By our count, commentators have identified
at least ten.
By David Corbin and Matt Parks
Six days before completing his
negotiations with Iran, Secretary of State John Kerrytold
a somewhat confused assembly of Latin American diplomats that
“the era of the Monroe Doctrine is over.” Greeted with (as the transcript has
it) “tentative applause,” Kerry left his script to assure the audience “that’s
worth applauding–that’s not a bad thing”–and accidentally to provide, as we’ll
see, the best summary yet of the President’s foreign policy.
The uncertainty of Mr. Kerry’s audience
should be excused, since the Monroe Doctrine as represented in his speech is
wildly different from the historical original–and in all the ways we’ve come to
expect from the Obama Administration. Monroe’s speech was a bold pronouncement
by a still-young republic that European nations seeking to expand their empires
should look elsewhere than the Americas. It was
anti-colonial and explicitly reciprocal:
Our policy in regard to Europe, which was
adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter
of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the
internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as
the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and
to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all
instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none.
The actual Monroe Doctrine protected
American independence and, by extension, the self-determination of the
newly-independent South American republics. It was, in other words, the
opposite of the imperialistic policy Mr. Kerry (perhaps ignorantly) repudiated
and implicitly apologized for. One can never expect accuracy to get in the way
when this Administration has an opportunity to score cheap political points
(“that’s worth applauding”) at the expense of its always benighted
predecessors.
For 190 years, American presidents had been guided by the common sense of the
Monroe Doctrine: that great powers seeking colonies or client states in the
Americas pose a dangerous threat to our security. Over time, they added
additional “Doctrines” to the American foreign policy tradition, some better
than others, summarizing essential policies or particular commitments: from
Truman’s pledge to support all free peoples resisting communist subversion or
conquest, to Nixon’s narrower promise to defend allies and friends from the
same, to Reagan’s support for third world populations attempting to overthrow
communist regimes; from Carter’s announcement that no hegemon would be
tolerated in the Persian Gulf region, to Clinton’s and Bush 43’s efforts to
promote democratization and freedom (respectively) at the intersection of
American interests and “values.”
Is there an Obama Doctrine? By our count,
commentators have identified at least ten. Why so many? President Obama might
tell us that he’s authored multiple doctrines (or perhaps no doctrine at all)
because he’s not doctrinaire, in the same way he claims not to be ideological.
The truth, however, is that there is an Obama Doctrine, grounded in pragmatism,
a philosophy both doctrinaire and ideological. Theatrically presented, it’s a
powerful force, at least among the transnational elites who populate the
alphabet soup of international agencies–capable of securing a Nobel Peace Prize
for nothing more than causing a (political) climate change in America and
abroad.
The Obama Doctrine, it turns out, isn’t so
much a policy as a posture: that the United States will applaud good things,
scorn bad things, and instruct others to do the same.The Administration, of
course, serves as the oracle of good and bad, occasionally requiring an
intervention like Mr. Kerry’s to interpret the otherwise ambiguous signs among
the entrails of its foreign policy chickens.
As the cause or catalyst of all things
successful and the most forceful voice against all things wrong (no one is more
angry!), President Obama is the politician that progressive pragmatists have
been waiting for. He has given life to their vision like no other politician in
the last century by convincing most American intellectual elites (and many in
the American electorate) that an idea or policy is not measured by how it
actually works, but by whether he says it has worked, is working, or will work:
that the imagining of a thing is the same thing as its factual existence (in
other words, hope is the same as change). This is what pragmatism unhinged from
empirics looks and sounds like–a predictable outcome given that it was
separated at birth from metaphysical absolutes for similar political reasons.
Syria, Obamacare, and now Iran make the
limits to this approach increasingly obvious, but they’ve been hidden in plain
sight all along. It turns out that saying you will lower the oceans and heal
the planet is not the same thing as doing it–nor can one simply talk a new
international order into being or lecture the flaws out of human nature.
When perplexed by political problems
beyond their understanding, the founders took a different approach. James
Madison spent much of the year leading up to the Constitutional Convention in a
careful study of confederacies–ancient, medieval, and modern.
Why? Because, as he and Hamilton put it in Federalist 18, “experience is the oracle of
truth; and where its responses are unequivocal they ought to be conclusive and
sacred.”
Having found that earlier confederacies
were alternately held together by superstition, force, or necessity, they
concluded that “a sovereignty over sovereigns . . . as it is a solecism in
theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity.
. .” A course correction, the framing of the Federal Constitution, was
necessary if the United States were not to suffer the same fate of others who
had trusted in this imperfect model of governance.
The original pragmatist, Nicolo
Machiavelli, unjustly criticized ancient and Christian thinkers for conjuring
imaginary republics and principalities. Ironically, his present-day successors,
having rejected the example of Madison and Hamilton, have taken a true flight
from reality, believing that they have morally and intellectually transcended
the past. But a nuclear Iran, Arab Winter, ambitious China, neutered Europe,
and awakened Russia are anything but imaginary. It will take more than
cheerleading and teleprompted wizardry to navigate this world safely; as
Machiavelli might have put it, the Obama Doctrine “will sooner effect [our]
ruin than [our] preservation.”
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