By Martin Hutchinson
President Barack Obama's victory clarifies the political and economic landscape. Unfettered in his second term, he will now be able to pursue the economic policies he truly favors. To see their result, we can look at a country with an overlarge government, low domestic savings, endless "stimulus" spending financed by its development bank, relatively high inflation, huge inequality and accompanying tax evasion, state meddling in major industries, which trade off their political connections, a high level of corruption and an education system that does a poor job of preparing its citizens for the high-tech world.
That country is Brazil. Sadly, Brazilian economic policies will if pursued for two decades or so produce in the United States a Brazilian standard of living.
Obama's opponents during the election campaign accused him of wanting the United States to be more like the Western countries of the European Union. Certainly the EU's all-powerful bureaucracy and its commitment to various "elite" projects such as fighting global warming and universal healthcare appeal to him. But in reality, the United States is a very different environment from Western Europe, with a different demographic profile and many attitudes that have derived from its New World provenance.
President Barack Obama's victory clarifies the political and economic landscape. Unfettered in his second term, he will now be able to pursue the economic policies he truly favors. To see their result, we can look at a country with an overlarge government, low domestic savings, endless "stimulus" spending financed by its development bank, relatively high inflation, huge inequality and accompanying tax evasion, state meddling in major industries, which trade off their political connections, a high level of corruption and an education system that does a poor job of preparing its citizens for the high-tech world.
That country is Brazil. Sadly, Brazilian economic policies will if pursued for two decades or so produce in the United States a Brazilian standard of living.
Obama's opponents during the election campaign accused him of wanting the United States to be more like the Western countries of the European Union. Certainly the EU's all-powerful bureaucracy and its commitment to various "elite" projects such as fighting global warming and universal healthcare appeal to him. But in reality, the United States is a very different environment from Western Europe, with a different demographic profile and many attitudes that have derived from its New World provenance.
The European approach, of
large government that cements in place an industrial structure built 50 years
ago is not available to a country with a rapidly growing population and a
shrunken manufacturing base. In any case, Europe has its own problems; the idyllic
picture of happy French peasants bicycling around with strings of gourmet
onions around their necks is already hopelessly outdated.
The tendency of US living standards to converge towards Brazilian ones
is a product of globalization, and a natural result of economic arbitrage in a
world of excessive and growing population and ever-easier communications. The
world's average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, on a purchasing power
parity basis, was $11,640 in 2011, just below Brazil's $11,719, and somewhat
below Bulgaria's $14,603 or Malaysia's $15,589. If Brazilian labor is
equivalent in quality and other factors of production to US labor, then US GDP
per capita of $48,442 is bound to converge on it over time.
The reason for the US superiority in living standards is not the
country's abundant natural resources - otherwise Argentina would be among the
world's richest countries. It's the quality of its institutions and economic
policies, which have allowed a massive investment in education and a level of
high-quality entrepreneurship that is the envy of the world.
Britain in the 18th century had the best institutions and policies in
the world; the United States adopted them, and was then lucky enough, partly
because of the continued existence of the "frontier" through the 19th
century, to avoid the poisonous socialism that grew up in Europe's big
cities.
This factor may seem modest, but it is analogous to intellectual
property or design excellence, which enable the stars in the pharmaceutical,
technology and other innovation-driven sectors to enjoy returns far above the
industrial norm for decades. When Apple unveils a new iProduct, it is fairly
similar to other products already on the market or shortly to arrive there, but
the company is able to command higher prices and enormously superior margins
because of the excellence of its design and product features.
However, Apple's margin superiority is not necessarily everlasting and
is subject to erosion over time. Its early products in the 1970s and 1980s,
notably the Macintosh, were equally ahead of their time, but struggled to make
large amounts of money. Then the Newton series of products, introduced in 1993,
were abject and expensive failures. However, Steve Jobs' return allowed the
company's revenues, margins and stock price to soar once again into the
stratosphere, eventually producing the iPad, a far more successful descendent
of the Newton.
Eventually, even the most successful companies lose their margin of
superiority. Microsoft, which had such superiority in the 1990s, has now
largely become commoditized. Polaroid, which enjoyed spectacular success with
its instant photography in the 1950s and 1960s, not only lost its edge after
its founder Edwin Land retired in 1980, it filed for bankruptcy in 2001.
Similarly, Jobs' death last year is almost certainly going to lead to a
gradual commoditization of Apple's product range and the descent of its margins
and stock price to more normal levels. Jobs' successors at Apple, like Land's
at Polaroid, are not stupid people, but in the long run they cannot preserve
the company's unnatural success.
A similar process applies to the United States. Its economic and
constitutional set-up was greatly superior to its competitors, carrying it to
an unimaginable superiority in wealth and living standards by the 1950s, aided
by the self-destruction of its European competitors. This wealth was partly
reinvested in college education via the GI Bill, allowing US living standards a
further leap forward.
However, the Progressives and the New Deal had already reduced the US
advantage over Western Europe and the Great Society reduced it further, so by
the 1970s, the United States was finding it increasingly difficult to preserve
its living standards advantages against the rest of the world. Good leadership
in the 1980s created a new ability to increase wages, so that by the late
1990s, with the United States having invented the Internet and much of modern
communications, and the post-Soviet peace dividend reducing its overheads, its
ability to charge a premium for its capabilities was restored and all seemed
well.
Since 2000, weak management has allowed the US competitive advantage to
erode. Fiscal and monetary laxity has drained the US capital base, an advantage
similar to the cash hordes of Microsoft, Google and Apple. The country's
integrity has slipped; from 16th place on Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index in 2011, with a score of 7.6, the country had slipped to 24th
place in 2011, with a score of 7.1.
Similarly, heavy immigration created a society with permanently high
unemployment (when those "not in the workforce" are included) and
inequality at a level the country had only briefly touched before, in the late
1920s. The result has been an 8% decline in median real wages, mostly in the
recession since 2007 but continuing in the most recent years when growth had
nominally resumed.
This is why calls for the Republicans to abandon their opposition to
immigration controls are especially misguided. High-skill immigration in
moderation is highly beneficial to the economy. But very heavy immigration,
even of the highly skilled, depresses job prospects and earnings for those in
professions especially subject to it - which is why median earnings for
college-trained software engineers are lower than those for college-trained
lawyers, where professional restrictions to immigration apply.
Mass low-skilled immigration, legal or illegal, inevitably puts pressure
on living standards at the bottom of the scale. The barber in Boston is paid
more than the barber in Bangalore because he benefits from geographical
proximity to rich neighbors, but if large numbers of immigrant barbers move to
Boston, his wages will decline towards the global norm.
In addition, the presence of large numbers of immigrants puts pressure
on the political system to adapt to the norms they are used to. In the United
States of 1900, this did not happen; first generation immigrants were forced to
assimilate to US norms and were given little political power until they had
abandoned the collectivist nostrums of their home countries.
However, today we rightly assimilate less brutally and encourage
immigrants to preserve much of their home cultures. Hence, since a high
proportion of immigration is Latin American in origin, there is a danger that
political norms will be forced towards the corruption, hatred of the rich
and caudillo cultures that have impoverished Latin America for
the past two centuries. In other words, if US living standards converge towards
the global norm, it is to Brazil and not to Malaysia or Bulgaria that the
society will converge.
Globalization is immensely beneficial to the welfare of the world
economy in general, but most of its benefits accrue to residents of poor
countries, as it provides them with opportunities to which they would not
otherwise be exposed. If technological advance is rapid and rich country
governance truly superior this will not matter much; rich countries' living
standards will continue to advance even as poor countries' standards advance
faster, and the world gets richer overall at a rapid clip.
However, poor countries are catching up with US education and governance
standards all the time, just as Apple's competitors are seeking all the time to
erode Apple's competitive advantage. Hence, if the United States suffers a
period of poor governance, an increase in the costs of government, a long-term
distortion of its markets, a draining of capital by misguided monetary policy
and a partial convergence on the inferior governance norms and higher
corruption of poorer countries, its living standards will erode.
Technological advances continue (as I wrote a few weeks ago, I do not
expect their economic benefits to disappear anytime soon). However, such
advances arrive in bursts, with periods of unimaginable change interspersed
with periods of relative stasis and adaptation to past advances. If such a
period of technological quiescence coincides with a period of erosion of US
advantages in governance and capital base, the descent of US living standards
towards Brazilian levels may be quite swift.
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