The cult of the colossal means kowtowing before the merely “big”–which
is thus adequately legitimized as the better and more valuable–it means
contempt for what is outwardly small but inwardly great, it is the cult of
power and unity, the predilection for the superlative in all spheres of
cultural life, yes, even in language. It is only since Napoleon’s time that the
adjective “great” or “grand” begins to make its telling appearance in
expressions such as “Grand Army,” “Grand Dukes,” “Great General Staff,” “Great
Powers,” and begins to demand from men the proper respect, and Europe is
actually just as much intoxicated as America by expressions such as “unique,”
“the world’s biggest,” “the greatest of all times,” “unprecedented.” To this
style of the time correspond, in equal degree, the unexampled increase in
population, imperialism, socialism, mammoth industries, monopolism, statism,
monumental architecture, technical dynamism, mass armies, the concentration of
governmental powers, giant cities, spiritual collectivization, yes, even Wagner’s operas.
Since the cult of the colossal reduces
qualitative greatness to mere quantity, to nothing but numbers, and since
quantity can only be topped by ever greater quantity, the intoxication with
size will in the end exceed all bounds and will finally lead to absurdities
which have to be stopped. Since, moreover, different quantities of different
species can only be reduced to a common denominator by means of money in order
to render them comparable in the race of outdoing each other, the result is a
tendency to measure size by money pure and simple–as, for instance, in the
American seaside resort, Atlantic City, where in 1926 I found a gigantic pier
simply being christened “Million Dollar Pier.” Thus we find very close bonds of kinship between the cult of the
colossal and commercialism.
While this time the world was gained,
the soul suffered considerable damage in the process. The abrupt change from
the concerns of the spirit to material affairs was bound to result in the
withering of the soul. By abandoning humanism one lost the capacity for making
man the measure of things and thus finally lost every kind of orientation. Life
becomes de-humanized and man becomes the plaything of inhuman, pitiless forces.
This results in “the abuse of greatness … when it disjoins remorse from power”
(Julius Caesar II, I),
hence the increasing indifference to all matters of collective ethics, hence
scientific positivism and relativism, which represent such a radical departure
from the certain sense of values possessed by the eighteenth century. It
further leads to a fanatical belief in a mechanical causality even outside the
processes of nature; to the love of mathematics (which the eighteenth century,
in contrast to the seventeenth, did not favor, at least not during its latter
part); to social laws such as Malthus’ “law of population,” or Lassalle’s “immutable
law of wages”; to the oriental-baroque flirtation with fate; in brief to
determinism which not only is raised anew to a philosophic dogma, but also
dominates sociology, be it in the garb of Marx’s materialist view of history,
be it in that of geographical determinism, as first developed by Ritter and Ratzel and finally raised in geopolitics to a
veritable geographic romanticism, or be it finally as biological or even merely
zoological determinism, the final degradation that could be reached along that
path.
It is rather fascinating to follow this
secular spirit in all its varied manifestations and to discover traces of it
even where one had hardly expected it. Let us ignore the difficult field of the
history of art, and look more closely into the scientific activities of the
nineteenth century: it is incontestable that the decidedly ontological,
cosmological and objectivist view which the nineteenth century had of the
world, in contrast to the anthropological and subjectivist view of the eighteenth
century, was bound to engender that scientific attitude which we call
“positivism,” and it is just as undeniable that it is closely linked to
“relativism,” the refusal to hold an opinion, the cool and seemingly objective
registration of facts. It is also related to that type of scholar so
characteristic of the nineteenth century, with his ceremonious gravity, his
antiquated outlook, his love of great systems, schools of philosophy and
gigantic works of learning, to whom brevity and a pleasing style are signs of
shallowness.
These qualities had been regarded
likewise by the pedantic and stilted seventeenth century, so completely
different from the cheerful and loquacious eighteenth century, which loved
essays and apercus, and in which even a man like Kant did not consider it
beneath his dignity to write Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, to say nothing of the merry pranks of
a Lichtenberg. Just as typical is the concomitant
difference between the scholar’s life in the eighteenth century–sociable,
characterized by extensive correspondence, dinners and disputations–and the
masterful dogmatism of the scholars of the nineteenth century, each of whom
reigned as despot over the circle of his disciples, bitterly opposed to all the
other intellectual despots. How symptomatic of the eighteenth century that the
aphorisms written by the physicist Lichtenberg for the “Goettinger Pocket Calendar,” and Samuel Johnson’s table
talk, as recorded by his friend Boswell, are still among the reading we most
enjoy! Where would we find this later in the nineteenth century?
What nineteenth century science lacked
in the final analysis was the courage to be simple and natural, a courage which
this neo-baroque century of the colossal lacked in every other respect as well,
because it had lost the human measure. We must refrain from following this
trait through the various branches of science, such as the natural sciences, or
history, where the collective concepts were smothering the concept of man, or
medicine, which at that time earned for itself the reputation of treating the
disease and not the patient, or finally jurisprudence. But we cannot omit
mentioning two exceedingly telling traits by which every century in the history
of thought usually gives itself away.
The first concerns the estimation in
which the great “strong men” of world history are held at a given period: the
Caesars, the imperators, conquerors and tyrants. The value which an era places
on Caesar, Alexander, Cromwell, Richelieu or Napoleon, typifies it as a whole
and there is nothing more characteristic of the century of the colossal than
that, like the seventeenth century before it, it looks up, awe-stricken, to
this type of man and his works. While in the sixteenth century (which, in its
turn, is so very similar to the eighteenth), Montaigne had reproached Caesar
most disrespectfully for “l’ordure de sa pestilente ambition,” and whereas
Montesquieu had bluntly talked of the “crimes de Cesar,” and Lichtenberg had
even resignedly spoken of the “biggest and fattest oxen that draw the crowds at
the cattle fair,” the nineteenth century again beings to discourse mysteriously
on the “missions” of the conquerors and to build up a veritable cult around the
Caesars. Even Mommsen wrote
his Roman History in this spirit, as did Droysen his history of Alexander the Great,
while it is one of Jacob Burckhardt’s valid
titles to fame that he bravely upheld the standards of true historical
greatness and at an early date opposed the Napoleon cult which has finally been
exploded in our days. Hand in hand with the over-estimation of the successful,
we find a corresponding under-estimation of those who, like Demosthenes,
offered unsuccessful resistance to the conquerors. It is a hopeful sign for our
own time that it has again brought the yardsticks of the eighteenth century
down from the attic and begins to note the negative side of the conquerors and
their deeds, that it criticizes the imperators and tyrants–the Alexanders,
Caesars, Richelieus, Napoleons and others of their kind–and sees their
opponents (from Demosthenes and Cato to Talleyrand, Madame de Staël, and Constantin Frantz) in a new light. It is only today that
we have reached the point where, following in Gibbon’s footsteps,
we are once more prepared to add up dispassionately the terrible liabilities of
the Roman Empire.
The second point in which the centuries
tend to show a characteristic difference is in their relationship to primitive
man, to the so-called “savage,” and here, too, ideas on “greatness” play a
decisive role. Here, too, we find a decisive contrast between the eighteenth
and nineteenth century, which the latter quite clearly appreciated. It was in
keeping with the human spirit of the eighteenth century to see in the primitive
first of all the human being and to compare him quite impartially with civilized
man, and that held good not only for the primitive but also as for all
non-European peoples (the Turks, Persians, Chinese), for whom there existed
genuine and highly respectful interest. Therefore, Rousseau’s glorification of
the primordial state must definitely be considered together with the Persian Letters of Montesquieu, Cooper’sLeatherstocking Tales, Bernardin de Saint-Pierre’s Paul et Virginie, with the enthusiasm for the Turks (of
the Genovese painter Liotard, for instance), the Robinson Crusoe
type stories and China’s deep influence on eighteenth century culture. In the
seventeenth century, on the other hand, Hobbes bases his doctrine of the
absolutism of the state on the sentence “homo homini lupus” (which in the eighteenth
century Shaftesbury quite
rightly declares to be an insult to the wolves), and thus, from a negative
estimate of man’s primordial condition, arrives at the “Leviathan” of the
absolutist state; and here, too, the nineteenth century follows in the
footsteps of its penultimate predecessor, though in a somewhat different spirit
and on different grounds. With an amazing lack of anthropological understanding
and on the basis of the evolutionary doctrines peculiar to the nineteenth
century, one now delights in picturing primitive man as a roaming beast, on an
altogether different level from modern man, particularly since the latter has
been broken in by civilization and the state. This attitude is in keeping with
the intellectual imperialism which undervalues the constants in the human soul,
an imperialism which prompted the nineteenth century to brutal meddling with
primitive and foreign cultures and did not let it rest before it had raised them,
clothed in calico and top hats, to its own giddy heights; yet withal it did not
realize that it acted from its own deep seated inhumanity and soullessness. It
is all the more typical that our own time has, as we know, completely reversed
its attitude in these matters; not only with the aid of improved ethnological
knowledge, but also from a newly awakened interest in man and a deeper
psychological understanding, it has rediscovered in the primitive a human being
not so very different from the eighteenth century conception; and if one
recalls the panegyric intoned by Montaigne in honor of the Red Indians one
recognizes in this our kinship to the sixteenth century.
If we now review once more all the many
signs which today point to a repudiation of the nineteenth century, and at the
same time to a renewal of the interest taken in the best of what the eighteenth
had to offer, we are inclined to come to the extraordinary conclusion that in
the history of human thought a rhythm of two centuries seems to obtain and that
each century takes after its grandfather. We are far from establishing this at
once as a social “law,” for that would indeed mark us as unregenerate children
of the determinist nineteenth century. At most we can venture the comforting
assumption that an excess of stupidity will in the end always correct itself
and wisdom will be re-established. However this may be, we cannot but
acknowledge that affinities between the spirit of the centuries do exist and
that much what today strikes us as new and full of promise, is the better part
of the newly discovered heritage of the eighteenth century; and here we may add
the hope that we may avoid copying its many disastrous mistakes, errors and blunders.
There is no doubt that the wind has
turned and that a new spiritual climate is developing, of which we dare to
predict or at least to hope that its main characteristics will not be unlike
those of the eighteenth century. In the midst of all the cultural refuse of the
nineteenth century with which we are still encumbered our great hopes and
efforts are directed towards the true twentieth century, which is still before
us. Whatever the individual aspects of that new century may be, one thing seems
to be certain: it will have no room for the cult of the colossal.
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