In Part I, we looked at the period prior to and during the time of
what we now call the Classical Gold Standard. It
should be underscored that it worked pretty darned well.
Under this standard, the United States produced more wealth at a faster pace
than any other country before, or since. There were problems; such as
laws to fix prices, and regulations to force banks to buy government bonds, but
they were not an essential property of the gold standard.
The
essential was that people had a right to own and trade gold coins. They had the right to deposit them
in a bank, if the bank offered attractive terms (especially the payment of
interest). Banks had a right to take deposits, to buy assets, and to pay
interest. Banks had a right to issue paper notes that were claims against
gold. Banks had a right to lend their deposits (fractional reserves).
Despite some
government interference, the Classical Gold Standard enabled a Golden Age of
prosperity and full employment that is totally out of reach today (not to
be confused with the rapid development of technology). This is not to say
there were not business failures, bank failures and panics – what were later
called depressions and now recessions. A free market does not attempt to
guarantee that no one can ever lose money. It is merely
an environment in which no one is forced to subsidize someone else’s risks or
losses.
Unfortunately, by
the early 20th Century, the tide had shifted. Europe was inexorably
moving towards war. The US was abandoning the principles
on which it had been founded, and exploring a different kind of government: an
unlimited government that could centrally plan and manage the economy and the
lives of the people.
In 1913, the
US government created the Federal Reserve. Much
has been written about this now-hated organization. At the time, the Fed
was supposed to be the re-discounter of Real Bills. Real Bills arose
spontaneously in the market centuries before banks or central banks. They
are credit used for clearing. When a wholesaler delivers goods to a
retailer, the retailer accepts the goods and signs the bill. Commercial
terms were commonly Net 90. It turned out that in the free market, these
bills would circulate as a form of currency, with a value that was based on the
discount rate and the time until maturity. Real Bills were the highest
quality earning asset, and the highest quality asset except only gold itself.
For many
reasons, politicians felt that a quasi-government agency could make better
credit decisions than the market. To
“discount” a Real Bill was to pay gold and take the Bill into one’s
portfolio. The Fed, as re-discounter, would offer the banks unlimited
liquidity in exchange for their bills. Almost immediately, the Fed also
began to buy US government bonds. What better way to expand credit than
to push down the rate of interest? The Fed could use much more leverage
than if they were restricted to buying bills (which would all mature into gold
in 90 days or less!) This time, they thought, there was no limit to how
far down they could push interest, nor for how long.
The Fed
almost certainly enabled the government to borrow at lower rates than would
otherwise have prevailed, but even so the rate of interest rose during World War I. This
is because the government was borrowing unprecedented amounts of money.
The interest rate peaked in 1919. Then it began to fall, not bottoming
until after World War II.
The net
effect of the Fed was to totally destabilize the rate of interest. In
looking at this graph of the 10-year US Treasury bond from 1790 to 2009, one
thing is obvious. There were spikes due to wars and other threats to the
stability of the government. But for long periods of time, the rate of
interest moved in a narrow range. For example, from 1879 until 1913 (i.e.
the period of the Classical Gold Standard), the rate of interest was bound to a
range of 3% to 3.5%. During World War I, the rate spiked up to 5.5% and
then began to fall to well under 2% after World War II. Then the rate
began its ascent to over 17% in 1981. After 1981, the rate has been
falling and is currently under 1.7%. It will continue to fall, but that
is a discussion for another paper.
The US,
unlike Europe, did not suspend redeemability of the currency into gold coin. In Europe, the toll of the war in
terms of money, property, and of course lives, was much higher. The
governments felt it necessary to force their citizens to deal in paper money
only. After the war, they had problems returning to gold. For
example, Germany was prohibited from freely trading with anyone. One
consequence of this was that the Real Bills market never reemerged.
In 1925,
Britain initiated a short-lived experiment: the Gold Bullion Standard. The
idea was that paper money would be backed by gold, but the gold would be kept
in the banking system in the form of 400-ounce bars. Technically, the
paper was redeemable, but the bars were so large that, for all practical
purposes, the money may as well have been irredeemable to ordinary
people. Britain abandoned this regime in 1931, in part due to gold flows
to the US.
In 1933, the
President Roosevelt told American citizens that they must turn in their gold
for approximately $20 per ounce. Once
the government got all the gold they could, Roosevelt revalued gold at $35 per
ounce. The dollar was never again to be redeemable to Americans.
After World
War II, Europe was physically and financially devastated. European
gold had largely moved to the US either because of the coming war, or to pay
for munitions. The Allied powers knew by 1944 that they would be
victorious, and so met at Bretton Woods to agree on the next monetary
system. They agreed to what could be called the Gold Exchange Standard.
In this new
standard, the US dollar would be the reserve asset of the central banks and
commercial banks of the world. They would end up with dollars on
both sides of their balance sheets, and pyramid credit in their local
currencies on top of this reserve. The dollar would continue to be
redeemable to foreign central banks (but not to US citizens).
This regime
was unstable, as economists such as Jacques Rueff and Robert Triffin realized. Triffin proposed that there is a
dilemma for the world and the US. As the world demanded more money, this
meant that the US had to run a trade deficit to provide the currency. But
a chronic trade deficit would cause the value of the dollar to fall, with
wealth being transferred from foreign creditors to domestic (US) consumers.
Throughout
the 1960’s, European central banks, and most visibly France, redeemed dollars. By 1971, the gold was flowing out
of the US at a rate of over 100 tons per day. President Nixon had to do
something. What he did was end the Gold Exchange Standard and plunge us
into the worldwide regime of irredeemable paper money.
Since then,
it has become obvious that without the anchor of gold, the monetary system is
un-tethered, unbounded, and unhinged. Capital
is being destroyed at an exponentially accelerating rate, and this can be seen
by exponentially rising debt that can never be repaid, a falling interest rate,
and numerous other phenomena.
No comments:
Post a Comment