State
of Incarceration
How can people who lack access to effective government
institutions establish property rights and facilitate exchange? The illegal
narcotics trade in Los Angeles has flourished despite its inability to rely on
state-based formal institutions of governance. An alternative system of
governance has emerged from an unexpected source — behind bars. The Mexican
Mafia prison gang can extort drug dealers on the street because they wield
substantial control over inmates in the county jail system and because drug
dealers anticipate future incarceration. The gang's ability to extract
resources creates incentives for them to provide governance institutions that
mitigate market failures among Hispanic drug-dealing street gangs, including
enforcing deals, protecting property rights, and adjudicating disputes.
The formation of "spontaneous order" often
comes as a surprise to those who see the state as the end-all to civilization.
Spontaneous order was defined by Friedrich Hayek as
A spontaneous order is a system which has developed
not through the central direction or patronage of one or a few individuals but
through the unintended consequences of the decisions of myriad individuals each
pursuing their own interests through voluntary exchange, cooperation, and trial
and error.
Through the past 50 years, the Mexican Mafia has
developed its own system of property rights, protection, and order within the
Los Angeles prison system. This phenomenon began in 1956 as incarcerated
Hispanics joined together for the sake of protection. Since the government,
which initially locked up the inmates, failed to enforce adequate property
rights, an internal system of government emerged as a response. From this
establishment of basic protections arose a governing arrangement to both
extract wealth over a given geographical area and provide law and order. The
Mexican Mafia has essentially created a state within the confines of the United
States and the state of California.
Like many states, some have risen to positions of more
influence despite the egalitarian model of members having "only one
official rank … one vote, and no one can give another member an order." No
state would be complete without taxes and the Mexican Mafia doesn't disappoint.
By utilizing a form of extortion by taxing profits from drug dealers with the
threat of violence upon incarceration, the Mexican Mafia plays the role of
enforcer even behind bars. This tax typically runs in the range of 10–30
percent of revenues. In exchange for tax revenues comes protection from fellow
inmates if one is unlucky enough to be locked up. In order for the Mexican
Mafia to maximize tax revenue from drug sales, this practice strives to
mitigate actual violence.
A system of dispute arbitration has also developed to
ensure peace. Skarbek points to an example in February of 1994 where
representatives of the Mexican Mafia and the representatives of two street
gangs known as 18th Street Gang and MS-13 met to resolve animosity stemming
from one gang member killing another. After arbitration, peace was reached and
a gang war averted for the sake of maintaining cash flow from drug dealing.
This process was repeated to settle future conflicts. Drive-by shootings are
even regulated by the Mexican Mafia as unauthorized shootings are punishable by
death on incarceration.
Though it is based on the threat of coercion, the
system of governance by which the Mexican Mafia engages in is quite
entrepreneurial. In Man, Economy, and State, Murray Rothbard describes the actions of an entrepreneur in this way:
In his quest for profits he saw that certain factors
were underpriced vis-à-vis their potential value products. By recognizing the
discrepancy and doing something about it, he shifted factors of production
(obviously nonspecific factors) from other productive processes to this one.
The Mexican Mafia engages in such a process by vetting
each target's potential for incarceration. Those who have a good chance of
being arrested and subsequently locked up are pressured into paying taxes. The
same goes to those whose friends or family have a high probability of being
jailed. Say what you will about this type of extortion, but the entrepreneurial
spirit pops up in even the most unlikely of places.
So what should Austro-libertarians, who recognize the
importance of property rights but are wary of coercion, take away from this
phenomenon of emergent order? After all, the Mexican Mafia has established a
semimonopoly of violence and coercion over a geographical area, meaning it has
become its own state even within the jurisdiction of the United States and
California government.
First, the demand for basic protection and property
rights amidst the failure of public authorities provided the incentive and
profit motive for inmates to form the Mexican Mafia and its practice of
taxation. Had adequate protection been offered, such an underground system of
law and order might not have emerged.
This takes us to the next point: the Mexican Mafia's
taxation and protective model was indeed the result of spontaneous order. As
Hayek outlined, the original members of the Mexican Mafia established this
system to better their own interests.
Where Hayek's insight doesn't apply is the use of
coercion by the Mexican Mafia. While emerging order as the result of purposeful
action is something to be celebrated when it results in peaceful, voluntary
cooperation, the violent tactics employed by the Mexican Mafia are a sight to
abhor. As the nonaggression axiom — the foundation for Austro-libertarianism —
shows, unjustified aggression toward one's property is morally reprehensible.
And this leads to the final point. The Mexican Mafia's
system of governance can be attributed to the state's prohibition of narcotics.
If the state regarded property rights as sacrosanct, there would be no laws
against drugs and therefore far fewer people in prison. Without the threat of
incarceration and subsequent assault, the Mexican Mafia would lose much of its
ability to tax.
Like the system of private law and property that developed
during the settlement of the
American West, the Mexican Mafia's creation of governance is demonstrative of
man's ability to develop protective services among the failures of existing
governments. In the case of the "not-so-wild" American West, property
protection and order were developed to ease the living conditions of settlers
in the absence of any governmental structure. In the Mexican Mafia's case,
protection and arbitration were not only responses to a lapse of government
enforcement but also mechanisms for violent exploitation. The two instances,
though similar as emerging orders, yielded two different outcomes: one that
decreased the amount of violence through volunteerism and one that utilized
state-like force to maintain control.
Though it's a shame the Mexican Mafia's system of law
and order devolved into coercion, Skarbek's case study is an important tool to
analyze an instance of spontaneous order, as mankind, possessing infinite
desire, continues to transform and adapt to changing circumstances.
Now if only our elected leaders appeared as the
tattoo-laden thugs whose behavior they inspire, perhaps the public would be
more reluctant to endorse their wielding of coercive power and authority. After
all, skin-deep appearances are the only thing separating our friend pictured
above from those who legislate in the confines of Congress, state capital
buildings, or city hall.