Markets may remain irrational longer than one can remain solvent
Is recent market behavior the beginning of
a market turndown? No one knows, although it is easy to find people providing
“answers.” The value of these predictions approach those
of astrologers and fortune-tellers. What follows are some thoughts regarding markets.
History and Markets
History is a summary of what historians
consider relevant. Selectivity of a limited number of events is required.
Behind these events are millions of other events and processes that must be
ignored. Many of these are causal elements and not even known to the historian.
What is reported is the outcome(s) of these complex interactions. Historians
then focus on a few causes that rationalize the outcome(s).
Often these are correlative; never do they fully explain the outcome they
purport to. That is the nature of all history.
Discussing the performance of the stock
market is an exercise in history. It is
subject to similar simplification. At the end of each market day, analysts
“explain” why the stock market went up or down. These explanations are more
rationalizations than explanations. Stock market outcomes can never be
explained in terms of one or two variables, regardless of how relevant they
might appear to be or how enlightened the analyst sounds. Soundbites preclude
more than a couple of variables. Yet complexity does not care about soundbites.
To retain the aura of “expert,” these
self-professed gurus must provide short, pithy and incorrect answers. A truthful
answer would go
something like the following:
I have no idea why stocks went up or down today. Nor does anyone else. There are literally thousands (millions?) of variable affecting peoples’ decisions to buy or sell stocks. No one knows them all and no one knows how to measure or weight them on a particular day. The market went up (down) because more buyers (sellers) participated today.
On some days, one or two major news items may ostensibly move markets, but that doesn’t change the fact that numerous other variables also had impact.
Seasonality
The old Wall Street Advice of “sell in May
and go away” proved to be correct, at least for the first half of June. The Dow
and S&P 500 are nearly level, each down slightly from their May
closes. The Dow is off more than 400 points from its intra-day high on May
28 and slightly more from its all-time May 22 high. This information reinforces
the advice to sell in May,
not necessarily at the
end of May.
But, is this rule of thumb valid? A
look at May closes since 2007 generally supports the market folklore of “going
away.” Four of the six May closes were higher than the August closes. One of
the exceptions was 2009 when markets were recovering from the 55% drop off
their highs. The other was 2012 where the exception was not particularly
notable.
One of the reasons
attributed to slowdowns in summer was vacations. That reason,
if ever valid, seems weak these days when people can trade at any time
and from any place thanks to advances in the internet and telecommunications.
Some argue that there are no more vacations in the sense that you are always
available.
Seasonality is also attributed to the
Fall. September and October are considered very dangerous months for stocks as
they have produced the largest downdrafts. Again, the empirics are there,
although there is no theory or rationale as to why that should be so.
Many people believe that seasonality can
be used to trade properly. However, unless some causal
relationship can be discovered, skepticism is probably warranted. Further, if
enough people believe in seasonality, their actions should eliminate the
phenomenon as they try to profit from it.
The Relevant Issue
As summer begins, markets have slowed as
of mid-June. Is this the beginning of the summer
doldrums? Is it
the beginning of a severe market adjustment? Or is it just some of the
irrelevant “noise” that accompanies markets? Frankly, there is no
way to know. Anyone who claims otherwise is a fool or believes
you are. Regardless of how smart we are or become, there are always
complexities that we cannot understand. Markets happen to be one of these
difficult (impossible?) to comprehend areas.
Markets seem dangerously overvalued with
respect to underlying economic conditions. Are
they pricing in a recovery that most of us don’t see? I don’t think so. There
has been no economic recovery thus far and none appears to be in the offing.
Even if this assessment is correct, it doesn’t provide actionable advice. It
doesn’t provide guidance for market decisions.
Alan Greenspan, the so-called “Maestro,”
used the term “irrationally exuberant” to
describe the stock market in December of 1996 when the Dow was around 6,000.
Greenspan’s characterization was massively mistaken, at least as a market
prediction. The market continued to rise to almost 12,000 before a major
correction in 2001. Greenspan was the Chairman of the Federal Reserve during
this period, had access to massive databases, thousands of experts and actually
managed the policy variables thought to be responsible for markets. Yet this
man who was alluded to as a financial genius, appeared clueless in hindsight.
The point is that even if markets appear
out of line with economic conditions, that doesn’t tell you when or whether
they will correct. In Greenspan’s case, he was “wrong” by a
factor of almost 6,000 Dow points and about five years in timing!
Markets seem to have the ability for, as
John Maynard Keynes said, “remaining
irrational longer than one can remain solvent.” It is with
respect to this phenomenon that one should not try to outguess markets. Even if
you are certain they are under or overvalued, they can become even more so and
stay in that condition for a long time.
As someone who anticipates a major
economic catastrophe ahead, I am especially cautious. However, no one truly knows whether we are in 1996 or early 2001.
Greenspan’s irrational exuberance was correct by every objective measure save
one - it was wrong by 5 years and a return of 100%.
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