In populist democracies, the regulation of banking is used as a political tool to favor some parties over others
Since 1790, the United States has suffered 16 banking crises. Canada has experienced zero — not even during the Great Depression |
It turns out Canada can thank the French for their
stable system, according to a paper by Columbia University’s Charles Calomiris, presented at the
Atlanta Fed’s 2013 Financial Markets Conference.
When it became a British colony, the majority of
Canada’s population was of French origin — and the French inhabitants hated the
British government.
So to keep the colony firmly within the Empire,
British policymakers steered toward a government structure that would limit the
power of the French-majority while also giving Canada more and more
self-government. The eventual result was a highly-centralized federal
government which controlled economic policy making and had built-in buffers for
banker interests against populist forces, the paper argues.
That anti-populist political system — known in
political science as liberal constitutionalism or liberal democracy — is a key
ingredient in Canada’s stable banking track record, Mr. Calomiris contends in
his paper, which is a summary of a much longer book he’s written with Stephen Haber due out in September. That’s because
this kind of political system makes it difficult for political majorities to
gain control of the banking system for their own purposes, the authors contend.
Populist democracies like the U.S., on the other hand,
tend to create dysfunctional banking systems because a majority of citizens
gain control over banking regulation that steers credit to themselves and to
their friends at the expense of the citizens that are excluded from the banking
system, he said.
The contrast between the U.S. and Canada was part of
Mr. Calomiris broader argument that dysfunctional banking systems — which are
by far the norm rather than the exception around the world — are the result of
political factors.
“Whether societies have dysfunctional banking systems
is really not a technical issue at all. It’s a political issue,” Mr. Calomiris
said at the conference, introducing his premise as “we do know how to avoid
dysfunctional banking but that we make political choices – you might even say
consciously” not to have functional banking systems for most of the modern era
in most countries of the world.
The history of the U.S. banking system is one in which
the government forms partnerships with different interest groups at different
points in history, and those coalitions jointly influenced the way the banking
system was regulated, Mr. Calomiris argues.
“In populist democracies, such as the United States,
the regulation of banking is used as a political tool to favor some parties
over others. It is not that the dominant political coalition in charge of
banking policy desires instability, per se, but rather, that it is willing to
tolerate instability as the price for obtaining the benefits that it extracts
from controlling banking regulation,” he writes in his paper.
Backing up their argument: Only six countries –
including Canada — have been crisis-free and at the same time have banking
systems that provide abundant credit. Three of these – Singapore, Malta and
Hong Kong – are small, island-bound city-states where the homogeneity of the
population makes it politically difficult to create losers. The other three –
Canada, Australia and New Zealand – all share histories of liberal democracy.
Mr. Calomiris argues that in the U.S., a coalition
that emerged in the 1990s of government, big banks and activist consumer groups
came helped fuel the housing crisis. Regulatory changes opened the door to a
wave of mergers and acquisitions that created today’s megabanks. But banks
still had to get approval – usually from the Federal Reserve – to complete
those mergers and outside groups were able to weigh in on the wisdom of the
deal as part of the Fed’s decision-making process.
Community groups, with the Clinton administration’s
encouragement, used the Fed’s approval process to extract binding concessions
from banks to loosen underwriting standards for poor, urban communities –
concessions to which the Fed agreed, Mr. Calomiris argues. The banks had to
apply the looser standards to everyone. That helped fuel an explosion in poorly
underwritten mortgages that contributed to the depth and severity of the
housing crisis, he contends.
All in all, Mr. Calomiris’ theory is a bleak one for
the ability of financial reform efforts to make much of a difference.
“Smart economists with their regulatory ideas are sort
of dead on arrival,” he said. “Political coalitions will decide — not whether
you’ve got the right VAR model — [but] whether a banking system is going to be
set up with rules that will lead it to be stable and have abundant credit or
not.”
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