by Stanley Weiss
When Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan met in July with Russian strongman Vladimir Putin
about the civil war in Syria, political biographers had a right to be confused.
After all, one is
the leader of a government that has imprisoned more journalists than China and Iran
combined; empowered special courts to arrest citizens on suspicion of terrorism without evidence or the right to a hearing; sentenced two students to
eight years in prison for holding a sign at a rally demanding “free education”; and has seen more than 20,000 complaints filed against it in the
European Court of Human Rights since 2008.
The other is
president of Russia.
That the leader of
secular, democratic Turkey—a longtime US ally and member of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization—has managed to out-Putin Putin when it comes to
steamrolling civil liberties the past ten years is just the beginning of the
way politics is changing on the Black Sea. Even while Putin receives a fresh
round of global scorn for the two-year prison sentence meted out to three young
women of the “Pussy Riot” punk band, Erdogan has
successfully executed every trick in the Putin playbook except one. But it is
that one failure that may have the most dramatic effect on Turkey’s future and
the direction of US foreign policy.
For two neighbors
that fought eight wars between them from the eighteenth through the early
twentieth century, Russia and Turkey have a lot in common. Both bridge Asia and
Europe. Both enjoyed historic runs as world powers. Both have declared their
intention to join Europe. And under Putin and Erdogan, both have taken historic
steps away from democracy in an attempt to recapture past glory. Call it the
four steps toward autocracy in a global age.
Step 1: Use the
judicial system to crush your enemies.
Like Putin—whom The Economist recently argued is
“building the legal framework for authoritarian rule”—Erdogan has used the
courts to create what has been called “a new climate of fear in Istanbul.” While arresting students,
journalists, and activists in record numbers, he has trained his greatest guns on the military—which has defended Turkey’s
secularism since 1921, when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk created modern Turkey out of
the Ottoman Empire’s ashes. As one Turk recently said of the bloodthirsty
Syrian dictator, the military is “the reason Turkey never had an Assad.” With
hundreds of officers now behind bars on trumped-up charges that they planned a
coup, last month Erdogan forcibly retired 40 top admirals and generals currently on trial before their guilt or
innocence could be established. But like Putin, Erdogan is granted a lot of
slack by his own citizens—he took a moribund economy in 2003 and turned it into
one of Europe’s strongest. Culturally, cities such as Istanbul are thriving.
Many Turks believe life is better under Erdogan and don’t look fondly on the
three coups the military staged since 1960 or the government it forced to quit
in 1997.
Step 2: Mask your true ideology under the guise of democracy.
Just as Putin
speaks of democracy in Russia while making no attempt to hide his affection for
the centrally planned, KGB-dominated days of the Soviet Union, Erdogan has
praised democracy while expressing disgust at Turkey’s separation of mosque and
state, calling himself both “the imam of Istanbul” and “a servant of sharia.” Since taking power in 2003,
Erdogan’s Islamist Justice and Development Party has tripled the number of students attending Islamist high
schools; passed a new law requiring that every public facility in the country
have a Muslim prayer room; taken control of the historically secular Turkish
Academy of Sciences; and built more mosques than any previous government while
announcing plans to create a super-mosque in Istanbul with the “highest minarets in the world.” It’s little wonder that in
2010, Saudi King Abdullah presented Erdogan with Saudi Arabia’s most
prestigious prize for his “services to Islam.”
Step 3: Make friends with old adversaries at the expense of old allies.
Just as Putin
actively built friendships with his old foes Germany, Italy, and France during
his first term, Erdogan took office announcing a strategic realignment of
Turkish policy centered on “zero problems” with the neighbors. He
sought out new partnerships with Iran, Syria, Libya, Pakistan, and Hamas—and
did so at the expense of the US and Israel. In 2003, he won Arab plaudits for
rejecting American requests to use Turkish territory to transport troops to
Iraq. In 2009, he was hailed as a Muslim hero for picking a fight with Israeli President
Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Further raising Western
eyebrows, he sided with Iran
against the US over Tehran sanctions; championed Palestinian
statehood at the United Nations; lauded Pakistani soldiers accidentally killed
by US drones as “our martyrs”; and even accepted a human rights award from former Libyan
despot Muammar Gaddafi.
Step 4: Assert strength by walking softly and carrying a big
stick.
If there is one
lesson of Putin’s that Erdogan hasn’t learned, it is that tough talk needs to
be followed by decisive action. The only battles Erdogan seems capable of
fighting thus far are wars of words—making him look, as journalist Gideon
Rachman puts it, “naïve and ineffective.”
He pledged to
bring Hamas and Fatah together but failed. He pledged to keep NATO out of Libya
but failed. When Israel killed nine pro-Palestinian Turkish activists on an aid
ship bound for Gaza in 2010, he threatened to send the
Turkish navy to protect future flotillas—then didn’t follow through. When Cyprus
began developing oil fields off its coast in 2010, Erdogan threatened to send
Turkish warships — then didn’t follow through. When Syria reportedly shot down a Turkish
reconnaissance jet this past June, Erdogan promised that Damascus would feel
Turkey’s wrath—and then didn’t follow through. It has led some to wonder if Erdogan’s
bark is worse than his bite.
Syria may prove to
be Erdogan’s undoing. Turkey first supported Syria, then tried to coax it to
change, then criticized it, and then officially allied with the Syrian
opposition. It has put Turkey in the uncomfortable position of being the only
country that has allowed its soil to become the base of Syrian opposition as
well as the sole NATO country trying to persuade other NATO members to
intervene. Other Muslims are openly accusing Turkey of being part of a “sabotage axis” against Damascus, aligning
with what nations such as Iran regard as “the devil’s instrument
on earth”—America—to unseat an Islamic regime.
Far from “zero
problems with its neighbors,” Turkey now has problems with all of its
neighbors, including Russia, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Israel, and Armenia. It has led
the Turkish magazine Radikal to
observe that Turkey, which was once known as the sick man of Europe, is now
becoming “the lonely man of the
Middle East.” With no NATO allies coming to the rescue anytime soon, Turkey runs that
risk that its own Kurds—which it has been battling for three decades—will ally with Kurds in Syria to destabilize
Turkey’s southern border. As the Centre for Research on
Globalization puts it, “Should Syria burn, Turkey will ultimately burn too.”
Once again,
Erdogan is turning back to the Putin playbook. Term-limited out as prime
minister, he is working to rewrite the Constitution to give the president more
power, an office for which he will then run Putin-style in 2014. It was said that Syria is
the place where Ataturk, as a young military officer, first proved his greatest
strengths. A century later, it is revealing a Turkish prime minister’s greatest
weaknesses. Where it will lead—for Turkey and America—nobody knows. But we’ll
soon find out how much of Putin that Erdogan really has in him.
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