As the
baby boomers approach retirement, many face a pensions crisis thanks to
quantitative easing.
By Jeremy
Warner
Intergenerational
unfairness is one of those intellectually sloppy complaints that nevertheless
commands a strong following among a certain cadre of privileged young
metropolitan types. It even has its own think tank – the grandly named
Intergenerational Foundation. Already there is a huge volume of literature on
how voracious baby boomers have stolen the food from their children’s mouths –
and pretty vacuous stuff it is too.
When it
comes to the aberration of absurdly high house prices, there may even be
something in it, but it seems an oddly irrelevant obsession set against much
more worrying divides, such as wealth and regional disparities within
generations. The unfairness lies not in the fact that the old are in aggregate
so much richer than the young – this has always been the case – but that
children from poorer backgrounds will generally be at a substantial
disadvantage to those from richer ones.
Yet for
those who continue to insist that the baby boomers have had it cushy, consider
the following. Say you have done the right thing throughout your working life,
and saved when means allowed. A typical middle-income earner might in that time
reasonably hope to accumulate a pension pot of
perhaps a couple of hundred thousand pounds. This, at least, is the position a
friend finds himself in approaching retirement age. As it happens, the average
pot on buying an annuity is much smaller – just £33,000.
To his
dismay, my friend has discovered that his own, considerably larger sum will buy
him and his wife a pension of little more than £10,000 a year, and that’s
assuming both no inflation-proofing and that he invests the lot, rather than
take his entitlement to a tax-free lump sum. Together with the basic state
pension, this may be just about enough to keep the wolf from the door, but it
can hardly be thought of an example of rampant intergenerational unfairness.
Many retirees face much worse, leaving them reliant on benefits.
One reason
for these now painfully low annuity rates is rising life expectancy. Yet the
bigger explanation is officially sanctioned, ultra-low interest rates. Central
bank money-printing may or may not have saved Western economies from ruin in
the aftermath of the financial crisis, but it has also disfranchised a
generation of older, small-time savers.
Just as
the main demographic bulge of post-war retirees come to buy their pensions,
they find themselves – thanks in part to these interventions – confronted by
the lowest rates of return in history.
A recent
report by the management consultants McKinsey tried to put hard numbers on the
consequences. Their findings were shocking. Since 2007, the world’s four most
influential central banks have injected more than $4.7 trillion of new money
into the world economy. The effect has been to help drive both short- and
long-term interest rates to record lows. The chief beneficiaries, as you might
expect, are governments with big deficits. In the UK alone, ultra-low interest
rates are reckoned to have saved the Government some $120 billion since the
start of the crisis.
Highly
indebted households will also have derived a major benefit. Without these
interventions, many would be facing foreclosure. What tends to be forgotten,
however, is that most households are net savers, not debtors. On the McKinsey
figures, households as a whole have lost out to the tune of $110 billion – a
massive transfer of income from people to government, amounting to nearly half
of what the Government collected in income tax last year.
Obviously,
these numbers cannot be taken in isolation. Households may have benefited in
other ways from QE, for instance via improved employment prospects.
Money-printing has also put a rocket under asset prices, so there could be an
element of swings and roundabouts. Certainly this is what the Bank of England
tends to argue. Unfortunately it ignores the fact that most household saving is
in the form of relatively small cash deposits, which have been greatly eroded
by “unconventional monetary policy”.
The
consensus when these easy money policies began was that despite the
distributional consequences, such measures were unavoidable and overwhelmingly
the right thing to do. Yes, they were unfair on savers, but, actually, that was
the whole point – an attempt to force those with the balance sheet strength to
disgorge their money so as to compensate for the collapse in debt-fuelled
spending by those without it.
The longer
this form of market manipulation has gone on, however, the more questionable it
has looked, and the more obvious its undesirable side effects become. As if to
prove the point, along comes the Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, to announce measures to counter a nascent house price bubble, which his
own policies are helping to inflate. There is indeed no mess quite so bad that
official intervention won’t make it even worse.
And what
about QE’s fabled upside? Well, so far there has been virtually no evidence of
negative real interest rates generating a revival in business investment.
Unsure in these surreal monetary conditions what an adequate rate of return
might be, many companies have chosen to sit on their hands.
Some cash
savers have likewise been spooked by the abnormality of today’s interest rate
environment and saved even more. With some sort of a recovery under way, a
full-scale reappraisal cannot come soon enough.
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