Social Security: The New Deal’s Fiscal Ponzi
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Charles Ponzi 1920 |
by David Stockman
The Social Security Act of 1935 had virtually nothing to do with ending the
depression, and if anything it had a contractionary impact. Payroll taxes began
in 1937 while regular benefit payments did not commence until 1940.
Yet its fiscal legacy threatens disaster in the present era because its
core principle of “social insurance” inexorably gives rise to a fiscal doomsday
machine. When in the context of modern political democracy the state offers
universal transfer payments to its citizens without proof of need, it offers
thereby to bankrupt itself—eventually.
By contrast, a minor portion of the 1935 legislation embodied the opposite
principle—namely, the means-tested safety net offered through categorical aid
for the low-income elderly, blind, disabled and dependent families. These
programs were inherently self-contained because beneficiaries of means-tested
transfers simply do not have the wherewithal—that is, PACs and organized
lobbying machinery—to “capture” policy-making and thereby imperil the public
purse.
To the extent that means-tested social welfare is strictly cash-based, as
was cogently advocated by Milton Friedman in his negative income tax plan, it
is even more fiscally stable. Such purely cash based transfers do not enlist
and mobilize the lobbying power of providers and vendors of in-kind assistance,
such as housing and medical services.
Social insurance, on the other hand, suffers the twin disability of being
regressive as a distributional matter and explosively expansionary as a fiscal
matter. The source of both ills is the principle of “income replacement”
provided through mandatory socialization of huge population pools.