Every
year for the last umpteen thousand years, a million or so gnus walk a thousand
miles up and down again the East African savannas, eating grass. Grazing has
remained their way of life without any discernible change in its manner from
one millennia to the next. Their prosperity is expressed primarily in their
numbers which grows or declines as wet years follow dry ones. Their society
adapts itself to their habitat. Two randomly chosen gnus of the same age and
gender are so much alike that for the inexpert eye they look identical, and
this must have been the case many centuries ago as well.
Unlike
the herd of gnus, a flock of Merino sheep does its grazing on a more or less
confined area. It is kept there by shepherds and their dogs, and depends on
some human assistance at lambing and for shelter and fodder when the winter is
too hostile. Man repays himself with wool and meat with some breeds being
better at furnishing wool, others meat. Two Merino ewes of the same age look
much the same, but a Merino is very different from a Blue-Face Leicester and
from other breeds of only a little less charming names. The two breeds, and
others who bear less charming names, specialise in somewhat different products
and are adapted to different habitats (though the Merino can put up with almost
any climate and miserable pasture).
Neither
the herds of gnu nor the flock of sheep has any social structure to speak of;
all individuals of the same age and gender are of equal rank and have equal
access to the available grazing. Packs of wolves do have a social structures of
sorts, but few animals are hierarchical. Neither species is acting purposefully
to create or improve its own habitat. Apart from moles, foxes and badgers who
burrow underground lodgings where the environment above ground suits then, the
only habitat-builder animal is the beaver who makes lakes.
On the
whole, the animal kingdom is characterised by great homogeneity, physical and
behavioural uniformity within each species. This is, of course, what the
evolutionary origin of the species, demonstrated by Darwin and his successors,
leads us to expect. It is much less clear whether we should also expect the
passive adaptation of each species to its environment and the almost total
absence (except in the beaver?) of deliberate attempts to alter and control it.
Improving its environment by ploughing the waste land, clearing the bush,
controlling and displacing the waters, and breaking paths for others to use, is
typical only of one species: mankind. So is its tendency to have a social
structure that is getting more elaborate as time passes.
Scientists
and philosophers over the ages have amused themselves with proposing answers to
the question: what essentially makes man a man and the animal an animal? Some
of the answers—the sense of ridicule and of humour, shame, modesty, the privacy
wanted for sex, forethought, a propensity for metaphysical thought—are
interesting though not overwhelmingly strong. One that the present article
commends is diversity within the species. A pair of young women randomly
chosen, not from humanity as a whole or a nation, but from among the young
women of a small town, is probably impossible to mistake for identical twins.
The two women will be incommensurately more different from one another than the
randomly chosen members of a pair of animals of a given animal species. If we
add to physical characteristics the ways of interaction with others and a host
of other things that only humans do man is more diversified by several orders
of magnitude than any species of animal. The scope for a variety of social organisation
and cooperation to evolve, compared to the much less varied scope for the same
even within such a collaborative but un-diversified, uniform animal species as
the ant or the bee, is enormous.
Curiously
enough, there is a strong propensity in human thought to hold that for one
reason or another, the material rewards accruing to men and women of widely and
even wildly different capacities, talents and efforts should differ but very
little, perhaps not much more than the grass one gnu manages to eat compared to
the amount every other gnu grazing next to it gets to eat, always bearing in
mind that one gnu is not noticeably cleverer or more intent on finding grass
than the other.
Judaism
and early Christianity insisted on equality of material well being—in practical
fact, equal poverty achieved by intense charity—is a moral rule religion orders
us to obey. The sort of supporting argument, namely that God created all men
equal was flagrantly contrary to evidence and experience, but held sway for
many centuries. With its decline after the Enlightenment, two lay doctrines
gained preponderance, Benthamite utilitarianism and Kantian
"rightsism". One led to the egalitarian streak in welfare economics.
The other to a soft-Left political philosophy characterised by appeals to
social contracts and is also egalitarian. By the end of the 20th century, both
these doctrines lost their shine as their logical basis was proved to be
faulty, though like other outdated doctrines, their trace is still deeply
marked in the habits of thought of the average intellectual. However, their
place in the vanguard has oddly enough, been taken by evolutionary game theory.
Oddly, because the popular view of Darwin and Darwinism has long used to be
that he was only a little better than the devil, his teaching was cynical,
cruel, and immoral and gave a pseudo-scientific licence to a capitalist
free-for-all, survival of the fittest and the devil take the hindmost. Much to
the surprise of some of us, we are now taught that evolutionary equilibrium is
egalitarian and is really a set of benign social contracts in a kind of genetic
disguise, yet entirely empirical and untainted by metaphysical affirmations.
Throughout
all but the tail-end of pre-history, most of humanity eked out a precarious
living by hunting game and gathering edible plants. We might say, by way of
causal explanation, either that most of humanity recognised and chose
hunting-gathering as the most efficient survival strategy, but equally well we
might say that because hunting-gathering was the most efficient survival
strategy, those who chose it eventually became the majority by way of their
genes being transmitted to their descendants while the genes of the ones who
had opted for another way of making a living, ill-adapted to the available
environment, died out with them. Genes mutate, some of the new genes predispose
to a wandering, others to a sedentary existence, but the latter get less of a
chance to transmit their predisposition than the former, hence the
hunter-gatherer dominance.
In the
small hunter-gatherer band, members had unequal day-to-day success in hunting
and gathering, but shared the meat, the berries and mushrooms equally.
Techniques of preserving food were poor and carrying along stocks of preserved
food were both awkward for the wanderer and unsafe if only some of the
wanderers had such stocks while the rest went hungry. Hence the best use of the
food was "share and share alike", the egalitarian rule. Sir Ken
Binmore, the distinguished game theorist and philosopher, is convinced and
would convince us that this rule, originating a very long way in pre-history,
is "hard-wired" in us to this day and appears as the notorious
"original position" in Rawls's Theory of Justice. Equal
distribution, then, is not a utilitarian recommendation nor a moral imperative,
but an empirical matter of genetic evolution.
It so
happens, though, that in the last ten thousand or so years B.C., initially in
Mesopotamia and the Nile Valley and subsequently over ever larger areas, the
technique of sowing grain, waiting for its harvest and preserving some of it
from one season to the next has proved vastly superior to hunting-gathering and
radically replaced it. Moreover, the genetic survival of the sedentary
agriculturist was not best served by share-and-share-alike. With other things
equal, the hardest-working and cleverest agriculturist was more likely to
produce a surplus to be saved and stocked than the less efficient,
lackadaisical and unskilful one. The former, by accumulating and not sharing
grain, had a better chance of safely raising his progeny than the latter. Like
it or not, "selfishly" individualist maximising behaviour became the
winner in the evolutionary process. Egalitarian distribution turned out to be
obsolete as a survival strategy, and the "original position" had to
fall back on some metaphysical affirmation for support.
However,
once individual maximisation and accumulation by the most successful has become
the dominant evolutionary conduct, in most of the contemporary world there
followed an accelerating capacity to produce wealth, undreamt of a mere century
or two ago, as did the risk by environmental degradation or nuclear war.
Share-and-share alike is a nostalgic ideal of some of us; persistent attempts
to impose it on contemporary societies by the use of a collective choice rule
that is almost pre-destined to favour it, cripple the wealth-creating capacity
and probably leave the risks of great damage intact. Whether they make for a
better world or a worse one is the sort of futile
"what-is-the-meaning-of-life" kind of infantile question to which
Buddha is reputed always to refuse to answer, an attitude we should respect and
probably ought to imitate.
A
million gnus, all alike and sharing the grass more or less equally, have never
tried a different way of life, never started off a dizzying gnu civilisation
and no one can say that they have lost something by leaving well alone. In any
case, being all alike, they hardly had a choice in the matter. Mankind, a
species of unparalleled diversity, has developed a civilisation in an
accelerating rush and has hardly a choice in the matter. Trying to exercise a
choice now and impose reversion to a distributive equality looks like a great mistake
we shall one day soon learn to regret.
No comments:
Post a Comment