Hundreds of millions of people around the
world lack regular access to clean water and sewerage. In many parts of the
globe, obtaining water for everyday use requires an enormous diversion of time
and effort. And beyond thirst and reduced productivity, the lack of clean water
has very serious health consequences: Dirty water can transmit parasites,
bacteria, and viruses and can inhibit sanitation, resulting in millions of
cases of water-borne diseases each year, many deadly. The “global crisis in
water,” as a 2006 United Nations report put it, “claims more lives through disease
than any war claims through guns.” In short, the unavailability of clean water
easily ranks among the most serious problems facing humanity.
Over the
past decade, clean-water scarcity has been the subject of hundreds of academic
studies, improving our understanding of its causes and its scope and
identifying many possible solutions. At the same time, however, the problem has
also been the focus of a burgeoning activist movement that tends to be less
reflective and less constructive. These activists deem access to water a human
right — one that is under constant assault by corporate malefactors.
Two recent
documentaries, Thirst and Flow, make the case for the water-rights
movement. They are cinematically beautiful, showing vividly colorful locales;
stunning footage of water dripping, trickling, splashing, and crashing about;
and dozens of scholars and activists who can be admired for their energy and
passionate commitment to ameliorating very real health and environmental
problems. Both documentaries offer an illuminating window into the central
assumptions held by this growing movement: Because water is a natural resource
necessary for human survival, access to clean water is a human right. Water
belongs to all; it is not a commodity that can be legitimately privately owned.
Water should be provided by governments; it is immoral to profit from its sale.
These
propositions raise important questions. If access to water is a human right,
does every human have a right to consume as much water as he wishes, regardless
of time and place? If not, to what quantity of water does each individual have
a right? Does it vary by circumstance? Whose responsibility is it to provide
that water to users? At whose expense? How are disputes between different users
of water to be settled? How do we encourage more efficient use of water?
Unfortunately,
neither Thirst nor Flow adequately addresses these practical
questions arising from their core convictions. Instead, both documentaries tell
us that water is part of an inviolate “global commons” that must not be owned,
traded in markets, or otherwise sullied by private enterprise. Once the
right-to-water premise is established, it’s not difficult to sort the Davids
from the Goliaths. From Bolivia to India to small-town America, the
documentaries show us how oppressed communities are rising up against
profiteering multinational companies and their cronies in the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, which are colluding to trample on the people’s
right to water.
Notable by
its absence in Thirst and Flow is any discussion of the mounting
academic research showing that it is precisely because water is un-owned,
un-traded, and hence under-priced, that water delivery systems, aquifers, and
watersheds are in serious peril. For the same reason, there is a substantial
underinvestment in the development and deployment of new technologies for water
management. And although they argue that water should be provided by the public
sector, neither Thirst nor Flow remarks on the fact that the
governments of poor countries have failed abjectly to provide water to hundreds
of millions of thirsty people. Likewise, we never hear how overbearing
government bureaucracy and regulation perpetuates water scarcity and prevents
private-sector solutions to water and sewerage issues.
Water use is not a simple science. Both the
amount of water and its particular uses vary significantly geographically and
among consumers. It typically does not exist in nature in a form suitable for
human consumption, so resources are required to test and treat it. It is heavy
and difficult to control, requiring infrastructure for storage and
transportation — pipes, reservoirs, testing equipment, and maintenance. Put
simply, usable water, at least on a massive scale, is neither free nor natural.
The
producers of Thirst and Flow do not deny that making water
usable requires these value-added services. But to them, since water resources
are part of a “global commons,” only government can be their legitimate
manager. However, a growing body of empirical research shows the shortcomings
of government management. With expanding human populations around the world,
all of whom want access to clean water and sewerage, there is an urgent need to
identify and implement practical solutions to the problems of managing and
delivering water — a task so vast and complex that only the private sector is
likely to succeed in it.
The
activists’ alternative, which would bar the owning and trading of water, would
result in the further spread of the sort of inept and corrupt water management
seen in many poor countries today. These countries often have government-owned
pipes, but they are leaky, water is stolen or “unaccounted for,” and sewerage
is non-existent. Many of these countries’ governments are semi-socialistic, so
they view extra people as a burden; these governments often excuse their
failure to extend state-owned services such as water, telephones, and
electricity into peripheral urban areas with bureaucratic sleight-of-hand:
denying the legal existence of people who live in these areas (e.g., “slum
dwellers”) and refusing to recognize them as formal citizens.
Where
governments fail in this way, informal entrepreneurs — not the multinational,
shareholder-owned water companies attacked in Thirst and Flow — very often step into the breach. For
them, every additional person represents a new opportunity to do business. They are the ones filling the water gap in
the slums of the world’s poorest cities, from Nairobi to New Delhi, from Abuja
to Asunción. Some deliver water on human- or donkey-powered carts, some in
diesel trucks, and some even via full-scale tankers. In African cities, street
vendors sell water to passersby in transparent plastic bags called “water
sachets.” Some entrepreneurs, such as those on the outskirts of Delhi, operate
small-scale pipe systems. Informal entrepreneurs also undertake truly
unenviable tasks, such as digging out latrines with shovels and hauling the
sewage away. In Indonesia, entrepreneurs have set up private sewerage systems.
In many countries, including India and Kenya, entrepreneurs and nongovernmental
organizations run privately-operated toilet facilities.
The
transactions between these informal entrepreneurs and consumers are generally
completely voluntary: entrepreneurs supply water and sewerage, and consumers
willingly pay for it, because it is more reliable, and often less costly, than
similar services provided by government. These private services make it
possible for their customers to pursue other uses of their own time and
resources, and to live better lives.
These
entrepreneurs and their customers are some of the world’s poorest people.
Nevertheless, they have created a thriving market to address water problems
that their governments have failed to solve. The great extent of such water
services throughout cities in Latin America, Africa, and Asia is testament to
their success — and just as importantly, to the failure of government
provision.
The demand,
repeated throughout Thirst and Flow, that profit from the
sale of water be abolished, would have the immediate effect of eliminating
these private providers. Given that these markets were formed precisely because
of government incompetence and corruption, it seems highly unlikely that
governments would replace these markets with a better system. In fact, many governments
have already declared the operations of the water entrepreneurs illegal. That’s
why they operate in the informal sector — the black market for clean water.
Abolishing water-selling profit may benefit these countries’ governments, but
for citizens it could mean an immediate reduction of access to water and
sewerage.
That’s not
to say that the informal markets are free of problems. Because many of these
markets are illegal, both the entrepreneurs and consumers face substantial
risks. Informal businesses are by definition unable to establish legally
enforceable contractual relations or to build their own brands. They are unable
to own property and thus cannot avail themselves of bank loans and other
mechanisms to grow their businesses. They live in fear of the police and often
are forced to bribe local officials in order to continue their activities.
How does one
reform an underground market that provides a good that not only is free of
stigma (unlike, for instance, the drug trade) but also is a human necessity? An
obvious solution in urban areas, particularly in slums, would be to formally
recognize these small-scale entrepreneurs, thus enabling them to own their
businesses and carry out their transactions legally. This would empower the
entrepreneurs to take advantage of their local knowledge and to acquire the
means to “scale up” their services.
In a licit,
competitive market, entrepreneurs would have stronger incentives to innovate,
which would in turn drive down unit costs, improve service, expand the adoption
of technologies, and benefit many more customers. Formalization would also
neutralize the common criticism made of many water vendors that they sell “poor
quality” water. Without access to capital, which would require formality, these
water vendors have little ability to improve the quality of their water. But if
they were able to formalize their operations, they would likely invest in
purification and monitoring technologies.
The very
existence of these informal water entrepreneurs thoroughly undermines the claim
that governments can be relied on to solve the water crisis and that markets
cannot. The water entrepreneurs and their customers are employing the human
creative drive to solve problems, to use resources more efficiently, and to
improve local environmental and health conditions. For these people — among the
poorest in the world — government is the problem, not the solution.
Whether the value-added services involved
in making water usable — transportation, storage, treatment — come from the
public or the private sector, someone has to pay for them. While both Thirst and Flow essentially ignore the informal
private water entrepreneurs, they aggressively attack formal private companies
supplying water to both the rich and the poor.
The book version of Thirst claims that “private systems usually
charge more than public systems right next door.” This is a false comparison of
the highest order. If the government sets the price of water below the market
level, the public system’s true costs can only be gauged by factoring in
taxpayer contributions. As even Thirst concedes, the cost of replacing
the crumbling municipal water infrastructure in the United States will run into
many billions over the coming years. Many local government officials then face
a quandary: Having under-priced water for decades, they have effectively
deferred costs into the future. They must raise taxes, raise water rates, or
consider other arrangements, such as the private provision of water or the
private maintenance of the water infrastructure. This seems particularly
objectionable in water-scarce areas, because these deferred costs greatly
imperil the future availability of water.
One case
covered extensively in Thirst is that of Stockton, California. The
city attempted to cut back on public expenditure by bringing in a private
company to manage and upgrade Stockton’s water infrastructure, a plan that
would, according to the mayor, save taxpayers about $175 million over twenty
years. The city council agreed to a twenty-year contract with OMI-Thames Water
that went into effect in August 2003. However, a consortium of residents and
the local trade unions objected to the deal — they worried about public
employee layoffs, reduced water quality, and price hikes — and were
subsequently joined by environmental groups in a lawsuit. By 2007, the outcry
forced the city to terminate the contract with the company prematurely.
But of
course leaving water systems under government control does not make those
services free. It only masks the costs by dispersing them among taxpayers, by
deferring them until the future through municipal bonds, or by simply ignoring
them and allowing infrastructure to decay until it reaches a critical point —
by which time the government officials currently in office will be long gone.
By undercharging for water, municipal systems often fail to generate the
revenue needed to update their infrastructure to cope with increasing demand,
and they fail to invest in the protection of aquifers and watersheds.
Artificially low water prices can also encourage waste and discourage conservation
by individual water users. Economically speaking, the costs of present
consumption are being passed on to future users.
While
water-system efficiency is not government’s strong suit, it is actually an
explicit goal of private operators. Privately-operated water systems reflect
costs more accurately, while growing revenue that can be reinvested in
infrastructure. Companies do this by negotiating long-term contracts, which
ensures that costs associated with replacing infrastructure can be recouped
over time.
Opponents
object on the grounds that higher-priced water is not feasible for the poor,
and that water should be subsidized by taxpayers so that it remains “low-cost”
for all. But if equity is a concern, practical steps can be taken to enact
minimal mandates that would ensure everyone has access to water, while keeping
the water supply managed by the private sphere. When it privatized the
provision of water in 1988–89, Chile enacted an individual water subsidy system
that guaranteed poorer households a certain amount of water. A study by Mark W.
Rosegrant (a policy analyst) and Renato Gazmuri Schleyer (the former Chilean
agriculture secretary) showed that, as a result of the combination of
privatization and targeted support, household access to water between 1970 and
1994 in Chile increased from 27 percent to 94 percent in rural areas, and from
63 percent to 99 percent in urban areas.
Some
activists claim that water and sewerage are a “natural monopoly” — that they
are functions that only a single entity can supply, and therefore that entity
should be governmental, with the public’s best interests in mind, instead of a
private corporation that won’t face competitive pressures. This is demonstrably
not the case in poor countries, and probably not anywhere. Moreover, as British
economist Colin Robinson has noted, municipal authorities can create the
opportunity for competition along the supply chain of water provision: in
infrastructure, testing, delivery, metering, collection, and wastewater
treatment. Consumers can benefit from the competitive market process without
the drawbacks that potentially arise from a sole provider.
If water
remains an unmanaged or poorly-managed common good, as demand for water grows
through increased population and economic development, pressure on water
resources will grow, too. But that need not be the case. Water can be managed
and supplied more efficiently, and new technologies are foreseeable for
treating, filtering, and monitoring water, as well as for distributing and
handling wastewater. For example, “graywater” — water left over from household
processes like bathing and laundry — might be more efficiently cycled back into
the system; the technologies that could make that happen are fairly easy to
envision. But these innovations will likely not be pursued, let alone be made
affordable, unless the supply of water is subject to market competition.
Both Thirst and Flow call attention to some of the
environmental problems connected to water resources in different locations
around the world. Both documentaries treat these subjects superficially and
with an alarmist tone, ignoring or dismissing on ideological grounds policies
that would lead to better management and more sustainable use of water.
Thirst explicitly
rejects the proposition that privately-managed water supply is efficient and
promotes conservation. The book tied to the movie claims that “profit-making
enterprises want you to use more water, not less, in order to maximize profit
for their shareholders.” In a policy vacuum, that statement might seem
sensible: it is true, after all, that companies generally seek to maximize
their profits, and selling more of something will bring in more
revenue. But we are not in a policy vacuum; we are in a system in which the
supply of water is dominated by government-run or government-subsidized
entities that charge below-market prices. Water users — whether households,
farms, or industries — tend to use it less efficiently than they would if they
paid its true cost. If we switched to a system in which water and sewerage were
supplied by companies charging competitive market prices, users would likely
reduce their consumption. The dynamic pricing of water also encourages the
adoption of conservation technologies, like household meters, which allow
people to better understand the relationship of their water usage to the wider
question of water scarcity.
Admittedly,
if many people in a given area are currently underserved, the introduction of a
competitive private supply may well lead to an increase in their consumption of
water. This is no bad thing; it presumably represents an improvement in their
standard of living. And while demand may well rise, it will be met with a
sustainable supply, since well-run companies will include in the prices they
charge the cost of investing in the purchase of water rights, as well as
storage, purification, pumps, and pipes. The same cannot always be said of
government-run water systems.
In a similar
vein, Thirst also
claims that “private companies have little incentive to conserve water because
payments and profits increase with rising water consumption.” Actually, private
water suppliers lose money when they lose water — whether through leaky pipes
or other means — so it certainly is in their interest to conserve water. And if
water were treated more as a marketable commodity, companies would have a
stronger incentive to maintain the ultimate source of water (that is, aquifers
and watersheds). Likewise, if private companies that use water pay a market
price for it, they will have a clear incentive to use that water more
efficiently.
Thirst and Flow take an unrealistically short-term
view of economic processes, relying on the assumption that companies exist
purely to generate a profit as quickly as possible. But private suppliers treat
water as an economic resource, which means they will be unlikely to exploit the
resource simply to produce short-term gains at the expense of long-term
sustainability. In contrast, when ownership is not protected by private
property rights, each user typically has incentives to consume as much as
possible as soon as possible, because what he doesn’t consume will be consumed
by others. This is the “tragedy of the commons” first described in Garrett
Hardin’s famous 1968Science article; it has led to some of the world’s worst
environmental disasters, like the near-extinction of the bison in North
America.
When
government controls resources, the result can be just as devastating. Soviet
bureaucrats, starting in the 1940s, decided to divert waters from the three
rivers that fed the Aral Sea in order to irrigate cotton plantations in central
Asia. Catastrophic environmental problems ensued, including destructive shifts
in the local microclimate and the complete devastation of the fishing industry
through water loss and salinization. The Aral now covers just a quarter of the
area it did in 1960.
Admittedly,
the effects of government control of water are generally far more subtle than
the Aral disaster. For example, water prices set artificially low by
governments can distort agriculture by making it easier for farmers to grow
water-intensive crops, like cotton and alfalfa, in places without plenty of
water. If farmers are made to pay the full cost of water, they may be more
likely to shift away from water-intensive crops to crops suitable for their
region. In Chile, South Africa, and India, market-priced water has encouraged
farmers to switch to crops (such as orchard fruits, grapes, and avocados) that
have generated more revenue, thus leaving the farmers better off while using
water resources far more sustainably.
A parallel
example exists with the world’s fisheries, which have largely been managed by
governments. Many have collapsed or are facing collapse due to extreme
over-fishing. But a studypublished in Science in September 2008 demonstrates that
when fisheries are managed with quasi-property rights and market processes, the
fisheries are far healthier and more sustainable than their government-managed
counterparts. In these cases, it is no longer “a race to the bottom”; the
fishermen view the fish as a valuable resource to be sustained for the long
term, rather than to be exploited in their entirety as quickly as possible.
Resource
problems often arise when rights to a resource are not clearly specified,
transferable, and legally enforceable. If governments relinquished their
control, stopped subsidizing users, and instead enabled property rights,
markets, and prices to flourish, the world’s “water crisis” would be a far less
serious concern.
Among the case studies highlighted in the
documentaries is one involving activists opposed to the operation of the
Coca-Cola Company in Plachimada, Kerala, India. Flow shows us prominent
environmental activists protesting in front of a Coca-Cola bottling plant, a
vigil by village women who object to the plant, and various locals who allege
that the groundwater in the area disappeared or became poisonous as a result of
the operations of the bottling plant. The documentary’s aim to paint Coca-Cola
as the source of exploitation and malfeasance is transparent.
The facts
paint a more complicated picture. Coca-Cola was invited by the Kerala state
government to open a bottling plant, which was constructed in 2000. After a few
years of operation, local antagonists blamed the plant’s operations for falling
water supplies and diminishing water quality, and so local officials refused to
renew the plant’s license, effectively shutting it down. However, a
court-commissioned study indicated that Coca-Cola’s operations coincided with a
period of low monsoonal rainfall, and that the company was not the primary
cause of lower groundwater levels. Nevertheless, the plant has remained shut
since March 2004 and the case is now pending before India’s Supreme Court. (In
a supposedly unrelated matter, the Marxist government of Kerala banned the
manufacture and sale of Coca-Cola in the state in August 2006; the ban was
overturned by the state’s high court a month later.)
This dispute
illustrates the need for clear rules pertaining to water extraction and the
property rights of local people. Without such clear rules, there is a danger
that governments will simply sell the extraction rights to companies, thereby
abrogating the legitimate historic claims of local users. If local people are
disenfranchised, and government officials are perceived to be acting against
the best interest of the electorate, conflict is inevitable. But Thirst and Flow do not explore such critical
underlying problems, preferring instead simply to note that some locals
objected to the presence of a multinational company and to conclude that
government therefore should own and manage water.
But the case
of another Indian city makes clear that government ownership is plainly not the
best solution. Tirupur, a city in the southern state of Tamil Nadu, is not
featured in Flow or Thirst — perhaps because it demonstrates how
India’s recent economic development has created the opportunity for Indian
businesses to use water more efficiently, through completely voluntary trading.
Tirupur
produces at least half of India’s cotton knitwear exports. The city has
hundreds of textile firms that employ hundreds of thousands of people. Each
kilogram of cloth processed in Tiripur requires approximately 150 liters of
water, chiefly for dyeing and bleaching. A vibrant trade in water with local
farmers has ensued — because the water is more valuable when used to produce
textiles than to produce agricultural goods. Environmental economist Prakash
Nelliyat notes, “Water-intensive industries are very willing to pay for water
as water is an important, high-value addition and input.”
Thirst and Flow also take issue with bottled water,
mocking its drinkers as dupes who would be better off drinking tap water. And
the films particularly criticize water bottled by foreign multinationals.
Nestlé, a large Swiss company which bottles water in locations from India to
Indiana, gets a drubbing. Thirst (the book) says, “Nestlé isn’t making
anything. It is merely exploiting a substance in the public domain, pasting on
its brand name, shipping it out, and marking it up for sale by a factor of a
hundred or more.”
One of
Nestlé’s bottling plants is located at a spring in Mecosta County, Michigan.
Both documentaries show us the Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation, a
coalition organized to oppose the operation of this plant. Its members alleged
that the plant has resulted in environmental problems (such as dry wells and
mud flats) and that Nestlé has received government tax breaks. This case — like
that of Coca-Cola in Kerala — is complicated, but again, Thirst and Flow appear to have little patience for
anything that might get in the way of a good story.
In its
defense, Nestlé points out that it pays more than $2 million in taxes in
Mecosta County each year. Further, according to local geographical experts, the
mud flats are a naturally occurring feature of the local geography. Nestlé, for
its part, claims that
“no reports of well issues have been made,” that monitoring of local water
resources has shown no significant change in water levels, and that this
monitoring record shows clearly that “water resources and ecosystems have not
been negatively impacted.”
But in some
ways, all this is beside the point. People value the convenience of bottled
water, so they pay more for it. It enables them to carry water on public
transportation or in other locations where potable water is scarce or
non-existent. And people also seem to value the quality of bottled water.
Perhaps they don’t like the overly chlorinated water produced by some municipal
water systems and they appreciate water being filtered. Tea brews better in
softer water, and often doesn’t brew in water with a relatively high mineral
content (as is frequently true of well water). In some areas, the use of
groundwater results in limescale deposits, which can, over time, harm
electrical elements in coffee machines, electric kettles, and other devices;
the use of bottled water can help prevent these and other problems. Beyond
that, consumers clearly trust the brands of bottled water — much as the
opponents of bottled water would like us to believe otherwise — and that trust
exists with good cause. In contrast, numerous studies have shown that some city
water systems provide low-quality water, often because of the proximity of
water pipes to sewer pipes. Municipalities with compromised water supplies
occasionally make the news — Fresno, California; Phoenix, Arizona; and
Washington, D.C. are among the major U.S. cities with public water problems in
the last decade.
The choice
between bottled and tap water should be a matter of personal preference, but
activists have inflated the debate far out of proportion, connecting it to
larger complaints about markets and “corporate globalization.” Presumably
caving to pressure from activist campaigns, some U.S. cities have begun taxing
the sale of bottled water and banning its purchase with city funds.
At the heart
of the debate is our attitude toward individual choices. Bottled water is a
good and a service; it enables individuals to experience a better quality of
life. This, rather than the parody of markets depicted in Thirst and Flow, is what defines a
dynamic market process. Individual consumers make choices about which goods and
services to purchase. Businesses take risks to produce and supply those goods
and services. A set of fundamental institutions — including property rights,
contracts, the ability to engage in trade, regulation, and taxation —
facilitate that process.
To be sure,
in calling attention to the process by which bottled water is manufactured, Thirst andFlow do raise some important issues. For
instance, it is truly objectionable when governments create exclusive deals for
large businesses rather than trying to create a level playing field for
businesses of all sizes to compete. And perhaps Mecosta County’s agreement with
Nestlé could have been arranged so as to yield more community power over
decision-making — a prospect that would have been likelier if the rights to
that water were clearly defined, transferable, and enforceable. (For instance,
each resident might be granted a share in the county’s water, entitling him to
a vote on how the county’s water resources can be used.)
The authors of the book Thirst compare the water crisis to “the
Boston Tea Party, the movement for the abolition of slavery, [and] the Vietnam
War protests.” While they are right to point out the importance of water
policy, the makers of Thirst and Flow have misdiagnosed the problems, and
their proposed solutions would only exacerbate them.
Many of
these films’ protagonists are members of a well-coordinated group of activists
opposed to capitalism and globalism; water is but one of their pretexts for
inveighing against the growth and integration of national economies. Their
attacks are broad and radical. International trade and market institutions,
such as property rights, are their common targets. Thirst,
for example, speaks favorably about the forced taking of private property
through eminent domain, evincing a general disdain for anything “private.”
These
anti-capitalist activists have a penchant for attacking multinational
businesses, since these are very visible and susceptible to attacks on their
reputation. The activists identify issues involving a high-profile target, such
as Nestlé or Coca-Cola, and make these issues out to be a “crisis” of one form
or another, repeating mistruths and creating alliances with local
nongovernmental organizations that may or may not have a legitimate grievance
with the company in question.
Several of
the people featured in both of the films make their living as full-time
activists, including Maude Barlow, a Canadian, and Vandana Shiva, an Indian;
they and their union friends jet around the globe armed with placards, giant
puppets, costumes, and expensive video equipment to document themselves. They
protest at global water meetings in Japan, Mexico, and Turkey, and somehow are
always on hand when TV cameras draw near.
Ultimately,
it is not these activists’ methods or love of street theater that is the problem.
Nor is it even their lack of pragmatism or their factual omissions. The chief
problem is that these activists’ ideas can genuinely harm the very people they
mean to help. They find disenfranchised local people — people who truly suffer
from government-induced water scarcity, for example — and exploit them for
ideological ends. Well meaning though they may be, these water activists
misunderstand or misstate the institutional deficiencies that contribute not
just to water scarcity, but poverty in general.
Attacking
corporations and lamenting globalization will not alleviate the water crisis.
Nor will pretending that water is a human right. We require another paradigm of
right — the right to property, and the institutions and practices that enforce
that right — to put self-interested individual creativity in the service of
managing, delivering, and preserving our world’s precious water.
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