A sense
of foreboding is rising across an increasingly troubled land
IT IS
an odd thing when a nation of 84m people lumbers towards a precise appointment
with a wholly unknown destiny. But such is the case with Egypt. The fatal date
is June 30th, the first anniversary of Muhammad Morsi’s inauguration as Egypt’s
first freely elected president. The event is a planned nationwide protest,
calling for Mr Morsi to go, in the manner of Egypt’s dictator of 30 years,
Hosni Mubarak, only 30 turbulent months ago.
No one knows
if the protests will succeed, nor what might happen if they do. What is sure is
that they will be big and very possibly bloody. The country is polarised, the
mood highly charged. Already skirmishes in provincial cities between friends
and foes of Mr Morsi’s party, a creation of the Muslim Brotherhood, have left a
handful of dead and scores of injured.
Many expect
clashes to worsen and spread before a showdown on June 30th. The army has
already deployed across the country to secure key installations and has
reinforced the gates of Mr Morsi’s palace with concrete barriers. Worried
citizens are stockpiling necessities, with a panicked run on petrol causing
mile-long queues and snarled traffic. Embassies caution their citizens to avoid
likely trouble spots.
With a mix
of error and mischance, Mr Morsi has managed to anger every tier of Egypt’s
class-ridden society. For those concerned mostly with money, whether rich or
poor, his government’s glaring failure to stem a dire economic slide counts
most. Inflation, unemployment, government debt and poverty have all swollen
markedly during Mr Morsi’s short tenure. Shortages of fuel and power are now
chronic.
For those
concerned more with politics, whether from an Islamist or secular point of
view, the Muslim Brotherhood’s secretive and bullying style has proved deeply
frustrating. Many on the religious right accuse Mr Morsi of using religion
simply to secure power, not to make Egypt more Islamic. Non-Islamists accuse
the Brothers of attempting a creeping takeover of state institutions, as well
as of rank incompetence. “It’s not a question of whether they are Muslim
Brothers or liberals,” wrote Mohamed ElBaradei, a prominent opposition
figurehead, in a recent scathing article. “They are simply not qualified to
govern.”
A large
proportion of Egyptians who voted for Mr Morsi last year, giving him his slim
51% majority, have now turned their back on him. Many of those who would never
vote for him have worked all along to undermine the Brothers. These include
stalwarts of the “deep state”, the opaque, Mubarak-era civil service and
security apparatus that spent decades oppressing Islamists. Powerful
businessmen who profited under Mr Mubarak also bear grudges, relentlessly
reflected in the privately owned media that far outshine the Islamists’ dowdy
efforts at propaganda.
The
increasingly nasty war of words between Egypt’s camps has turned politics into
what Khalil Anani, an analyst, describes as a zero-sum game. The Brotherhood
and its allies believe they are facing a conspiracy to reinstate the
dictatorship that long oppressed them. Their enemies feel that if they do not
stop the Islamists now, Egypt will lose any chance of being an open, modern,
pluralist society.
All this
might have been averted if Mr Morsi had treated his opponents more respectfully
at an earlier stage. But the insincerity of his gestures towards secular
parties, which often—to be fair to him—seemed like a disorganised rabble,
rendered meaningful reconciliation unlikely. Yet instead of offering
compromise, Mr Morsi abused his electoral legitimacy to enact a host of
controversial laws and appointments.
As
resistance to him has made the country increasingly ungovernable, eyes have
naturally turned to Egypt’s armed forces, which underpinned Mr Mubarak’s regime
and stepped in to fill the vacuum when he fell. In a closely scrutinised speech
on June 24th, the defence minister, Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, issued a veiled
warning that the army would not stand by while the country slid into chaos. He
gave the sparring factions six days to settle their differences. Some in the
deep state may wish to see this as a green light for the army’s intervention.
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