Infinite Progress and Finite Resources
Whether one wants
to call it a problem, a plague, or a pending crisis, it is clear that
healthcare systems throughout the developed world are increasingly difficult to
sustain. This is true whether they are market-dominated (as in the United
States) or government-run and heavily regulated (as in Canada and Western
Europe). In the U.S., tens of millions go without health insurance. Medicaid
costs are giving the states economic fits, and the projections for Medicare
over the next two decades are a well-publicized source of anxiety. In Canada,
waiting lists plague the national healthcare system, and though patients are
well covered for physician and hospital costs, they also pay a good bit out of
their own pockets for other services. In Western Europe, the combination of
lagging economies, high unemployment, and a citizenry unwilling to tolerate
benefit cuts is giving administrators and legislators a chronic headache.
Yet even as healthcare costs continue to rise faster than inflation on both
sides of the Atlantic, there is good reason to doubt that the actual health
gains will be anywhere proportional to the cost escalation. Indeed, the recent
history of health progress shows a significant divergence of costs and
benefits: small health gains achieved at higher costs. Moreover, the fact that
the rising cost problem afflicts all systems should undercut a common
misconception afflicting both pro-government and pro-market advocates: that
there is an organizational solution if only their respective ideological strategies
were implemented. That may have been the case in the past, but it makes less
and less sense in light of expensive medical advances and undiminished public
demand for them. We increasingly want more healthcare than we can reasonably
afford, and we are often unsatisfied with the healthcare we get.
Our predicament invites us to consider two fundamental but neglected
problems: our unwavering national commitment to medical progress and
the way medicine and the broader culture situate the place of death in
human life. But haven’t these problems been discussed enough already — such as
the high cost of medical care at the end of life or the role of technology in
pushing up costs? I think not. The dilemmas of progress and the realities of
death are commonly domesticated and often trivialized, turned into little more
than troublesome management puzzles. We have lacked a serious and sustained
consideration of the value of medical progress, beyond simply discussing how
best to manage and pay for it. And we have approached death in the public
square mainly with calls for new death-defying advances and greater patient
choice at the end of life. Such responses are insufficient to the challenges
ahead and the gravity of these subjects.
Unless we think more seriously about progress and death, there will never
be a feasible, humanly tolerable way to organize and run a healthcare system.
We need to begin with the present moment: Where are we now with the fruits of
progress after a century of rapid development, and what are we to make of death
now that so much has successfully been done to forestall it? In the political
realm, neither liberals nor conservatives have grappled adequately with these
questions, and yet both sides might have something constructive to offer, if
only we could cut through the loud and divisive clashes of partisan politics.
The
False Promise of Better Management
The problems of progress and death are usually dealt
with in American society by evasion. They are translated out of the
uncomfortable and seemingly intractable language of philosophy and religion
into the more comfortable technical patois of law, management, and policy. What
kind of medical progress, for instance, will do us the most good? That question
is rarely addressed in any direct way, since we wrongly assume that we already
know the answer. Progress is taken to be an unquestionable value and goal,
stifling any critical examination. Benjamin Franklin captured this spirit in a
1780 letter to the great scientist Joseph Priestley: “It is impossible to
imagine the height to which may be carried, in a thousand years, the power of
man over matter.... All diseases may be prevented or cured.”
That kind of optimism continues to this day. The budget of the National
Institutes of Health has had a steady and unbroken record for over 30 years of
annual increases, now reaching $28 billion, voted upon with little dissent in a
wholly bipartisan way. Few if any other federal agencies can match that record.
Yet however much progress has been made, healthcare budgets always grow, the
standard of what counts as good health steadily rises, and there is no such
thing as too much. The economic cost of all that progress is now staggering.
The strategy of choice from both the left and the right to deal with that
cost has been organizational and ideological. From the left, the emphasis has
been on achieving government-financed, universal healthcare. Such a system
would guarantee care for all citizens and allow government to use supply-side
controls, such as caps on drug prices, to hold down costs. From the right, the
emphasis has been on increasing consumer choice using market mechanisms,
increasing competition among providers, and reducing government regulation.
Taken together, there is a bewildering array of management tactics, actual
or proposed, to hold down costs: more medical research to rid us of expensive
diseases, more health service research to design more efficient mechanisms of
healthcare delivery, increased use of information technology (being pushed
jointly by Hillary Clinton and Newt Gingrich), evidence-based medicine, medical
savings accounts, physician incentive payments, and on and on. Everybody has a
macro- or micro-scheme to make the system work better. Yet none of these reform
ideas, individually or in combination, has worked to stop cost escalation in
any notable way, even if there are scattered and local examples of small-scale
success. And given that the cost-control effort in the U.S. began with the
Nixon administration, we can hardly say that reform schemes have not had enough
time to be tested.
Infinite
Progress and Finite Resources
In one of the rare examples of professional agreement,
almost all economists believe that progress-driven technological innovation is
the main engine of cost increases, stemming both from the development of new
technologies and the intensified use of older ones. A common estimate is that
40 to 50 percent of expenditure growth can be traced to the increased costs of
technology, far outrunning ordinary cost-of-living increases, malpractice
suits, or administrative costs (among other favorite villains). As the
physician-economist Thomas Bodenheimer spelled out in a June 2005 article in
the Annals of Internal Medicine, there are many causes that
drive this high-tech cost growth. They include increased capital expenditures
(e.g., hospitals adding new or steadily upgraded diagnostic devices), increased
use of new medical procedures and drugs (e.g., coronary angiography), expanded
educational needs to master the use of the technologies, and increased
personnel time to use the technologies with sick patients. Bodenheimer quotes
the Brookings Institution economist Henry Aaron to put to rest a widespread
misconception: that the wider use of a given technology will drive down unit
costs. “Rapid scientific advance,” Aaron has written, “always raises
expenditures, even as it lowers prices. Those who think otherwise need only
turn their historical eyes to automobiles, airplanes, television, and
computers. In each case, massive technological advance drove down the price of
services, but total outlays soared.”
Not everyone finds these dramatic cost increases to be worrisome. Some
argue that progress always costs money, but that in the end it does not matter
how much a country spends on healthcare: if that is what people want, it is
their right to make that choice. A second response, pushed by the Harvard
economist David Cutler and the present administrator of the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, Mark McClellan, is that an investment in health
research is the best of all national investments, with an economic return of at
least five times the cost of the research. New medical technologies may be
expensive, these experts say, but they have an economic return of at least five
times the cost of the research because of the economic value of the lives saved
and the consequent increased life expectancy.
But both of these arguments are ultimately flawed. The first one assumes
that there is a direct correlation between satisfying market preferences for
healthcare and actual satisfaction with one’s health. But a preference for
unlimited healthcare has never been shown to guarantee personal satisfaction
with one’s health. In fact, there is evidence that many people feel
subjectively worse about the state of their health even as the population’s
health objectively improves. (This argument is made, for example, by Dr. Arthur
Barsky in his book Worried Sick: Our Troubled Quest for Wellness.) Meanwhile, the
Cutler-McClellan argument fails to consider the economic downside of ever more
costly medicine (such as cuts in benefit coverage that disadvantage the poor),
and it depends much too heavily on the use of disputed economic models. Those models
attempt to put an economic value on individual lives by using survey research
data on what people say they would be willing to pay for increased safety or
additional years of life. This seems to me a fallacious argument.
A third response to the impact of technology on healthcare costs —
evidence-based medicine — seems more plausible. The aim of evidence-based
medicine is to measure the actual efficacy of medical procedures, diagnostic
and therapeutic, and then to use the scientific results to set benchmarks for
physician practices. Yet quite apart from the fact that scientifically credible
evidence is expensive to gain, many physicians are suspicious of what they call
“cookbook medicine.” They see it as great for outcome probabilities in general
but less useful in telling them how to treat their individual patients.
To know scientifically that a procedure may, in general, have a 75 percent,
or 50 percent, or 5 percent statistical likelihood of benefiting a certain
class of patients provides no obvious guidelines on whether it will benefit an
individual patient, or whether its cost will be “worth it,” however we choose
to define that expression. As the likelihood or scope of medical benefit
decreases, our ethical problems increase. Using a high-cost, high-tech therapy
when the likelihood of dramatic improvements in health is 75 percent seems like
an obvious good. But what if the likelihood of success is only ten percent, or
what if the maximum benefit is likely only a few more weeks or months of life
in the hospital? How then do we judge?
In a remarkably candid op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, Miles
D. White (Chairman and CEO of Abbott, a pharmaceutical company) points to
“healthcare’s paradox of progress.” He asks us to consider what an extra year,
or six months, or 90 days of life is “worth,” and he argues that “we must start
to analyze the value to society of innovations.” To say that is near-heresy in
a pharmaceutical industry which gives the highest possible status to
innovation, for reasons of competitive advantage, profit, and health gains. Yet
it is precisely the right issue, especially as we think about the opportunity
costs of high-tech medicine.
The
Costs of Innovation
Let me offer a few of my favorite examples of the
innovation problem. There are at least four expensive technologies already or
soon to be on the market for the treatment of heart disease: a drug-eluting
stent that is triple the price of earlier stents, doubling annual expenses to
$4.6 billion; an improved ventricular assist device for use with patients who
are not candidates for transplantation, at an estimated cost of $16 billion a
year; an expanded use of the implantable cardioverter defibrillator, adding
400,000 new patients at a cost of $24 billion, or $120 billion to treat the estimated
backlog of 2 to 4 million patients (with no clear way of determining which
individual patients will benefit); and the long pending artificial heart, which
could add costs of $11 billion a year. Now it is sometimes said that, in a
medical economy of $1.4 trillion, the cost of each of these therapies taken
individually is a drop in the bucket. One might say the same about the drug
costs for treating colorectal cancer: about $31,000 for an eight-week course
and up to $161,000 for some 12-week treatments. And that is only for one type
of cancer. Taken together, such costs give added vitality to the old Washington
joke, “a billion here and a billion there begins to look like real money.”
To be sure, the median survival rate for colorectal cancer has nearly
doubled over the past decade, at the cost of a 340-fold increase in drug
expenses. But in the case of some of the treatments, the gain is limited, as
low as seven additional months of survival time. Likewise, most of the heart
disease treatments cited above do not cure the disease; they just help people
live longer with it, and often not much longer at all. As a society, we rightly
cringe at saying that a few extra months of life just “aren’t worth it.” But we
also cannot ignore the opportunity costs of letting expensive medications at
the end of life trump other goods and obligations, including the obligation to
provide basic medical care to the poor. As a team of oncologists put it: “As a
society, we are reluctant to systematically deny access to expensive treatments
that extend life by only a few weeks, but the morality of refusing to make
deliberated choices is itself questionable.”
One way or another, our society needs to reconsider the nature of its
commitment to medical progress. We need to stop assuming that every
technological innovation is unequivocally good, and that progress should be
open-ended, ever advancing, with no final goals or limits. In The Mirage of Health, the late
biologist René Dubos provided good scientific reasons why disease and illness
will always be part of the human condition. Assuming Dubos’s judgment to be
biologically correct, this might seem to justify the belief in infinite
progress: after all, the work of improving health will never be done; given
nature’s fickle ways and mankind’s penchant for creating new health hazards,
the work of medical innovation seems endless. But we are also discovering that
throwing increasingly expensive technologies at disease, and particularly the
chronic and degenerative diseases of aging, is an economically unsustainable or
unwise way to proceed. And we are learning that progress itself steadily ups
the ante about what counts as good health. We want and expect more from
medicine than our grandparents did, and our adult children already want and
expect more than we do. We are stuck in a vicious circle: the more we get, the
more we want, and the more we want, the more we try to get. The result is an
unaffordable healthcare system and a society that puts the pursuit of health
above everything else. And given the large percentage of healthcare costs that
are paid from the public treasury — even in the U.S., with its complicated
system of private employer-based insurance — this healthcare problem is also a
massive political problem.
The
Politics of Progress
As the annual increase in the NIH budget indicates,
medical progress commands an unusual congressional consensus and great public
support. This is true even for the most controversial area of research: stem
cells. Everyone aggressively supports some form of stem cell research — whether
using adult cells, umbilical cord cells, or cells taken from destroyed human
embryos. Many states have already rushed to fund expensive stem cell programs —
the largest initiative being in California, which recently authorized $3
billion over ten years for stem cell research. The public controversy centers
on embryonic stem cell research, which social conservatives oppose because they
believe that deliberately destroying human embryos is wrong. But these moral
opponents regularly make their arguments in utilitarian terms — by saying that
embryo destruction is “unnecessary” because adult stem cells may “work better.”
The most vigorous opponents of embryonic stem cell research, in other words,
are also the most vigorous proponents of massive public subsidies for
alternative forms of stem cell research. They still embrace the gospel of
medical progress.
Meanwhile, market-oriented conservatives have few hesitations. In the name
of freedom and progress, they embrace a notable moral relativism: It is not the
job of industry to pass judgment on what succeeds in the marketplace. Indeed,
many economic conservatives fear state regulation on ethical grounds and
embrace government-led research. As The Wall Street Journal editorialized,
“political backing will be needed to damp down [ethical] objections to this
kind of progress.” In the end, technological innovation is pushed as a major
source of prosperity — as a source of jobs, profit, and national pride.
Many social conservatives have acknowledged the potential for moral and
cultural harm in market practices. But they do not usually assault economic
conservatives with the fury they reserve for liberals. A commitment to market
values still dominates modern conservatism, admitting of no final ends, putting
profit and preference satisfaction ahead of most other considerations, serving
the faith in infinite progress as well as anyone could ask for. The
pharmaceutical industry — resistant to price controls, dedicated to innovation,
as willing to produce lifestyle drugs as life-saving drugs — stands as a model
of this outlook and approach.
I wish I could say that liberals do better when it comes to thinking
critically about the value of progress. But perhaps even more than
conservatives, they are strict adherents of Enlightenment values. Science,
rationalism, and the pursuit of progress (taken to be the main way to pursue
happiness) are deep liberal commitments. This is visible in the liberal
leadership of the stem cell movement and in the enthusiasm of many liberals for
various enhancement technologies, such as radical extension of life expectancy,
determination of the genetic traits of one’s children, and the effort to
improve many human capacities from memory to intelligence. No liberal cause is
higher than saving life and relieving suffering. These aims and values are
surely shared by American conservatives, but they are held with less intensity,
offset by religious or other sources of skepticism about improving the human
condition in any ultimate sense.
At the heart of the liberal ideology of medical progress is the notion of
control: specifically, thescientific mastery of nature, both the kind
that hurts us and the kind that needs improvement, andpersonal control of
our own biological lives, including (for some) euthanasia and
physician-assisted suicide when nature can no longer be dominated. Needless to
say, the liberal idea of progress admits of no final ends or purposes, no limit
to what might be achieved, and no real grounds beyond public safety to limit
the research imperative.
While liberals are usually thought of as market opponents, they have much
in common with market conservatives. “Choice” is a word much used on both sides
of the ideological aisle, whether by the libertarian market right to make and
sell whatever people will buy, or the liberal scientific left to choose
whatever biological future we are imaginative enough to devise. Yet if there
are some liberals willing to consider the need for rationing healthcare
resources to set limits on costs (if not on progress itself), the more common
liberal trait is a faith in better management techniques and increased research
funding to get us out of tight philosophical and economic corners. But in
reality, our choices are not so easily fudged.
Decline
and Death: The Great Trade-Off
What demographers call the “health transition” — the
shift from short lives marked by death from infectious diseases to long lives
marked by death from chronic diseases — can be thought of as the great
trade-off. The momentous gain in life expectancy — which began long before
modern clinical medicine became efficacious but accelerated thereafter — was
accompanied by changed patterns and trajectories of death. Death from most
infectious diseases (such as dysentery, typhoid, plague, and smallpox) was
often miserable but relatively fast, lasting from a few days to a few weeks;
and, if one survived, there was rarely any lingering damage. Contemporary
death, increasingly in old age, is for the most part slow and drawn out, lasting
many weeks, months, and often years. This is the modern medical bargain: a
longer, healthier life followed by many more years of serious decline and
disability. Of course, it is often forgotten that the main reason for a longer
life expectancy has been the sharp drop in child and maternal mortality. But
the fact that medicine can now prevent or hold off many causes of death, in
ways almost unimaginable 150 years ago, has created a number of new problems
and moral dilemmas.
Despite its successes against many deadly diseases, modern medicine does
not really know what to think about death itself. The medical enterprise is
plagued by a great schism. On one side is thepalliative care movement,
working to pull the care of the dying back to its ancient roots of giving
comfort and relieving suffering. An acceptance of death as an inherent part of
life is taken to be necessary for a peaceful death. The other side of medicine
is shaped by the research drive, aiming to find cures for any and
all lethal diseases (none are exempt at the NIH). Death is the enemy, not to be
accepted. Why do people die? The tacit answer is that they die from bad health
behavior (which can be reformed), from genetic causes (which can be
eliminated), or from the temporary inability of research (such as stem cells)
to find cures. Such cures only require more time, money, and tireless zeal. The
research drive in effect treats death itself as a curable disease, a kind of
contingent biological event.
These two sides of medicine are thus at war with each other: accept death
as a biological inevitability or reject it as a lingering biological accident.
In the meantime, people keep dying. The idea of looking more closely at death
and questioning the research imperative to “cure” it is less attractive than
seeking largely managerial ways of helping the terminally ill to die more
peacefully, by rescuing them in their final days or final hours from the
cure-driven apparatus of modern medicine.
After many complaints and bad publicity in the 1960s and 1970s about the
way the dying were being cared for (including abandonment by doctors,
indifference to patient wishes, and often uselessly aggressive treatment),
three specific reforms emerged: the hospice and palliative care movement,
living wills and the appointment of surrogates to effect patient wishes, and a
reform of medical education to encompass end-of-life care. Lurking in the wings
was also a renewed push for euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, the
latter eventually legalized in Oregon.
The three reform efforts have had mixed success. The hospice movement, with
improved palliative care as its core value, has been the most effective
strategy, now reaching over 500,000 terminal patients a year. Living wills and
the appointment of surrogates have had far less impact. Despite nearly 30 years
of publicity, it is estimated that less than 25 percent of the adult population
has made use of them; and even when they have, treatment instructions are often
ignored by doctors or family caretakers. Physician education in end-of-life
care has surely improved in recent years, but it is still slight and sketchy in
comparison with efforts to teach aspiring doctors how to keep patients alive.
Moreover, despite the fact that Oregon permits physician-assisted suicide,
there is little evidence of any strong push to extend the practice to other
states (California being the exception). Yet even in Oregon, less than 74
people a year have made use of it, confirming earlier studies finding that
there would be no significant demand for physician-assisted suicide or
voluntary euthanasia and thus no measurable healthcare savings. More
significantly, there is clearly an ethical reluctance in this country to permit
or encourage these practices. This opposition no doubt springs from a
recognition that assisted suicide and euthanasia would radically change the
role of doctors, giving them a dangerous power over life and death long ago
warned against in the writings of Hippocrates, and from worries about the
potential for abuse, as seen in the Dutch practice of euthanasia.
To
Treat or Not to Treat
As we are regularly reminded, the ethical and economic
dimensions of medicine are irrevocably intertwined. Beginning in the 1970s,
Medicare figures have shown that those in their last year of life (about 5
percent of Medicare recipients) consume some 25 percent of Medicare
reimbursements. Many took this figure to show that too much money was being
“wasted” on the dying. In reality, the figures were drawn retrospectively from
medical records, with no indication of whether the 5 percent were known in
advance to be dying but nonetheless treated excessively. One study showed that
the most expensive patients are those who are not thought to be in danger of
dying but who unexpectedly take a bad turn, provoking an all-out effort to keep
them alive.
And here lies perhaps the hardest dilemma: not what to do when people are
dying, but what to do when they might yet be “saved” or when their health
prospects are unclear. Many efforts have been made to define such crucial terms
as “medical necessity,” what patients need to save their lives or reduce their
suffering, and “medical futility,” what treatments with very sick patients will
do them no good at all. And many people assumed that the meaning of these terms
could be determined empirically as a straightforward medical matter. In fact,
this has not been possible, and these terms are less and less used in the
clinical setting, beset by the emergence in recent years of two increasingly
fuzzy lines: the medical line between living and dying and between useful and
useless treatments.
We all know that technology is seductive: give me a try, it says, since
“hey, you never know” (as an advertisement for the New York Lottery puts it).
As with the lottery, there are always some winners, even when the odds are
astronomically against them. Every doctor can tell a story of a highly
improbable treatment outcome. Moreover, precisely because medical technology so
often promises some potential benefit, even if small and uncertain, doctors are
forced with much greater frequency to decide to forgo treatment — that is, to
decide when not to take one more possible step, one that will likely do no good
at all, but just might, maybe. An estimate (but with no solid data) is that 80
percent of current deaths come about because of deliberate decisions to cease
or forgo treatment. Most doctors and families in such situations feel that they
have no real choice, that all medical benefits for the given patient have come
to an end. Yet this situation has spurred a reaction, in some conservative
quarters, that abuse is rampant in discontinuing treatment with death as the
explicit aim. And it has inspired calls, in some liberal precincts, that there
is now no moral difference between allowing to die and directly killing
patients, justifying euthanasia. Both beliefs seem to me wrong, but for reasons
beyond the scope of this article.
For both economic and ethical reasons, decisions about whether to use
expensive or burdensome treatments with a statistically low likelihood of
success have received little systematic attention. If one believes that the
highest good is to resist death, then a low probability of a good outcome is
seen as better than no probability at all. But if one believes there are other
goods at stake, individual or societal, then we face a more difficult set of
decisions, because the marginal potential benefit of medical intervention is
not cost-free.
We also face the age-old problem of medical uncertainty. Medical progress
increases uncertainty by increasing the possible ways of intervening in
response to disease. Evidence-based medicine, as noted, can generate
statistically useful data, but it provides no certain predictions about
individual patient responses. Moreover, some clinical categories are
exceedingly hard to diagnose, meaning it is often hard to know whether someone
has six months, six weeks, or six days left to live. Given this uncertainty,
the challenge before us is whether we can learn to forgo high-tech
interventions in individual cases, when death now is not inevitable, because
doing so might allow us to sustain a healthcare system that provides decent,
high-probability medical benefits for all. Meeting this challenge requires a
greater willingness, in the culture, to accept personal death in its proper
season rather than seeing death as the greatest enemy, or seeing every illness
(especially among the elderly) as a triage situation that justifies putting all
other concerns temporarily aside.
Death:
The Frontier of Progress
The struggle against death has always had the highest
priority in clinical medicine (at least since the late nineteenth century, when
medicine started becoming effective in saving life) and it remains the highest
priority of progress to this day. Over the years, the NIH has spent the most
research money on combating the leading lethal diseases (such as cancer, heart
disease, stroke, and, more recently, AIDS), and much less on chronic,
non-lethal conditions (such as mental health, arthritis, and osteoporosis)
which together afflict many more people.
This set of priorities has never been seriously challenged. And the steady
decline in mortality from the most lethal diseases has encouraged more, and not
less, research to defeat them. While it might be hard to prove empirically, I
think that much of the healthcare cost pressure in developed countries can be
traced to the war against death, whether in the intensified use of technology
to diagnose lethal disease or the development of expensive technologies to
treat it. Time spent in an intensive care unit may or may not save your life,
but there is not the least uncertainty that the bill for the effort will be
staggering.
While there are surely many exceptions, the leading killer diseases are
primarily diseases of aging. I have long believed, for that reason, that they
should have a lower research priority at the NIH. At a minimum their budgets
should plateau, allowing other research budgets to increase proportionately. A
larger proportion of the remaining funds should be allocated to support
prevention research. In caring for the elderly, we should focus on quality of
life, not length of life. The
time has come to take that idea seriously.
At the clinical level, it would seem appropriate to insist on a strong
likelihood of success — a decent prospect for more years, not just months, of
life in good health — before proceeding with treatment in intensive care units
or the prescription of enormously expensive devices and drugs. Drug and device
manufacturers should be required to provide solid information on the likely
economic impact of any new, or improved, product they want to introduce into
the medical marketplace.
To balance off these technological restrictions, there should be a far
greater emphasis on two fronts. The first would be more research and clinical
work on the disabilities and frailties of old age, taking seriously the notion
of improving the physical and mental quality of elder life. At age 75, I do not
look for medicine to give me more years, but I do want my remaining years to be
good years, with mind and body reasonably intact. The second emphasis should be
on long-term care. Some 30 percent of the elderly will spend some time in a
nursing home, and by their eighties, almost all will need help carrying out the
ordinary activities of daily living. Roughly half of those over 85 have some
degree of dementia, placing a heavy burden on family members, many of whom need
financial, social, and psychological help.
Liberals have been ambivalent about, and some even hostile to, policies
with this kind of anti-technology bias. They see it as a form of “ageism,”
treating the elderly differently from the young, and they reject the notion of
applying different standards based on age for the use of high-technology
medicine. They also want improved long-term care, but not at the expense of
technological medicine. While social conservatives, meanwhile, have commented
little on the resource allocation problem (at least in the way I have framed
it), there is in the conservative tradition a healthy respect for a limited and
finite human life cycle, a time to be born and a time to die. Such
conservatives have sensibly resisted the call for radically increasing human
life expectancy. Yet they also worry that setting limits on the use of existing
medical technologies would lead to a more radical program of “social
euthanasia,” where the old are left to die or actively killed because they are
too burdensome or too expensive.
To be forced, out of sheer necessity or prudence, to limit healthcare shows
no disrespect for life, so long as it is done in the name of other important
social goods or to preserve a decent level of healthcare for all. No one has an
unlimited claim on medical resources, particularly when providing them would
divert money from other important social needs. In this connection, the
conservative jeremiad that ours is a “culture of death,” aimed at getting rid
of the weak and defenseless, seems both misleading and misguided. Death rates
for every age group in this country are steadily declining, and those over 85
are the fastest growing segment of the population.
If anything, the war against death has been waged too fiercely, putting
many people at risk of needlessly poor deaths — deaths so miserable that many
become tempted by euthanasia or assisted suicide as more desirable exits. In
reality, it is the “culture of life at all costs” that might one day lead us to
accept the so-called “culture of death” by human will — both as an answer to
prolonged dwindling at the end of life and as an extension of modern control
from birth to death. While many conservatives believe it is disrespect for life
that drives the euthanasia campaign, I think that misses the point. It embodies
the same drive for ever greater control of our biology that marks the medical
enterprise as a whole, fueled by an excessive fear of decline and encouraged by
the perfectionism inherent in medicine’s research zeal.
Technological
Captivity
Our American approach to medicine inculcates an
attitude toward death that amounts to technological captivity — a captivity
that affects liberals and conservatives alike, albeit in rather different ways.
The great irony in this situation is that as this deeply rooted drive for
research and innovation grows stronger, the evidence also grows that medical
progress and clinical innovation are not the main determinants of population
health. The best estimates are that no more than 40 percent of the decline in
death rates can be traced to organized healthcare. It is, instead, the
socioeconomic conditions of society that make the greatest difference. The best
predictor of a healthy life is a person’s level of education, and that level is
in turn made possible by the general prosperity and organization of a society.
If technological innovation proceeded not one step further in our country,
life expectancy would continue to rise as long as the general standard of
living continued to rise, and even more if effective disease prevention
strategies were put into place. Of course, technological innovation will
continue. But we might dream of different priorities for its development and
resist expensive but only marginally effective treatments. Research as such is
not the problem, but using technological advance as the only serious test of
useful research is a problem that we are persistently unwilling to confront. It
has been demographic, not biological, research that has revealed the social
determinants of health, and it will be political and ethical reflection, not
new technologies, that will enable us to make use of that profound knowledge. Devotion to progress demands no less.
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