Unbacked paper money is political money and as such it is a disruptive element in a system of free markets
by Thorsten Polleit
On 15 November 1923 decisive steps were taken to end
the nightmare of hyperinflation in the Weimar Republic: The Reichsbank, the
German central bank, stopped monetizing government debt, and a new means of
exchange, the Rentenmark, was issued next to the Papermark (in German:
Papiermark). These measures succeeded in halting hyperinflation, but the
purchasing power of the Papermark was completely ruined. To understand how and
why this could happen, one has to take a look at the time shortly before the
outbreak of World War I.
Since 1871, the mark had been the official money in
the Deutsches Reich. With the outbreak of World War I, the gold redeemability
of the Reichsmark was suspended on 4 August 1914. The gold-backed Reichsmark
(or “Goldmark,” as it was referred to from 1914) became the unbacked Papermark.
Initially, the Reich financed its war outlays in large part through issuing
debt. Total public debt rose from 5.2bn Papermark in 1914 to 105.3bn in 1918.[1] In 1914,
the quantity of Papermark was 5.9 billion, in 1918 it stood at 32.9 billion.
From August 1914 to November 1918, wholesale prices in the Reich had risen 115
percent, and the purchasing power of the Papermark had fallen by more than
half. In the same period, the exchange rate of the Papermark depreciated 84
percent against the US dollar.
The new Weimar Republic faced tremendous economic and
political challenges. In 1920, industrial production was 61 percent of the
level seen in 1913, and in 1923 it had fallen further to 54 percent. The land
losses following the Versailles Treaty had weakened the Reich’s productive
capacity substantially: the Reich lost around 13 percent of its former land
mass, and around 10 percent of the German population was now living outside its
borders. In addition, Germany had to make reparation payments. Most important,
however, the new and fledgling democratic governments wanted to cater as best
as possible to the wishes of their voters. As tax revenues were insufficient to
finance these outlays, the Reichsbank started running the printing press.
From April 1920 to March 1921, the ratio of tax
revenues to spending amounted to just 37 percent. Thereafter, the situation
improved somewhat and in June 1922, taxes relative to total spending even
reached 75 percent. Then things turned ugly. Toward the end of 1922, Germany
was accused of having failed to deliver its reparation payments on time. To
back their claim, French and Belgian troops invaded and occupied the
Ruhrgebiet, the Reich’s industrial heartland, at the beginning of January 1923.
The German government under chancellor Wilhelm Kuno called upon Ruhrgebiet
workers to resist any orders from the invaders, promising the Reich would keep
paying their wages. The Reichsbank began printing up new money by monetizing
debt to keep the government liquid for making up tax-shortfalls and paying
wages, social transfers, and subsidies.