Monday, December 26, 2011

From a nation of laws to a nation of men making laws in secret


America’s Future: Russia and China Use Copyright Laws to Crush Government Criticism
America Mimics Russia, China, Iran and Malaysia
Leading American Internet businessmen warn that the draconian copyright bill on the verge of being passed by Congress would let the US government use censorship techniques “similar to those used by China, Malaysia and Iran.”
If you want to know what the United States would look like after this bill is passed, just look at what’s been happening in Russia:  The Russian government has been crushing dissent under the pretext of enforcing copyright law.
As the New York Times noted last year:
Across Russia, the security services have carried out dozens of similar raids against outspoken advocacy groups or opposition newspapers in recent years. Security officials say the inquiries reflect their concern about software piracy, which is rampant in Russia. Yet they rarely if ever carry out raids against advocacy groups or news organizations that back the government.
***
[A] review of these cases indicates that the security services often seize computers whether or not they contain illegal software. The police immediately filed reports saying they had discovered such programs, before even examining the computers in detail. The police claims have in numerous instances been successfully discredited by defendants when the cases go before judges.
***
The plainclothes officers who descended upon the Baikal Wave headquarters said they were from the division that investigated commercial crime. But the environmentalists said they noticed at least one officer from the antiextremism department, which tracks opposition activists and had often conducted surveillance on the group.
***
Baikal Wave’s leaders said they had known that the authorities used such raids to pressure advocacy groups, so they had made certain that all their software was legal.
But they quickly realized how difficult it would be to defend themselves.
They said they told the officers that they were mistaken, pulling out receipts and original Microsoft packaging to prove that the software was not pirated. The police did not appear to take that into consideration. A supervising officer issued a report on the spot saying that illegal software had been uncovered.
Before the raid, the environmentalists said their computers were affixed with Microsoft’s “Certificate of Authenticity” stickers that attested to the software’s legality. But as the computers were being hauled away, they noticed something odd: the stickers were gone.
In all, 12 computers were confiscated. The group’s Web site was disabled, its finances left in disarray, its plans disclosed to the authorities.
The police also obtained personnel information from the computers. In the following weeks, officers tracked down some of the group’s supporters and interrogated them.“The police had one goal, which was to prevent us from working,” said Galina Kulebyakina, a co-chairwoman of Baikal Wave. “They removed our computers because we actively took a position against the paper factory and forcefully voiced it.”
“They can do pretty much what they want, with impunity,” she said.
***
Mr. Kurt-Adzhiyev said he now realized that the authorities were not so much interested in convictions as in harassing opponents. Even if the inquiries are abandoned, they are debilitating when they require months to defend.
Since the American copyright bills (SOPA and PIPA) target online activities, the same thing happening to Russian critics’ computers could happen to the websites of any Americans who criticize the government, the too big to fail banks, or any of the other powers-that-be.
Indeed, the American copyright bill is modeled after the Chinese system.  As I noted Monday:
Given that Joe Lieberman said that America needs an internet kill switch like China, that the U.S. economy has turned socialist (at least for friends of those with control of the money spigot), and that the U.S. government used communist Chinese torture techniques specifically designed to produce false confessions in order to sell the Iraq war, I guess that the bill’s Chinese-style censorship is not entirely surprising.
Of course, it might seem over-the-top to worry about copyright laws being used to stifle government criticism in America … if it weren’t for the fact that:
§  Some folks have alleged that copyright infringers are terrorists. See thisthisthis and this
§  The U.S. government has been using anti-terrorism laws to crush dissent
§  In modern America, questioning war, protesting anything, asking questions about pollution or about Wall Street shenanigans, supporting Ron Paul, being a libertarian, holding gold, stocking up on more than 7 days of food, or liking the Founding Fathers may get you labeled as a suspected terrorist
§  We’ve gone from a nation of laws to a nation of men making laws in secret

A Christmas Tale


A Polish village, a war, and a brand new bicycle.
He passed away earlier this year, the old man. We spent a number of Christmases with him and his wife, in their crowded, crumbling apartment in a village called Mysliborz near the German border. It was on one such Christmas night that he told this story, which even after all these years I am unable to forget:
FOR CHRISTMAS that year I received a brand new bicycle. This was in the first year of the war. The bicycle was a Lucznik, sleek and fire engine red. I was the envy of all the kids in the village. I still cannot imagine how my father saved enough to buy such a thing, but somehow he had.
That was the winter German troops arrived in our village. Immediately the soldiers began posting notices all over town. Every week a new notice ordering villagers to bring this or that item to police headquarters. One week it would be butter churners, the next week it was goats. If you ignored the order and you were found out, or if someone reported you, you would be severely punished. You can probably guess what that meant.
I was attending school the day the Germans decided to round up all of the bicycles in the village. I can only imagine how terrible my father must have felt, knowing how much I loved that bicycle. Nevertheless he dared not disobey orders. My father was a practical man. He wasn't going to risk being shot over a bicycle.
That afternoon my friend Radek and I walked home from school just like we always did. It had been raining earlier but now the sky had cleared and the cobblestone streets shimmered in the late afternoon sun. Suddenly Radek halted. He nudged me and asked if that wasn't my bicycle leaning against the wall of the tavern. We hurried to get a closer look. True enough, it was my bike. No one else in town had one like it, and no one would for many years.
"How do you suppose it got here?" asked Radek.
I shrugged. "Beats me."
I climbed on my bicycle and began pedaling up and down the street. It was my bike all right.
Radek ran alongside me for a while. "Can I try?" he cried.
"I have to get home now," I said. I rode off doing tricks down the alley.
I did not go home directly. Chores waited at home. I rode up and down the wet cobblestone streets, enjoying the looks of all the wide-eyed villagers envious of my new bike.
My mother and father were working in the garden when I rode through the gate. I saw my mother straighten and the hoe fall from her hands. She let out a small cry.
My father looked up. His face had turned ashen gray. He raised his arm and pointed as though he were seeing a ghost. "Where did you get that?" he cried.
I was confused. What kind of question was that? "I got it for Christmas," I said. Even then I was too old to believe in St. Nicholas.
"No! Where did you get it just now?"
Something caught in my throat. "I found it leaning against the wall of the pub." I seemed to have done something wrong, but for the life of me I had no idea what. I dropped the bicycle to the ground and ran to my mother. I began to cry.
"Shhhh. It's okay," she said weakly.
My father stared blankly down the road. "I'm a dead man," he muttered.
My mother bunched her apron in her hands. "Take it back to where he found it. Maybe they haven't noticed it missing."
"But it's mine!" I cried. I still didn't know what the matter was. My mother patted my head and shushed me.
My father sighed and picked up my bicycle. He looked at me, almost kindly. "Stop that. Be a man," he said. He climbed on my bicycle and rode off awkwardly down the street.
Mother and I stood by the front gate a long time. We waited in silence until we saw the first star come out. At length she said it was time to go inside for supper.
Later that night, after I had gone to bed, my father came into my room. He sat on the edge of my bed. I turned away from him, still angry. "I am sorry," he said. I felt his rough hands stroke my hair. I edged closer to the wall. I could tell by the sound of his voice he had been crying.
THE OLD MAN paused and slowly shook his head. "Six million people died in that war, but that was the only time I ever heard my father weep," he said.
It was late and my wife and the baby had drifted off to sleep. This was many years ago when we were living in a small town in western Poland.

A poor substitute for real history

Pop history
While society has become ever more estranged from the great events of the past, music has been on a lazy nostalgia trip of reunions, reissues, recycling and anniversaries.
by Neil Davenport 
Ageing rockers, mods and soul men - not to mention militant rappers and balding acid ravers - don’t just grow old disgracefully; they go on reunion tours to celebrate it, too. The Noughties was the decade in which any musician with a reasonable back catalogue could relive former glories and bolster bank balances. It was as if the League of Gentlemen’s Les McQueen, and his quest to relive his Seventies glam-rock days in Crème Brulée, became the blueprint for the decade. Nearly all the acts of any note from the past 30 years - apart from the Smiths and the Jam - have sorted out bitter differences with former band members, attached girdles to their stomachs, booked world tours and banked the proceeds. Yes, it’s undignified, but probably more lucrative than a shift with a local mini-cab firm.
In an age of internet file-sharing, royalties from back catalogues don’t quite have the staying power they used to. The far more lucrative tour and festival circuit is where the real money is at. Any band that does feel compelled to reissue its back catalogue must do so via state-of-the-art remastering (the Smiths) or superannuated box sets featuring fanboy artefacts such as rough demo collections nobody plays again (Nirvana) and souvenir tat that has a queasy end-of-the-pier feel to it (Primal Scream).
The outfit that has tried all avenues of back-catalogue reheats as successfully as anyone is bone-crunching, sci-fi surf punks, the Pixies. Their reunion lasted longer than their original creative years: a worldwide comeback tour, reissued ‘best of’ packages and, when all that had been exhausted, a twentieth-anniversary tour of their best album, Doolittle.
Playing a fan-favourite album in its entirety became a big concert draw in the 2000s. It was popularised by the promoter behind the All Tomorrow’s Parties festival, Barry Hogan, who successfully enticed hip alt.rock bands to perform ‘classic’ albums in their entirety. That he calls these concerts ‘Don’t Look Back’ suggests a developed sense of irony. On a harmless Saturday-night-out level, some of these shows can be enjoyable enough. Dinosaur Jr performed Living All Over Me, the Tindersticks gave us their second eponymous album and, the granddaddy of them all, Brian Wilson, revived the Beach Boys classic Pet Sounds at the Royal Festival Hall.
In fact, for an individual lampooned as a far-gone Sixties casualty, Wilson has played the back catalogue game even better than the Pixies. Since 2002, Wilson - with his backing band, the Wondermints - has routinely performed Beach Boys classics at inflated prices in London’s more opulent concert halls. He even re-recorded his ‘great lost’ Beach Boys album, Smile, only to issue the original 1968 album, in deluxe editions of course, last month. Wilson ended 2011 by announcing a full-blown Beach Boys reunion to celebrate 50 years of, well, not being quite together.
That announcement, however, was nothing compared to the news that the original Stone Roses line-up would be touring next year. Given that singer Ian Brown and guitarist John Squire frequently poured scorn on the idea of a reunion - especially given Brown’s most famous lyric ‘the past was yours/the future’s mine/you’re all out of time’ - it seems the reunion roadshow is set to trudge through this decade too. For those of us who (yawn) lived through the Stone Roses the first time, their career has been one long anniversary anyway. Glad to have them back? It’s like they’ve never been too far away from a deluxe re-issue and a 10-page spread in Mojo. But a note of caution for younger fans eager to see them afresh: the Stone Roses’ well-known signature tune, ‘Stone Roses cancel comeback tour’, could still make a last minute re-appearance…
The obsession with pop’s recent past is the subject of Simon Reynolds’ current book, Retromania. As someone who, like me, was schooled in punk and post-punk, discussing or liking records from the past (let alone buying them) would be to commit a grave social faux pas. Incredible as it may seem now, in the 1980s The Beatles, Rolling Stones and the Beach Boys were derisorily known as ‘dad’s music’ and given instant dismissal. As Reynolds pointed out in his previous book, Rip It Up and Start Again, record companies often deleted albums as there was too much new stuff being released. And given the mind-boggling brilliance of a lot of early Eighties alt.indie and new pop, there wasn’t the time to go and find rare Big Star albums from the 1970s.
Indeed, the whole point of being an alt.music fan was discovering the next big thing, watching them take off and being indelibly linked to the period you’re living in. Even today, it is still far more thrilling to witness a band on the cusp of making it big (such as The xx a few years back) than to see a band recreating ‘your yoof’ (though one unkind soul recently suggested to me that my youth never ended). There can be no more woeful sight than Echo & The Bunnymen destroying their last ounces of credibility or seeing Peter Hook take a shovel and crowbar to Joy Division’s ‘Unknown Pleasures’ and reduce grown men to tears (though not in the way Ian Curtis originally planned).
It would be simplistic and banal to argue that the nostalgia industry is down to the lack of decent new bands today. On their own terms, there are still dozens of new albums each year worthy of attention and acclaim. It’s just that, as Reynolds points out, ‘the pop present became ever more crowded out by the past…instead of being about itself, the 2000s has been about every other previous decade happening again all at once’. Reynolds is as much schooled in leftist sociology as he is in the back pages of Melody Maker and makes a number of insightful points on the current nostalgia glut. Although digital innovations were hugely impressive in the 2000s - it was the decade where how you listened to music became more important than what you listened to - Reynolds acknowledges that ‘our belief in progress itself has been shaken badly’. The knock-on effect has been a slow-developing popular culture where the past always wins.
However, even some of this feels a little too rehearsed as an explanation for the dominance of reissues and reunions. After all, a broader script of disillusion with progress was palpable in the Nineties – the decade when techno, cuts’n’glitch electronica, drone-rock, trance and pneumatic R’n’B all triumphed. The 2000s, by contrast, have very little that can compare for era-defining styles. There is literally no difference in styles between chart records of 1999 and 2009, except that the reality-TV show spin-off plays a bigger part.
Reynolds has a superb eye for detail and charts how current pop is all-consumed by its past. He rolls out pithy put-downs on contemporary music’s anti-modernist regression and sheer laziness. Nevertheless, he doesn’t quite offer a full explanation as to why the 2000s and beyond are the ‘Re’ era (reissue, revival, repackage, reunion etc). But it becomes apparent when he fondly reels off previous pop genres - whether mod, rave, hip hop or British indie - how these styles were created through localised, organic scenes. They developed through young people attending clubs or hip watering holes, making them their own and forging ahead creatively as a result. In the recent past, innovative clusters of groups were always associated with specific regions: Bristol and trip hop; Manchester and pop reinvention; Seattle and grunge; Glasgow and indie; Chicago and house; and so on. Whatever happened to the creatively dynamic, localised scenes that suddenly went global?
In Britain in particular, the relentless war on public drinking has had the knock-on effect of stunting the development of bohemian enclaves around the country (see When indie music was truly independent, by Neil Davenport). It has also encouraged a deadening privatised world and a stay-at-home-with-mom sensibility with young people today. The idea of pubs, clubs and record shops being associated with hipster scenes is as bizarre to young people as an old clip of Ready, Steady, Go. As such, the relationship to music is entirely privatised and far less significant than it used to be. Shaking off an obsession with pop may be no bad thing (a curse perhaps for my post-punk generation), but with that has also come a decline in creative energy and in a sense of ‘anything is possible’. Fatalism and nostalgia have been the twin dead hands on creativity in this past decade.
Alongside all this, the pop anniversary has thrived only because real social history has declined. As a society, Britain has become alarmingly philistine about its own and wider European history (apart from the Second World War, and even this is a paltry, one-sided understanding). The ideological thrust of New Labour’s New Britain was to dismiss the past with the effect of closing down the future. Furthermore, Britain’s imperial past, even its achievements in the Victorian era, are seen as too tortuous, too problematic and rather disdainful to anti-modernist or multicultural sensibilities. The past is not only a ‘different country’ but one to emigrate from, never to return. Even a decade that once had a perpetual glow to it, the Sixties, has now been written off for being racist, sexist and obsessed with consumerism.
In the absence of genuine social history, as a source of narrative and debate in society, pop anniversaries step in to fill the vacuum. The ‘significance’ of commemorating 30 years since punk or 20 years since Nirvana’s Nevermind is preferable to commemorating real events in British or Western history. It is not only down to Western self-loathing, but it is presumed to be ‘arrogant’ that discussing history means discussing ‘your story’ rather than somebody else’s story. History has often been a contested battlefield, but it’s a field that is now vacated due to it being ‘dodgy’ or ‘not relevant’ to the New Britain of the present. Occasionally, there will be the odd documentary on the Tudors or the recent historical series on Jerusalem, but these are far outweighed by endless programmes on Factory Records, New York hip hop, punk, Sixties folk and even documentaries on progressive rock. No corner of recent pop ‘history’ has been left unexplored on BBC4; it’s far harder to find programmes that even scratch the surface of Britain’s tumultuous history.
Retromania is an enjoyable survey of how deeply ingrained the ‘Re’ era has become this past decade. When the past triumphs over the present so relentlessly in popular culture, it’s a worrying sign of deep cultural and creative malaise. Ironically enough, however, it’s precisely because we’re so quiet on real History that pop history has grown ever louder. Like so many box-set reissues of worn-out albums, it’s surely time we changed the record.

Big Cities as gateways of prosperity


Why Big Cities Matter More than Ever
   
By Mario Polese
The information revolution, we used to hear, would break the shackles of geography and make cities irrelevant. Thanks to e-mail, the Internet, and an ever-widening array of technological devices, you would be able to work just as effectively in South Podunk as in the Big Apple. A new, post-metropolitan era would open in which creative and flexible firms could locate their operations anywhere. The age of the big city would come to an end.
But that hasn’t happened. Big cities have continued to grow. In rich nations today, urbanization levels are on the order of 80 percent or higher. China and India are urbanizing at breakneck speed, with Shanghai and Bombay racing each other to become the world’s largest metropolitan area and eclipse Tokyo (currently 33 million strong). Why is it that cities have lost none of their powers of attraction, despite the new freedom that information technology brings individuals and firms? The economic advantages of cities—of urban “agglomeration,” in the language of the people who study these things—are difficult to measure precisely and not the same for all firms. But they are quite real, and we can capture them in what I call the Seven Pillars of Agglomeration.
Let’s start with the most basic pillar, one that has historically supported the great manufacturing economies of big cities: economies of scale in production. That is, as the scale of production increases, unit costs fall. That basic rule of economics makes it profitable for firms to manufacture goods in just a few large factories, rather than in many smaller ones. And if you’re going to have just one or two big plants, it makes sense to locate them where you can find a lot of workers: densely packed urban areas. This logic explains the growth of large manufacturing cities like Detroit in the earlier part of the twentieth century. Nowadays, though, it applies most readily to midsize cities, because real estate in larger cities often costs too much to build big factories (see the sidebar below).
Smaller Cities Matter, Too
Consider a remarkable fact: over the long run, the growth rates of American cities in various size groups tend to be about the same. That is, over the last century, the country’s distribution of small, midsize, and big cities has remained stable. This stability intrigues economic geographers. Why aren’t all cities converging toward one ideal size—whether large or small?
Part of the answer is that the attributes that make big cities attractive to some industries make them less attractive to others—and every industry gravitates to locations where its comparative costs are lowest. For example, providing environments for rapid, diverse, face-to-face contacts is a comparative advantage of big cities, while physical space is more readily available in smaller ones. If the demand for face-to-face contacts increases, real-estate and wage costs will rise in the largest cities, crowding out industries for which those costs carry—comparatively—less weight. We understand intuitively that Manhattan isn’t a good location for manufacturing airplanes or laptops. But it’s excellent for management consulting and producing operas. So urban systems have a self-regulating nature: certain industries emerge (or centralize) in the largest cities; others move to smaller ones.
So small cities, no less than large ones, fill an essential economic need. The more attractive big cities become for some industries, the more alluring small cities will be to others.
The second pillar, however, tends to push firms back to larger cities: economies of scale in trade and transportation. Just as larger factories lead to lower unit costs by making manufacturing more efficient, fully loading a truck, an airplane, or a cargo ship leads to lower unit costs by making delivery more efficient. And filling up those trucks, planes, and ships—both coming and going—is generally easier if they’re delivering to the largest ports, airports, and other distribution centers. That means the bigger urban areas.
Reinforcing this tendency is the third pillar of agglomeration: falling transportation and communications costs. Throughout history, transportation costs—not only monetary outlays but also lost time and the frustration that can come with trading with distant partners—have been a barrier to market expansion. It follows that a fall in transportation costs will stimulate trade, enabling the lowest-cost producers to improve market share. And the steeper the drop in transportation costs and the greater the weight of scale economies in production, the greater the potential for centralizing production in one or two places. Henry Ford could locate automobile production in Detroit because paved roads and railways allowed him to reach the entire American market.
Indeed, if scale economies are infinite and transportation costs are close to zero, all production will be centralized in one place, with the first (lucky) producer to have arrived on the scene. Such an extreme case probably doesn’t exist in the real world, but the film industry comes close. Scale in the industry is vitally important, with its enormous sound studios and vast budgets. It costs little to ship a film—and even less if done electronically. The centralization of the film industry in Southern California is the result. With transportation costs removed as an economic factor, competitors had no way to match the scale economy that Hollywood had established early in the twentieth century.
What about the argument that falling communications costs actually undermine urban concentration? For example, didn’t the existence of e-mail encourage Silicon Valley companies to outsource computer programming to Bangalore, India? The truth is that this shift did foster urban concentration—in Bangalore. Think of communications costs as tariffs: competition intensifies when they fall. If one city is already more efficient at producing a particular good and then the barriers are removed, that city’s market share will expand accordingly.
The centralizing influence of technology is consistent with history. The advent of the telegraph—as revolutionary in its time as the Internet is today—not only failed to slow the growth of London and New York; it enabled financial firms and corporate offices in those cities to extend their reach. The arrival of radio and television in the twentieth century replaced a lot of locally produced entertainment with programs produced in New York or Los Angeles.
Scale economies are only part of the urban-expansion story. Most city dwellers work not in massive plants but in small and midsize firms in a wide array of industries: legal services, shirt-making, financial counseling, and on and on. Why should these companies set up shop in cities? Pillar four—the need for proximity with other firms in the same industry—provides part of the answer.
Proximity brings numerous advantages. To name just one: face-to-face contacts remain essential for the most valuable and sensitive information. Finance, among the most spatially concentrated of industries, is an obvious example. Trust must be constantly renewed; millions of dollars will be committed based on a brief encounter. The greater the risks and sums involved, the greater the need for relationships built on something more than e-mail exchanges. Body language, facial expressions, and eye contact are among the signals that financial workers use to judge others.
Personal contact is also crucial in industries where creativity, inspiration, and imagination are vital inputs. For firms working in these rapidly evolving industries—high fashion, say, or computer graphics—the surest way to stay on top of the latest news is to locate near similar firms. The more that information can be transmitted electronically, it seems, the more valuable becomes information that cannot be so transmitted. Electronic and face-to-face communications tend to be complements; business travel, for example, has accelerated since the advent of the Internet. The more people communicate, the more they want to meet in the flesh.
Lower recruitment and training costs are additional advantages of proximity, particularly in highly specialized fields. A firm clearly benefits if it can hire from a pool of available workers with relevant training acquired at previous employers. The chances of finding a first-rate, experienced screenwriter will be a lot better in Los Angeles than in Baton Rouge.
Companies that require a wide array of talents, across a broad range of industries, will be drawn to big cities as well. Thus pillar five: the advantages of diversity. Consider advertising, a field whose products are constantly changing and come with no blueprint. Successful ad firms must rapidly assemble dizzying combinations of expertise and talent according to various clients’ needs. Each ad campaign, after all, is unique: one may call for animation, another for symphonic music, a third for trained chimpanzees. Where better to find the necessary components than in big cities, with their myriad industry clusters? Of the world’s top ten advertising agencies, it is no surprise that three are in New York, three in Tokyo, and two each in London and Paris. The entertainment industry, publishing, and many other fields feel the same pull.
Firms—above all, general-service businesses, for which customer access is important—naturally want to locate in the geographic center of their markets, which brings us to pillar six: the quest for the center. What economic geographers call “centrality” varies by industry, however. For companies with low-scale economies—a gas station, for instance—a central location can simply be a busy street, where the potential number of customers driving by is sufficient to ensure profitability.
But the centrality principle also holds at the national and international levels, and it makes large urban agglomerations particularly appealing. The performing arts are a good example. Broadway, the largest cluster of theaters in America, is in New York City not only because of the sizable local population but also because of all the potential theatergoers within a manageable distance of the city. Greater Philadelphia, with more than 5 million residents, is a mere 90-minute drive away; and don’t forget Gotham’s many rail, air, and bus links to other cities (including distant ones), which bring in countless more potential theatergoers. Centrality is often a legacy of history. Paris, shaped by many centuries of investment in roads, rail, and other transportation modes converging on the capital, remains the undisputed center of the French market.
Finally, there’s pillar seven: buzz and bright lights. Talented and ambitious people benefit from being in a big city, just as firms do—in part because the companies can hire talented and ambitious workers. Some people move to cities not just because they need to make a living (though being in a metropolis does offer all the advantages of a diverse labor market) but also because they want to be where the action is. Ambition, dreams, the need for recognition—all are powerful forces in human behavior. Many a young man or woman will ask: Where are my chances best of meeting the right people and doing exciting things? The answer, for good reason, will often be the big city. Why, indeed, are some people willing to spend small fortunes for apartments on Fifth Avenue or homes in Beverly Hills if not to feel that they are truly at thecenter?
Cities face many challenges in the coming years: municipal debt, onerous taxes, the cost of living, and crumbling infrastructure, among others. But whatever the genuine threats to urban prosperity, human contact is more important than ever in the age of information technology, and people will continue to seek places where they can share ideas, make transactions, and pursue their dreams. There’s nowhere better to do these things than big cities.

The End of Faith


As China's economy continues to trend downward, Beijing's elites are sparking a new, palpable frustration in the general population.
BY CHRISTINA LARSON 
BEIJING – In June, a Chinese friend of mine who grew up in the northern industrial city of Shenyang and recently graduated from university moved to Beijing to follow his dream -- working for a media company. He has a full-time job, but the entry-level pay isn't great and it's tough to make ends meet. When we had lunch recently, he brought up his housing situation, which he described as "not ideal." He was living in a three-bedroom apartment split by seven people, near the Fourth Ring Road -- the outer orbit of the city. Five of his roommates were young women who went to work each night at 11 p.m. and returned around 4 a.m. "They say they are working the overnight shift at Tesco," the British retailer, but he was dubious. One night he saw them entering a KTV Club wearing lots of makeup and "skirts much shorter than my boxers" and, tellingly, proceeding through the employee entrance. "So they are prostitutes," he concluded. "I feel a little uncomfortable."
But when he tallied his monthly expenses and considered his lack of special connections, or guanxi, in the city, either to help boost his paycheck or to find more comfortable but not more expensive housing, he figured he'd stick out the grim living situation. "I have come here to be a journalist -- it is my goal, and I do not want to go back now. But it seems like it's harder than it used to be."
When I asked how his colleagues and former classmates were getting along, he thought about it for a moment and then replied that some were basically in the same lot as him, "but many of my friends have parents in Beijing, and they can save money to live with them. If your family is already established here, it helps a lot." After a moment, he added: "And some of them have rich parents who have already bought them their own apartments -- and cars."
Despite China's astonishing economic growth, it has gotten harder for people like my friend to get by in the big city. His is not a particularly lucrative profession. Like many in Beijing, he cannot count on his annual pay to keep pace with China's official rates of inflation -- which many economists suspect are lowballed anyway. (The consumer-price-index inflation rate is considered so sensitive that the State Council approves it before it is released publicly.) Even so, every month this year consumer-price-index inflation has exceeded the official average monthly target of 4 percent. Last month state media hailed it as good news that it was, officially, just 4.2 percent.
Anyone in Beijing can point to examples of friends who see rents hiked 10 percent or more in one year. The prices at restaurants keep going up, even as portions are getting noticeably smaller. Throw in the loss of intangibles that money can't buy -- like air quality and food safety -- and you begin to understand the grumbling among some of Beijing's non-wealthy folks that their standard of living seems to be diminishing, even as the national GDP surges ahead at a heady 9 percent.
Could it possibly be true that a swath of people in China's big cities is downwardly mobile, if one compared wages with living expenses? I asked Patrick Chovanec, an associate professor at Tsinghua University's School of Economics and Management in Beijing. Alas, he told me, it's difficult to find much clarification in China's famously fudgeable official statistics. (For instance, the official unemployment rate only includes individuals with urban hukous, or permanent residency permits -- which excludes the most economically vulnerable.) Still, he noted: "If you perceive that you're losing buying power -- or have rising but unmet expectations -- that's when people get upset.… And this country, for a country growing at over 9 percent, is in a foul mood."
Indeed, there is a palpable sense of frustration in Beijing, especially compared with the last time I lived here in 2008. You can see it on the dour faces on the metro, hear it in raspy voices at dinner conversations, and especially sense it in the new gruffness of taxi drivers, who no longer think ferrying people around town for 10 yuan, about $1.60, is such a good deal for them (their base fare hasn't been raised). Still, it's hard to rage against abstractions. It's a lot easier to fume at obnoxious people.
No wonder, then, that in 2011 the Chinese media and Sina Weibo (China's version of Twitter) buzzed nearly every month with salacious reports of China's Paris Hilton-types -- the sons and daughters of the wealthy and political elite, dangling opulent accessories and impoverished judgment -- behaving badly in BMWs and Audis and typically expecting to get away with it, to boot.
The year began with the trial of Li Qiming, a university student in Hebei province who in October 2010 was drunk-driving and slammed into two other college students out skating, killing one of them. When he saw what had happened, he tried to speed away, but the campus guard stopped his vehicle. When questioned, the first thing he is widely reported to have blurted out was, "My father is Li Gang." Li Gang is the district's deputy police chief.
Then there was 15-year-old Li Tianyi, the son of a high-ranking army official, who had no license when he got behind the wheel of a BMW in September. While carousing the streets of Beijing, he grew frustrated when another car was blocking his path. He reportedly got out of the car and assaulted the other driver while either he or a friend shouted, "Who will dare call the police?" Behind his car's windshield was a temporary driving pass for the Great Hall of the People, China's parliament building.
And earlier this month, a student at Beijing Film Academy got into a fight over where he could park his Audi, the telltale car of choice of Chinese officials. After a brawl in the parking lot, a cleaner, a 43-year-old migrant worker from nearby Hebei province, was taken to a hospital, where he died.
Perhaps the closest female equivalent was the lightning-rod saga of Guo "Meimei," a petite 20-year-old with a heart-shaped face and big brown eyes who took to posting photos of herself driving her "little horse" (a white Maserati) and her "little bull" (an orange Lamborghini) on her Weibo microblog. On her account, she claimed to be a general manager at the Red Cross of China, one of the country's largest and most politically connected charities. Her luxury goods, not to mention horrible judgment, were widely taken by readers as signs of corruption at the charity. (In the months following the scandal, which reached its zenith in June, donations to the charity dropped offprecipitously). Later, it came out that she held no such position and was rumored instead to be either a mistress or relative of someone at the Red Cross.
The anger in China at such dilettantes misbehaving runs deeper than, say, America's love-hate relationship with Lindsay Lohan. As Michael Anti, a popular Chinese blogger and political commentator, told me, "The rich are becoming a dynasty." Now people in China recognize that "you get your position not by degree or hard work, but by your daddy." Anti added that though corruption and guanxi are hardly new concepts in China, there was previously a greater belief in social mobility through merit. "Before, university was a channel to help you to ruling class. Now the ruling class just promote themselves."
There is a dark sense that something has changed. "It's not simply income equality that bothers people -- that's a misconception," Chovanec told me. "When Jack Ma makes a billion dollars for starting a successful company, that's OK.… It's inequality of privilege. It's how people make their money. There's now a whole class of people getting wealthy because of who they are, not what they do -- and they follow a different set of rules."
In today's China, the abilities to buy and sell real estate and to win government contracts are among the greatest drivers of wealth, and it's those who are already wealthy and well-connected who have access to these opportunities. If their children are lazy or dull, they can use their stature to create opportunities and positions for them, cutting short the trajectories of more able aspirants. Social status is becoming further entrenched because, as Chovanec notes, "Government is so pervasive in China's economy.… Government has great power in determining winners and losers, so who you are and who you know does more than anything else to determine success." And those at the top increasingly act above the law. "Privilege begets money, and money begets privilege."
This, of course, runs counter to the optimistic, popular fairy tale of China over the past 30 years, duly promoted by the ruling Communist Party, that a rising tide and roaring economy inevitably lifts all boats; that the future will be better, materially, than the past; that hard work will get you ahead; and that education is the great leveler. Call it the Chinese dream.
"Well, that used to be true, pretty much -- but not now," reflects Qiao Mu, a professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University. "Take myself. I was born in 1970 into a poor family in west China. There wasn't yet a large class of rich people in China, so the opportunities were more open. At that time, I could depend on my hard work and study to advance. I could change my position in society." But today, he says, sighing deeply, "It's much more difficult for these young guys, my students. You have to rely on your background, and those who already have connections and wealth help themselves and their children.… The condition is getting worse, not better."
Or, as my friend, the struggling reporter, put it: "People no longer believe you can win by working hard and honestly in China."