Allies Fear a U.S. Pullback in Mideast

Latest Evidence War-Weary U.S. Seeks to Close Books on Region's Long-Term Problems

By GERALD F. SEIB

America's allies in Israel and Saudi Arabia view the new nuclear agreement with Iran with a mixture of unease and alarm. But for some in the skeptics' camp, the broader concern extends well beyond the preliminary nuclear deal.

Their underlying worry is that the negotiations with Iran represent just the latest evidence that a war-weary U.S. is slowly seeking to close the books on a series of nettlesome long-term problems, allowing Washington to pull back from its longtime commitment to the Middle East.

In this view, the attempt to bring the nuclear dispute with Iran to a close without military action is of a piece with other steps the Obama administration has taken: withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, in each case amid doubts whether much of an American presence will remain; an agreement on Syria that leaves Bashar al-Assad in power, without his chemical weapons but also without being subjected to a U.S. military strike; even an effort to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal that could finally close the book on Secretary of State John Kerry's renewed effort to resolve

Though each of those steps can be seen as a logical policy evolution, America's friends worry that the administration's moves, when taken together, indicate the U.S. has simply lost its appetite for continued entanglements in a region that has been at the center of American foreign policy since at least the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Israel and Saudi Arabia in particular worry that a deal that accepts even a diminished or constrained Iranian nuclear program will result in a region in which Tehran plays a bigger role and America, freed of the need to suppress Iran's nuclear ambitions, a smaller one.

This is hardly what the administration says it is up to, of course. President Barack Obama, in announcing the preliminary nuclear accord with Iran over the weekend, specifically sought to reassure America's partners in the region. "As we go forward," he said, "the resolve of the United States will remain firm, as will our commitments to our friends and allies—particularly Israel and our Gulf partners, who have good reason to be skeptical about Iran's intentions."

Moreover, senior U.S. officials insist that, even if the preliminary nuclear accord works and leads to a permanent understanding on Iran's nuclear program, that won't magically produce some broader rapprochement with Iran and the clerical regime that rules the country.

The administration does hope that a successful nuclear agreement might empower moderate forces in Tehran to temper the regime's behavior in other areas, officials say. But for now Washington's concerns about Iran's support for terrorism and its backing of Hezbollah fighters and Syria's Mr. Assad remain unchanged. "Those [concerns] are the same as yesterday," said one senior official shortly after the nuclear accord was announced.

Still, the concerns about America's long-term commitment in the region aren't illogical. There is little doubt that the decadelong fights in Iraq and Afghanistan have left Americans in general, and not merely the Obama administration, wary of more military entanglements, particularly in the Arab and Islamic worlds. Uniformed officers in the Pentagon as well as civilians in the White House have been wary of military action to resolve either the Syrian civil war or the questions over Iran's nuclear program.

Americans' appetite for continuing their traditional leading role also appears to have been eroded by both continuing economic strains at home and the slow but steady move toward a greater energy independence that lessens U.S. dependence on Middle East oil.

Meanwhile, President Obama and his top aides have talked for several years about leading a pivot in American foreign policy toward Asia—and, implicitly, away from its traditional fixation with problems in the Middle East.

Particularly for America's long-standing friends in Israel and Saudi Arabia, even the hint of American retreat from the front lines in the Middle East is cause for concern. For decades those two nations, different in so many other ways, have united in their open dependence on U.S. power to ensure their own survival.

If the U.S. is perceived as strong, leaders of Israel and Saudi simply feel more secure.

By contrast, a perception that the U.S. is pulling back in the region can create its own realities. Israel, for example, may conclude that it may need, some day, to resort to unilateral military action to cut down the Iranian nuclear program.

And the Saudis already seem to believe that they have to spend whatever money is necessary—and more than the U.S. is willing to invest—to ensure that Egypt's military rulers remain in control rather than the deposed Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo. The Saudis also may conclude that international acceptance of a nuclear program of any kind in Iran compels them to seek their own nuclear-weapons capability, most likely through simple purchase of nuclear arms from their fellow Islamic leaders in Pakistan.