As long as Assad stays in office, Erdogan loses power in Turkish politics and risks losing at elections in 2014
By
Egemen B Bezci
Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will be greeted by Barack Obama at the White
House today after waiting more than six months for an appointment since the US
president was elected for a second term in November. Weighty issues accompany
Erdogan into the meeting between the two heads of state.
Erdogan's visit to
Washington follows frequent visits to Turkey by US Secretary of State John
Kerry since took the post in February. Since then, rapid developments in the
Middle East have brought new opportunities and threats. The most recent one was
last weekend's car bomb attack in the Turkish town of Reyhanli near the Syrian
border that claimed the lives of more than 50 Turkish citizens. The incident
created more stress on a Turkish government that is already searching for a
solution to the already complicated Syria problem.
In the light of
all these developments, three important issues mark Erdogan's agenda during his
time in the White House; namely, the Syrian issue, relations with Israel and,
significantly, energy politics. It is remarkable to note that for the first
time in contemporary Turkish politics, a prime minister will not have to push
the Kurdish issue. Erdogan's recent democratic initiative has resulted in a
ceasefire with Kurdish militants.
The ceasefire
secured on March 21 between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Ankara is
one of the key factors for understanding the puzzle of energy politics in the
Middle East. The three-decade-long struggle between the PKK, a Kurdish armed
secessionist organization that long-operated across Turkey, Iraq, Iran and
Syria as it pursued the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, had
claimed more than 30,000 lives and has been a source of instability along the
trajectory of Turkey's border with Iraq, Iran and Syria.
The recent
discovery of extensive oil resources near Kirkuk, a city under the
administration of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq,
makes it necessary to politically stabilize the region, both for the safe
transportation of the fuel to global markets and for the creation of a suitable
environment for energy-related investments in the area. Both the KRG and the US
would not wish to see the PKK destabilize northern Iraq by using the region as
a safe haven to execute attacks on Turkish soil.
Moreover, Kerry's
statement during one of his visits to Turkey, in which he applauded Ankara's
efforts to disarm the PKK, demonstrates a parallel vision on this matter.
However, the Obama administration and the Nuri al-Maliki government in Iraq are
urging KRG President Massoud Barzani to cancel direct energy deals with Turkey
just as Ankara is looking to use them to deepen economic and political ties
with the KRG.
Erdogan's
long-term rationale for strengthened ties with the KRG is to economically
integrate northern Iraq into the hinterland of Turkey's southeast region. US
concerns increase if the KRG exports oil via Turkey independent of the
government in Baghdad, as tension between Baghdad and officials in the
Kurdistan capital Erbil would escalate. Therefore, the energy deal between KRG
and Turkey gathers importance as a topic of discussion between Erdogan and
Obama.
Then attention may
turn to US hopes for the renewal of relations between Israel and Turkey. Just
at the middle of Turkey's endeavors to work a deal to establish a permanent
ceasefire with the PKK, and seemingly under the gaze of Obama, Israeli Prime
Minister Netanyahu called Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to apologize for
the Mavi Marmara incident, the May 2010 raid by Israel of the
Gaza-bound ship. Moreover, Netanyahu stated that Israel accepted Turkey's
pre-conditions for the reconciliation of relations between their
countries.
The apology fitted
in with the US's Middle East vision in three ways. Firstly, the apology paved
the way for possible cooperation between Turkey and Israel on the Syrian
conflict. It is no secret that Turkey and Israel have different visions on the
Middle East. However, both countries have a crucial common point in their
threat perceptions.
Both countries, as
well as the US, are deeply concerned about the future of chemical weapon
arsenals in Syria. The main concern of these actors regarding chemical weapons
in Syria is the possibility that non-state actors such as Hezbollah, the PKK
and other radical groups acquire these weapons. Therefore, though the recent
apology created an atmosphere of collaboration between Israel and Turkey, both
countries could work to stop non-state actors getting their hands on Syrian
chemical weapons. Such collaboration is highly desired by the Obama
administration. Accordingly, improvement in Israeli-Turkish relations is an
important matter for the White House talks.
The most important
topic in the Erdogan-Obama meeting, however, is the Syrian conflict. Erdogan is
seeking more direct US involvement in Syria. As long as Bashar al-Assad stays
in power, Erdogan's reputation and prestige suffer at home. The increasing
humanitarian and financial burden of Syrian refugees in Turkey is slowly
exceeding Turkey's capacity.
Moreover, the
recent devastating car-bomb in Turkey has put Erdogan's foreign policy under
heavy criticism. In order to get more US involvement in Syria, Erdogan is
likely to demonstrate in the White House that Turkey is not supporting the
al-Qaeda-linked al-Nousra Front in Syria. Moreover, Turkey created new
opportunities for a more secular Syrian opposition, namely the PKK's branch,
the Syrian Kurdish Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat.
About 400,000
Syrian refugees have fled to Turkey. Beside the humanitarian dimension of the
conflict, extremists groups which allegedly have connections with the global
al-Qaeda network, such as al-Nousra Front, are gaining stronger footholds in
Syria. This situation particularly worries the US and Israel, thus, in this
context, the Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat, as a secular organization, emerges as a
leading and quasi-trustable opposition group for the US.
Armed PKK militants
inside Turkish soil have started to leave Turkey to settle in Syria and Iraq.
Considering that PKK has about 6,000-7,000 armed militants, relocation of the
PKK's armed wing from Turkey to Syria would likely shift the balance of power
in Syria.
The Erdogan-Obama
meeting is likely to consider Western concerns on the Syrian opposition.
Erdogan's desired support from the US depends on how he portrays Turkey's
connections with Syrian opposition groups and eases US concerns on the presence
of extremist groups within the opposition.
The political
power game in the Middle East is getting more complex. Erdogan realizes that
without more direct US involvement in the Syrian conflict, the Syrian
opposition will not be able to overthrow the Assad regime soon. The consequences
of that reach well within Turkey's borders.
As long as Assad
stays in office, Erdogan loses power in Turkish politics and risks losing at
elections in 2014. Therefore, the decisions taken at the meeting in the White
House have a deep bearing on the coming years in Middle Eastern politics.
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