The Egyptian State
Unravels
By Mara Revkin
 |
| An anti-Morsi protester holds a homemade gun in Cairo |
“Everybody needs a
weapon,” said Mahmoud, a 23-year-old Egyptian arms dealer, as he displayed his
inventory of pistols, machetes, and switchblades on the living room floor of
his family’s apartment in the crime-ridden Cairo neighborhood of Ain Shams.
With Egyptian
government statistics indicating a 300 percent [1] increase in
homicides and a 12-fold increase in armed robberies since the 2011 revolution,
Mahmoud and other black-market entrepreneurs are capitalizing on a growing
obsession with self-defense and civilian vigilantism among Egyptians who have
lost patience with their government’s inability to restore security.
Frustration with lawlessness is among the numerous grievances that will drive
antigovernment protesters to the streets on June 30, the one-year anniversary
of President Mohamed Morsi’s inauguration.
Mahmoud is one of
many post-revolutionary lawbreakers who were victims of crime before they
became perpetrators. When I asked him how he made the decision to start selling
black-market weapons, he replied sarcastically, “What decision? I had no
choice.” Over lukewarm Pepsi served by his mother, Mahmoud explained that he
used to earn a living as a taxi driver. But shortly after the revolution, his
car was hijacked at gunpoint by a local gang. Like many of the amateur black
marketeers responsible for Egypt’s current crime wave, Mahmoud is a far cry
from the hardened criminal I had been expecting; he is just a young man hoping
to earn enough money to move out of his parents’ house, marry his fiancée, and
replace his stolen taxi.
Mahmoud’s
neighborhood is home to one of Cairo’s most active black markets in unlicensed
weapons, where vendors hawk a variety of small arms -- stolen police pistols,
locally made shotguns, knives, switchblades and Tasers -- at below-market
prices. Although Egyptian law prohibits the sale of unlicensed weapons, these
informal markets have thrived since the early days of the revolution. They
operate openly and often in plain view of the police, who until recently showed
little interest in regulating the illicit trade, despite soaring crime rates.
Even in downtown Cairo, unlicensed weapons dealers have been known [2] to
set up shop just steps away from prominent symbols of judicial authority, the
Lawyers’ Syndicate building (Egypt’s version of the Bar Association) and the
headquarters of the Supreme Judicial Council.
In the days
leading up to the June 30 protests, police have attempted to crack down on the
illegal weapons trade. But dealers like Mahmoud are adept at evading the authorities.
When police approach, they simply move their wares elsewhere, selling weapons
from the safety of private homes or parked vehicles.
Black-market
weapons range in price from cheap to high-end: a switchblade goes for about
L.E. 75 ($10.75), a Taser costs around L.E. 350 ($50), and for L.E. 700 ($100),
you can purchase a locally manufactured birdshot gun. Stolen police pistols, at
the upper end of the market, sell for upwards of L.E. 2000 ($285). Small knives
have become a popular choice for women, who have been plagued by an increase in
sexual assault and harassment since the revolution.
Like good
entrepreneurs, weapons dealers have been quick to exploit fears of violent
crime. Just down the street from the crowded Naguib Metro station, in broad
daylight, one cardboard sign urged, “Protect yourself for L.E. 10.” That $1.40
would buy you a dull but nonetheless menacing blade that looks guaranteed to
inflict at least tetanus, if not more serious harm.
Many of the guns
for sale come from the thousands [3] of
firearms that were ransacked from police departments during the revolution.
Others are smuggled across Egypt’s borders with Libya and Sudan. The cheapest
firearms are the birdshot guns, known as “fards,” which are handmade [4] by
underemployed craftsmen who cobble together the frighteningly inaccurate
weapons from machine parts and scrap metal.
ANYTHING GOES
The proliferation
of small arms in Cairo and across Egypt is just one symptom of the security
vacuum that persists two years after the uprising that shattered Hosni
Mubarak’s seemingly unbreakable police state. Distrustful of a police force
known for being simultaneously abusive and incompetent, and wary of an
increasingly politicized judicial system that rarely delivers justice, many
Egyptians are administering law and order on their own terms.
In one
particularly extreme case [5] in
March, two young men accused of stealing a rickshaw in a Nile Delta town were
stripped naked, hung upside down from the roof of a bus station, and beaten to
death by a mob of 3,000 people. Not all of the vigilantism is violent, however.
Take Namaa, a civil society organization that works on sustainable development.
The group is funding a crowd-sourcing initiative that solicits reports about
neighborhood hazards -- damaged electrical wires, for example -- and dispatches
volunteers to respond to problems that might otherwise be ignored by local
authorities.
Meanwhile, facing
intermittent strikes by judicial workers and police officers, Egypt’s
overextended government is all too willing to outsource some of its law
enforcement functions to nonstate actors and informal institutions. In the
notoriously lawless Sinai Peninsula, official state courts have long preferred
to delegate the adjudication of tribal disputes to customary courts. Since the
revolution, local authorities there have tolerated the expansion of informalSharia committees [6] that
administer Islamic law, creating what is beginning to resemble a state within a
state. Informal justice is not limited to Egypt’s most remote regions, and
unofficial customary courts in the greater Cairo area have seen demand for
their services, ranging from dispute resolution to marriage licenses, increase
notably since 2011.
Instead of working
to reform the country’s dysfunctional institutions, some political leaders have
embraced the devolution of core security functions to community-based policing
initiatives or private contractors [7]. Earlier
this year, the Building and Development Party, the political wing of the
formerly militant Islamist group al-Gamaa al-Islamiya, proposed draft legislation [8] that
would legalize unarmed “popular committees” to supplement the uniformed police
force. In another instance of state-sponsored community policing, the Ministry
of Supply recentlyannounced [9] the
formation of unarmed, civilian-staffed popular committees to curb the smuggling
of flour.
The outsourcing of
traditional law enforcement functions to civilian and nonstate actors is a
common pathology of weak states and transitioning democracies, in which
security and judicial institutions are viewed as either illegitimate or
ineffective. And indeed, Egyptians complain that the police never fully
redeployed after they withdrew from the streets during the revolution. Those
few who are present in the streets are doing nothing to combat crime.
Ahmed al-Shenawi,
an Egyptian criminologist, told me about a neighbor in Alexandria who owns an
empty lot and recently discovered that a stranger was unlawfully constructing
an apartment building on his property. When the owner asked the local police to
intervene on his behalf, he was told that there was nothing the authorities
could do. The police did advise him, however, to hire some baltagiyya (Egyptian
slang for “thugs”) to forcibly expel the interloper. Another common complaint,
by victims of car theft, is that police refuse to assist them and instead
recommend that they seek out the thieves and offer to buy back their stolen
vehicles.
In yet another
account of the state’s indifference to disorder, Shahinaz Nabeeh, a
British-Egyptian journalist, once called the police after she saw a group of
thugs beating a man in the Cairo neighborhood of Agouza. When she asked if the
police could please be sent quickly, the dispatcher who answered the phone
replied nonchalantly, “Inshallah” (God willing), and promptly hung up on
her. The police never arrived, and the fight continued for two hours until the
victim finally died.
In these cases,
the refusal of police to do their job has more to do with apathy and
incompetence than it does with corruption. But other reports suggest that a
much more malignant phenomenon is at work: direct police complicity in
organized crime. Criminal gangs are among the biggest beneficiaries of
post-revolutionary lawlessness. They function as a substitute for state
security personnel in the most dangerous slums of Cairo, allegedly with the
tacit permission and even encouragement of police. According to Haitham Tabei,
an Egyptian journalist who reports on urban crime, the police have willingly
abdicated control over entire neighborhoods of the city to criminal gangs.
These predatory groups operate illicit fiefdoms of racketeering, trafficking,
and prostitution with total impunity, hiring thugs (and sometimes even
children) to staff their private militias.
In Mahmoud’s
neighborhood, gangs have been known to extort payments from shopkeepers in
exchange for protection from break-ins. Some of them base their operations out
of nearby Pharaonic tombs that were unearthed in the middle of a densely
populated neighborhood over a decade ago [10] and
have been neglected by Egypt’s dysfunctional Antiquities Ministry ever since.
Among the deteriorating ruins, local gangs are illegally constructingslum dwellings [11] and
extracting rent from hapless tenants who would otherwise be homeless.
Outside of Cairo,
the problem is even more severe. Gangs control entire sections of major
highways in Upper Egypt and Sinai, where they terrorize truck drivers with
semiautomatic weapons and use the threat of carjacking to extort royalties from
companies that rely on ground transport to ship their goods. As one truck
driver told al-Masry al-Youm, a daily newspaper, “No road is safe
after the revolution.”
"THE POLICE
HAVE BEEN DEFANGED"
Although the
primary function of the Mubarak regime’s security apparatus was to protect the
state from its political opponents, one of its few positive side effects was an
overall chilling effect on crime. Before the revolution, Cairo had one of the
lowest homicide rates in the world, with significantly fewer murders per capita
than Oslo, Helsinki, Toronto, Brussels, and New York, according to 2009 UN statistics [12].
Crime waves are to be expected [13] in
post-authoritarian transitions, and the tradeoff between democratic reform and
insecurity has been widely studied in the context of the Soviet Union’s demise.
So it is perhaps unsurprising that violent crime rates have soared since the
collapse of the Mubarak regime. In particular, Egyptian criminologists
attribute the uptick both to the presence of a significant number of escaped
criminals who broke out of jails during the revolution and to first-time
offenders who have resorted to crime for lack of legitimate job prospects.
(Unemployment in Egypt now stands at a record 13.2 percent [14].)
During the 18-day
uprising in 2011, more than 23,000
prisoners [15] escaped, and some 5,000 escapees [15] remain
at large. But when I contacted Cairo police stations to ask whether the
government has a strategy for recapturing the wanted fugitives -- or even has a
list of their names -- I was repeatedly told that no such information exists.
Ahmad Bastamy, a criminologist, explained that much of the paperwork
documenting the names and charges against the at-large escapees was destroyed
during the revolution, making their recapture all but impossible.
Crime has never
been more of a problem, yet the government’s capacity to enforce law and order
is at an all-time low. Egypt’s government has made a number of symbolic -- and
almost entirely superficial -- gestures at security sector reform. A dizzying
succession of cabinet reshuffles over the last two years has ushered in five
new interior ministers. Mubarak’s hated domestic security agency, the State
Security Investigations Service (SSIS), was rebranded [16] with
a new name, the National Security Agency, in an effort to signal its supposed
commitment to protecting the people from the state, rather than the other way
around. But despite the new signage and a handful of personnel changes, the
core of Mubarak’s security apparatus has been largely preserved.
Meaningful
security sector reform, a central demand of the revolution and one of Morsi’s
forgotten campaign promises, has all but fallen off the political agenda.
Egypt’s partially dissolved parliament and recently reshuffled government are
preoccupied instead with mass protests, the deteriorating economic situation,
and a legal battle over the design of the electoral system that has postponed
elections indefinitely. A former police official, Mohamed Mahfouz, is leading a
campaign to reform the national police force and rehabilitate its public image.
But when I asked him how much progress has been made on the issue, he replied
bluntly, “Absolutely none.”
In March, a senior
official in the Building and Development Party estimated [17] that
80 percent of the state security employees formerly employed by the Mubarak
regime are still working for the supposedly reconstituted National Security
Agency. Of those few officers who were prosecuted for crimes and rights
violations during the revolution, the vast majority have been acquitted and
reinstated. This has only reinforced an institutional culture of impunity that
may prove to be Mubarak’s most intractable legacy.
Meanwhile, human rights
activists are concerned that an expanding private security industry [18] -- one
of the few sectors creating jobs in Egypt today -- operates with
alarmingly little oversight or legal accountability. Private contractors are
increasingly being used to prop up the dysfunctional state security apparatus.
The Brotherhood was forced to hire [19] private
security companies to protect its headquarters on June 30, after the Interior
Ministryannounced [20] that
the police would only be responsible for “state institutions.” The growth of a
largely unregulated industry of private security guards, some of whom are licensed [21] to
carry weapons, presents another obstacle to comprehensive security sector
reform.
Ironically, the
non-Islamist opposition, which campaigned so vocally for state security reform
during the revolution, is now itself preventing institutional change. Liberal
parties that were calling for a purge of state institutions a year ago are now
deeply suspicious of any new appointments or legislative reforms initiated by
the Muslim Brotherhood-led government, which they fear is maneuvering to
repopulate the state security apparatus with Islamists. Accusations of
“Brotherhoodization” have put Morsi’s government on the defensive [22], and
any attempts at reform will likely be resisted by an opposition whose primary
agenda seems to consist of obstructing that of the Brotherhood.
Mahfouz fears that
the entrenched culture of state security institutions is deeply resistant to
change. “For decades,” he told me, “the police were taught that the people were
their enemy and the state was their friend. Now, they need to be retrained to
see the people as their friend.” But a new report [23] documenting
359 cases of torture by security personnel since Morsi’s inauguration is a
reminder that old habits are hard to break.
Despite the
persistence of police brutality since the revolution, Egyptians are more likely
to describe law enforcement officers as incompetent than dangerous. As one
American diplomat who wished to remain anonymous put it, “The police have been
defanged.” Convincing the police to protect people who hate them -- and no
longer fear them -- is no easy task.
The police
themselves complain that they are increasingly the victims of preemptive
attacks by criminals and unruly protesters. In recent months, reports of stolen [24] police
vehicles and deadly attacks [25] on
officers -- sometimes in broad daylight -- have become commonplace. The
government has responded by adopting new legislation [26] that
imposes harsher penalties for assaulting security personnel -- an admission of
the growing vulnerability and ineptitude of a police force that once inspired
terror.
Nabeel Zakaria, a
retired army general, told me that Egyptians have given up on the police.
“Everyone is responsible for his own protection now,” said Zakaria, who lives
with his family in an affluent suburb north of Cairo. He says the two-hour-long
commute into the city and back is well worth the peace of mind that comes with
living in a gated community insulated from urban crime.
Zakaria’s
assessment of the police is consistent with recent polling data [27], which
found a stark disparity between levels of public support for the military and
police. Whereas the military is by far the most popular institution in Egypt
today (73 percent believe it has a positive influence on the country), only 35
percent of Egyptians expressed positive views about the police, and 63 percent
believe that the police are doing more harm than good
BROKEN LAW
The courts have
not fared much better. The Islamist-controlled executive and legislative
branches have been engaged in a protracted power struggle with the judicial
system, seeing it as an obstacle to their agenda. In recent months, Morsi and
Islamist lawmakers have repeatedly called into question the neutrality of Mubarak-appointed
judges and accused them of protecting the interests of the former regime. They
are still reeling from decisions that the courts made last June, when judges
dissolved the lower house of parliament and issued controversially lenient sentences [28]in the
trials of the former president and other regime officials. The entanglement of
the judiciary in politics through repeated confrontations with the executive
and legislative branches has eroded the institution’s legitimacy in the eyes of
the public. As Shenawi described the situation, “If the president doesn’t even
respect the courts, how can we expect the people to respect them?”
The conflict
between the judiciary and the legislature escalated again in May, when Egypt’s
Supreme Constitutional Court issued a provocative ruling invalidating the new
electoral law and postponing parliamentary elections indefinitely. Meanwhile,
Egypt’s judges have threatened to take to the streets over a draft law [29] regulating
judicial authority that they say would undermine the independence of the
courts. These maneuvers have led the public to conclude that Egypt’s
purportedly neutral judiciary is now functioning as a political interest group
that may be tempted to prioritize its own self-serving agenda over the rule of
law.
Without a serious
effort to rebuild confidence in Egypt’s security apparatus and judicial
institutions, there are few incentives to abide by laws that are neither
enforced nor respected. Egyptians once lived in fear of the state. Now they
fear its absence. Against the backdrop of antigovernment protests, the
black-market weapons boom in a context of unchecked lawlessness is an alarming
reminder that Egypt’s government, which so recently oversaw a vast police
state, has now lost its monopoly on violence.
During a widely
ridiculed speech [30] on
June 26 that was intended to placate the opposition, Morsi tried to deflect
blame for the unrest onto former regime loyalists known as feloul,
whom he accused of hiring gangs to instigate trouble. These paranoid
allegations of organized thuggery, whether true or not, were the words of a
leader who knows he is not fully in control. The diffusion of lethal weapons
among civilians who no longer fear or respect their government has created a
highly combustible atmosphere in which violence is viewed as a legitimate and
even necessary response to insecurity.
On both ends of an
intensely polarized political spectrum, Morsi’s supporters and his opponents
insist that they are committed to diffusing violence. But the two camps are
behaving in ways that make armed confrontation inevitable. Islamists organized
a rally under the slogan “No to Violence” on June 21, yet a
Brotherhood-affiliated televangelist, Safwat Hegazy, took to the stage to proclaim [31], “If
anyone so much as sprays Morsi with water, we will spray him with blood.” Two
days later, anti-Morsi protesters violently attacked [32] the
Brotherhood’s headquarters in the Nile Delta town of Damanhour, killing one
person and injuring sixty more. Neither the opposition nor the Brotherhood is
doing much to reduce the probability of a bloodbath on June 30, other than to
engage in a mutually discrediting display of blame-shifting.
Meanwhile, the
looming specter of violence has inspired nostalgia for the days of military rule.
Earlier this month, protesters gathered [33] outside
of the Ministry of Defense to demand that Morsi transfer power to the head of
the armed forces. But the restoration of martial law would be a superficial and
ultimately unsustainable solution to a security vacuum that requires much
deeper institutional reforms. Egypt’s precarious democratic experiment hinges
on whether the country can build an accountable state that can be trusted to
maintain a monopoly on violence and wield it lawfully and humanely. Until then,
Egyptians will continue to take security into their own hands.
Links:
[1] http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7ffac226-adab-11e2-a2c7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2TXRGDMyQ
[2] http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/179509
[3] http://213.158.162.45/~egyptian/index.php?action=news&id=20350&title=Hand in stolen firearms, get a licence in Egypt
[4] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-07/egypt-investment-collapses-as-violence-sparks-lawless-vigilantes.html
[5] http://bigstory.ap.org/article/journalists-accuse-egypts-brotherhood-assault
[6] http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/11/islamic_justice_in_the_sinai
[7] http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/egypt/130315/egypt-replace-police-private-security
[8] http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/egypts-fallen-police-state-gives-way-to-vigilante-justice/274616/
[9]
[10] http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/11/18/egypt.tomb/
[11] http://www.ahram.org.eg/News/818/3/209736/تحقيقات/البلطجة-تحكم-حى-عين-شمس.aspx
[12] http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2012/nov/30/new-york-crime-free-day-deadliest-cities-worldwide#data
[13] http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/7_dokument_dok_pdf_4865_2.pdf
[14] http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/performance-egyptian-economy-under-morsy
[15] http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/official-egypt’s-police-intensify-efforts-bring-down-crime-rate
[16] http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/16/world/middleeast/16egypt.html?_r=0
[17] http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/177015
[18] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-12/commandos-pounce-on-egypt-crisis-as-security-work-expands.html
[19] https://twitter.com/gelhaddad/status/350279670639505408
[20] http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/73716/Egypt/Politics-/Police-wont-protect-Brotherhood-HQ-on--June-Interi.aspx
[21] http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/private-security-firms-attempt-fill-gap-left-weakened-security-apparatus
[22] http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/interior-minister-denies-police-brotherhoodization
[23] http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06/26/report-359-torture-cases-during-morsis-first-year-in-power/
[24] http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1774231
[25] http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1774276
[26] http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/73822/Egypt/Politics-/Egyptian-Cabinet-approves-harsher-penalties-for-as.aspx
[27] http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/05/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Egypt-Report-FINAL-May-16-2013.pdf
[28] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18306126
[29] http://allafrica.com/stories/201305311330.html
[30] http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/75073/Egypt/Politics-/Morsis-opponents-pick-holes-in-latenight-speech.aspx
[31] http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/362299.aspx
[32] http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ad9a1aba-3565-11e2-bd77-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2XPeRkZxn
[33] http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/74651.aspx
Links:
[1] http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7ffac226-adab-11e2-a2c7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2TXRGDMyQ
[2] http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/179509
[3] http://213.158.162.45/~egyptian/index.php?action=news&id=20350&title=Hand in stolen firearms, get a licence in Egypt
[4] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-07/egypt-investment-collapses-as-violence-sparks-lawless-vigilantes.html
[5] http://bigstory.ap.org/article/journalists-accuse-egypts-brotherhood-assault
[6] http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/11/islamic_justice_in_the_sinai
[7] http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/egypt/130315/egypt-replace-police-private-security
[8] http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/egypts-fallen-police-state-gives-way-to-vigilante-justice/274616/
[9]
[10] http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/11/18/egypt.tomb/
[11] http://www.ahram.org.eg/News/818/3/209736/تحقيقات/البلطجة-تحكم-حى-عين-شمس.aspx
[12] http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2012/nov/30/new-york-crime-free-day-deadliest-cities-worldwide#data
[13] http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/7_dokument_dok_pdf_4865_2.pdf
[14] http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/performance-egyptian-economy-under-morsy
[15] http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/official-egypt’s-police-intensify-efforts-bring-down-crime-rate
[16] http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/16/world/middleeast/16egypt.html?_r=0
[17] http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/177015
[18] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-12/commandos-pounce-on-egypt-crisis-as-security-work-expands.html
[19] https://twitter.com/gelhaddad/status/350279670639505408
[20] http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/73716/Egypt/Politics-/Police-wont-protect-Brotherhood-HQ-on--June-Interi.aspx
[21] http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/private-security-firms-attempt-fill-gap-left-weakened-security-apparatus
[22] http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/interior-minister-denies-police-brotherhoodization
[23] http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06/26/report-359-torture-cases-during-morsis-first-year-in-power/
[24] http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1774231
[25] http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1774276
[26] http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/73822/Egypt/Politics-/Egyptian-Cabinet-approves-harsher-penalties-for-as.aspx
[27] http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/05/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Egypt-Report-FINAL-May-16-2013.pdf
[28] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18306126
[29] http://allafrica.com/stories/201305311330.html
[30] http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/75073/Egypt/Politics-/Morsis-opponents-pick-holes-in-latenight-speech.aspx
[31] http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/362299.aspx
[32] http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ad9a1aba-3565-11e2-bd77-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2XPeRkZxn
[33] http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/74651.aspx
No comments:
Post a Comment