The strife that will consume everybody
In the photograph the two robed men
stand shoulder-to-shoulder, one tall and erect, the other more heavyset. Both
smile for the camera. The picture from Tehran is a rare record of Iran's
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei meeting Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, the head
of Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shi'ite paramilitary group.
Taken
in April during a discreet visit by the Hezbollah chief to his financial and
ideological masters, the photograph captured a turning point in Syria's civil
war and the broader struggle between Sunnis and Shi'ites, the two main branches
of Islam. It was the moment when Iran made public its
desire for Hezbollah to join the battle to help save Syria's President Bashar
al-Assad, diplomats said. At the time, Assad and his Alawite sect, an offshoot
of Shi'ite Islam, were losing ground to an advancing Sunni insurgency.
Within days of
returning home, Nasrallah gave a televised speech making it clear that
Hezbollah would fight alongside Assad to prevent Syria falling
"into the hands" of Sunni jihadi radicals, the United States and Israel. The very
survival of the Shi'ites was at stake, he said.
Soon
afterwards, fighters from Hezbollah - which until then had largely stayed out
of its neighbour's civil war - entered Syria. In June they
helped Assad's forces recapture the strategic town of Qusair and other
territory, turning the war in Assad's favour.
Regional
security officials told Reuters there are now between 2,000 and 4,000 Hezbollah
fighters, experts and reservists in Syria. One Lebanese
security official said a central command in Iran led by the
Revolutionary Guards directs Hezbollah operations in Syria in close
coordination with the Syrian authorities. Another source said Hezbollah had
"hit squads" of highly trained fighters in Syria whose task is to
assassinate military leaders among the Sunni rebels.
Hezbollah
declined to comment for this report on its involvement in Syria. Nasrallah has
previously said it is necessary for Hezbollah to fight Sunni radicals allied to
al Qaeda.
Officials in Iran did not respond
to requests for comment. Last week, Iran's foreign ministry spokeswoman,
Marzieh Afkham, said that Iran had no official military presence in Syria, but
was providing humanitarian assistance. Last September, Mohammad Ali Jafari,
head of the Revolutionary Guards, said some members of Iran's elite Quds force
were in Syria but that it did not constitute "a military presence."
Hezbollah's
role in Syria has ramifications not just in its home in Lebanon but across the
region. If Assad wins, Iran's influence along the shores of the Mediterranean
will grow. If he loses, Hezbollah and Iran's reach will likely be damaged. For
some members of the group, the fight is an existential one.
Reuters has
learned that a few voices within Hezbollah, which is considered a terrorist
organisation by the United States and Europe, opposed joining the conflict in
Syria. Two prominent members feared intervention would drag Hezbollah and the
Shi'ite community into a quagmire; they questioned where the group would draw
the line after Qusair.
Sheikh Subhi
al-Tufayli, who led Hezbollah from 1989 to 1991, said the decision to intervene
had been entirely down to the Islamic Republic of Iran. "I was secretary general
of the party and I know that the decision is Iranian, and the alternative would
have been a confrontation with the Iranians," Tufayli, who fell out with
Iran and his former group, told Reuters at his home in the Eastern Bekaa Valley
near the Syrian border. "I know that the Lebanese in Hezbollah, and Sayyed
Hassan Nasrallah more than anyone, are not convinced about this war."
Such doubts are
repeated across the Middle East. Shi'ite groups, clerics and communities in
places such as Iraq are struggling
with whether to back Assad or not.
But the
critical voices were ignored and eventually silenced. "Even if (Hezbollah)
has its wise men, the decision (to fight in Syria) is not theirs," said a
Lebanese security official who, like most people Reuters spoke to for this
report, would not be named. "The decision is for those who created and
established it. They are obliged to follow Iran's orders."
A Lebanese
politician summed up the point, saying: "Nasrallah is not going to say
‘No' to someone who has given him $30 billion over the past 30 years."
STRIKE FORCE
The
paramilitary group - its name means the Party of God in Arabic - was originally
conceived at the Iranian embassy in Damascus in 1982. Its main aim was to fight
Israeli forces that had invaded Lebanon that year.
It became
notorious for suicide-bombings, kidnappings and hijackings as it drove Israel back towards
its border with Lebanon; it also pushed U.S. and European forces out of Beirut
following the Israeli invasion and during Iran's war against Iraq, which the
West had armed and backed.
Hezbollah came
to serve as a subcontractor buttressing the strategic interests of its Iranian
paymasters, forming a military front with Syria and Iran against Israel and the
United States. Domestically, it spearheaded the rise of Lebanese Shi'ites from
an underclass community to, by some lights, the most powerful sect in the
country.
Its
paramilitary forces are now more powerful than the Lebanese army and even some
Arab armies, regional experts say. It has an Iranian-trained strike force
numbering around 7,000, with some 20,000 reservists, according to security
officials and diplomats.
In Syria, the
discipline and training of Hezbollah fighters paid off most significantly in
June, when Assad's regime recaptured the town of Qusair, about 10 km (6 miles)
from the Lebanese border. A regional security official said: "(The battle
for) Qusair was basically a Hezbollah operation, from the planning to the
handling of key weapon systems. It is our understanding the Hezbollah crews
were even operating Syrian T-55 and T-54 tanks there, as well as all
significant artillery systems, anti-tank missiles and so on."
Since then,
Hezbollah has expanded its deployment in Syria to every area where rebels are
present, a regional security source who declined to be identified said.
The group has
beefed up its presence around the capital Damascus, the border area and the
city of Homs, which is strategically located between Damascus and the mountain
heartland of Assad's minority Alawite sect.
Its main task
is to prevent rebel groups, mainly Sunni jihadis linked to al Qaeda, such as
the al-Nusra Front, from entering the heart of the capital. "It is
(Shi'ite) Hezbollah versus (Sunni) al-Nusra Front and other jihadis now in
Syria," said one military observer.
The regional
security source said: "In these places, Hezbollah is hunkering down in
fixed positions because it understands that the fighting will be protracted and
will shape its fate in Lebanon. Its actions are taken in full coordination with
the Syrian military, and Iranian experts provide it with military and
technological assistance."
Hezbollah is
also putting down roots in Bosra al-Sham, south of Damascus, and other places
on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights, a strategic plateau in southwestern
Syria occupied by Israel, said the source. The group wants to prevent weapons
being sent from Lebanon to rebels in Syria, and to stop rebels moving the other
way. To do so, it sets up ambush points and lays mines on cross-border routes,
said the regional security source.
"Where in
the past Hezbollah deployment in Syria was focused on protecting Shi'ite
populations, now it is everywhere there is fighting with the rebels," said
the source.
Hezbollah
fighters serve as the prime instructors for the Syrian militias that provide
Assad's most loyal forces, said the same source. "Hezbollah also has hit
squads, covert units selected from among its best fighters and trained by
Iranians, whose mission is to assassinate Sunni opposition leaders and Free
Syrian Army commanders in Damascus and Aleppo," he said.
Hezbollah did
not comment on its involvement in Syria.
As well as its
standard weapons, Hezbollah is using new arms, mostly from Iran, that are flown
in to Damascus or Beirut. Hezbollah has also received weapons from the Syrian
army, including flame throwers, said the source.
Weapons are
moved from Lebanon into Syria with high frequency and little difficulty, given
the control that the Syrian regime and Hezbollah wield over the border
crossings, the source said.
The Iranian
Revolutionary Guards Corps and Quds force, and the Syrian military high
command, operate a war room to coordinate Syrian army and Hezbollah operations.
This war room was initially responsible for deploying Hezbollah fighters in
Syria on specific operations. But more recently, "Hezbollah was ... given
responsibility over geographical areas as well as over security
installations," said the source.
SECURE BASE
Supporting its
fighters in Syria is Hezbollah's network of political and commercial interests
in Lebanon. The group now has 12 seats in Lebanon's parliament, two ministers
in the current caretaker cabinet, a radio and satellite television station, and
a community network that provides everything from health and education to
pensions and housing.
As well as
penetrating the army and security services, it places allies in every
significant ministry, government office, or state-owned enterprise and key
institutions, according to Lebanese political and security sources.
At the Beirut
harbour, Hezbollah has a dock of its own, according to two Lebanese security
sources. Shi'ite merchants linked to Hezbollah bring consignments through the
dock to avoid paying custom duties, sell them at prices lower than competitors,
and donate some of the profits to the group, the security and political sources
said.
In addition,
the group has investments in Lebanon and abroad, including construction,
supermarkets, petrol stations, and industry projects. "They have their own
money-laundering operations," one Lebanese politician said. "They
legalise hot money through high cash-generating businesses and front companies
such as real estate, cell phone shops, valet parking companies and religious
foundations."
Former U.S.
Treasury official Matthew Levitt, a fellow at the Washington Institute and
author of the forthcoming "Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's
Party of God," said the group is engaged in a broad array of illicit
activities, from counterfeiting currencies, documents and
goods to credit card fraud, money-laundering, arms smuggling and narcotics
trafficking. Hezbollah, one investigator quipped, is like the "Gambinos on
steroids."
Hezbollah has
regularly denied such allegations.
Politically,
Hezbollah can make or break Tammam Salam, the Sunni politician tasked in April
with forming a new government in Lebanon. The group enjoys a veto on all policy
decisions - a power it secured after a long standoff between it and the
Sunni-led government which began after the 2006 war with Israel.
"If
Hezbollah wants to form a government then it will be formed; if they don't, it
won't. They are the most powerful force on the ground. They are more powerful
than the state," said a Western diplomat.
Hezbollah's
creeping hegemony in Lebanon began after the 2005 killing of former prime
minister Rafik al-Hariri, a Sunni Muslim billionaire who used money, influence
and international clout to win support across Lebanon's sectarian divides.
Hariri, who had
close links to Saudi
Arabia and the West,
was assassinated in Beirut by a car bomb in which U.N. investigators saw the
trademark handiwork of Syria, and for which four Hezbollah members were
subsequently indicted. None of the four has been arrested. The group denies any
involvement in the killing.
Hariri's
killing prompted an international outcry which forced Hezbollah's ally Syria to
end its 29-year military presence in Lebanon. But it also removed from the
scene the one man who could have challenged Hezbollah's dominance.
"If he were
still alive, he would have had the majority in government and the position of
(Hezbollah) would have been difficult," said Tufayli, the former Hezbollah
leader.
The Lebanese
security figure said Hariri was killed in a joint Iranian-Syrian plan executed
by Hezbollah elements without Nasrallah's knowledge.
Hezbollah has
shown itself unwilling to countenance the smallest threat. In June when unarmed
Shi'ites protested outside the Iranian embassy in Beirut against Iran's
military involvement in Syria, Hezbollah gunmen, dressed in black and armed
with handguns, charged the crowd, killing one protester.
CAR BOMB
REPRISALS
Syria presents
wider risks. Under Nasrallah, Hezbollah initially tried to maintain a balance
between its role in Lebanon and its ambitions as an Islamist vanguard of Iran
in the region. The intervention in Syria has ended this ambiguity, placing
Hezbollah in the frontline of the regional conflict between the Western-backed
Sunni Arab powers and Shi'ite Iran.
The chaos
threatens to unleash sectarian demons from Beirut to Baghdad. Reprisals against
Hezbollah have already begun: In May, rockets were fired at the
Hezbollah-controlled southern suburbs of Beirut, and since then several car
bombs have exploded in Lebanon.
"Hezbollah
entered a Sunni-Shi'ite conflict declaring jihad, so they should expect
counter-jihad in return," said one Sunni opposition figure.
Tufayli, the
former Hezbollah leader, said the group's intervention in Syria was a fatal
miscalculation. The conflict, he said, is becoming a sectarian proxy war that
minority Shi'ites will never win.
"Until
recently, I had thought that armed resistance (against Israel) is a top
priority and a precious goal... Those seeking to fortify the resistance should
not drag it into war between Sunnis and Shi'ites... That strife will consume
everybody," he said.
SPENDING
BILLIONS
The war is
imposing huge costs on both Hezbollah and Iran, which is already under
crippling international sanctions because of its nuclear ambitions.
A regional
security official with access to current intelligence assessments put
Hezbollah's annual income at between $800 million and $1 billion, with 70-90
percent coming from Iran, the amount partly depending on the price of oil. The
group's remaining funds come through private Shi'ite donors, "protection
rackets and business and mafia networks in Lebanon," said the source.
Apart from its
involvement in Syria, Hezbollah pays salaries to 60,000-80,000 people working
for charities, schools, clinics and other institutions in addition to its
military and security apparatus, other Shi'ite sources said.
Other security
sources said Hezbollah is now receiving additional funds dedicated to the
Syrian war. "Syria is sucking up Iran's reserves, with the Islamic
Republic paying between $600-700 million a month (just towards the cost of
fighting in Syria)," said a top Lebanese security official. Those figures
could not be confirmed.
And the price
is not just financial: Hezbollah's involvement in Syria has hurt its support at
home. "There isn't a single village in the south that has not lost a
member (in Syria)," said Ali al-Amin, a Shi'ite columnist and a critic of
Hezbollah.
Most Lebanese
Shi'ites, though, still support the group. "A large chunk of society is
rallying behind Hezbollah because they regard their ties to it as
existential," said Amin. "They say 'we are with it whether it goes to
hell or heaven.'"
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