Economies are Not Destroyed in a Day
Earlier this month, Argentina's leading
conservative paper, La Nación published an unsigned editorial comparing
the economies of Argentina and Venezuela. The editorial concluded that as
economic freedom declines in Argentina, and as Argentina adopts more of what
Chavez called “twenty-first century socialism,” it is becoming increasingly
similar to Venezuela. Is this true? Will Argentina suffer the same fate as
Venezuela where poverty is increasing and toilet paper can be a luxury?
The similarities of regulations and
economic problems facing both countries are indeed striking in spite of obvious
differences in the two countries. Yet, when people are confronted with the
similarities, it is common to hear replies like “but Argentina is not
Venezuela, we have more infrastructure and resources.”
Institutional changes, however, define
the long-run destiny of a country, not its short-run prosperity.
Imagine that Cuba and North Korea
became, overnight, the two most free-market, limited-government countries in
the world. The two countries would have immediately gained civil liberties and
economic freedom, but they would still have to accumulate wealth and to develop
their economies. The institutional change affects the political situation immediately,
but a new economy requires time to take shape. For example, as China opened
parts of its economy to international markets, the country started to grow, and
we are now seeing the effects of decades of relative economic liberalization.
It is true that many areas in China continue to lack significant freedoms, but
it would be a much different China today had it refused to change its
institutions decades ago.
The same occurs if one of the wealthiest
and developed countries in the world were to adopt Cuban or North Korean
institutions overnight. The wealth and capital does not vanish in 24 hours. The
country would shift from capital accumulation to capital consumption and it
might take years or even decades to drain the coffers of previous accumulated wealth.
In the meantime, the government has the resources to play the game of
Bolivarian (i.e., Venezuelan) populist socialism and enjoy the wealth,
highways, electrical infrastructure, and communication networks that were the
result of the more free-market institutional realities of the past.
Eventually, though, highways start to
deteriorate from the lack of maintenance (or trains crash in the station
killing dozens of passengers), the energy sector starts to waver, energy
imports become unavoidable, and the communication network becomes obsolete. In
other words, economic populism is financed with resources accumulated by
non-populist institutions.
According to the Fraser Institute’s
Economic Freedom of the World project, Argentina ranked 34th-best in the year
2000. By 2011, however, Argentina fell to 137, next to countries like Ecuador,
Mali, China, Nepal, Gabon, and Mozambique. There is no doubt that Argentina
enjoys a higher rate of development and wealth than those other countries. But,
can we still be sure that this will be the situation 20 or 30 years from now?
The Argentinean president is known for having said that she would like
Argentina to be a country like Germany, but the path to becoming like
Switzerland or Germany involves adopting Swiss and German-type institutions,
which Argentina is not doing.
The adoption of Venezuelan institutions
in Argentina, came along with high growth rates. These growth rates, however,
are misleading:
First, economic growth, properly
speaking, is not an increase in “production,” but an increase in “production
capacity.” The growth in observed GDP after a big crisis is economic recovery,
not economic growth properly understood.
Second, you can increase your production
capacity by investing in the wrong economic activities. Heavy price regulation,
as takes place in Argentina (now accompanied by high rates of inflation),
misdirects resource allocation by affecting relative prices. We might be able to see and even touch
the new investment, but such capital is the result of a monetary illusion. The
economic concept of capital does not depend on the tangibility or size of the
investment (i.e, on its physical properties), but on its economic value. When
the time comes for relative prices to adjust to reflect real consumer
preferences, and the market value of capital goods drops, capital is consumed
or destroyed in economic terms even if the physical qualities of capital goods
remains unchanged.
Third, production can increase not
because investment increases, but because people are consuming invested
capital, as is the case when there is an increase in the rate that machinery
and infrastructure wear out.
I’m not saying that there is no genuine
growth in Argentina, but it remains a fact that a nontrivial share of the
Argentinean GDP growth can be explained by: (1) recovery, (2) misdirection of
investment, and (3) capital consumption. If that weren’t the case, employment
creation wouldn’t have stagnated and the country’s infrastructure should be
shining rather than falling into pieces.
Most economists and policy analysts seem
to have a superficial reading of economic variables. If an economy is healthy,
then economic variables look good, GDP grows, and inflation is low. But the
fact that we observe good economic indicators does not imply that the economy
is healthy. There’s a reason why a doctor asks for tests from a patient that
appears well. Feeling well doesn’t mean there might not be a disease that shows
no obvious symptoms at the moment. The economist who refuses to have a closer
look and see why GDP grows is like a doctor who refuses to have a closer look
at his patient. The Argentinian patient has caught the Bolivarian disease, but
the most painful symptoms have yet to surface.
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