Saturday, November 26, 2011

The malady of self-delusion


Lessons For Obama From Silent Cal
Frugal, laconic Calvin Coolidge instinctively applied his conservative principles. The result was just what we need today: low debt and rising prosperity.
By Charles C. Johnson
When President Obama demanded in September that "millionaires and billionaires" "pay their fair share," he laid a claim to justice, albeit justice wrongly understood. America's tax code is unjust, he argued--not because everyone doesn't pay the same rate, but because the "rich" don't pay enough in federal taxes. Dropping his g's, stomping his feet, seducing crowds, he was in full campaign mode. "If you love me, then you gotta help me pass this bill," he told a swooning crowd. The campaigner-in-chief was back, still wanting to "spread the wealth around," insisting that taxes must be raised. It was all about "living within our means."

But if Obama is serious about living within our means, he would do well to study President Calvin Coolidge--the last Republican president to pay down the debt while simultaneously growing the economy. There's never been a better time than now for a return to the Coolidge perspective. Often wrongly dismissed as a "do-nothing" executive by New Deal activists, Coolidge showed what true conservatism could produce. He brought Washington's fiscal house into order. He balanced budgets, cut spending, slashed taxes, and helped expand the economy to produce prosperity. In other words, exactly what we need today.

Unfortunately, Obama's philosophy of government couldn't be further from Coolidge's. "The wisest and soundest method of solving our tax problem is through economy [spending restraints]," Coolidge said in his inaugural address in 1925. His concept of our republic differed markedly from Obama's. "The collection of any taxes which are not absolutely required," he argued, "which do not beyond reasonable doubt contribute to the public welfare, is only a species of legalized larceny. Under this Republic the rewards of industry belong to those who earn them. Americans, he reminded us, "are politically free people and must be an economically free people." But with President Obama, America has become less economically free, falling in the indexes of economic freedom.

This is chiefly because of the climate of economic uncertainty his policies create. In 2009, President Obama rightly opposed raising taxes in the jaws of a recession. Now, confusingly, he insists on raising them despite the economy's continuing contraction. Obviously he hasn't learned that taxes can't solve Washington's fiscal woes, because to tax is to destroy the dynamic sources of our prosperity.

Coolidge knew this well, counseling his fellow citizens against the class warfare underlying Obama's economic philosophy: "We cannot finance the country, we cannot improve social conditions, through any system of injustice, even if we attempt to inflict it upon the rich. Those who suffer the most harm will be the poor." And the poor have suffered dearly under President Obama: The number of Americans living in poverty increased again in 2010, rising for the fourth year in a row. Now, one in six Americans lives below the poverty line.

Americans instinctively dislike class warfare, Coolidge argued, because they "believe in prosperity. It is absurd to suppose that [Americans are] envious of those who are already prosperous." Prudence and the lessons of history, Coolidge believed, told us "the wise and correct course" was "not to destroy those who have already secured success but to create conditions under which everyone will have a better chance to be successful."

COOLIDGE'S APPROACH really was one of seeking the proper balance. Government and business each "ought to be sovereign in its own sphere," he told the Chamber of Commerce of New York State in November 1925. "When government comes unduly under the influence of business, the tendency is to develop an administration which closes the door of opportunity; becomes narrow and selfish in its outlook, and results in an oligarchy." On the other hand, "[w]hen government enters the field of business with its great resources, it has a tendency to extravagance and inefficiency, but, having the power to crush all competitors, likewise closes the door of opportunity and results in monopoly."

With his belief in big government, Obama insists that he remains focused on creating jobs. Coolidge however, knew that government could not "create jobs" directly. Job creation was the province of private enterprise. "If business can be let alone and assured of reasonable freedom from governmental interference and increased taxes," the retired Coolidge later wrote during the Depression as a columnist, "that will do more than all kinds of legislation to relieve depression.…It will be the part of wisdom to give business a free hand to supply its own remedies."

Coolidge achieved as much as he did because he believed so deeply in "economy," meaning frugality. He ranked it third, after only "order and liberty," as "one of the highest essentials of a free government." He put it simply: "I favor the policy of economy, not because I wish to save money, but because I wish to save people." A dollar saved was a dollar the people could spend themselves, on their own betterment.

Unlike other politicians who espoused a phony fiscal conservatism even then, Coolidge worked to make his principles policy. And he believed wholeheartedly in budgets, confessing a "sort of obsession" to make the numbers come out right. "I regard a good budget as among the noblest monuments of virtue," he proclaimed in 1924. Compare that with President Obama's last budget, a monument to profligacy that failed to attract a single vote in the Senate.

Obama prefers to ramp up the rhetoric, demonizing "fat cats" and "millionaires and billionaires." In one of his two books about himself, he described his time in corporate America as a period "behind enemy lines." Coolidge, by contrast, once remarked that business capital is "the chief material minister to the general character of all mankind." He famously believed that "the chief business of America is business," but business and the wealth it produced were only a means, not an end.

By leaving business alone, Coolidge oversaw one of the lowest unemployment rates in American history. By keeping businesses free from excessive taxes, he protected consumers from having to pay for them with higher prices. "High taxes mean high prices," Coolidge maintained. But he also added a moral dimension: "I am opposed to extremely high rates, because they produce little or no revenue, because they are bad for the country, and finally, because they are wrong."

"Debt reduction is tax reduction," as he often put it. The corollary was also true. Tax reduction was debt reduction. "I want taxes to be less," he said, "that the people may have more." By lowering taxes, Coolidge actually produced humanitarian results. Here, even progressives might find something to admire. Those making less than $5,000 a year paid 15.4 percent of total income taxes in 1920, but only .4 percent in 1929. Those who earned more than $100,000 paid 65.2 percent, up from 29.9 percent over that same period. Coolidge got more revenue, too. The economic expansion led to a 28 percent increase in the proportion of the budget paid by federal income taxes. By 1927, 98 percent of Americans paid no income tax at all.

THESE SUCCESSES were possible not only because of Coolidge's grounding in common-sense economics and his belief in limited government, but because he surrounded himself with men of accomplishment, not agenda. There were major businessmen and real statesmen in his cabinet. Among them was Andrew Mellon, his (and Harding's and Hoover's) Treasury Secretary. A financial wizard, Mellon had such genius and force of personality that it was said "three Presidents served under him." Another of Coolidge's outstanding appointees was Vice President Charles Dawes, who had been the nation's first director of the Bureau of the Budget in the Harding administration. Dawes, who had devised a plan to restore post-World War I Germany and stabilize its economy, would go on to win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1925.

Like many conservatives today, Coolidge was popular with the man in the street but unpopular in the Ivory Tower and in Washington. Then as now, the educated class harbored contempt for the philosophic underpinnings of our republic and for those who most seriously defended them. When attacks on Coolidge's philosophy failed, his critics simply got personal. Socialite Alice Roosevelt Longworth, the daughter of Teddy Roosevelt, scorned Coolidge as having been "weaned on a pickle." He was the butt of jokes and vicious rumors. Coolidge "slept more than any other President, whether by day or by night. Nero fiddled, but Coolidge only snored," wrote H. L. Mencken in 1933. When told of Coolidge's death, Dorothy Parker, the popular satirist, is said to have quipped, "How could they tell?"

More recently, author William L. Shirer recalled "the incredible smugness and emptiness of the Calvin Coolidge era." He was not alone in such cheap shots. Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. castigated Coolidge for being too beholden to business and pictured him as a boorish philistine.

To today's left, Coolidge was a bogeyman. The Huffington Post quoted an unnamed Washington Democrat who sought to tie the Tea Party to Coolidge. Mike Lux, a left-wing political consultant, linked him to the Paul Ryan budget: "[Republicans] want to take us back to the era of Calvin Coolidge, when the advances of the last 80 years simply didn't exist," Lux wrote on the Huffington Post.

On the other hand, many on the right long for a return to Coolidge's principles. Peggy Noonan, among others, saw Coolidge in Governor Mitch Daniels of Indiana. George Will calls him "the last president with a proper sense of his office's constitutional proportions." Richard Land of the Southern Baptist Convention, who served as the honorary co-chair of Rick Perry's recent prayer event, predicted a President Perry "would be the most conservative president since Calvin Coolidge."

Predictably, what Land hopes for, Andrew Romano of Newsweek fears. "Perry…would do more to limit the power of federal government -- or at least attempt to do more--than any president since Calvin Coolidge," Romano warned after reading an interview Perry did with his magazine last fall. But if Perry wants to claim the Coolidge mantle, he won't be alone. Sarah Palin's book America by Heart brims with favorable references to the 30th president. And Michele Bachmann extolled Coolidge's economic policies on the House floor in 2009.

Unlike George W. Bush, Coolidge believed that sometimes the government can't do much at all to mend the people's woes. In fact, the trick often is to do nothing, which is what Coolidge did by vetoing a farm subsidy bill--the McNary-Haugen bill--in 1927 and again in 1928. "Farmers have never made much money. I don't believe we can do much about it," he explained. Coolidge's was a government of limits because he recognized there are limits to what government can do. "It is much more important to kill bad bills than to pass good ones," he rightly noted.

COOLIDGE'S VIEW OF government couldn't be more different from President Obama's. He believed in the "right of the individual to possess, enjoy, and control the dollar which he earns." Liberty "would be…a mockery unless it secured to the individual the rewards of his own effort and industry." President Obama doesn't believe in such a right. "I do think at a certain point you've made enough money," he preached. "We don't want to stop [entrepreneurs] from fulfilling their responsibility to help grow our economy."

Coolidge would never have said such a thing, because he understood what Obama does not, that personality matters a lot to policy. And he was a master of what one admirer called "brilliant flashes of silence." "No man ever listened himself out of a job," Coolidge noted on one occasion. Another time he declared, "I don't recall any candidate for president that ever injured himself very much by not talking." And then there was this: "They can't hang you for what you don't say."

He was, in fact, a painfully shy man. When it came to his political thought, he was seeped in the classics--he translated Dante on his honeymoon--and the Founding Fathers. He genuinely believed in the Declaration of Independence's teaching that all men were created equal, and he fought for it not only by keeping government limited, but by working to criminalize lynching and by extending the promise of citizenship to every Native American.

The last president to write most of his own speeches, Coolidge spoke so eloquently on so many subjects that it is a shame that few people read him today. Indeed, "Silent Cal" authored three collections of speeches and an autobiography. He wrote a daily, post-presidential syndicated column that numbered more than 300 pieces. He gave well over 500 press conferences during his five and half years as president. All of these well-attended chats were on background; Coolidge would let the press quote a serious administration official, but never him directly. "The words of the President have an enormous weight and ought not to be used indiscriminately," he counseled in his Autobiography.

Obama, by comparison, uses words so indiscriminately that it seems hardly a day goes by when he doesn't deliver a major speech. These are described as major because, in Obama's view, nothing he does is minor. His favorite word is "unprecedented," which he uses most about himself. Obama has suggested in some remarks that he fancies himself a new Lincoln, a political messiah, another "tall, gangly, self-made Springfield lawyer." Invoking Lincoln when he announced for president, Obama called on his fellow Americans to "gather…to transform a nation." The question is toward what ends that transformation is intended.

For Obama, Lincoln is personal, but for Coolidge, Lincoln was political. Coolidge, too, was thought to be Lincoln's "heir," because he spoke so frequently of Lincoln's political thought, often reverently. He argued that Lincoln was a great man because he "made the same appeal to his countrymen which all great men have made…it came not from his belief in their weakness but in their strength." Lincoln's "great achievement consisted in bringing the different elements of his country into a more truly moral relationship."

But Coolidge, unlike Obama, never gave the impression he was the chosen one. He believed that it was the people who decided who was great. Obama, on the other hand, compared himself to Moses. Electing him would be the "moment when the rise of the oceans began to slow and our planet began to heal," he said during his campaign.

COOLIDGE KNEW WELL the danger of letting politics go to the head. "Nine-tenths of [the visitors to the White House] want something they ought not to have," he held. He had a simple solution for dealing with these visitors: "If you keep dead-still they will run down in three or four minutes." President Obama, who fetes Andy Stern of the SEIU and other union leaders, gives such importunate visitors everything they want.

He was also determined to avoid being taken in by flatterers. "It is difficult for men in high office to avoid the malady of self-delusion," he reflected. "They are surrounded by worshippers….They live in an artificial atmosphere of adulation and exaltation, which sooner or later impairs their judgment. They are in grave danger of becoming arrogant or careless." President Obama is rightly denounced for being both, and it has something to do with the self-delusion fostered by the adulation he has received during his presidency, his 2008 campaign, and long before.

Conservatives should work toward nothing less than what Harding and Coolidge vowed in 1920--"a return to normalcy," by which they meant a turn away from "things …go[ing] to hell in a handbasket," as they had during the Wilson years. What Harding promised, Coolidge delivered. On the eve of the 2008 election, Obama promised to "fundamentally transform" America. He delivered, too, but with "hope and change" that have left us with a changed credit rating. The task now is to return to normalcy once more, before it's too late.

It won't be easy. But as Coolidge wrote: "It is a great advantage to a President, and a major source of safety to the country, for him to know that he is not a great man. We draw our Presidents from the people. I came from them. I wish to be one of them again." In 1928 he announced "I do not choose to run," eschewed a likely election victory, and retired to Northampton, Massachusetts. Come 2012, we will have a chance to help Obama resemble Coolidge and quietly return to private life.

Oil and gas are boosting U.S. employment

The Non-Green Jobs Boom
By WSJ Editorial
Forget 'clean energy.' Oil and gas are boosting U.S. employment.
So President Obama was right all along. Domestic energy production really is a path to prosperity and new job creation. His mistake was predicting that those new jobs would be "green," when the real employment boom is taking place in oil and gas.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported recently that the U.S. jobless rate remains a dreadful 9%. But look more closely at the data and you can see which industries are bucking the jobless trend. One is oil and gas production, which now employs some 440,000 workers, an 80% increase, or 200,000 more jobs, since 2003. Oil and gas jobs account for more than one in five of all net new private jobs in that period.

The ironies here are richer than the shale deposits in North Dakota's Bakken formation. While Washington has tried to force-feed renewable energy with tens of billions in special subsidies, oil and gas production has boomed thanks to private investment. And while renewable technology breakthroughs never seem to arrive, horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing have revolutionized oil and gas extraction—with no Energy Department loan guarantees needed.

The oil and gas rush has led to a jobs boom. North Dakota has the nation's lowest jobless rate, at 3.5%, and the state now has some 200 rigs pumping 440,000 barrels of oil a day, four times the amount in 2006. The state reports more than 16,000 current job openings, and places like Williston have become meccas for workers seeking jobs that often pay more than $100,000 a year.

Or take production in Pennsylvania's Marcellus shale formation, which the state Department of Labor and Industry says created 18,000 new jobs in the first half of 2011. Some 214,000 jobs are now tied to a natural gas industry that barely existed in the Keystone State a decade ago. Energy firms are also rushing to develop the Utica shale in eastern Ohio, and they are expanding operations in Texas, Louisiana and Oklahoma, among other places.

Good news? You'd think so, but liberals can't seem to handle this truth so they are now trying to discredit the jobs that accompany it. The American Petroleum Institute recently commissioned a study by the Wood Mackenzie consulting firm, which estimated that better federal energy policy would create an additional 1.4 million jobs by 2030.

This has caused a fury on the political left, which complains that the study included estimates of direct and indirect jobs (such as equipment suppliers) but also "induced" jobs, or jobs created when oil workers spend their salaries at, say, hotels, restaurants or bowling alleys. It seems these claims rely on—drum roll, please—"multipliers" to produce estimates of knock-on jobs.

Liberals know all about multipliers, which are the central operating conceit of modern Keynesian economics. The entire public justification for the $820 billion Obama stimulus was the claim that every $1 of spending would have a multiplier effect of 1.5 or more and thus create millions of new jobs.

That looks like a joke now. But Democrats and liberals continue to cite the black-box multiplier claims of Moody's Mark Zandi, who says the latest Obama jobs bill will create 1.9 million jobs. Some 750,000 of those jobs are supposed to appear merely from extending the payroll tax holiday for workers, giving them more money to spend on, say, hotels or restaurants or bowling alleys. All such multipliers are suspect, but the liberals can't have it both ways and invoke them to justify government spending but then repudiate them for private business.

In any case the beauty of the oil and gas boom is that multipliers aren't needed to predict job growth. It's happening right before our eyes. And it stands to reason that if the Obama Administration dropped its hostility to oil and gas energy, even more jobs would be created as the industry invested to exploit other areas with new technology and production methods.

Yet earlier this month the Interior Department released a new five-year plan that puts most of the Outer Continental Shelf off-limits for oil drilling. And the Administration has delayed for at least another year the Keystone XL pipeline that is shovel-ready to create 20,000 new direct, pipeline-related jobs.

The Office of Natural Resources Revenue recently noted that federal revenue from offshore bonus bids (from lease sales) in fiscal 2011 was merely $36 million—down from $9.5 billion in fiscal 2008. The Obama Administration has managed the nearly impossible feat of turning energy policy into a money loser, pouring taxpayer dollars into green-energy busts like Solyndra. The Washington Post reported in September that Mr. Obama's $38.6 billion green loan program had created a mere 3,500 jobs over two years. He had predicted it would "save or create" 65,000.

Mr. Obama nonetheless keeps talking about "green jobs" as if repetition will conjure them. He'd do more for the economy if he dropped the ideological illusions and embraced the job-creating, wealth-producing reality of domestic fossil fuels.

The Wholly German Empire

2021: The New Europe
 Niall Ferguson peers into Europe's future and sees Greek gardeners, German sunbathers—and a new fiscal union. Welcome to the other United States.
Welcome to Europe, 2021. Ten years have elapsed since the great crisis of 2010-11, which claimed the scalps of no fewer than 10 governments, including Spain and France. Some things have stayed the same, but a lot has changed.

The euro is still circulating, though banknotes are now seldom seen. (Indeed, the ease of electronic payments now makes some people wonder why creating a single European currency ever seemed worth the effort.) But Brussels has been abandoned as Europe's political headquarters. Vienna has been a great success.

"There is something about the Habsburg legacy," explains the dynamic new Austrian Chancellor Marsha Radetzky. "It just seems to make multinational politics so much more fun."

The Germans also like the new arrangements. "For some reason, we never felt very welcome in Belgium," recalls German Chancellor Reinhold Siegfried von Gotha-Dämmerung.

Life is still far from easy in the peripheral states of the United States of Europe (as the euro zone is now known). Unemployment in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain has soared to 20%. But the creation of a new system of fiscal federalism in 2012 has ensured a steady stream of funds from the north European core.

Like East Germans before them, South Europeans have grown accustomed to this trade-off. With a fifth of their region's population over 65 and a fifth unemployed, people have time to enjoy the good things in life. And there are plenty of euros to be made in this gray economy, working as maids or gardeners for the Germans, all of whom now have their second homes in the sunny south.

The U.S.E. has actually gained some members. Lithuania and Latvia stuck to their plan of joining the euro, following the example of their neighbor Estonia. Poland, under the dynamic leadership of former Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, did the same. These new countries are the poster children of the new Europe, attracting German investment with their flat taxes and relatively low wages.

But other countries have left.

David Cameron—now beginning his fourth term as British prime minister—thanks his lucky stars that, reluctantly yielding to pressure from the Euroskeptics in his own party, he decided to risk a referendum on EU membership. His Liberal Democrat coalition partners committed political suicide by joining Labour's disastrous "Yeah to Europe" campaign.

Egged on by the pugnacious London tabloids, the public voted to leave by a margin of 59% to 41%, and then handed the Tories an absolute majority in the House of Commons. Freed from the red tape of Brussels, England is now the favored destination of Chinese foreign direct investment in Europe. And rich Chinese love their Chelsea apartments, not to mention their splendid Scottish shooting estates.

In some ways this federal Europe would gladden the hearts of the founding fathers of European integration. At its heart is the Franco-German partnership launched by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman in the 1950s. But the U.S.E. of 2021 is a very different thing from the European Union that fell apart in 2011.

* * *
It was fitting that the disintegration of the EU should be centered on the two great cradles of Western civilization, Athens and Rome. But George Papandreou and Silvio Berlusconi were by no means the first European leaders to fall victim to what might be called the curse of the euro.

Since financial fear had started to spread through the euro zone in June 2010, no fewer than seven other governments had fallen: in the Netherlands, Slovakia, Belgium, Ireland, Finland, Portugal and Slovenia. The fact that nine governments fell in less than 18 months—with another soon to follow—was in itself remarkable.

But not only had the euro become a government-killing machine. It was also fostering a new generation of populist movements, like the Dutch Party for Freedom and the True Finns. Belgium was on the verge of splitting in two. The very structures of European politics were breaking down.

Who would be next? The answer was obvious. After the election of Nov. 20, 2011, the Spanish prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, stepped down. His defeat was such a foregone conclusion that he had decided the previous April not to bother seeking re-election.

And after him? The next leader in the crosshairs was the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, who was up for re-election the following April.

The question on everyone's minds back in November 2011 was whether Europe's monetary union—so painstakingly created in the 1990s—was about to collapse. Many pundits thought so. Indeed, New York University's influential Nouriel Roubini argued that not only Greece but also Italy would have to leave—or be kicked out of—the euro zone.

But if that had happened, it is hard to see how the single currency could have survived. The speculators would immediately have turned their attention to the banks in the next weakest link (probably Spain). Meanwhile, the departing countries would have found themselves even worse off than before. Overnight all of their banks and half of their nonfinancial corporations would have been rendered insolvent, with euro-denominated liabilities but drachma or lira assets.

Restoring the old currencies also would have been ruinously expensive at a time of already chronic deficits. New borrowing would have been impossible to finance other than by printing money. These countries would quickly have found themselves in an inflationary tailspin that would have negated any benefits of devaluation.

For all these reasons, I never seriously expected the euro zone to break up. To my mind, it seemed much more likely that the currency would survive—but that the European Union would disintegrate. After all, there was no legal mechanism for a country like Greece to leave the monetary union. But under the Lisbon Treaty's special article 50, a member state could leave the EU. And that is precisely what the British did.

* * *
Britain got lucky. Accidentally, because of a personal feud between Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, the United Kingdom didn't join the euro zone after Labour came to power in 1997. As a result, the U.K. was spared what would have been an economic calamity when the financial crisis struck.

With a fiscal position little better than most of the Mediterranean countries' and a far larger banking system than in any other European economy, Britain with the euro would have been Ireland to the power of eight. Instead, the Bank of England was able to pursue an aggressively expansionary policy. Zero rates, quantitative easing and devaluation greatly mitigated the pain and allowed the "Iron Chancellor" George Osborne to get ahead of the bond markets with pre-emptive austerity. A better advertisement for the benefits of national autonomy would have been hard to devise.

At the beginning of David Cameron's premiership in 2010, there had been fears that the United Kingdom might break up. But the financial crisis put the Scots off independence; small countries had fared abysmally. And in 2013, in a historical twist only a few die-hard Ulster Unionists had dreamt possible, the Republic of Ireland's voters opted to exchange the austerity of the U.S.E. for the prosperity of the U.K. Postsectarian Irishmen celebrated their citizenship in a Reunited Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland with the slogan: "Better Brits Than Brussels."

Another thing no one had anticipated in 2011 was developments in Scandinavia. Inspired by the True Finns in Helsinki, the Swedes and Danes—who had never joined the euro—refused to accept the German proposal for a "transfer union" to bail out Southern Europe. When the energy-rich Norwegians suggested a five-country Norse League, bringing in Iceland, too, the proposal struck a chord.

The new arrangements are not especially popular in Germany, admittedly. But unlike in other countries, from the Netherlands to Hungary, any kind of populist politics continues to be verboten in Germany. The attempt to launch a "True Germans" party (Die wahren Deutschen) fizzled out amid the usual charges of neo-Nazism.

The defeat of Angela Merkel's coalition in 2013 came as no surprise following the German banking crisis of the previous year. Taxpayers were up in arms about Ms. Merkel's decision to bail out Deutsche Bank, despite the fact that Deutsche's loans to the ill-fated European Financial Stability Fund had been made at her government's behest. The German public was simply fed up with bailing out bankers. "Occupy Frankfurt" won.

Yet the opposition Social Democrats essentially pursued the same policies as before, only with more pro-European conviction. It was the SPD that pushed through the treaty revision that created the European Finance Funding Office (fondly referred to in the British press as "EffOff"), effectively a European Treasury Department to be based in Vienna.

It was the SPD that positively welcomed the departure of the awkward Brits and Scandinavians, persuading the remaining 21 countries to join Germany in a new federal United States of Europe under the Treaty of Potsdam in 2014. With the accession of the six remaining former Yugoslav states—Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia—total membership in the U.S.E. rose to 28, one more than in the precrisis EU. With the separation of Flanders and Wallonia, the total rose to 29.

Crucially, too, it was the SPD that whitewashed the actions of Mario Draghi, the Italian banker who had become president of the European Central Bank in early November 2011. Mr. Draghi went far beyond his mandate in the massive indirect buying of Italian and Spanish bonds that so dramatically ended the bond-market crisis just weeks after he took office. In effect, he turned the ECB into a lender of last resort for governments.

But Mr. Draghi's brand of quantitative easing had the great merit of working. Expanding the ECB balance sheet put a floor under asset prices and restored confidence in the entire European financial system, much as had happened in the U.S. in 2009. As Mr. Draghi said in an interview in December 2011, "The euro could only be saved by printing it."

So the European monetary union did not fall apart, despite the dire predictions of the pundits in late 2011. On the contrary, in 2021 the euro is being used by more countries than before the crisis.

As accession talks begin with Ukraine, German officials talk excitedly about a future Treaty of Yalta, dividing Eastern Europe anew into Russian and European spheres of influence. One source close to Chancellor Gotha-Dämmerung joked last week: "We don't mind the Russians having the pipelines, so long as we get to keep the Black Sea beaches."

***
On reflection, it was perhaps just as well that the euro was saved. A complete disintegration of the euro zone, with all the monetary chaos that it would have entailed, might have had some nasty unintended consequences. It was easy to forget, amid the febrile machinations that ousted Messrs. Papandreou and Berlusconi, that even more dramatic events were unfolding on the other side of the Mediterranean.

Back then, in 2011, there were still those who believed that North Africa and the Middle East were entering a bright new era of democracy. But from the vantage point of 2021, such optimism seems almost incomprehensible.

The events of 2012 shook not just Europe but the whole world. The Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities threw a lit match into the powder keg of the "Arab Spring." Iran counterattacked through its allies in Gaza and Lebanon.

Having failed to veto the Israeli action, the U.S. once again sat in the back seat, offering minimal assistance and trying vainly to keep the Straits of Hormuz open without firing a shot in anger. (When the entire crew of an American battleship was captured and held hostage by Iran's Revolutionary Guards, President Obama's slim chance of re-election evaporated.)

Turkey seized the moment to take the Iranian side, while at the same time repudiating Atatürk's separation of the Turkish state from Islam. Emboldened by election victory, the Muslim Brotherhood seized the reins of power in Egypt, repudiating its country's peace treaty with Israel. The king of Jordan had little option but to follow suit. The Saudis seethed but could hardly be seen to back Israel, devoutly though they wished to avoid a nuclear Iran.

Israel was entirely isolated. The U.S. was otherwise engaged as President Mitt Romney focused on his Bain Capital-style "restructuring" of the federal government's balance sheet.

It was in the nick of time that the United States of Europe intervened to prevent the scenario that Germans in particular dreaded: a desperate Israeli resort to nuclear arms. Speaking from the U.S.E. Foreign Ministry's handsome new headquarters in the Ringstrasse, the European President Karl von Habsburg explained on Al Jazeera: "First, we were worried about the effect of another oil price hike on our beloved euro. But above all we were afraid of having radioactive fallout on our favorite resorts."

Looking back on the previous 10 years, Mr. von Habsburg—still known to close associates by his royal title of Archduke Karl of Austria—could justly feel proud. Not only had the euro survived. Somehow, just a century after his grandfather's deposition, the Habsburg Empire had reconstituted itself as the United States of Europe.

Small wonder the British and the Scandinavians preferred to call it the Wholly German Empire.

Not any more


More More More
How do you like Andrea True’s federal government?
By Mark Steyn
I see Andrea True died earlier this month. The late disco diva enjoyed a brief moment of global celebrity in 1976 with her ubiquitous glitterball favorite:
More More More
How do you like it?How do you like it?More More MoreHow do you like it?How do you like it?
In honor of Andrea’s passing, I have asked my congressman to propose the adoption of this song as the U.S. national anthem. True, Miss True wrote the number as an autobiographical reflection on her days as a porn-movie actress but, consciously or not, it accurately distills the essence of American governmental philosophy in the early 21st century: excess even unto oblivion.

When it comes to spending and the size of government, only the Democrats are officially panting orgasmically, “More More More, How do you like it?” while the Republicans are formally committed to “Less less less.” This makes for many dramatic showdowns on the evening news. In the summer, it was the “looming” “deadline” to raise the debt ceiling. In the fall, it was the “looming” “deadline” for the alleged supercommittee to agree $1.2 trillion of cuts. The supercommittee was set up as a last-minute deal for raising the debt ceiling. Now that the supercommittee’s flopped out, “automatic” mandatory cuts to defense and discretionary spending are supposed to kick in — by 2013. But no doubt, as that looming deadline looms, the can of worms will be effortlessly kicked down the room another looming deadline or two.

In return for agreeing to raise the debt ceiling (and, by the way, that’s the wrong way of looking at it: more accurately, we’re lowering the debt abyss), John Boehner bragged that he’d got a deal for “a real, enforceable cut” of supposedly $7 billion from fiscal year 2012. After running the numbers themselves, the Congressional Budget Office said it only cut $1 billion from FY 2012.

Which of these numbers is accurate?

The correct answer is: Who cares? The government of the United States currently spends $188 million it doesn’t have every hour of every day. So, if it’s $1 billion in “real, enforceable cuts,” in the time it takes to roast a 20 lb. stuffed turkey for your Thanksgiving dinner, the government’s already borrowed back all those painstakingly negotiated savings. If it’s $7 billion in “real, enforceable cuts,” in the time it takes you to defrost the bird, the cuts have all been borrowed back.

Bonus question: How “real” and “enforceable” are all those real, enforceable cuts? By the time the relevant bill passed the Senate earlier this month, the 2012 austerity budget with its brutal, savage cuts to government services actually increased spending by $10 billion. More more more, how do you like it?

But don’t worry. Aside from spending the summer negotiating a deal that increases runaway federal spending, those stingy, cheeseparing Republicans also forced the Democrats to agree to create that big ol’ supercommittee that would save $1.2 trillion. Over the course of ten years.

Anywhere else on the planet that would be a significant chunk of change. But the government of the United States is planning to spend $44 trillion in the next decade. So $1.2 trillion is about 2.7 percent. Any businessman could cut 2.7 percent from his budget in his sleep. But not congressional supercommittees of supermen with superpowers thrashing it out across the table for three months. So there will be no 2.7 percent cut.

That means the “sequestration” from defense and discretionary spending will now be enforced, starting in 2013. That would be so brutal and slashing that by 2021 it would reduce U.S. public debt by $153 billion! Which sounds kinda big if you say it in a Dr. Evil voice and give a menacing mwa-ha-ha laugh, but in fact boils down to about what we borrow currently every month.

But don’t worry. Slashing a month’s worth of spending over a decade is way too extreme. So that’s not going to happen, either. Instead, CNN and Meet The Press will just interview bigshot senators and congressmen about it day in, day out, and then normal service will resume: More more more, how do you like it?

In the course of a typical day I usually receive at least a couple of e-mails from readers lamenting that America is now the Titanic. This is grossly unfair to the Titanic, a state-of-the-art ship whose problem was that it only had lifeboat space for about half its passengers. By contrast, the USS Spendaholic is a rusting hulk encrusted with barnacles, there are no lifeboats, and the ship’s officers are locked in a debate about whether to use a thimble or an eggcup.

A second downgrade is now inevitable. Aw, so what? We had the first back in the summer, and the ceiling didn’t fall in, did it? And everyone knows those ratings agencies are a racket, right? And say what you like about our rotten finances, but Greece’s are worse. And Italy’s. And, er, Zimbabwe’s. Probably.

The advantage the United States enjoys is that, unlike Greece, it can print the currency in which its debt is denominated. But, even so, it still needs someone to buy it. The failure of Germany’s bond auction on Wednesday suggests that the world is running out of buyers for Western sovereign debt at historically low interest rates. And, were interest rates to return to their 1990–2010 average (5.7 percent), debt service alone would consume about 40 percent of federal revenues by mid-decade. That’s not paying down the debt, but just staying current on the interest payments.

And yet, when it comes to spending and stimulus and entitlements and agencies and regulations and bureaucrats, “More more more / How do you like it?” remains the way to bet. Will a Republican president make a difference to this grim trajectory? I would doubt it. Unless the public conversation shifts significantly, neither President Romney nor President Insert-Name-of-This-Week’s-UnRomney-Here will have a mandate for the measures necessary to save the republic.

As for Andrea True, back in 1976 she made a commercial in Jamaica. To protest the then–prime minister’s flirtation with Castro, Uncle Sam had imposed economic sanctions against Her Majesty’s government in Kingston. Miss True was unable to bring her earnings home. So, for want of anything better to do with them, she went into a Jamaican recording studio and made a demo of a song: “More More More.” Sure, 35 years later Fidel’s still around, but at least the world got a disco hit out of it, which is more than you can say for the Iranian sanctions.

We’re approaching a state in which the government spends $4 trillion but only raises $2 trillion. Which is an existential threat to the nation, but at least has the advantage of being one whose arithmetic is simple enough even for politicians: Try to imagine every aspect of government having to make do with half of what it currently has.

That’s the scale of reform necessary to save America from a future as a bankrupt, violent, Third World ruin. More more more, how do you like it? More poverty, more crime, more corruption, more decay: How do you like that?

Flirting with Castroite policies? Maybe Washington could impose economic sanctions against itself.

Liberals deny the freedom to others which they arrogate to themselves


The liberal betrayal of freedom

Domenico Losurdo, the author of Liberalism: A Counter-History, tells spiked that the principle of liberty continues to be too important to be left in the hands of liberals.
By Tim Black
‘The deep inspiration of this book is the desire to expose the hypocrisy of the liberal West today. But it is not a polemic.’ Domenico Losurdo, a professor at the University of Urbino, is telling me about Liberalism: A Counter-History, an impressively erudite work published in his native Italian in 2005, but only emerging in English earlier this year. ‘In order to understand the hypocrisy of the modern West today’, he continues, ‘it was necessary to study the liberal tradition from the beginning. So I began not with Tony Blair or George Bush but with Grotius in Holland and John Locke in Britain.’

As summaries go, Losurdo’s is accurate. His book is a thorough, reflective, but critical history of a particular intellectual tradition, and it does have a grand historical canvas, zipping back and forth over the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, before ending with the outbreak of the First World War. And by its conclusion, Losurdo’s ‘deep inspiration’ is well and truly manifest: the contradictions of liberalism, from the fundamentally illiberal realities of a self-conceived liberal society, to the wilful inconsistencies of liberty’s greatest classical proponents, lie exposed on the equivalent of the historian’s dissecting table.

For those who think of themselves as liberal today, it ought to make for a discomfiting sight. If conventional histories of liberalism that tend to chart its inexorable triumph are, to use Losurdo’s choice of word, ‘hagiography’, then Liberalism is a warts-and-all biography. He takes the familiar ‘surface glitter’ of the tradition of Locke and Mill, of Jefferson and Lincoln, and peers beneath to look at its less than star-spangled underside.

His treatment of Locke is a good example. After all, here we have the thinker widely referred to as the ‘father of liberalism’, and for good reason. In ‘Book Two’ of his Two Treatises of Government, Locke provided a characteristically powerful argument in favour of the liberty of the individual. So, having distinguished the freedom of the individual in nature from that of his freedom in society, he writes: ‘The Liberty of Man in Society, is to be under no legislative Power, but that established by consent, in the Common-wealth, nor under the Dominion of any Will, or Restraint of any Law, but that which the Legislative shall enact, according to the Trust put in it’. For the individual, this entails ‘A Liberty to follow my own Will in all things, where the rule prescribes it; and not be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man.’ (1)

And yet Locke was also prepared to argue for what, properly speaking, is the antithesis of liberty – namely slavery. That is, he was prepared to justify an institution that, in essence, entails an individual’s subjection to ‘the Arbitrary Will of another Man’. Locke did so on the basis that if someone has taken another person captive in a ‘state of war’, the conqueror can then choose to do with the captive as he wishes. If this argument possesses a slightly abstract quality in the context of the Two Treatises of Government, it acquires, as Losurdo reveals, a decidedly more concrete flavour in the 1669, Locke-penned Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina. ‘Every freeman of Carolina’, Locke wrote, ‘shall have absolute power and authority over his negro slaves, of what opinion or religion so ever’. The inconsistency is flagrant: Locke argues against the despotism of absolute monarchy in one breath, while defending the despotism of slave holding in the other.

As far as Losurdo is concerned, this seemingly contradictory conception of liberty was no mere mistake. In fact, he tells me, it would not even have been perceived as a contradiction by supporters of the ‘parliamentary coup d’état’, as Marx called the English revolution of the 1640s. Rather, the liberty to dispose of one’s property as one sees fit, free of the arbitrary inference of a political power – in this case the English monarch and to a lesser extent the church – also entailed the liberty to dispose of one’s human property, be it slaves or servants, as one sees fit. The emancipation of civil society from its political thraldom was no less than the emancipation of increasingly self-conscious property owners, or ‘freemen’ to use that seventeenth-century term, from the ‘Arbitrary Will’ of the monarch. Theirs was a form of freedom all right, but it was limited to people like them – it was exclusive. Little wonder that to oppose the burgeoning institution of slavery, to oppose the Carolina freeman’s ‘absolute power and authority over his negro slaves’, was seen to violate the principle of liberty itself – a principle, that is, restricted to what felt like a naturally demarcated community of freemen.

This tangle of emancipation and disemancipation, of progress and regress, reappears in the American revolution of the 1770s and early 1780s. On the one hand, the rebel colonists were certainly fighting the good fight, the fight to be recognised as the political equals of their emancipated masters over in Britain; ‘No taxation without representation’, went the popular cry. And in the famous lines of the Declaration of Independence in 1775, the cause of liberty certainly seemed to have been enshrined: ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.’

But once more, while championing their own incipient liberty, while conscious of themselves as aspirant freemen, entitled to self-government, the American revolutionaries were simultaneously more than content to render the liberty of black labourers all too alienable, with 12 of the first 16 US presidents all slave holders.

In fact, slavery – and the slave trade – was not a hangover from less enlightened times; it actually underwent a massive expansion against the background of the English and American revolutions – revolutions considered, in the main, as liberal. So, in 1700, America’s slave population numbered 330,000, by 1800 it was three million and by 1850, six million. ‘We cannot say that slavery persisted despite this axis of liberalism’, Losurdo tells me. ‘On the contrary, slavery reached its highest development in the wake of the triumph of liberalism. That is the greatest paradox in my book.’ Or, as Samuel Johnson said in 1775 of the American revolutionaries, ‘How come we hear the loudest yelps for liberty from the drivers of negroes?’.

If slave-holding jibes such as Johnson’s were common anti-American currency at the time, the hypocrisy of English liberalism was also being increasingly highlighted – and not just in relation to the treatment of the American colonists or its economic foundations in the slave trade. The harsh, largely economically free but politically unemancipated life of the labouring classes in England had also come to contemporaries’ attention. In some cases, a waged existence was little better than explicit slavery. In the salt mines and coal works of Scotland, observed the classical economist Adam Smith, workers wore collars with the name of their master inscribed; elsewhere, the jurist William Blackstone noted that servants could be physically punished by their master and prevented from marrying.

Not that the conditions of the decidedly unemancipated classes were being criticised as unfree. Quite the contrary: they were being naturalised as the conditions befitting the emergent day labourer, a type of person ‘no more capable of reasoning’, to quote Locke once more, ‘than almost a perfect natural [ie, an aborigine]’. So in the 1770s, Smith could talk of ‘the race of journeymen and servants’, at the beginning of the nineteenth century the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham could speak of ‘an indigenous class’ of disciplined industrial labourers, and, of course, writing at the same time as Bentham, Thomas Malthus - the hero of today’s green-hued liberal and a progenitor of yesterday’s workhouses - could write of ‘the race of labourers’. The transformation of a social relation into a natural one, indeed, into a nascent racial one, is apparent from the terms used in an issue of the Saturday Review in 1864: ‘The English poor man or child is expected always to remember the condition in which God has placed him, exactly as the negro is expected to remember the skin which God has given him.’

Yet to the guts of those who believe that it was the liberal conscience of the time, in the shape of the abolitionist William Wilberforce for instance, which corrected matters, Losurdo delivers a well-timed kick – not to mention a timely reminder that freedom is not something that Good Liberals grant to people, but something people fight for. ‘Of course we have seen the emancipation of the former slaves’, he told me, ‘of course we have seen that working men in the metropolis are no longer an inferior race or caste; of course we have seen great steps on the road towards emancipation. The question is, are these steps towards emancipation the result of an internal, spontaneous tendency of liberalism or not? My answer is no, they are not.’

Rather, Losurdo argues, the impulse and aspiration towards emancipation came from those excluded from the liberal tradition, from those who stood outside the community of the free, as its ‘bipedal machines’, its ‘race of labourers’. Aided and abetted by an assortment of liberal intellectuals from Tom Paine to Nicolas de Condorcet, those without liberty radicalised the liberal tradition; they aspired to universalise its promise. Not just the promise of economic liberty – of being able voluntarily to enter into a private contract – but the promise of political and moral freedom, too. The promise, that is, of being able to decide how best to live one’s life. In fact, it was at this stage – the beginning of the nineteenth century – that economic liberty and political liberty started to separate. The reasons are obvious: the attempt to acquire political liberty on the part of the ‘race of labourers’ posed a threat to the economic liberty of the ‘community of the free’. As Benjamin Constant warned French liberals in 1815: ‘the necessary aim of those without property is to obtain some: all the means which you grant them will be used for this purpose… [political rights] will inevitably encroach upon property’.

The threat to traditional liberals from the increasingly freedom-conscious masses was most definitely abroad. One thinks in England of the Chartists, but Losurdo’s main point of reference, in the first instance, is to the Jacobin revolution in France in 1789 and to the 1791 Black Jacobin revolution in the then French colony of San Domingo, known today as Haiti. Take the leader of the latter slaves’ revolt, Toussaint L’Ouverture. ‘Natural liberty is the right which nature has given to every one to dispose of himself according to his will.’ (2) In L’Ouverture’s hands, these words, taken from the French philosopher Abbé Raynal’s Philosophical and Political History of the Establishment and Commerce of the Europeans in the Two Indies (1770), were read and interpreted, according to CLR James, as the liberty to which L’Ouverture and his fellow enslaved were also entitled. Self-governance – political and moral autonomy – was no longer conceived as the provenance of the propertied alone; it ought to be the provenance of every man.

That this radicalisation, indeed this actualisation of the principle of liberty, of which Losurdo cites Marx and Engels as heirs, emerged from without the liberal mainstream should be apparent from the response in the West at the turn of the nineteenth century. In Britain, habeas corpus was suspended and between 1800 and 1850, 1,800 people were deported for political crimes alone, while in the US, Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts (1798), a direct response to the perceived threat of the French revolution. In 1812, US politician John Calhoun even wrote to one anxious slaveholder, reassuring him that ‘more than half [of the slaves] have never heard of the French revolution’.

Admittedly, Losurdo barely touches on the twentieth century, let alone our current era. But throughout Liberalism, the message is clear. Too often, and too frequently, self-conceived liberals deny the freedom to others which they arrogate to themselves. Today, whether it is the contradictory creed of liberal interventionism in which usually dark-skinned people are deemed incapable of determining the future of their own societies, or the nudging and nagging ‘libertarian paternalism’ of Western political elites, who feel that the majority of us are just not to be trusted with our own lives, liberty remains a far from universal principle. Yet this only makes the principle all the more important to defend. The promise of being able to exercise one’s autonomy, writ so large and powerfully in the self-consciousness of liberalism’s greatest proponents, from Locke to Mill, may have been developed on the material basis of a property-owning few, but its political and moral importance transcends its economic origins. Losurdo, you see, comes not to bury liberalism, but to unearth its emancipatory promise - a promise that today’s bomb-happy interventionists and behaviour-obsessed politicians continue to inhibit.

A self-perpetuating political class


The “Disgrace” of the Majority
To the disbelief of left-wing media, most Britons want a referendum on EU membership.
By THEODORE DALRYMPLE
An editorial in the Guardian on October 25 exposed the nature of what often is called “the European project”: a goal that those pursuing it never state out loud. In brief, it is the construction of a huge power bloc under the domination of a self-perpetuating political class and its auxiliary nomenklatura, free of the most minimal democratic oversight or constitutional restraint.

The editorial was titled “Conservatives and Europe: learned nothing, forgotten nothing,” a reference to Talleyrand’s famous dictum about the Bourbons. Britain’s Conservative Party, the editorial argued, was unfit to govern because of its continued internal division on the issue of the U.K.’s membership in the European Union, the latest manifestation of which was a vote by 80 Conservative members of Parliament in favor of holding a referendum on the issue. A Guardian poll, published in the paper on the same day as the editorial, established that 70 percent of the population believed that such a referendum should be held; 49 percent wanted to leave the union and 40 percent wanted to remain in it (11 percent were undecided).

One can make many criticisms of the Conservative Party, but surely one such criticism is not that 80 of its members of parliament have voiced the disquiet of at least half the nation’s population about the most important question that it faces. The Guardian called the 80 members of parliament “a disgrace,” by which it meant that the opinion of fully half of the population, and possibly more, should not even be heard in the Mother of Parliaments. In other words, the philosopher-kings of the European nomenklatura should be allowed to get on with their work free of interference—because, after all (and as new evidence further proves every day), they are doing such a fantastic job.

Houston, we have a problem!


Stealing as Policy, from the Iron Curtain to Robert Byrd
At least my former boss Ceaucescu was honest about it.
By ION MIHAI PACEPA
History often repeats itself, and if you have lived two lives, as I have done, you may have a chance of seeing that reenactment with your own eyes. “Stealing from capitalists is our duty,” I repeatedly heard Nikita Khrushchev shout. “Don’t raise your eyebrows, Comrades. I intentionally used the word steal. We have a historical duty to steal from capitalists.”
“Stealing from capitalists is our historical duty,” I also often heard my former boss, Nicolae Ceausescu, shout as he banged the table with true Khrushchev-like fervor.
Both leaders rose to lead their countries without ever having earned a single penny in any productive job. Neither man had the slightest idea about what makes an economy work. And each sincerely believed that stealing from the rich was the magic wand that would cure all his country’s economic ills. Their vaunted “historical duty” was rooted in Marx’s Manifesto of the Communist Party, which urged its followers to “eradicate capitalism” by progressive income taxes and abolition of all rights of inheritance.
Last September, I could hardly believe my eyes. The president of the United States asked the extraordinary joint session of the U.S. Congress to impose an additional super-tax on “rich people.” In other words, to make “stealing from capitalists” an official policy of the United States, whose Declaration of Independence emphatically states that “all men are created equal.”
James Madison, author of the U.S. Constitution, must have turned over in his grave. He once wrote:
I cannot undertake to lay my finger on that article of the Constitution which granted a right to Congress of expending, on objects of benevolence, the money of their constituents.
Samuel Adams, one of the founding fathers of the United States, also clearly stated:
The utopian schemes of leveling [i.e., redistribution of wealth] … are arbitrary, despotic, and, in our government, unconstitutional.
That memorable day of September 8, 2011, when the U.S. president tried to legalize “stealing from capitalists,” marked the 835th day that the Democrat-controlled Senate had failed to pass a U.S. budget. Even a mom-and-pop grocery store has to have a budget to keep its business running. Stealing can hardly be budgeted, however.
The economic collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically proved that stealing does not pay, even if it is committed by the government of a superpower. The Democratic Party’s reliance on redistributing America’s wealth instead of encouraging the production of wealth generated economic collapse as well. The GDP fell from 4.5% to 1.3%.
In my experience, the redistribution of wealth has always been presented as needed to help the poor, but it has usually been used by politicians to buy the votes they need to transform their electoral district or even their country into monuments to themselves.
Lenin pretended that Russia was poor because its wealth was monopolized by its privileged class, and he was able to gather millions behind his flag by promising to redistribute the country’s wealth. Stealing became, indeed, a national policy on the day the Soviet Union was born. After the 1917 revolution, Lenin confiscated the imperial family’s wealth, seized the land owned by the rich Russians, and nationalized Russian industry, banking, and agriculture. By forcing the peasants into collective farms, the Kremlin stole their land, their animals, and their agricultural tools. Within a few years, the entire Soviet economy was running on stolen property managed by bureaucrats who had no clue about how to make their new country work. Some 10 million people died of starvation.
In the mid-1930s, the Communist Party itself became a target for theft. Following a brief period of collective leadership exercised by the Politburo, Stalin stole all the top-level positions in the country and pinned them onto his own chest like war decorations, thereby establishing a dismal new feudalism in the middle of the 20th century. That was exactly what later occurred in Eastern Europe after the Communists took over. When I left Romania, the list of the positions and titles accumulated by Ceausescu and his wife could have easily filled a small booklet.
Once settled in the saddle, Stalin began using the wealth stolen from the people to glorify himself and his political father. The city of Tsaritsyn was grandiosely rebuilt as Stalingrad, just as St. Petersburg was aggrandized as Leningrad to glorify Lenin. The embalmed body of Russia’s newest saint, Lenin, was put on display as a holy relic for adoration by the people in an imperial mausoleum.
In the mid 1930s, the statues and the portraits of Stalin began growing like mushrooms all over Russia, which became a monument to him personally. That was exactly what later occurred in Eastern Europe after the Communists took over. As one might expect in the Balkans, Ceausescu’s cult took on a gloriously Byzantine coloration. Almost every Romanian town acquired its Ceausescu boulevard, Ceausescu plaza, Ceausescu square, and before long the country’s industrial and agricultural organizations acquired similar names. “A man like me is born only once every five hundred years,” my former boss proclaimed over and over.
People everywhere love free lunches, and American politicians also began using the redistribution of wealth to promote themselves. Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society,” built with America’s tax money, had the secret purpose of stitching together a pro-Democratic voting coalition needed to keep him in power. It accomplished its goal, but it shifted the U.S. budget into the red.
Lyndon Johnson opened a new American era, in which stealing tax money to build monuments to yourself has become a legal policy.
Over his long career in the U.S. Congress, the late Democratic Senator Robert Byrd was able to steal $3.3 billion, with a “b,” of tax money in order to build his West Virginia into a monument to himself. Several transportation projects named after him gained national notoriety. The Robert C. Byrd Highway, also known as the Appalachian Development Highway System, was dubbed “West Virginia’s road to nowhere” in 2009, after it received a $9.5 million earmark in the $410 billion Omnibus Appropriation Act and $21 million more from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. More than 50 buildings erected with tax money stolen by Senator Byrd are now named for him. Here are a few: Robert C. Byrd Community Center, Pine Grove, WV; Robert C. Byrd Federal Correction Institution, Hazelton, WV; Robert C. Byrd Visitor Center, Harpers Ferry National Historical Park, WV; Robert C. Byrd United States R Courthouse and Federal Building, Charleston, WV; Robert C. Byrd Academic and Technology Center, Marshall University in Huntington, WV; Robert C. Byrd Auditorium, National Conservation Center, WV; Robert C. Byrd Green Bank Telescope, Green Bank, WV; Robert C. Byrd Library, Wheeling, WV.