John Maddox
(1925 – 2009) was for many years the editor ofNature, one of the two
most important general science journals in the world. In 1972 he published a
broadside against the radical pessimism then very prevalent with the title The
Doomsday Syndrome: An Assault on Pessimism. In this book, which makes
interesting reading today, Maddox attacked the propensity of scientists such as
Paul Ehrlich and Barry Commoner to project current trends indefinitely into the
future and to conclude therefrom that catastrophe must sooner or later (usually
sooner) result.
Ehrlich – who is still predicting catastrophe with as
much confidence as if all that he had predicted for the recent past had
actually come to pass – famously, or infamously, asserted in his neo-Malthusian
book, The Population Bomb, published in 1968, that the battle to
feed mankind was over and that hundreds of millions of people would inevitably
starve to death in the 1970s, irrespective of what anyone did to try to avoid
it.
His prediction
was not borne out; forty years later the greatest nutritional problem in the
world is probably obesity caused by over-eating. But like those persons on the
fringe of religion who predict that the world will beyond peradventure end on a
certain date but whose faith is quite unshaken by the failure of that wicked
world to conform to their righteous prophecies, so Professor Ehrlich continues
to assert that really he was right all along: merely that he
mistook the date of the great reckoning.
The problem with
an open-ended prediction, or rather prophecy, is that it can never be
proved wrong, however long it fails to be borne out. To the argument that the
prophet’s direst prognostications have not come to pass, he can always return
the answer, ‘No, not yet.’
I doubt there is
anyone who never makes such prophecies and who does not derive a certain
satisfaction from doing so, for there is undoubtedly a pleasure to be had from
the contemplation of future catastrophe provided that that remains is the
parallel psychological universes of possibility or geographical distance. Catastrophe is not, of course, such fun
to live.
Maddox pointed
out the fundamental flaws of such prophecies of catastrophe: the unjustified
projection of trends indefinitely into the future and the failure to take into
account the possibility of countervailing developments. And he was not just
concerned to refute the notion of overpopulation; he attacked those who saw in
the possibility of genetic engineering only the shadow of Brave New World and
in the new information technology only that of Nineteen Eighty-Four.
He thought that scientific and technological advance would enrich our lives by
(for example) delivering us from many diseases and enabling us to have more
leisure time to pursue our interests pleasurably.
Now in a sense
Maddox made some of the same errors as his self-chosen opponents. If it cannot
be known that technological advance will be used to bad ends, neither can it be
known that it will be used for good; and to say, as he does, that ‘medical men’
(as he calls them, not foreseeing a time when most ‘medical men’ would actually
be women) will use genetic engineering for human benefit because in the past
they have always used technical advance for human benefit is a projection of a
kind that he elsewhere decries and even ridicules. Much in the future remains
radically unknowable; and Maddox, though he was very well-informed, had no
precognition of developments such as the internet or the polymerase chain
reaction that has so revolutionized genetic engineering. He even thought that
cloning of mammals was likely to remain forever in the realms of science
fiction.
His assault on
pessimism, however, seems to me to be a little simplistic because it is based
on the assumption that pessimism rests largely or solely on wrongful
projections or on the belief that technical advance will always be put to bad
ends. But it is possible to remain pessimistic even in the absence of these
errors. I believe in the possibility of indefinite technical advance, and I do
not believe that such advance will invariably be put to bad ends (though some
if it may). I think, for example, it is likely that medicine will continue to
advance, that many diseases now incurable will become curable, and that,
provided we refrain from doping ourselves up with corn syrup, our healthy
lifespan will continue to lengthen. But I certainly do not believe that our
life will get ‘ever happier, ever merrier,’ to quote one of the greatest
optimists of all time, Josef Vissarionovich Stalin.
Pessimists are
of two types, the catastrophists, that is to say the types who look up in the
starry heavens and see (metaphorically) only asteroids in the sky racing
towards us to wipe us out as the dinosaurs were wiped out; and existential
pessimists, that is to say those who see dissatisfaction as the permanent
condition of mankind because of his inherent makeup, his contradictory desires
and emotions, dissatisfaction that is perfectly compatible however with a great
deal of enjoyment of life. I am a pessimist of the latter kind.
The former kind
of pessimist, those who foresee inevitable universal collapse, destruction,
death by epidemic, and so forth, have no sense of humor, or at least of irony.
For them, the furrowed brow and the shoulder weighed down by care are signs of
intellectual and moral seriousness, the sine qua non genuine
concern for humanity and (God preserve us) the planet. Like catastrophe itself,
they are not much fun.
The existential
pessimist is light-hearted, for he knows that human life is not perfectible,
and can therefore enjoy what it has to offer without any sense of guilt that he
is not spending his every waking hour averting disaster or bringing perfection
about. He does not deny that many diseases currently incurable will one day change
their status and that this is a good thing, for taken in the round more life is
better than less; but neither does he expect that, when formerly incurable
diseases have become curable, human complaint and dissatisfaction will become
things of the past. Golden ages in the future are just as mythical as golden
ages in the past (except, perhaps, in isolated fields, as exemplified in Dutch
painting).
As for radical
optimists, they are as insufferable as the catastrophist pessimists. America
has produced perhaps more of them than anywhere else: which is why, perhaps,
its best literature is so overwhelmingly tragic in tone.
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