Italy floated plans to leave euro in 2011

Private investors have pulled out of Club Med, dumping their claims onto the taxpayers of Germany and the northern creditor states

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard

So, we now know: Silvio Berlusconi seriously floated plans to pull Italy out of the euro in October/November 2011, precipitating his immediate removal from office and decapitation by EMU policy gendarmes.

Ex-ECB insider Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi has quietly dropped a few bombshells in his new book Morire di Austerita (Dying of Austerity), worth a read if you know Italian.

Mr Bini-Smaghi – until recently on the ECB's six-man executive council, and for many years Italy's man in Frankfurt – states that Silvio Berlusconi was toppled as Italian premier in November 2011 as soon as he began to rattle the EMU cage in earnest.

Specifically, he discussed (threatened?) Italian withdrawal from the euro in private meetings with other EMU governments, presumably with Chancellor Angela Merkel and France's Nicolas Sarkozy, since he does not negotiate with underlings. ("L'ipotesi d'uscita dall euro era stata ventilata in colloqui privati con i governi degli altri paesi dell'euro").

We have long suspected this. Now it is confirmed.

Mr Bini-Smaghi also reveals that Merkel continued to think that Greece could be thrown out of the euro safely as late as the early autumn of 2012, when thePfennig finally dropped that all hell would break lose, with chain reactions engulfing the whole system. She then switched tack abruptly, rushing to Athens to praise the new government for its heroic efforts. "Merkel l'ha capito sole nell' Autunno del 2012".

He confirms that Germany is indeed on the hook for €574bn of credits from the Bundesbank to the central banks of Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, and Slovenia.

We have always been assured that the so-called Target2 credits within the ECB's internal payments system is a technical adjustment, without significant risk.

Mr Bini-Smaghi states that any EMU state leaving the euro would face likely default on external obligations. "The national central bank would not be able to repay liabilities accumulated in relation to other members of the euro system, which are registered in the internal payments system of the Union (known as Target2). The insolvency would provoke substantial losses for counter-parties in other eurozone countries, including central banks and states."

German voters may wish to know this before the elections on Sunday week, since they are told otherwise by their own leaders. The anti-euro AfD party – now running at 4pc in the polls, with a shot at the Bundestag – might also find this to be of interest.

As I understand it, the Bundesbank (and the central banks of Finland, Holland, and Luxembourg, likewise) offsets the Target2 claims on the Club Med bloc by selling securities to banks registered in Germany. It does this for monetary policy reasons.

This means that if the euro blows up, the Bundesbank still owes this money to the same private banks, which could be Deutsche Bank, but could also be Nomura, Citigroup, or Barclays. This is not fictitious. The Bundesbank cannot default on these securities.

Perhaps I am a bear of very little brain, but I have yet to hear a satisfactory explanation as to how this can be conjured away painlessly, as we are told by a long list of illustrious economists that it can be. I have never seen them answer this issue. They publish long papers, blinding everybody with science as economists are prone to do (usually bluffing), but never get to the core point.

The fast is that Target2 is the flipside of intra-EMU capital flight. Private investors have pulled out of Club Med, dumping their claims onto the taxpayers of Germany and the northern creditor states. Dress this up any way you want, but that is the reality.

Yes, the Bundesbank could print money with gay abandon in such a crisis – and would have to do so to avoid a deflationary shock, and on a much larger scale than anything suggested so far within the EMU construct. Germany would no doubt muddle through, but its monetary doctrines would be shredded.

The Bundesbank's official position is that the Target2 controversy is a storm in a teacup. In fact, they don't believe it themselves. A Bundesbanker with direct responsibility for Target2 said in my presence that he "worries about it every night". The bank's own president Jens Weidmann testified last year that the imbalances are an "unacceptable risk".

I suspect that somebody is trying to pull the wool over the eyes of the German people, and it is not the splendidly outspoken Jens Weidmann. I disagree with his monetary theories: his intellectual honesty is magnificent.