By PHILIP
GIRALDI
One of the surprise results of President Barack Obama’s recent trip to
the Middle East was the last-minute phone call between Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu of Israel and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey that took
place from a hastily set-up trailer near the Tel Aviv airport as Obama was
about to leave.
The two
nations had once cooperated closely and were generally viewed as strategic
partners, but the Turks had begun to distance themselves from Israeli policies
in early 2009 when the Turkish prime minister confronted Israel’s President
Shimon Peres at a January international meeting in Davos. Referring to the
slaughter of Gazan civilians earlier that month during Operation Cast Lead,
Erdogan told Peres, “you
know well how to kill.” In the one-hour discussion of Gaza that was moderated
by David Ignatius of the Washington Post, Peres was allowed 25
minutes to speak in defense of the Israeli attack. Erdogan was given 12
minutes. During the debate, Peres pointed accusingly at Erdogan and raised his
voice. When Erdogan sought time to respond, Ignatius granted him a minute and
then cut him off, claiming it was time to go to dinner. Erdogan complained
about the treatment and left Davos, vowing never to return. Back in Turkey, he
received a hero’s welcome.
The
bilateral relationship then hit zero when, in June 2010, the Israelis boarded
the Turkish ferry Mavi Marmara in international waters. The Mavi
Marmara had only
humanitarian supplies on board, but the Israeli naval commandos from the elite
Shayetet 13 unit were met by a number of Turks wielding improvised weapons made
from the ship’s rails and deck chairs. The Israelis killed nine Turks, one of
whom was also an American citizen; most were shot execution-style. Israel could
have defused the crisis by admitting it had erred, apologizing, and offering to
pay reparations, but refused to do so. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who
had personally directed the operation, claimed that the Israelis were acting in
self-defense.
The
Turkish connection was important because Turkey was the only predominantly
Muslim country with which Israel had a truly friendly relationship. But Israel
is much less important to Ankara. The prior warmth was based on common
interests uniting the Israeli and Turkish militaries that never quite
penetrated to the government level in Ankara, where Israel’s destabilizing role
in a region that Turkey was increasingly seeing as its backyard was watched
carefully. The military’s ability to influence events waned when the Turkish
National Security Council, a powerful remnant of the last military coup
consisting of high-ranking officers, was effectively delegitimized and broken
by Erdogan. He also ordered the arrests of hundreds of senior officers who
might or might not have been conspiring to overthrow him.
What is
important to Erdogan is that Ankara’s strained relationship with Israel has
created problems in Washington. Since the split, there have been numerous
articles, mostly written by neocons, criticizing Turkey’s democratic
credentials and its self-confident Islamic identity while asking whether the
country is really “part of the West.” In the September 16, 2011 Washington Post Morton Abramowitz, a former U.S.
Ambassador to Turkey, opined that Erdogan
now directly challenges our major alliance in the Middle East, and how
far he will go is unclear … By threatening to militarily contest Israel’s
blockade of Gaza … the Turkish government has laid down a serious challenge to
American policy … Obama’s meeting with Erdogan on
Tuesday is crucial. He
can take a few important steps. He should immediately deploy 6th Fleet ships
from Norfolk to the Eastern Mediterranean to signal that the United States will
not tolerate even inadvertent naval clashes. He needs to make clear to Erdogan
that the United States will not side with Turkey against Israel and that
Turkey’s current strategy risks undermining regional stability.
Turkey is shifting to a policy of confrontation, if not hostility,
towards our allies in Israel and we urge you to mount a diplomatic offensive to
reverse this course. We ask you to outline Turkey’s eroding support in Congress
… and how its current ill-advised policy towards the State of Israel will also
negatively reflect on U.S. Turkish relations and Turkey’s role in the future of
NATO.
But the
White House has never taken its eye off the ball regarding Turkey. Turkey is
without any doubt the key player and most essential ally for the United States
in the entire Near East region. It is frequently cited as an example of how
democracy can function in a predominantly Islamic country. It is the NATO
member with the largest army after that of the U.S., fought in the Korean War,
has fully supported every U.S. intervention in its backyard save only Iraq in
2003, and shares long borders both with Syria and Iran. Whatever happens in
Syria will largely be shaped by what Ankara decides to do, and President Obama
knows it. Israel is understandably concerned about what might come out of the
Syrian farrago and knows it too, so Obama was able to convince Netanyahu that
if he wants to sit at the table when critical decisions are made about Syria,
accommodating Turkey and Erdogan would be a necessary first step. So it was
most definitely in Israel’s own interest as well as that of Washington to mend
fences with Erdogan.
Netanyahu
faced considerable internal opposition within his new coalition to making the
call that Obama personally brokered. Netanyahu’s former Moldovan bouncer
Avigdor Lieberman, who until recently provided comic relief as a foreign
minister, immediately denounced the
prime minister’s apology as a “serious mistake” before saying, “Such an apology
harms IDF soldiers’ motivation and their willingness to go out on future
missions, and strengthens the radical elements in the region. Worse still is
the fact that the apology also affects Israel’s uncompromising struggle for
righteousness, morality and for the morality of its soldiers.”
There was
also considerable opposition from Turkey. Erdogan responded to the call
somewhat reluctantly, according to Turkish sources, and only because Obama was
involved. He accepted the Netanyahu apology but demanded that it first be put
in writing before giving his verbal consent, reportedly because
he did not trust the Israeli Prime Minister to stick with whatever wording
might be agreed upon over the phone. The official Israeli version subsequently
appeared in several forms in English on the Israeli Foreign Ministry website before
it was agreed to by Ankara. It now reads that “Israel regrets … [due to] a
number of operational mistakes … the loss of life or injury.” It agreed to
“conclude an agreement on compensation/nonliability. Prime Minister Netanyahu
also noted that Israel has substantially lifted the restrictions on the entry
of civilian goods into the Palestinians territories, including Gaza…”
The
Israeli and U.S. media initially reported that the two countries would restore
full diplomatic relations, but that is incorrect. Erdogan has instructed his
foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, to establish a fair level of compensation
for the families of the Mavi Marmara victims as well as for the shipowners,
a sum likely to exceed $20 million, before improving ties in any way. And he
has not committed to returning his ambassador to Tel Aviv. Turkey is also
monitoring compliance with the pledge to ease entry to Gaza and the West Bank.
Davutoglu reportedly sent a strongly worded message to Netanyahu regarding
Israel’s new restrictions on Gazan fisherman, which went into effect two days
after the three heads of government spoke on the phone.
Israel has
also taken note of an independent announcement by Turkey that Erdogan would visit Gaza and the West Bank in April, while
there have been rumors in the Turkish media that the current Turkish consul
general in Jerusalem, Sakir Ozkan Torunlar, will be re-designated ambassador to
Palestine, meaning full recognition of the Palestinian State, with all that
implies.
Possibly
most important of all is the fact that the Erdogan-Netanyahu agreement did not
explicitly mention legal liability. In June 2012 Israel’s own state
controller investigated the Mavi
Marmara incident and,
though absolving the military, noted “essential and significant flaws” in the
operation as directed by Netanyahu. A simultaneous United Nations investigation
called the use of force in the raid “excessive and unreasonable.” The Turkish
Justice Ministry completed its own inquiry in the summer of 2012, resulting in
criminal charges being filed against four senior Israeli military officers.
That trial is scheduled to begin later this year with more than 500 witnesses
prepared to provide eyewitness testimony for the in absentia proceedings. It all means that the
rapprochement engineered by President Obama between Israel and Turkey is still
very much a work in progress, and it is Ankara that is best placed to dictate
the course of further developments.
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