Cuba would have become the first nuclear power in
Latin America 50 years ago, if not for the dynamics captured in this remarkable
verbatim transcript -- published here for the first time -- of Fidel Castro's
excruciating meeting with Soviet deputy prime minister Anastas Mikoyan, on
November 22, 1962. The document comes from the personal archive of his son, the
late Sergo Mikoyan, which was donated to the National
Security Archive and which appears for the
first time in English this month in the new book, The
Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis.
Long after the world thought
the Cuban Missile Crisis had ended, with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's
withdrawal of his medium-range nuclear missiles announced on October 28 -- and
two days after President John F. Kennedy announced the lifting of the
quarantine around Cuba -- the secret crisis still simmered. Unknown to the
Americans, the Soviets had brought some 100 tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba --
80 nuclear-armed front cruise missiles (FKRs), 12 nuclear warheads for dual-use
Luna short-range rockets, and 6 nuclear bombs for IL-28 bombers. Even with the
pullout of the strategic missiles, the tacticals would stay, and Soviet
documentation reveals the intention of training the Cubans to use them.
But Fidel Castro was livid.
Khrushchev had not consulted or even informed Castro about any deals with the
Americans -- Fidel heard about the missile withdrawal from the radio. The Cuban
leader refused to go along with any onsite inspections in Cuba, and raised
further demands. The Soviets had their own Cuban crisis: They had to take back
what the Americans called the "offensive weapons," get the U.S. to
confirm its non-invasion pledge, and most importantly, keep Cuba as an ally. At
the Soviet Presidium, everyone agreed only one man could achieve such a
resolution: Anastas Mikoyan.
Mikoyan arrived in Cuba on
November 2, 1962, and over 20 days of often-bitter conversations with Cuban
leaders -- culminating in this tense meeting -- Mikoyan began to appreciate the
danger tactical nuclear weapons posed if they were left on the island,
especially in Cuban hands. On one day, Castro would refuse to see Mikoyan; on
another, Fidel would order his anti-aircraft crews to shoot at the American
surveillance planes.
The final straw apparently
came on November 20, when Castro sent instructions to Cuba's representative at
the United Nations, Carlos Lechuga, to mention "we have tactical nuclear
weapons, which we should keep" -- partly as leverage in negotiations over
inspections, also to establish the fact that the weapons were in Cuban
possession. Extremely worried, Mikoyan cabled the Soviet Presidium that he now
planned to inform the Cuban leader that all tactical nuclear weapons would be
withdrawn from Cuba. Mikoyan had to break this unpleasant news to his hosts,
and he had to do it in such a way that they would remain Soviet allies.
This four-hour conversation
on November 22 provided the final blow to the Cuban revolutionaries, now that
the Soviet Union was removing all the weapons for which Cuba had to suffer so
much. Castro opened the conversation saying that he was in a bad mood because
Kennedy stated in his speech that all nuclear weapons were removed from Cuba,
but surely the tacticals were still on the island. Mikoyan confirmed that
"the Soviet government has not given any promises regarding the removal of
the tactical nuclear weapons. The Americans do not even have any information
that they are in Cuba." But the Soviet government itself, said Mikoyan,
not under U.S. pressure, has now decided to take them back.
Castro's mood only got
worse. Now the tacticals were coming out. Already the Soviets had given in to
American pressure on the IL-28 bombers (technically the bombers could reach
Florida so they qualified as "offensive" and they were nuclear
capable). Mikoyan tried to persuade Castro that "as far as Il-28s are
concerned, you know yourself that they are outdated. Presently, it is best to
use them as a target plane." Castro retorts: "And why did you send
them to us then?"
Castro was very emotional
and at times rough with Mikoyan -- he criticized the Soviet military for
failing to camouflage the missiles, for not using their anti-aircraft launchers
to shoot down U.S. U-2 spy planes, essentially allowing them to photograph the
sites. He went back to the initial offer of missiles and stated that the Cubans
did not want the missiles, they only accepted the weapons as part of
"fulfilling their duty to the socialist camp." The Cubans were ready
to die in a nuclear war and were hoping that the Soviet Union would be also
willing "to do the same for us." But the Soviets did not treat the
Cubans as a partner, they caved in under U.S. pressure, and did not even
consult the Cubans about the withdrawal. Castro expressed the humiliation the
Cubans felt: "What do you think we are? A zero on the left, a dirty rag.
We tried to help the Soviet Union to get out of a difficult situation."
In desperation, Castro
almost begged Mikoyan to leave the tactical warheads in Cuba, especially
because the Americans were not aware of them and they were not part of the
agreement between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Castro claimed that the situation now
was even worse than it was before the crisis -- Cuba was defenseless, and the
U.S. non-invasion assurances did not mean much for the Cubans. But Mikoyan
rejected Castro's pleas and cited a (nonexistent) Soviet law proscribing the
transfer of nuclear weapons to third countries. Castro had a suggestion:
"So you have a law that prohibits transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to
other countries? It's a pity. And when are you going to repeal that law?"
Mikoyan was non-committal: "We will see. It is our right [to do so]."
This ended Cuba's hope to
become a Latin American nuclear power.
Ironically, if the Cubans
were a little more pliant, and a little less independent, if they were more
willing to be Soviet pawns, they would have kept the tactical nuclear weapons
on the island. But they showed themselves to be much more than just a parking
lot for the Soviet missiles. Cuba was a major independent variable of the Cuban
Missile Crisis. Mikoyan treated his Cuban hosts with great empathy and respect,
while being highly critical of his own political and military leadership. He
admired the genuine character of the Cuban revolution, he saw its appeal for
Latin America. But he also saw the danger of the situation spiraling out of
control probably better than other leaders in this tense triangle, and thus
brought about the final resolution of the crisis.
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