In the name of revolution and the people
By Pepe Escobar
"Despicable human
scum." "Worse than a dog." A "traitor for all ages"
who "perpetrated anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts in a bid
to overthrow the leadership of our party and state and the socialist system."
Fate: a swift military tribunal, and a swift execution
"in the name of revolution and the people".
So that was the date with
destiny for Jang Song-thaek, 67, uncle of North Korea's leader Kim Jong-eun
(arguably 30), according to state news agency KCNA. In North Korea, the
revolution is definitely not a bulgogi party.
KCNA maintains that Jang
- married to Kim Kyong-hui, the very influential sister of the late Dear Leader
Kim Jong-il - admitted he wanted to stage a military coup d'etat. The
inevitable follow-up is - what else - a purge (at the Central Committee's
administrative department). Who said all that Cold War shtick was
over?
Jang was, in theory,
young Kim's Cardinal Richelieu. And then, out of the blue, he is shown on state
TV dragged out of a meeting, publicly humiliated, demonized as a drug addict
and womanizer, stripped of all posts and titles (chief of the Party's
administrative department, vice chairman of the National Defense Commission),
accused of corruption, tried and whacked, as if this was a North Korean Pulp
Fiction remake. What gives?
Re-educate or else
Let's see the reaction
from the usual suspects. South Korean President Park Geun-hye said this is a
"reign of terror". Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera said
this is a remix of the Cultural Revolution in China. Beijing, demonstrating trademark
restraint, called it just "an internal affair".
The most obvious
interpretation is Kim telling North Korea, the Korean peninsula and the world
at large "I'm in charge. And don't you mess with me."
Now for the details.
Little Kim, since he acceded to the leader's throne, was already deep into a
sequential reshuffle of especially the military nomenklatura (that's according
to South Korea's Unification Ministry). The most probable scenario is that
Jang's slow-motion purge started a few months ago. Or even before that, because
Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il always suspected him of social (and especially
political) climbing. Some of Jang's aides had already met the Pulp Fiction
treatment, but his money manager is lucky enough to be in China, taken care of
by the South Koreans.
Make no mistake: Jang was
very powerful and well connected. So powerful that the inevitable
"re-education" campaign to follow - either you worship Kim or he'll
go medieval - will not be that easy.
Jang was right at the
center of North Korea's crossroads, which could be roughly summarized as the
rarefied elite deciding to fully support the primacy of the Workers' Party to
balance the military to then embark in a unified manner on some sort of
economic opening.
We should always remember
that Kim Jong-il's top policy was originally "military first". But
then he started veering the other way to prepare his succession. Little Kim
predictably promoted a lot of party officials to important positions; now the
mantra is party supremacy. In this context it's also important to keep in mind
how the Workers' Party emphatically denounced Jang's "crimes".
Any significant economic
reform directly depends on party supremacy over the military - because after
all the top economic planners in North Korea are party people, busy emphasizing
that economic development is as crucial as missiles and nuclear weapons.
Apart from his alleged
coup attempt, Jang was a firm defender of North Korean special economic zones
(SEZs), attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) and more commodity
exports (it's as if Pyongyang was flirting with its own remix of Beijing in the
early 1980s). Pyongyang is already moving this way - for instance investing in
road, rail and port infrastructure on both the Chinese and Russian borders. And
it's not only China and Russia that want to invest in North Korea; candidates
also include Hong Kong, Taiwan, India, Indonesia and Mongolia.
I want more money
Once again, it always,
one way or another, has to do with China. Jang was close to Beijing - and he
wanted a lot of Chinese investment. No one knows how this purge will affect
business. Those subscribing to the view of North Korea as a Mob operation will
see the purge as a tactic to raise the price for North Korean
"cooperation" with the Chinese.
That's not so
far-fetched. Pyongyang does depend on China, but it will never allow itself to
become a mere puppet. Myanmar has played it beautifully - although without the
Pulp Fiction element; one day it was hermetically closed and totally dependent
on China, the next it "opened up" and was immediately
"diversifying" with multiple partners, Westerners included.
What's certain is that
the top Kim Jong-eun policy - the Worker's Party as strong or even stronger
than the military - does not change. As for what happens next, Little Kim could
even add a twist, like rattling the whole planet by launching a nuclear missile
or setting up another nuclear test to foment "internal cohesion".
North Koreans - not to mention South Koreans, Japanese and Americans - will
certainly get the message; don't mess with him or he'll go medieval on your
ass.
No comments:
Post a Comment