Moody's stripped France of its
triple-A rating last week, citing "deteriorating economic prospects,"
the "long-standing rigidities of its labor, goods and services
markets" and "exposure to peripheral Europe." And it could get
worse: "We would downgrade the rating further in the event of an
additional material deterioration in France's economic prospects," says
Dietmar Hornung, Moody's lead analyst for France.
Don't think, however, that the
French government is unduly alarmed. Finance Minister Pierre Moscovici insisted
that the downgrade did not "call into question the economic fundamentals
of our country." We've never made a fetish of the opinions of the ratings
agencies, which tend to be lagging indicators. Nonetheless, the
"fundamentals" Mr. Moscovici points to are worth a closer look.
In 1981, when the Socialist
government of Francois Mitterrand took office, France's national debt amounted
to 22% of GDP. In the intervening years France's economy has grown by an
inflation-adjusted 73%, while the national debt—now at 90% of GDP—grew by 609%
in real terms. In raw numbers, that comes to about €1.7 trillion in additional
debt. At no time in those 31 years did any French government balance a budget,
much less run a surplus.
All this amounts to one of the
free world's longest-running experiments in the real-world effects of stimulus
spending. If the fabled Keynesian multiplier really existed, all that spending
should have translated into robust economic growth for France. Instead, the
only thing that's been multiplied is France's debt.
President Francois Hollande is
now bemoaning the supposed growth-killing effects of the spending cuts being
demanded of him by the European Union. Yet if deficit spending could stimulate
an economy, France would not be looking over the border with envy at Germany's
growth, debt and unemployment figures. Nor would it again be trying to explain
away another debt downgrade.
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