No Memory an Island
By James Bowman
There are at least
two good reasons why Hollywood is so fond of movies about memory loss. One is
that the movies are always and inevitably tempted by voyeurism, and exotic
illnesses or injuries, including psychological ones, promise voyeuristic
thrills aplenty. The other reason has to do with visual paradox. The movies are
supremely realistic — surrealistic, you might almost say — in their capacity to
look more like life than life does. Human life is always writ large on the big
screen. But life as most of us experience it depends utterly on knowing who and
where we are on earth, on placing ourselves in relation to the rest of the
world. The central task of the mise en scèneis to place people in
some context. But what if the people themselves don’t recognize their context?
This is interesting to moviegoers who know what the characters don’t, which is
the case in most such movies, or moviegoers who have to figure out the context
just as the characters do, as in Memento or Mulholland
Drive.
But memory is also
shorthand for identity: we are our memories in a way that everyone instantly
understands and that the movies have been happily exploiting at least since the
classic 1942 amnesia flick, Random Harvest. We all
instinctively feel that to lose our memory is to lose ourselves, a prospect
that stirs audiences with mixed feelings. On the one hand, America is the land
of second chances. We like to believe that history is bunk because we don’t
like being bound by it. Where fresh starts are a kind of national religion, and
assuming that our other faculties remain more or less intact, memory-lessness
is the ultimate fresh start. To those for whom the past is a burden there is
bound to be something attractive about simply shedding it — though ethical
questions may also arise, as in the case of Eternal
Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, where something
like “brain-washing” is going on. On the other hand, we are terrified by the
prospect of Alzheimer’s disease or permanent amnesia. It is naturally
horrifying to think of ourselves as unable to recognize our loved ones or to
remember the things that are most important to us.
Happiness and
Revenge
Alzheimer’s itself
makes a moving appearance in such films as Iris, about the
English novelist and philosopher Iris Murdoch, the Argentinean film Son
of the Bride (El Hijo de la Novia), and the adaptation by Nick Cassavetes of a Nicholas Sparks novel, The
Notebook.
But it is hard to
do very much with such a theme except to show, with the help of flashbacks to
better times, the pathos of what the disease can do to destroy a person with a
vibrant presence — especially, as in all three of these cases, a woman — and
make her into a hollow shell of a human being. There are also a number of movies
that explore the idea of people getting a “do-over” in life, the best of them
all being Groundhog
Day. A similar idea occurs in Sliding
Doors and Twice
Upon a Yesterday (also known as The
Man with Rain in His Shoes), both of 1998, and Me
Myself I of 1999. Except for Groundhog Day, these
all have a certain fanciful and merely speculative quality to them that makes
them seem insubstantial. All, however, are more or less alert to the moral
implications they raise, linking them to a school of films that explore the
ambiguity of our feelings toward our memories by using memory loss as metaphor.
In 50
First Dates, for example, the hero played by Adam Sandler is a
womanizer who lives in Hawaii and dates only tourists. Like him, they are
presumably looking for a good time and often want to forget about it (and him)
when they return home, as he always forgets about them. He is a reminder that
Don Juan is the prototypical amnesiac. But one day he meets a local girl, Lucy
(Drew Barrymore), to whom he is unaccountably attracted and who has lost her
own short-term memory because of an accident. Suddenly the man who specialized
in forgetting women, and making them forget him, finds himself in love with a
woman who can’t remember him from day to day. In a way this can be seen as a
condign punishment, but in another way — and this is how Mr. Sandler, who does
not specialize in humility and contrition, plays it — her condition suits him
perfectly. He is doing what he has always done, attempting to charm a new girl
every day, at least so far as she is concerned. From his point of view, the
triumph of the fresh conquest is presumably undiminished because she is the
same girl.
When, in
Shakespeare’s Winter’s Tale, King Leontes of Sicilia suddenly
realizes the devastation he has caused by his unreasoning fit of jealousy
towards his wife Hermione, the first resolution he can think of to repair the
damage is to “new-woo my Queen.” It points to the moral that can be found in a
more optimistic take on the situation in 50 First Dates. In fact,
it could be said that Lucy is living every woman’s dream. She can never be
taken for granted or ignored because her young man has to new-woo her every
day. Some women might be tempted to think that it would almost be worth
sacrificing their memories for such a happiness. And of course the happy couple
in this movie is not unaware that they are — or at least that she is — uniquely
favored by being able to enjoy the thrill of their first kiss again and again.
At times, we have the feeling that the movie is tending towards mere
wish-fulfillment, as so many movies these days do.
The scenario of 50
First Dates was pioneered by a 1994 movie called Clean
Slate, which starred Dana Carvey as an amnesiac private eye
trying to investigate a murder without being able to remember from day to day
who he is or what he is looking for. A comedy, this proved to be a
disappointment because it tried to do too much and was cluttered with
irrelevant and not very comic material. Amnesia was only a plot device, as it
is in so many daytime soap operas, and a means of generating some laughs
without any deeper significance. Yet feeble as it was, it also looked forward
to Christopher Nolan’s much more ambitious Memento (2000), in
which an amnesiac, played by Guy Pearce, seeks revenge for the murder of his wife
by writing on his body the various clues he uncovers in hunting down the
murderer, hoping that he will remember them — and him. His forgetfulness makes
him a walking embodiment of one of the main moral problems with revenge, which
is that by the time vengeance is accomplished neither the victim nor the
villain are the same people they were when the initial offense took place.
Without memory, in
other words, there can be no revenge. And so powerful is the urge for revenge
in the hero’s case that he must keep it up as best he can with the very
inadequate memory-substitutes of tattoos and Post-It notes and Polaroids. The
problem with the film is that, in attempting to put the audience in the hero’s
place by telling the story backwards, it comes after a while to seem merely
gimmicky. The serious question of the morality of revenge is obscured by the
mental exercise required just to work out the puzzle of sequence and causation
in a story that is being told back to front. And there seems no place at all
for those who, faced with its implied trade-off between memory and mental
tranquility, would choose — as most of us surely would choose — to keep their
memories even if they bound us to an act of vengeance.
This question
arises much more specifically and meaningfully in Atom Egoyan’s Ararat (2002),
which concerns itself — along with too many other things — with the Armenian
genocide in Turkey in 1915. There the forgetfulness is not primarily individual
but collective. What does it mean to be the son or grandson or even
great-grandson of those who actually suffered the original injury? In tribal
societies, of course, the demand for revenge can easily span the generations,
but you don’t have to be a primitive tribesman to recognize the uniqueness of
the crime of genocide. If someone tried to obliterate your ethnic identity even
long before you were born, is it not as much an injury to you as it was to your
ancestors who were killed? The injury in such a case is twofold: the individual
who is killed, raped, or maimed has a grievance against his assailants as human
beings, just as he would if they were of his own nation, race, or tribe; but if
he were killed merely for belonging to that nation, race, or tribe, all who
belong to it would also have a grievance. It’s hard to see where that grievance
could ever end.
In Egoyan’s film
the genocide is something that the protagonists strive both to remember and to
forget, and the question of the ethnic obligation to remember is left up in the
air. Like Clean Slate, the movie is too busy and loses itself in a
welter of conflicting and complementary psychologies. But the fact that the
actual massacre, only present in the form of a movie within the movie, is
constantly fading into the background has its own significance. For like the
backwards story-telling of Memento, it parallels the characters’
own forgetfulness; it evokes the Heraclitean notion that the passage of time
makes the essences of identity that revenge must believe in problematic. And
yet this argument is really just a disguised tautology. Sure, if you take away
memory, revenge makes no sense because identity has shown itself in
forgetfulness to be fluid. But it is precisely memory that solidifies identity
— and that few of us would wish to be without at any price if we could help it.
Without memory, in
other words, we cease to exist as who we are and become only receptors of
current data. And memory also alters as a result of moral information. One of
the best recent statements of that idea is to be found in Alejandro Amenábar’s Open
Your Eyes (in Spanish Abre Los Ojos) of 1997 —
later remade in an inferior American version called Vanilla
Sky with Tom Cruise. Like 50 First Dates, the
film features a Don Juan figure, played by Eduardo Noriega, as its image of
forgetfulness: a man who “forgets them as soon as he sleeps with them.” He,
like Adam Sandler’s character, finally falls in love, but is stalked by a
vengeful former girlfriend who can’t forget that he has forgotten her. She
deliberately kills herself and horribly mutilates him in a car crash. He is
left to seek by scientific manipulation a way to get back the past and the
woman she took from him — only to find that when he does so he can’t tell the
woman he wants from the woman who tried to kill him for not wanting her.
Thus he becomes the victim of the kind of forgetfulness that had first made him
a victimizer. In this film the moral implications of memory are much darker and
much more fully explored than in 50 First Dates, but like that film
it leaves some of the central questions it raises unresolved.
The Memories We
Choose
An even stronger
contender for the Oscar for the best cinematic treatment of memory as metaphor
was Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, which deals
with a fictional doctor-scientist, played by Tom Wilkinson, who has developed a
technique to brainwash two unhappy former lovers, played by Kate Winslet and
Jim Carrey, so that they no longer have any memory of each other. The science
is rather cheesy and Dr. Who-ish, but the metaphor is much stronger. This is
partly because Jim Carrey’s character, supposedly asleep throughout the movie
as his memories are being erased, suddenly develops regrets and frantically
tries to resist the process by finding hiding places for the memories he no
longer wants to let go. More importantly, when he has apparently failed in all
but arranging in his dream for another first date, the two meet again and fall
in love again. At that point an accident reveals to them that they have a
history together which both have forgotten. As they listen to tapes of
themselves describing their dissatisfactions with each other at the point when
they have, so far as they can tell, only just met, they are granted a double
perspective on their relationship: they simultaneously see the typically sweet,
trusting, ever-hopeful beginning and the typically sour, suspicious, despairing
end.
That love wins out
over doubt and resentment seems only natural and right and a reminder that
among love’s obligations is the obligation to keep fresh the memories that made
us fall in love in the first place. This process is naturally the opposite of
that employed by the forgetful Don Juan, the master figure of our sexually
licentious age. But in trying to conform to that model, the two lovers in Eternal
Sunshine of the Spotless Mind discover that what they have been
seeking is really a loss of self, even a loss of soul — which, as we remember,
was also the fate of the original Don Juan, dragged down to hell by the ghost
of the wronged woman’s father whom he had killed. Memory, that is, may carry
with it the need for revenge, as in Memento and Ararat,
but here it also carries with it the need for forbearance, hope, and charity.
Being who we are, who our memories make us, is no guarantee of being good, but
it is a prerequisite to being at all.
Something similar
is suggested by a movie that is in some ways even better than Eternal
Sunshine. Where that film achieves its effects with the help of a comical
mad-scientist and his louche associates, Wandafuru raifu (i.e.,
“Wonderful Life”) or Afterlife (1998), by
the Japanese director Hirokazu Koreeda, is set in that special twilight zone
inhabited by movies about life-after-death where everything seems mad — but
only, as we gradually learn to think, because the universe is saner than
anything we are accustomed to on earth. Afterlife’s afterlife
consists of a vast, Japanese-style bureaucracy in which the newly dead have to
be processed by civil servants who gently lead them to the choice of their
happiest earthly memory, in which they will subsequently live for all eternity.
It emerges that the civil servants are the dead who cannot make up their minds
and so condemn themselves to live in a kind of limbo, guiding others to the
happiness that they lack the power to choose for themselves.
I wondered when I
saw this movie if it had been influenced by one of the great under-appreciated
films of the last decade, Kids in the Hall: Brain Candy (1996). Its
premise is that a giant pharmaceutical company has developed a happy drug
called Gleemonix that makes you feel “like God is rubbing your tummy,” a drug
rushed into production before clinical trials have been completed. The effect
of the drug is to summon up people’s happiest memories as a means of keeping
them in a blissful state. But after the drug has become a runaway best seller,
the people who had taken part in its early trials start to become catatonic. Like
the dead in Afterlife, they are stuck forever in their happiest
memories. But where, in that film, this position is heaven, albeit a very
mysterious sort of heaven, it is hell in Brain Candy. The head of
the pharmaceutical company, played by Mark McKinney, takes the view that the
comas of the drug’s victims are “acceptable losses.” Of course, he adds, “you
could take the narrow view and say, ‘Oh God! More coma victims.’” So he offers
hospital care and big checks to the victims and sponsors a “Miss Coma” beauty
contest.
No Memory an
Island
The research team
that invented the drug has learned to see, albeit somewhat perversely, that
“people are supposed to be depressed sometimes. You can’t be happy all the
time; that’s life.” And so they decide to start “working on a cure for all this
happiness.” In this way the film also looks forward to Eternal Sunshine,
which is similarly persuasive that we have to hang on to the bad memories as
well as the good. But the later film also goes on to suggest that the bad ones
are somehow included in the good ones and are redeemed by
them. With only happy memories, we would be like the catatonic victims of
Gleemonix, imprisoned in ourselves. Perhaps, as in Eternal Sunshine,
it takes the unhappiness to make us see ourselves as we really are, and as
others see us. At any rate, this is the central idea of Afterlife,
which follows the progress of a Mr. Watanabe (Taketoshi Naitô) who cannot
choose his favorite memory because he claims to have no memories. In seeking to
acquire some by watching videotaped recordings of his life, he is stricken with
remorse at the way he lived, and especially the way he neglected his devoted
wife. Once again, evil is associated with forgetfulness, good with remembrance.
Mr. Watanabe goes
on to choose the one moment in which he showed love and kindness to his wife as
his happiest memory, but the twist in the story comes as his counselor, Mr.
Mochizuki (Arata), realizes that Watanabe’s wife was his own fiancée before he
was killed in the war. Checking in the files on her choice of
happiest memory when she passed into heaven some years before, he finds that it
was of him — by coincidence on the same park bench that Watanabe chose as the
site of his happiest memory. At last he is able to choose, because he finds
himself part of somebody else’s memory. In an even more elegant and moving way
than Eternal Sunshine, it makes the point that, although our
memories are also our selves, they cannot be merely private. It is the
inclusion of other people through love that makes them happy.
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