The "Fair" Trade Delusion
by Richard Epstein
In the sprawling field of international relations, few debates are as persistent and acrimonious as the one between the advocates of "free trade" and "fair trade." The fair trade position takes the view that a wide range of tariffs, duties, and other conditions may be used to restrict the flow of goods and services across national or state boundaries. The free trade position, which I heartily endorse, holds that national trade policy should allow goods and services to move fluidly across national borders—just as if those borders did not exist. One way to achieve this end is to sign bilateral free trade accords with other nations, with an eye to reducing tariff barriers and other impediments to the free flow of goods and services.
Illustration by Barbara Kelley
Right now, the United States has three pending free trade agreements with South Korea, Colombia, and Panama. Signing them just as they are will expand growth and lead to more opportunities for all parties. Although the economics of free trade are straightforward, its politics are not.
Last week, that sometime friend of free trade, President Barack Obama, announced that he would not submit any of these three free trade agreements to Congress unless and until Congress decided to reauthorize and extend the Trade Adjustment Assistance ("TAA") program that offers a rich package of financial benefits to various workers whose jobs are lost as a result of imported goods and services.
The president’s political logic is depressingly clear. He is willing to hold hostage the large overall gains from free trade to his renewed demand for economic assistance to those individuals, often union members, who are dislocated by the onslaught of new goods and services into the United States. Those parties, like the Chamber of Commerce, which should know better, have supported the president with the pragmatic argument that it is better to yield on the TAA, and move forward on the mentioned free trade agreements, than to come away empty handed.
That pragmatic compromise will, however, strangle free trade. Once it is accepted that all free trade agreements can be tied to other demands, the sky is the limit. For instance, labor groups have long insisted on the fair trade provision that we can only have free trade agreements with those nations whose labor laws look remarkably like our own. Their intention is to use these conditions to hobble their foreign competitors by forcing the competitors to abandon their own low-cost practices, thereby depriving free trade of much of its punch. Environmental groups have also joined the fair trade fray by insisting that poorer countries must have public amenities that only rich countries can afford, so that they too become weakened competitors in the American market.
All of these clever maneuvers should be stoutly resisted as a matter of first principle. Quite simply, the label "fair trade" in the hands of its advocates is a snare and delusion. My objection to fair trade does not rest on the absurd proposition that "fairness" is irrelevant to market transactions. It is the broad definitions of both fair trade and "unfair competition" that turns them into the enemy of growth and competition properly understood.
Although the economics of free trade are straightforward, its politics are not.
What exactly is unfair competition? The differences between the narrow classical liberal definition and much broader progressive definition are too vivid to deny. To truly understand unfair competition, we should step back from international disputes over free trade and ask how the notion of unfair competition plays out in the context of domestic trade. Classical liberal theory does not dismiss "unfair competition" as an oxymoron. Quite the opposite, it develops a set of rules that isolate for attack cases where one competitor uses force and fraud to upset the balance in a competitive market.
Consider this example: well before the eighteenth century, a suit for unfair competition lay against one schoolmaster who fired shots across the path of students who were making their way to a rival school. As the students dispersed, the rival was allowed to sue his mischievous competitor even though he and his school were never in the line of fire. The point here is that no individual student could be expected to mount this costly effort against the aggressor—each student’s stake is too small. But the competitor who lost customers to force surely did care about the collapse of his business. Allowing such a suit advances social welfare by forcing people to compete solely on quality and price.