By Clyde Prestowitz
All my life I've
been a Europhile. My dad worked for a Belgian company. I was a high school
exchange student to Switzerland in 1958. My first posting as a Foreign Service
officer was as vice consul to Rotterdam. I lived in Brussels for five years in
the 1970s as head of Scott Paper Company's European marketing operations. I
take my family to Europe frequently and maintain a wide range of work and other
activities there.
Through all the vicissitudes of
mid-night negotiations, I admired the dedication and vision of the negotiators
who were building the European Union. I believed in the vision of a united
Europe and welcomed the advent of the Euro as a major step along the way. When
the recent crisis first broke three years ago, I welcomed it, thinking that
surely it would be a catalyst for Europe to move to full financial integration
and to greater political integration on the way toward realizing the vision of
a truly united Europe.
I was wrong, and I have come to realize
that my dream of a united Europe a la the United States, is not the
European dream. Indeed, with great disappointment I have at last concluded that
there is no European dream because a las those whom we on the outside call
Europeans are not and don't want to be Europeans.
I spent part of last weekend with a
group of leading intellectuals from various European countries. The Germans
were firm in their conviction that the primary cause of the EU crisis is the
laziness, profligacy, free rider attitude, and mendacity of the so called
Peripheral Countries ( Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and even maybe
France), especially Greece, Portugal, and Spain. They emphasized that Germans
believe in paying their way, in spending prudently, saving, investing,
producing, and maintaining sound money and strong currencies.
They attributed Germany's economic success of the past decade wholly to the dedicated pursuit of these virtues. Conversely the problems of the others were blamed largely on their failure adequately to observe the German virtues. Did they realize that Spain's government budget deficit and debt as a percent of GDP had been less than Germany's? Yes, in some cerebral way in their heads they did, but not in their gut. Did they realize that the German banks had been major lenders to and facilitators of the peripheral real estate bubbles whose collapse precipitated the crisis? Again, yes, but only in a kind of theoretical way. There was clearly no conviction that that was a primary cause of the problem or that keeping the German banks whole might have been an on-going drag on the recovery of the peripheral countries. Was there any understanding that for Germany the Euro is actually undervalued (compared to what a free standing Deutsch Mark would be valued at) and that much of Germany's export success is due to that? Absolutely not. No, Germany's success was seen as entirely due to hard work and financial virtue.
My companions saw the solution very much
in terms of continued enforcement of strict austerity and achievement by the
peripheral countries of fiscal and trade surpluses by dint of reducing wages,
employment, and costs. None of them were interested in achieving a European
banking union or any other kind of arrangement that would result in German
money being used to support Europe-wide obligations.They attributed Germany's economic success of the past decade wholly to the dedicated pursuit of these virtues. Conversely the problems of the others were blamed largely on their failure adequately to observe the German virtues. Did they realize that Spain's government budget deficit and debt as a percent of GDP had been less than Germany's? Yes, in some cerebral way in their heads they did, but not in their gut. Did they realize that the German banks had been major lenders to and facilitators of the peripheral real estate bubbles whose collapse precipitated the crisis? Again, yes, but only in a kind of theoretical way. There was clearly no conviction that that was a primary cause of the problem or that keeping the German banks whole might have been an on-going drag on the recovery of the peripheral countries. Was there any understanding that for Germany the Euro is actually undervalued (compared to what a free standing Deutsch Mark would be valued at) and that much of Germany's export success is due to that? Absolutely not. No, Germany's success was seen as entirely due to hard work and financial virtue.
That, of course, is the way Chancellor
Angela Merkel played it over the weekend with regard to the provision of
assistance for Greece in order to enable it to avoid default. The Greek
situation is truly a vicious circle. Austerity has led to dramatic shrinkage of
the Greek economy which means that the debt as a percent of GDP is actually
climbing rapidly despite the loans and other measures that have been taken in
an effort to relieve and re-generate the Greek economy. The Greek situation is
getting worse, not better. Everyone at the weekend meeting which included
International Monetary Fund head Christine LaGarde knew and knows that the half
measures agreed upon will not be enough. Everyone knows that there will have to
be debt relief for Greece somewhere along the way. But German politics don't
allow Merkel to face that reality right now, and she is not the kind of leader
(one thinks of Helmut Kohl) who tries to shape and guide public opinion as
opposed to following it.
Nor is it only a matter of German
attitudes. The UK has always run hot and cold on Europe. At the present moment,
it is running perhaps colder than ever in the past. Prime Minister David
Cameron and his ruling coalition only want to be part of the EU as long as it
leaves the UK more or less completely autonomous without having to pay any
costs or having to accept any regulations. The betting among my sources is that
the UK will be out of the EU within a couple of years.
As for the French, along with the
Germans the main historical drivers of the EU, they now seem bent on doing
everything possible to turn France into a true Peripheral country. The
new President, Francois Hollande, spent the weekend telling Arcelor-Mittal
Steel Company CEO, Lakshmi Mittal that if he didn't renege on plans to
close two old, inefficient blast furnaces that are part of a steel complex in
Florange and thereby lay off 600 French workers, the French government would nationalize
the whole complex and attempt to sell it to someone else. Somehow, this didn't
seem at all in the spirit of the recent French government sponsored advertising
program to attract investment to France with a lyric that runs: "say yes
to France."
I guess that Lakshmi Mittal is going to
say "no" to France.
But what I really regret is the fact
that the giants who built the EU are now gone, and the pygmies who have taken
their places are all saying "No" to Europe.
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