Work Is A Human Right
BY WALTER RUSSELL MEAD
Pretty much everybody understands at some level that the question of
jobs is at the heart of America’s politics today. An old world of stable,
reasonably well paid jobs in manufacturing (stuff processing) and in corporate
or government bureaucracies (information processing) is passing away. What comes
next is up in the air, but as things stand we see growing insecurity,
inequality and a darker outlook for youth.
The argument about how to address the jobs question is the single
political issue that has the most to do with how the country will develop for
the next twenty years. Political disputes over hot button social policy issues
like gay marriage or affirmative action often get more attention, but
underneath the noise it is the question of jobs that will shape the way our
institutions and policies develop. After all, creating the best possible
conditions for large numbers of Americans to make good livings and achieve
their personal goals engages the electorate’s attention year in and year out.
Scandals and controversies come and go, even long wars come to an end sometime,
but in times like ours when people aren’t sure that the economy will allow them
to make a good living, the job question never really goes away.
But if the debate over jobs is central, it is also confused. As a
nation, we haven’t thought very deeply about what an information economy will
look like, much less thought about what kinds of government policies can help
or hinder the growth of an information-based middle class.
There seem to be two main kinds of confusion at work: the widget fallacy
and a skewed idea about what work is and how it relates to human life overall.
The widget fallacy is the idea that only the production of concrete
objects really matters. It leads many people to deny that mass prosperity under
an information economy is even possible. For this crowd, if you aren’t bashing
metal in a noisy place, you aren’t really working. If America isn’t “making
things,” these people say, the economy will wither and die.
That may be true, but the jobs question isn’t about whether “America” is
making things, but about whether people or machines are making the things
“America” or any other country makes. You can have, indeed we have now, a
healthy industrial economy that doesn’t create many jobs because factories
increasingly use robots and computers rather than human beings. There are going
to be fewer and fewer people in the widget works even as widget production hits
all time highs. The world’s factories are going to be spewing out widgets like
nobody’s business in the next generation, but there won’t be many people
involved.
This inevitably means that when we talk about the jobs of the future we
aren’t talking about jobs in the widget works. There will still be some factory
jobs, just as two percent of American workers still grow food, but
manufacturing will never again employ one third of the American workforce or
anything close to it.
Because manufacturing jobs have been well paid and many service jobs
(like flipping burgers) are not, the collapse of the manufacturing job market
is often seen as leading to an inevitable and permanent decline in living
standards for American workers. For widget fetishists, this is pretty obvious.
Jobs that aren’t ‘real’ can’t possibly pay much because they don’t add real
value. From this perspective, a world in which most people aren’t “making
things” in factories, will be one in which most people don’t create much if any
value and therefore they won’t earn much pay. From this point of view, most of
us will be flipping burgers and serving fries when the singularity hits, road
kill on the information highway.
Widget fetishists wring their hands pretty elegantly from time, but they
have no practical solutions to offer. Just as all the efforts to save the
family farm were doomed to fail once most family farms stopped making economic
sense, so any effort to build the economy around human manufacturing jobs in
first world will run aground. Too many of these jobs are too vulnerable either
to low wage foreign competition or to automation and those realities aren’t
going to change.
This doesn’t mean that all these jobs are going to disappear tomorrow,
and there are things we can do that support the development and retention of
the existing jobs base. The ‘insourcing’ of manufacturing won’t bring back the
1970s, but hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs can still be created.
For some time to come, “brown jobs” in oil and gas and associated industries
can help support the middle class and ease the transition to a new kind of
economy. Even after the housing bubble, it remains the case that
homebuilding for a new generation can provide a lot of jobs.
These jobs will not undergird the economy or the middle class long term,
but they have their place and it is important that we make the transition to
the new economy in the most favorable possible circumstances. Policymakers
should not be so carried away by the new economy that they forget the old;
America needs to be firing on all cylinders going forward and economic
transitions of this magnitude in any case work themselves out over decades and
generations rather than a couple of presidential terms.
But caveat all the caveats and except all the exceptions, and you are
still left with a tough truth: jobs in the widget works (and clerical and even
professional information processing jobs that are the white collar equivalent
of making widgets) can’t create the future of the American middle class.
There is another mistake people make about the nature of work that
inhibits creative thought about the jobs question. For thousands of years most
work was pretty laborious and, much of the time, unpleasant. Carrying buckets
of night soil out to the rice paddies every morning is not most peoples’ idea
of a good time. Even as mechanization reduced the amount of backbreaking labor
in the world of agriculture, the rise of the dirty and dangerous factories of
the industrial age reinforced the connection of work with dirty, horrible and
degrading activity that breaks the body, dulls the mind, and keeps the worker
in a state of anxiety and dependence incompatible with the full expression of
human potential.
Building on a tradition that has roots in both Chinese and Greek
antiquity (Aristotle and Confucius both believed that a certain leisure and
elevation were necessary for the full cultivation of human potential), the
thinkers and social critics behind progressive, blue model society divided the
world into two quite different camps. Work was a Darwinian sphere of
competition and aggression set among the dark, Satanic mills; innocent wives
(“hearth angels” to our Victorian forbears) and virginal children populated the
clean and happy suburbs where all was sweetness and light.
It is not hard to understand what made them think in this way. In the
1890s, conditions for workers in European and North American manufacturing
looked something like life in Bangladesh today. Factory workers routinely
worked 14 hour days six or even seven days per week. Young children were at the
mills instead of in school. Factories were dark, noisy, and as polluted as
anything you would find today in China. There were no safety and fire inspections
in most plants; plant fires like the tragedy in Bangladesh were common here.
Wages were so low that few working people could save; without unemployment
insurance, disability insurance or old age pensions, workers lived hard,
insecure and dismal lives.
People looked at this and could not see work as anything but a blight.
Progress from this perspective is almost identical to liberation from work; it
is about shrinking and ultimately erasing the dark world of work so that all
can frolic in the groves of consumption. Nothing was more common in the
mid-twentieth century than for reformers and utopians to dream about the ‘end
of work’ and the ‘leisure society’. In a 1930 essay (“Economic
Possibilities for our Grandchildren”) that has been getting some play on the internet lately , John Maynard Keynes, the Great
Blue Prophet, predicts that as technologically assisted affluence grows, work
will just wither away.
Given the rising productivity of humanity based on the increase of
technological knowhow and the availability of more capital to invest in using
it, Keynes suggests, humanity is on the verge of solving its “economic
problem.” Looking 100 years or so ahead of 1930 he predicts that output per
capita will be so high, and automation so well developed, that everyone will
have enough of the necessities of life that work will gradually disappear. This
is revolutionary, says Keynes; humanity is making its escape from the human
condition as it has been known since prehistoric times.
Keynes’ vision of the age of leisure saw two kinds of ‘work’. Most work
was toilsome and degrading, though practically anybody could do it. The other
kind was ennobling and fulfilling: singing grand opera, painting or writing
masterpieces. The trouble, he felt, was that most people don’t have the talent
for interesting work. Once the world no longer needs the labor of the
untalented masses for survival, the shlubs have no work to do. They lie about
listlessly, unable to make good use of their free time, watching the talented
tenth create, but condemned to be spectators in the game of life.
Nietzsche connoisseurs and Fukuyama readers will have noted something
interesting here; Keynes’ vision of post-industrial man is very much like
Nietzsche’s vision of the Last Man, and Keynes’ understanding of the end of
economics is largely the same as Alexandre Kojeve’s interpretation of Hegel’s
end of history. The purpose of history has been fulfilled, the great economic
problem solved, but deprived of the challenge and drama of meaningful events
and real challenges to overcome, humanity will become rather dull.
The widget fundamentalists and the Keynesian visionaries agree that the
mass of humanity has no meaningful economic function beyond the brute labor
necessary to wrest a living from reluctant nature. Once a certain stage of
development has been reached, they have no further economic role to play.
Keynesians and widget fans also agree that since most people won’t have jobs
but will need incomes, there must be large transfer payments to make the
economy of the future work. The surplus created by the workerless corporations
and the handful of talented humans still able to function effectively will have
to be distributed to the rest of the population. The information economy will
be the greatest and most comprehensive welfare state ever seen. The economy
will be large enough to support very large entitlement programs, and the
majority of the population will rely on those payments as its chief if not only
means of support.
From this perspective, incredibly influential in the shaping of modern
progressive consciousness, the core task of politics is to ensure that as the
surplus grows in size and becomes concentrated in ownership, the state spreads
that surplus around. It can do this by legislating better working conditions,
higher wages and earlier retirement; it can also do it by progressive taxation
on profits with the funds gained in that way to be spent on entitlements for a
majority that would otherwise be left behind. For progressives who embrace
these ideas, the transfer state must inevitably grow as the economy develops;
the purpose of the political process is to make sure that this happens.
This vision is not wholly wrong; twentieth century progressives were
absolutely right to insist that as the economy reached an appropriate level of
development, conditions for workers had to improve, social goals (like the
conservation of parks and the provision of clean water and air) needed to be
reached, and the extremes of poverty and insecurity that characterized earlier
stages of industrialization should no longer be tolerated.
But the progressives were wrong about both the nature and the future of
work, and those errors today are making it harder to realize the promise of the
information economy. The next stage of prosperity is not going to be about
wholesale job destruction compensated by growing transfer payments; if we try
that route we will find it leads into a dead end.
To understand the place of work in human life, it’s useful to drop
Aristotle and consult Genesis. That ancient work may not be a good guide to
paleontology or astrophysics, but its insights into the human condition remain
unsurpassed. When God creates Adam, he sets him into the Garden of Eden and
gives him a mission. Adam is to tend the garden, naming and ordering its
animals and plants, and, like God, to express himself in creative engagement
with the world. Later, when God expelled Adam and Eve from the garden, God
cursed human work: “Cursed is the ground for thy sake; in toil shalt thou eat
of it all the days of thy life. Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to
thee… In the sweat of they face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the
ground.” (Gn 3:17-19)
Work, in other words, has a dual nature. Laborious, soul-killing toil
and drudgery is often part of work but it is not what work is ultimately all
about. Curse aside, work is an essential aspect of human nature. When people
speak about the right to work, they aren’t just talking about the right to earn
an income. They are talking about the right of all of us to take our place in
the common enterprise of human life. To be shut away from work is to be
marginalized in the most destructive way. There are few things worse for human
beings than to feel useless.
That said, the industrial age was an age when work was particularly
alienating and depressing. Few large populations have ever been expected to
devote so much of their lives to such intrinsically alienating and belittling
tasks as Fordist industrial workers on the assembly lines of 20th century
factories. Peasants, by contrast, however heavily taxed and exploited, worked
at a variety of tasks over the course of a single day and even more over the
year. Their work had plenty of toil and sweat in it, but it was also closer in
some ways to the Edenic ideal than was industrial work. This is why so many
people saw the Industrial Revolution as a step backward from the standpoint of
human happiness.
When thinking about the future of jobs during the Information
Revolution, it’s important to remember that the drive to work is embedded in
human nature rather than in economic scarcity. Human beings don’t just work
because they want to get paid so they won’t freeze and starve in the dark; they
want to make meaningful contributions to the societies in which they live, and
they want to be recognized and esteemed for the contributions they make to the
common good.
There is a horrible snobbery lurking beneath the idea that most people
will not be able to find meaningful work when the age of scarcity ends. Once
the working classes aren’t needed to dig coal anymore, in this view, there is
nothing to be done for the mass of mankind than to sit them in front of the TV
on a comfy couch with a big bag of chips. They are good for nothing else.
This is a premise which any serious theist or humanist must reject. If
we believe that every human being has a unique real worth, we must also believe
that every human being has a contribution to make. Keynes rather snidely
remarks that few people have the talent to live creative lives; writing about
the difficulty many will have adjusting to lives without toil he warns of the
intense boredom that most will suffer. “Yet it will only be for those who
have to do with the singing that life will be tolerable and how few of us can
sing!”
Actually, a good many more of us can sing than Keynes thought; it’s just
that life in the coal mines and the factories means that many people haven’t
had the same chances to develop their talents that a son of privilege like
Keynes did.
Thomas Gray showed a greater understanding of the vast untapped human
potential all around us in his “Elegy in A Country Churchyard” and this 1750
poem can give us some sense of the dynamism we shall experience as freedom from
want gives more people more education, more tools and more opportunity than
ever before. Looking at the humble headstones in a quiet English country
graveyard, the poet speculates on the lives that the graveyard’s residents
might have lived in other circumstances:
Perhaps in this neglected spot is laid Some heart once pregnant with celestial fire; Hands, that the rod of empire might have sway’d, Or waked to ecstasy the living lyre:
But Knowledge to their eyes her ample page, Rich with the spoils of time, did ne’er unroll; Chill Penury repress’d their noble rage, And froze the genial current of the soul.
Full many a gem of purest ray serene The dark unfathom’d caves of ocean bear: Full many a flower is born to blush unseen, And waste its sweetness on the desert air.
Some village-Hampden, that with dauntless breast The little tyrant of his fields withstood, Some mute inglorious Milton here may rest, Some Cromwell, guiltless of his country’s blood.
Th’ applause of list’ning senates to command, The threats of pain and ruin to despise, To scatter plenty o’er a smiling land, And read their history in a nation’s eyes…
In the old days, when most of humanity had to work in agriculture simply
to keep everyone fed, not many people had the opportunity to be teachers or
students. Few learned to read, many fewer were able to travel. Humanity was
tied down to the material plane; many people spent much of their working lives
staring at the buttocks of the ox that was pulling their plough. This was not a
very stimulating view.
In the 21st century more of humanity than ever before will escape
from “chill penury”; fewer flowers will blush unseen and more people like
Milton and Cromwell will be able to take their stands and speak their piece.
More than that, as a smaller and smaller share of our total production is made
up of the material goods that ensure our basic survival, more and more of the
economy is going to be about other things.
Far from approaching a time of rest, idleness and a golden age for couch
potatoes on welfare, we are moving into a period of unprecedented activity,
endeavor and strife. There will be more than enough work in coming years as
newly liberated humanity spreads its wings; a final essay on the jobs question
will look at what this means in policy terms.
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