[This article is featured in chapter 79 of Making Economic Sense by Murray Rothbard and originally appeared in the September, 1985 edition of The Free Market]
by Murray N. Rothbard
It was a scene familiar to any nostalgia buff: all-night lines waiting for the banks (first in Ohio, then in Maryland) to open; pompous but mendacious assurances by the bankers that all is well and that the people should go home; a stubborn insistence by depositors to get their money out; and the consequent closing of the banks by government, while at the same time the banks were permitted to stay in existence and collect the debts due them by their borrowers.
It was a scene familiar to any nostalgia buff: all-night lines waiting for the banks (first in Ohio, then in Maryland) to open; pompous but mendacious assurances by the bankers that all is well and that the people should go home; a stubborn insistence by depositors to get their money out; and the consequent closing of the banks by government, while at the same time the banks were permitted to stay in existence and collect the debts due them by their borrowers.
In other words, instead of government
protecting private property and enforcing voluntary contracts, it deliberately
violated the property of the depositors by barring them from retrieving their
own money from the banks.
All this was, of course, a replay of the
early 1930s: the last era of massive runs on banks. On the surface the weakness
was the fact that the failed banks were insured by private or state deposit
insurance agencies, whereas the banks that easily withstood the storm were
insured by the federal government (FDIC for commercial banks; FSLIC for savings
and loan banks).
But why? What is the magic elixir
possessed by the federal government that neither private firms nor states can
muster? The defenders of the private insurance agencies noted that they were technically
in better financial shape than FSLIC or FDIC, since they had greater reserves
per deposit dollar insured. How is it that private firms, so far superior to
government in all other operations, should be so defective in this one area? Is
there something unique about money that requires federal control?
The answer to this puzzle lies in the
anguished statements of the savings and loan banks in Ohio and in Maryland,
after the first of their number went under because of spectacularly unsound
loans. "What a pity," they in effect complained, "that the
failure of this one unsound bank should drag the sound banks down with them!"
But in what sense is a bank
"sound" when one whisper of doom, one faltering of public confidence,
should quickly bring the bank down? In what other industry does a mere rumor or
hint of doubt swiftly bring down a mighty and seemingly solid firm? What is
there about banking that public confidence should play such a decisive and
overwhelmingly important role?
The answer lies in the nature of our
banking system, in the fact that both commercial banks and thrift banks
(mutual-savings and savings-and-loan) have been systematically engaging in
fractional-reserve banking: that is, they have far less cash on hand than there
are demand claims to cash outstanding. For commercial banks, the
reserve fraction is now about 10 percent; for the thrifts it is far less.
This means that the depositor who thinks
he has $10,000 in a bank is misled; in a proportionate sense, there is only,
say, $1,000 or less there. And yet, both the checking depositor and the savings
depositor think that they can withdraw their money at any time on demand.
Obviously, such a system, which is considered fraud when practiced by other
businesses, rests on a confidence trick: that is, it can only work so long as
the bulk of depositors do not catch on to the scare and try to get their money
out. The confidence is essential, and also misguided. That is why once the
public catches on, and bank runs begin, they are irresistible and cannot be
stopped.
We now see why private enterprise works so
badly in the deposit insurance business. For private enterprise only works in a
business that is legitimate and useful, where needs are being fulfilled. It is
impossible to "insure" a firm, even less so an industry, that is
inherently insolvent. Fractional reserve banks, being inherently insolvent, are
uninsurable.
What, then, is the magic potion of the
federal government? Why does everyone trust the FDIC and FSLIC even though
their reserve ratios are lower than private agencies, and though they too have
only a very small fraction of total insured deposits in cash to stem any bank
run? The answer is really quite simple: because everyone realizes, and realizes
correctly, that only the federal government--and not the states or private
firms--can print legal tender dollars. Everyone knows that, in case of a bank
run, the U.S. Treasury would simply order the Fed to print enough cash to bail
out any depositors who want it. The Fed has the unlimited power to print
dollars, and it is this unlimited power to inflate that stands behind the
current fractional reserve banking system.
Yes, the FDIC and FSLIC "work,"
but only because the unlimited monopoly power to print money can
"work" to bail out any firm or person on earth. For it was precisely
bank runs, as severe as they were that, before 1933, kept the banking system
under check, and prevented any substantial amount of inflation.
But now bank runs--at least for the
overwhelming majority of banks under federal deposit insurance--are over, and
we have been paying and will continue to pay the horrendous
price of saving the banks: chronic and unlimited inflation.
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