How Brussels became a hiding place for elites sick of
dealing with the demos
By Daniel
Ben-Ami
One of the most shocking political developments of
recent years was the lack of any public outcry at the imposition of unelected
regimes in Greece and Italy. In fact, the installation of technocratic
governments in both countries in the midst of the Eurozone economic crisis in
2011 was widely welcomed. The European Union played a central role in insisting
on what could reasonably be called a ‘soft coup’.
If something similar had been attempted a generation
or two earlier, it would almost certainly have been met with widespread
protest. Europeans might have seen such a blatant attack on democracy as normal
in other parts of the world, but not at home, in the birthplace of democracy.
Such changing attitudes point to the rise of
technocratic rule. Democracy, even in the limited sense of an expression of the
popular will through parliament, has gone out of fashion. Indeed, there is no
real politics today, in the sense of popular contestation over different
visions of how society should be run. Instead, the trend is towards apolitical
administration by an elite of expert technocrats. The general public, the demos in democracy, has been sidelined.
This is the backdrop to James Heartfield’s
groundbreaking new book, The
European Union and the End of Politics. Both parts of the title are
important. Heartfield, a London-based writer and fellow contributor to spiked, explains the rise of
the EU against the backdrop of the depoliticisation of nation states. He
provides an innovative account of the rise of technocratic rule in its most
advanced and grotesque incarnation.
For Heartfield, the drive to European integration in
its current form begins in the 1980s. He avoids the common error of reading the
recent experience back into earlier pan-European entities such as the European
Coal and Steel Community or the European Economic Community. Indeed,
technically the EU itself did not even come into existence until 1993.
The EU did not come about as a result of any
democratic drive to transcend nation states and replace them with a
pan-European superstate. Popular agency did not drive the change. Instead, as
Heartfield points out, the EU emerged as a result of the decline of popular
democracy within nation states.
Old forms of politics, such as the party system and
trade unions, have lost legitimacy. The old right and the old left are both
defunct. Free-market reforms have failed to achieve their goal of rolling back
the state and national Keynesian solutions have not resolved underlying
economic problems.
In such circumstances, the drive towards EU
integration has materialised almost by default. National elites have become
more dependent on their relationships with their European counterparts as a
source of legitimacy. Domestic politics and political parties matter much less
than in the past.




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