Is federal debt really nothing more than money ‘we owe to ourselves’? No. It frays the political fabric, and we are feeling its effects already.
By Arnold Kling
“The debt we create is basically money we owe to
ourselves, and the burden it imposes does not involve a real transfer of
resources,” Paul Krugman wrote recently in “Debt
Is (Mostly) Money We Owe to Ourselves.”
“That’s not to say that high debt can’t cause problems
— it certainly can. But these are problems of distribution and incentives, not
the burden of debt as is commonly understood.... talking about leaving a burden
to our children is especially nonsensical; what we are leaving behind is
promises that some of our children will pay money to other children, which is a
very different kettle of fish,” he added.
If this little lullaby (“the debt is something we owe
to ourselves”) helps you sleep, then you may be in for a rude awakening.
Government debt frays the political fabric, and we are feeling its effects
already.
Think of a simple economy, where the only product is
corn. There is no foreign sector, and there are no financial claims more
complicated than IOUs.
There are two types of people in our economy: Lenders
and Spenders. Sammy Spender and Lois Lender each grow two bushels of corn per
year. However, Sammy wants to eat three bushels this year. There are three ways
that this can happen.
Private loan: In a purely
private transaction, Sammy borrows one bushel of corn from Lois this year and
pays her back one bushel of corn next year.
One-time redistribution: The government
redistributes corn by taxing one bushel of corn away from Lois and giving it to
Sammy.
Government borrowing: The government
borrows one bushel of corn from Lois this year and gives it to Sammy. It then
pays Lois back out of taxes next year.
In each case, Sammy can consume three bushels of corn
this year — the two he produces, plus the additional bushel from Lois.
Conversely, Lois consumes one bushel of corn this year — the two she produces,
minus the bushel that Sammy gets.
Next year (year two) is where the three cases differ.
With the private loan, when Sammy pays Lois back next year, she is the one who
will have three bushels of corn and he will be the one with only one bushel.
In the one-time redistribution case, assuming no
further redistribution, then next year Sammy and Lois will revert to consuming
what they produce — two bushels of corn each.
Every year, the debt creates more and more political
division and antagonism.
With government borrowing, the outcome is decided in
year two. Suppose that the government pays back the debt at that time. It owes
Lois one bushel of corn. If it obtains that bushel of corn by taxing Sammy,
then the result is the same as the private loan. If it obtains the bushel of
corn by taxing Lois, then the result is the same as the one-time redistribution.
If the government gets half of its tax revenues from each, then Lois will have
2.5 bushels of corn to eat (two bushels she produces plus one bushel repayment,
minus 0.5 bushels of tax). Sammy will have 1.5 bushels to eat (two bushels he
produces minus 0.5 bushels of tax).
In the first year, when the government borrows the
money, nobody is unhappy. Sammy gets to eat an extra bushel of corn, and Lois
willingly defers consuming one bushel of corn with the expectation of getting
it back next year.
However, this sets the political system up for
conflict and strife in year two, when the burden of paying the debt has to be
apportioned. As we have seen, it could be divided any number of ways. However,
consider this: Lois is expecting three bushels of corn, based on what she
produces and her expectation of having her loan repaid. Meanwhile, Sammy is
expecting two bushels of corn, based on what he produces. There are only four
bushels of corn available, and there will be a political battle over who gets
disappointed the most.
It gets worse.
In fact, in year two, the government will not want to
resolve the issue of distributing the cost of the debt. Paying off the debt
requires incurring political cost. The easiest thing to do is instead to roll
over the debt. Moreover, Sammy is used to eating three bushels of corn, and the
government does not want to have him face austerity. So it goes to Larry and
Lena Lender for a loan of two bushels of corn. The government pays back Lois
with one bushel and gives the other bushel to Sammy. It goes into year three
with a debt of two bushels of corn.
As you can see, the political incentive for the
government is to go deeper and deeper in debt. This in turn raises the stakes
in the political conflict over who will bear the burden of tax increases and
spending reductions. Every year, the debt creates more and more political
division and antagonism.
It gets worse.
As the debt spirals out of control, governments of
failing states resort to what economists call inflationary finance. They cannot
find enough Lenders to continue to pay off the Spenders. So they borrow from
their central bank. The central bank in turn can only expand its lending by
creating more money.
In 2011, the Federal Reserve bought 77 percent of new
debt issued by our government. We are already resorting to inflationary
finance.
At the moment, there is little inflation taking place
and there appears to be very little on the horizon. However, the Federal
Reserve balance sheet is like a pile of kindling soaked in gasoline. So far, no
match has been lit. What happens if a fire does start — if inflation rises to 4
or 5 percent?
Many of the securities that the Fed has acquired are
long-term bonds and mortgages. As inflation and interest rates increase, the
value of these securities plummets.
Once inflation reaches those levels, the Federal
Reserve will want to reduce inflation, or at least to contain it. To do so, it
will need to sell government securities, probably in record amounts. This will
put more pressure on the government to borrow from private Lenders. It will
make it much harder to balance the budget. The Fed is going to be caught
between a rock and a hard place. If it fights inflation, the political system
will be stressed by the challenge of allocating budgetary pain. If it fails to
fight inflation, it risks hyperinflation.
It gets worse.
Many of the securities that the Fed has acquired are
long-term bonds and mortgages. As inflation and interest rates increase, the
value of these securities plummets. (A bond that pays 2.5 percent interest
loses roughly half its value when market rates rise to 5 percent.) In this
scenario, the Fed will be incurring losses, which will require a subsidy from
the government budget. Thus, the challenge with balancing the budget gets even
more difficult.
Another term that economists have coined in the
context of government debt is “sudden stop.” What that means is that when all
other sources of lending have dried up and the public's tolerance for
hyperinflation has been exhausted, the government must suddenly balance its
budget. That is how government debt crises typically end. At that point, the
irreconcilable expectations of Lenders and Spenders are resolved, one way or
another.
The political conflict created by the debt in the
United States is as large as it is in Greece. I believe that Americans will not
be as prone to violent demonstrations, but the underlying anger will be there
nonetheless.
The burden of the debt is that we create an
ever-deeper conflict of interest between Lenders and Spenders. Yes, if you
think of Lenders and Spenders collectively, you can say that “we owe the debt
to ourselves.” But that is a dangerously vacuous way of looking at it. Large
government debt is a recipe for a bitter political stew.
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