5-6 years) and lower tax rates, while eliminating
special deductions and tax expenditures (and I say, get rid of almost
everything!), and drill more oil and gas so we can start exporting energy, I
will become a raging bull, and not too far in the future. In such a scenario,
the future of the United States would be better and brighter than ever. It is
the one I want for my kids.
And if we don't
act responsibly? Then we need to get ready to batten down the hatches, because
if it going to be an exceedingly rough storm. I think we'll know by the middle
of next year. And yes, I know our choices will mean radically different
investment environments ahead, but that is why this election makes such a
difference. It really is about avoiding a
depression.
No comments:
Post a Comment